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ABSTRACT
This study is a collective biography of nine prominent 
secessionists; Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, William Lowndes Yancey, 
John A. Quitman, Robert Barnwell Rhett, Laurence M. Keitt, Louis 
T. Wigfall, James D.B. DeBow, Edmund Ruffin, and William Porcher 
Miles. It explores both the variety of personalities drawn to 
the secession movement and what motivated them to advocate the 
creation of a Southern Confederacy. By examining individuals, 
each chapter dramatizes a particular aspect of southern 
radicalism. Although the chronological focus is on the secession 
crisis and the decade preceding the Civil War, the scope of this 
study includes the entire nineteenth century.
Previous studies of Civil War causation have either ignored 
the fire-eaters or dismissed them variously as demagogues, 
reactionaries, blunderers, or as members of a displaced class in 
southern society; many have treated them simply as villains or as 
heroes of a lost cause. My subjects show, however, that fire- 
eaters spent decades developing a coherent political philosophy 
and shared a tradition of concern for southern liberty that had 
existed as long as the republic. Fire-eaters participated 
actively in all levels of politics and often received tremendous 
and sustained popular support. Because fire-eating was not 
strictly an intellectual movement, my dissertation also 
demonstrates how political developments outside their control 
hindered or helped the fire-eaters in their campaign for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
secession.
Although my study stresses the unity of ideas, themes, and 
methods which characterized the fire-eaters, I have also been 
careful to avoid treating them as a monolith. The fire-eaters 
were an issue-oriented group; besides sharing a devotion to 
southern independence, they were men with markedly different 
political agendas and outlooks. This diversity enabled them to 
appeal to a wide spectrum of southern opinion and thereby rally 
support for secession through a variety of means.
VI
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INTRODUCTION
Patrick Henry thought he "smelt a rat" at the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787. Since then there have always been Americans 
who, like Henry, worried that the government of the United States 
had too much power, constantly acquired more, and in the process 
menaced the liberty of its citizens. Whether they called 
themselves anti-federalists, Tertium Quids, or simply states- 
rights men, in each generation before secession some feared that 
naive or even sinister forces, through one usurpation of power 
after another, encouraged the growth of federal power. As the 
nineteenth century progressed, a small but vocal group of 
southerners emerged who identified northerners as the source of 
this attack on liberty. By 1861, thousands of southerners agreed 
with fire-eater Robert Barnwell Rhett that northerners "like 
Frankenstein... have raised a monster which they cannot quell. 
Ultimately, most southerners listened to these warnings and 
turned to secession.
Although secessionists helped plunge the United States into 
Civil War, in all the literature concerning that conflict there 
has been surprisingly little written about the leaders of 
secession. Studies exist concerning state politics in the South
Jesse Carpenter, The South as a Conscious Minority 1789- 
1861 (New York: The New York University Press, 1930) ; William J . 
Cooper, Jr., Liberty and Slavery: Southern Politics to 1860 (New 
York: Alfred Knopf, 1983); Charleston Mercury, March 4, 1861.
vix
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and secession, but in some of these individual human beings 
vanish almost entirely, victims of historians' painstaking 
analyses of group behavior. Examinations of the disintegration 
and rise of political parties help put aspects of the secession 
movement in a national perspective, but, necessarily, they fail 
to demonstrate the impact of those southerners who insisted that 
no political party could preserve southern rights or liberty.^ 
Other studies amply illustrate the determination of northern 
political leaders to preserve the Union and have carefully 
delineated the positions and values of radical political groups 
in the North.^ But no studies exist that shed light on 
secessionists, on their values and ideologies, or on why so many 
southerners followed them out of the Union. Most historians, if 
they discuss the secessionists at all, tend to oversimplify and 
dismiss the "fire-eaters" as angry, disgruntled trouble-makers
2See, for example, William L. Barney, The Secessionist 
Impulse; Alabama and Mississippi in 1860 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1Ô74 ) .
^Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption of the American Democracy 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948); Eric Foner, Free SoTl, 
Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before 
the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977 ) .
 ̂ David M. Potter, Lincoln and his Party During the 
Secession Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942 ) ; Hans 
Trefousse, The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard for Racial 
Justice (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968 ) ; 
Ronald Walters, The Antislavery Appeal: American Abolitionism 
after 1830 ( Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 37976 ) ; 
Louis Filler, The Crusade Against Slavery 1830-1860 (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 196Ù); Peter F. walker. Moral Choices: 
Memory, Desire, and Imagination in Nineteenth-Century American 
Abolitionism (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press,
I T tTT.-------
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out to deceive or manipulate their section of the country and 
subvert the integrity of the Union. Some older studies, on the 
other hand, have treated them as heroes of a lost cause.^
Even the term "fire-eater" is shrouded in mystery. It was 
used as early as 1851, but done so indiscriminately by both 
northerners and southerners to condemn anyone believed too far 
out of the political mainstream. Many historians have used the 
terras "southern radicals" and fire-eaters interchangeably.
Almost fifty years ago, Ulrich B. Phillips struggled to provide 
clarity. "Fire-eaters," he wrote, wrre those who engaged in a 
"persistent advocacy of Southern independence." I consider this 
definition accurate and useful in drawing a distinction between 
fire-eaters and southern radicals. Southern radicals vigorously 
promoted southern interests, but did not necessarily advocate 
secession. All fire-eaters, therefore, were radicals, but not 
all southern radicals were fire-eaters. And, as both Phillips 
and the epithet itself implied, fire-eating carried with it 
connotations of violence and bitterness, if not also of 
showmanship.^
William L. Barney, The Road to Secession; A New Perspective 
on the Old South (New York; Praeger Publishers, 1972); David S. 
Heidler, "Fire-Eaters: The Radical Secessionists in Antebellum 
Politics," Ph.D. Dissertation, Auburn University, 1985; John 
Witherspoon DuBose, The Life and Times of William Lowndes Yancey 
(2 volumes; New Yorkl Peter Smith, 1942); Avery 0. Craven, Edmund 
Ruffin, Southerner: A Study in Secession (reprint; Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1982; originally. New York D. 
Appleton and Company, 1932).
^Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, The Course of the South to 
Secession (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939), 128.
IX
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A congressman from South Carolina once proclaimed, "I have 
been a disunionist from the time I could think." Few others, 
however, made it as easy for historians to classify them as fire- 
eaters. Historically the term was always a pejorative one; no 
fire-eater embraced it. Typically the fire-eaters tried to 
portray themselves as conservative, not radical, politicians who 
struggled to save fundamental American values. Inadvertently, a 
fire-eater from Alabama once applied the term to himself. During 
a speech in which he attacked opponents for claiming that "fire- 
eaters" denounced the Democratic party platform of 1856, this 
speaker clumsily bellowed, "When and where, I ask, did I ever
Odenounce it?" Another fire-eater also applied the term to 
himself occasionally, but only in an abortive attempt to diminish
Qthe powerful negative impact of this epithet.
Historians have attempted periodically to compile rosters of 
fire-eaters, but a lack of precise definition left no two lists 
completely alike. U.B. Phillips named over a dozen "fire- 
eaters," while David Potter and William Barney mentioned fewer.
A scholar of antebellum rhetoric, H. Hardy Perritt settled on 
fourteen and included several that the three historians did not. 
Most recently, in The Encyclopedia of Southern History, Alvy King 
mentioned seven in his dubious entry which defined fire-eaters as
^Quoted from ibid., 142.
ÛNashville Weekly Union, October 26, 1860, in William L, 
Yancey Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, 
Montgomery, Alabama.
9See below, page 331, on James DeBow.
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those who most actively defended slavery and turned to secession 
only in reaction to anti-slavery agitation. Only three fire- 
eaters appear on all five of these lists: Robert Barnwell Rhett 
of South Carolina, Edmund Ruffin of Virginia, and William Lowndes 
Yancey of Alabama.
The reaction of southerners to Abraham Lincoln contributed
to this divergence of opinion among historians. Many politically
active southerners waited to join the secession bandwagon until
late in 1860, when Lincoln's election seemed likely, and most
advocated secession only after the election was over. After
secession occurred, many veteran fire-eaters, like Edmund Ruffin,
grumbled that "eleventh hour laborers" and recent
"submissionists" displaced some of the earliest and most staunch
supporters of disunion in the service of the Confederacy.
Recollecting the battle of Fort Sumter a quarter century later,
another fire-eater drew sharp distinctions between "political
dudes, who sought prominence and did nothing in peace or war,"
11and bona fide secessionists.
William L. Barney, The Road to Secession; Phillips, Course 
of the South; David Potterl completed and edited by Don 
Fehrenbacher, The Impending Crisis 1848-1861 (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1976); H. Hardy Perritt, "The Fire-Eaters," in Waldo W. 
Braden, ed., Oratory in the Old South, 1828-1860 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1970), chapter 8; Alvy L. King, 
"Fire-Eaters," in David C. Roller and Robert W. Twyman, eds.. 
Encyclopedia of Southern History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1979), 434-35.
11William Kauffman Scarborough, ed.. The Diary of Edmund 
Ruffin (2 volumes; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1Ô72 - ), II, 229; Robert Barnwell Rhett, Jr., to E.C. Wharton, 
August 2, 1886, Edward Clifton Wharton and Family Papers, 
Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collections, LSU
xi
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The ambiguity surrounding fire-eaters is not limited to 
problems of definition. Even the few previous studies of them 
reveal clearly that these were men with vastly different 
personalities and backgrounds, and, beyond their devotion to 
southern independence, that they had markedly different political 
agendas and outlooks. They joined the secession movement at 
various times and for various reasons, and the most prominent 
ones developed distinctive messages and political styles in their 
efforts to gain support. The extent of their cohesion as a group 
has not yet received careful study, and the reasons for their 
ultimate success currently remain speculative.
My study provides a first step toward resolving these 
questions. I have chosen nine men who illustrate simultaneously 
the unity and diversity of people and ideas encompassed within 
the secession movement. These men were well represented in the 
historical record, forcefully and eloquently advocated secession 
years before Lincoln's election, and had an unwavering commitment 
to southern independence.
Libraries, Louisiana State University.
xii
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Prologue
And this is the fourth of July —  a day in which we have 
talked so much in the past of liberty & independence, George 
Washington Etc, with all Yankee land [now] pressing upon our 
vitals & exhausting that substance which we so much 
begrudged old George 3 & Lord North. Independence indeed!
In what has it at last culminated? Have ancient or modern 
times furnished a despotism more absolute & irresponsible 
than the one which left its head at the capital of the old 
republic & tramples underfoot with impunity every vestige of 
liberty. And yet the Creatures who denounce monarchy & 
claim the cognomen of Republicans par excellance, fling up 
their hats & shout hozzanah's to the despot who has his feet 
upon their neck. I am in despair! The course of 
republicanism seems to be the same in all ages & what hope 
have even we who are now staking our lives & fortunes in 
protection of its stronghold of a better fate as history 
advances? The evil day may be averted but how long. If 
this law is to be perpetual better at once acknowledge our 
error, repeal the declaration of Independence & return to 
the household of the Tudors, the Stuarts & the Guelphes! At 
all events any of these or even the house of Hapsburg rather 
than the vulgar & besotted & drunken rule of the Lincolns, 
Greelys & Sewards! Whilst there is a Southern sword to be 
drawn this last fate can never be ours!
—  James DeBow to Charles Gayarré, July 4, 1861
James D.B. DeBow to Charles Gayarré, July 4, 1861, Charles 
Gayarré Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley 
Collections, LSU Libraries, Louisiana State University.
xiii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter I
"TO MAKE HIS MIND THE MIND OF OTHER MEN"
When South Carolina seceded in 1860, many of its political 
leaders had spent over thirty years preparing its people to deal 
with the sectional crisis. They indoctrinated their people with 
arguments for state sovereignty; they issued warnings about 
hostile sectional majorities; they argued for the necessity of 
perpetuating southern institutions. These Carolinians acted as 
educators whose task was to teach the southern people the 
principles and necessity of secession.
Nathaniel Beverley Tucker was a teacher. As a professor of 
law at the College of William and Mary, as an essayist and as 
author of a textbook on government. Tucker devoted his academic 
career to teaching his students a particular understanding of the 
nature of the Union. But Tucker did not confine his teaching to 
the classroom. He became a close friend and political confidant 
of the important South Carolina politician, James Henry Hammond. 
He reached for a mass audience by writing a novel intended to 
popularize secession. He tried to lecture presidents, both in 
person and through newspaper articles. In all these efforts 
Tucker strove to correct what he saw as flaws in the fabric of 
the Union, or to prepare the southern mind for secession.
Tucker had a two-fold purpose when he lectured to his 
college students about law and government. His first, and the 
one he professed to be more important, was to "subdue the mind of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the student to a sense of the difficulty of the task before 
him....to impress the student with a sense of the vastness and 
importance of the subject." Because so many young men entered 
college with the notion that they already had a vast storehouse 
of knowledge. Tucker believed he must "tame down the mind of the
student to a teachable temper." He claimed he had no intention
to "infect" his students with his own opinions and concerns. As
he began his teaching career, he announced, "I shall be more
gratified to find you prepared to 'give a reason for the faith 
that is in you,' whatever that faith may be, than to hear you 
rehearse, by rote, any political catechism that I could devise."^ 
In reality Tucker's second goal was far more important to 
him. Because his political philosophy placed him outside the 
political mainstream. Tucker worried that his ideas would never 
reach the southern people. "My only chance to impart my ideas to 
the world," he once wrote to a friend, "is by impressing them 
into the minds of my pupils." Although he denied offering a 
political catechism. Tucker very much wanted to produce a 
generation of young, politically-inclined men to propagate his 
peculiar political gospel throughout the South. While he did 
desire to enlighten his students and open their minds to all
Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, A Series of Lectures on the 
Science of Government, Intended to Prepare the Student for the 
Study of the Constitution of the United States (Philadelphia: 
Carey and Hart, 1845 ), T", 460; Nathaniel Beverley Tucker to 
James H. Hammond, April 24, 1847, James H. Hammond Papers, 
Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress; Nathaniel Beverley 
Tucker, "A Lecture on the Study of Law," Southern Literary 
Messenger, I (December, 1834), 148.
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kinds of ideas, he confessed to Hammond, "My ulterior motive is
to make him a States-Right man." Tucker's students surely had an
awareness of their teacher's plans, for occasionally Tucker
revealed these desires in the classroom. In his first lecture at
William and Mary, Tucker explained his belief that "correct
constitutional opinions and sound maxims should be implanted" in
his students' minds. Many years later he admitted to his
students "that it is at your expense" he tried to secure Southern
interests, and that through his lectures he "sought to enlist"
2his pupils in a crusade for Southern rights. As sectional 
tensions increased. Tucker asked Hammond for help in educating 
the South as to "the evils of Union" and "the advantages which a 
Southern Confederacy must enjoy." Although frequently 
exasperated when his students had trouble grasping his ideas. 
Tucker boasted to Hammond, "My plan has worked we11."^
Many of the lessons Tucker passed along were ones that he 
had learned in his youth. His father, St. George Tucker, and his 
half-brother, John Randolph of Roanoke, had the greatest 
influences on him. Beverley venerated his father's 
accomplishments as a Revolutionary War hero, as a jurist, and as 
a scholar. He found a model of political integrity and boldness 
in Randolph, as well as an emotional bond that filled one of his
2Tucker to Hammond, March 13, April 24, 1847, Hammond 
Papers, Library of Congress; Tucker, "A Lecture on the Study of 
Law," Southern Literary Messenger, I (December, 1834), 150; 
Tucker, Lectures, 450.
^Tucker to Hammond, April 18, 1850, April 24, 1847, Hammond 
Papers, Library of Congress.
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most persistent longings. Yet Tucker held ambivalent attitudes 
towards both men. At times, he felt he could never surpass or 
even equal his father's deeds, yet he felt compelled to try. He 
envied his brother's oratorical skills and position in the 
political spotlight. Despite these mixed feelings. Tucker 
credited both of these men with teaching him his most important 
values, as well as his concepts of law, government, and the 
nature of the Union.
The Tucker family had resided in the British colony of 
Bermuda for over one hundred years when St. George sailed to the 
North American continent in 1771. He went to college at William 
and Mary, and when the Revolutionary War began ran supplies from 
the West Indies to Charleston. He fought with distinction later 
in the war, and rose to the rank of major. He became acquainted 
with George Washington and the Marquis de Lafayette, and joined 
them at Yorktown in October to witness the surrender of Lord 
Cornwallis.^ St. George married Frances Bland Randolph in 1778. 
Widowed in 1775, Frances had been left with her three boys, 
Richard, Theodorick, and two-year-old John. She had inherited 
her husband's three plantations; Matoax, in Chesterfield County, 
and Bizarre and Roanoke to the west. Frances gave birth to 
Tucker children in 1780 and 1782, and on September 6, 1784, 
Nathaniel Beverley was born. He was named for his father's
Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of St. George 
Tucker is based on Robert J. Brugger, Beverley Tucker: Heart over 
Head in the Old South (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1978), 1-25.---------
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5
brother and for Colonel Beverley Randolph, who fought along side 
his father during the Revolution. In 1786, St. George attended 
the Annapolis Convention, which met to discuss problems of 
interstate trade arising from the Articles of Confederation. At 
the time of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention in 1787, 
St. George was in Richmond attending to his law practice. There 
he opposed the new document on the grounds that the Articles 
better guaranteed state autonomy and were therefore the lesser of 
two evils. In 1789 he took a seat in the state judiciary on the 
general-court circuit and the next year replaced his former 
mentor, George Wythe, in the Chair of Law and Police at william 
and Mary.
During the 1790's St. George lectured to his students about 
two of the most controversial issues of the day. In 1796 he 
published his lecture proposing emancipation of slaves in 
Virginia; he made the same proposal to the General Assembly later 
that year. Slavery, he believed, was incompatible with the 
Revolutionary ideal that all men are created equal. His plan 
called for a gradual end to slavery; it allowed as long as one 
hundred years to fully implement emancipation. Toward the end of 
the decade, St. George warned his students that the Alien and 
Sedition acts, passed under John Adams's administration, 
threatened personal liberties and foreshadowed consolidation of 
power in the federal government.
The study and practice of law soon removed St. George from 
his academic post. in 1802, he began editing Sir William
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, for half a 
century the most influential work devoted to the study of common 
law. Besides editing the text, St. George added his own notes in 
an attempt to make the Commentaries more relevant for the United 
States. His became the standard American edition, and the one 
his son would use in his law classes a generation later. St. 
George's career of legal studies culminated when he was elected 
to the highest court in Virginia, the Court of Appeals, in 1804.
St. George's impressive career and his personality left 
indelible impressions on young Beverley. As his most recent 
biographer noted, Beverley Tucker's household was marked by a 
heritage of suspicion of government, idealizing public virtue, 
and debating the merits of slavery.^ Beverley spent most of his 
life grappling with the issues he encountered in his earliest 
days. Eager for personal success and recognition, he often 
undermined the value of his own accomplishments by comparing them 
to his father's. His attempt to impress St. George motivated 
many of his deeds. "I have hardly a wish but to shew myself 
worthy of your affection," he once wrote to his father. But no 
matter how hard Tucker tried, he found his father reacting, _t 
best, with indifference. His father's apparent aloofness caused 
Beverley no end of depression. He complained to John Randolph 
that he could not foresee any improvement in his relationship 
with his father, and that his heart "sickens when I endeavor to 
look forward to a period when it will be ameliorated, and look in
^Ibid., 24,
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vain." Nevertheless, Beverley always viewed his father as 
"noble," and described his love for him as "the master passion of 
my heart.
Beverley Tucker turned to his half-brother, John Randolph, 
for the emotional support he lacked from his parents. Besides 
feeling alienated from his father. Tucker lamented the untimely 
death of his mother. Randolph supplied him with stories and 
memories about her, as well as an almost maternal source of 
affection. The half-brothers grew quite close, and their 
meetings at Randolph's Bizarre plantation never seemed long 
enough for Beverley. Tucker not only fell under the spell of 
Randolph's fraternal affection, but also became enamored with 
his sibling's political success and ideology. Tucker rapidly 
became a political disciple, and pledged to his brother, "I would 
go with you to the end of the world." Late in his life. Tucker 
claimed the "eloquent lips" of his brother taught him more about 
politics than "all the men with whom I have ever conversed, and 
all the books I ever read." Emotionally and ideologically it was 
Randolph, not St. George, who exerted the greater influence on
7Tucker.
Beverley Tucker to St. George Tucker, September 15, 1805; 
Beverley Tucker to John Randolph, March 20, 26, 1808, Tucker- 
Coleman Collection, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William 
and Mary; Beverley Tucker to Daniel Call, March 14, 1835, Tucker 
Family Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
"̂ For Randolph as sort of a surrogate mother to Tucker, see 
Tucker to Randolph, February 19, 1806, Tucker-Coleman Collection, 
William and Mary. On Tucker's devotion to his brother, see 
Tucker to Randolph, April 21, 1807, ibid., Tucker, Lectures, 28.
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The lessons Tucker learned from Randolph came in turn from 
the special role Randolph played in national politics. Randolph 
displayed his dazzling speaking abilities in Congress where he
served as a representative from Virginia, Originally a
Jeffersonian Republican and loyal floor leader for the third 
president, by 1805 Randolph believed he saw signs that Jefferson 
had lost sight of the principles which had brought him into 
office. Under Randolph's leadership, a handful of Congressmen 
formed what they called the Tertium Quids. The Quids maintained 
allegiance to no political party, but tried instead to preserve 
what they considered old Jeffersonian principles of small 
government, local power, and strict construction of the 
Constitution. Eager to learn the lessons offered by Randolph, 
Tucker immediately began to interpret national politics through 
the Quid perspective and urged his brother to continue in his 
lonely political course. Half way through Jefferson's second 
administration. Tucker wrote to Randolph, "The time I trust is at
hand when it will be in the power of your 'Spartan Band' to
display their firmness and decision, the happiest contrast to the
Oimbecility & distraction of their opponents."
When Tucker compared the ideas he learned from Randolph to 
political developments in the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century, he concluded the United States had "wandered far from
Robert Brugger claims that St.George, not Randolph, exerted 
greater influence on Tucker (Brugger, Tucker, 26-28).
0
Tucker to Randolph, January 31, 1807, Tucker-Coleman 
Collection, William and Mary; Brugger, Tucker, 26-28.
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principles formerly professed." He considered the "stark-naked 
ultra-federalism of John Q[uincy] Adams" the logical result of a 
generation of executive usurpation and the relentless assault of 
"power and villainy against liberty and t r u t h . L i k e  his 
brother. Tucker reserved some of his harshest remarks for Thomas 
Jefferson. Tucker condemned the President for augmenting his 
power at the expense of state and local government. He shared 
his brother's indignation with the possibility that Jefferson 
might plunge the young nation into another war with Great 
Britain. He branded many of the laws passed under Jefferson's 
administrations unconstitutional, even if they had not been so 
ruled by the Supreme Court. By the end of 1807, Tucker believed 
Jefferson had acquired so much power that he began to refer to 
him as "his majesty." His disgust with "the absurd and ruinous 
policy of this self-willed administration" and his hatred toward 
the president grew so intense that he now wished Jefferson would 
precipitate a war, "if it be only that it may burst upon his
head, and expose him to a nation smarting under the lash which
10his own folly has prepared."
As Tucker matured he continued to link his political views 
to those of his brother. While reviewing various excesses of the 
John Quincy Adams administration almost two decades after the 
Jefferson presidency, he told Randolph, "I have never seen any
9Tucker to Randolph, February 16, 1808, February 13, 1827, 
Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary.
^^Tucker to Randolph, January 19, 1808, July 19, December 
23, 30, 1807, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary.
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reason to doubt the soundness of our principles, or the wisdom of 
our policy." He had long considered himself and his brother 
among the "few honest and independent individuals" in the 
country, and promised that history would vindicate their bold 
stance, even if their own society did not seem to appreciate 
them.^^ Whenever he sensed an assault on his brother's integrity 
or political ideology. Tucker lashed out with a sense of personal 
outrage. He tagged a group of Randolph's opponents in western 
Virginia a bunch of "sovereign Yahoos" who would be surprised 
that Randolph had neither horns nor tail. Once when Randolph 
became embroiled in a bitter controversy in Congress, his 
faithful brother assured him no "union of Jacobins & federalists" 
could diminish his qualities of "Integrity fidelity independence 
courage and magnimity [sic]." The years after Randolph's death 
only made Tucker more relentless in defense of his brother. 
Horrified at a 1851 biography of Randolph, Tucker treated its 
author to a "savage scalping" in a book review. Even the editor
*1 Oof Tucker's piece considered it a "terrible & scathing" attack.
The memories Tucker had about his brother helped shape and 
guide his own political thought. Tucker considered himself the 
political heir of his brother, as well as a virtual copy of
11Tucker to Randolph, November 4, 1807, March 22, 1826,
Ibid.
12Tucker to Randolph, April 12, 1809, February 26, 1827, 
Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary; William Gilmore 
Simms to Tucker, June 26, July 14, 1851, in Mary C. Simms 
Oliphant, Alfred Taylor Odell, and T.C. Duncan Eaves, eds.. The 
Letters of William Gilmore Simms. 5 volumes. (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1955), III, 132, 138.
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Randolph's independence and integrity. He considered his brother 
a prophet for anticipating the shattering of constitutional 
restraints during the War of 1812. He conveniently overlooked 
any differences of opinion the two had. He once told his friend 
Hammond the only times he and Randolph did not agree about men or 
issues was when "we had not...the same data. But in other 
matters, having learned from him to think freely, I have no doubt
that, had I been near him, it would have been said that all my
1 1opinions were taken from him."
The dismal beginning of Tucker's career only increased his 
reliance on Randolph. After attending William and Mary in 1801, 
he chose to emulate his father by pursuing a legal career. But 
when father and son clashed over where Beverley should locate his 
practice, his feelings of filial piety led him to yield, "as they 
always have done," to his father's choice, Fredericksburg.
Perhaps no location would have helped Tucker. His practice in 
Virginia never prospered; in fact, it was a financial nightmare. 
Tucker inadvertently compounded his monetary difficulties in 1807 
when his marriage to Mary "Polly" Coalter so displeased his 
father that St. George threatened to cut off Beverley financially 
from his family. Tucker feared his father "means to be as good 
as his word in leaving me to shift for myself, or rather," he 
hinted to Randolph, "in leaving it to you." Randolph obligingly
13Tucker, "South Carolina: Her Present Attitude and Future 
Action," Southern Quarterly Review IV (October, 1851), 285; 
Tucker to Hammond, April 24, 1847, Hammond Papers, Library of 
Congress.
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gave Tucker one hundred acres of land and sixteen slaves to 
support himself and his new b r i d e . D e s p i t e  the kindness and 
charity of his brother, Tucker's fortunes continued to plummet. 
Lack of income and mounting debts sent him into fits of 
depression. He complained to his sympathetic brother, "can you 
wonder that in this state of things I am ever gloomy and 
despondent." He feared he would never attain a fraction of the 
eminence his father achieved. "Of politics," he moaned to 
Randolph, "I can not bring myself to think." The future looked 
no better. He once hoped moving his practice to western Virginia 
might change his luck. Almost anything would be better than the 
"distress and horror" of his early years, which made him feel as 
though he "was growing old instead of maturing.
The War of 1812 briefly promised a much desired change. On 
February 20, 1812, Tucker received his commission as lieutenant 
in a Virginia militia unit. But the war brought few 
opportunities for Tucker to earn distinction. He spent most of 
it on garrison duty, and his only chance for battle ended in the 
summer of 1813 when an anticipated British attack on Norfolk
Tucker to St. George Tucker, September 15, 1805, August 
21, 1807; Tucker to Randolph, January 14, 1808; Tucker to John 
Coalter, December 20, 1808, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William 
and Mary.
^^Tucker to Randolph, March 12, 26, April 6, 1808; Tucker to 
John Coalter, September 30, 1811, Tucker-Coleman Collection, 
William and Mary.
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never materialized.^^
During the last year of the war, he confided to his brother-
in-law, "I am no longer considered here as of the Bar —  at least
I am not consulted but for advice." At age twenty-nine. Tucker
looked back on his life and decided he had done little but follow
the advice of others, "and with little profit." Deciding to
strike out on his own, he at first considered a military career.
Then, the allure of the West acted upon him. Originally he
considered moving to Tennessee; he had heard that land around
Nashville was cheap and plentiful. In 1815 he made an
exploratory trip westward, traveling as far as Missouri
Territory. He purchased land near St. Louis, and returned to
Virginia to prepare Polly, his two young children, and some of
17his slaves for their westward journey.
Life in the West brought both tragedy and redemption to 
Tucker. Late in the summer of 1816, his son Jack —  named in 
honor of John Randolph —  and his daughter Frances both died of 
fever. After recovering from these crushing losses. Tucker 
turned first to farming, and then late in 1817 was admitted to 
the bar in Missouri. This time, success quickly followed. More 
polished and better educated than most of his competition. Tucker 
attracted a large clientele and opened a law office in St. Louis.
Tucker's commission of February 20, 1812 is located in the 
Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary. Also see Brugger, 
Tucker, 45.
17Tucker to Coalter, February 8, 1814; Brugger, Tucker, 45-
49.
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Before the end of the year, the territorial governor appointed 
him to the Northern Circuit Court of Missouri.^®
While in St. Louis, Tucker perceived a surprising level of 
sophistication among the settlers of the territory. "We have 
some Yankees it is true but more Virginians," he boasted to 
Randolph. He rejoiced that most people he met "do not hold the 
doctrine of presidential infallibility," and found a happy 
contrast to "the wanton freaks of democratic despotism" he had 
recently observed in Kentucky. Excited with the possibilities of 
this situation. Tucker set out to find a place for a planned 
community. He moved his family to a 6,000 acre site on Dardenne 
Creek in St. Charles. Coalter relatives from South Carolina and 
Kentucky soon joined them. Tucker's goal was to create a 
settlement based upon his nostalgic impressions of Virginia. 
Initially his experiment succeeded, and several other southern 
families moved to Dardenne. Tucker envisioned a community in 
which slaves worked the fields while their masters devoted 
themselves to leisurely hours of reading, composing essays, 
refined conversation and genteel visits. Before the end of its 
first year. Tucker bragged to his father that he had indeed 
created "a neighborhood hardly to be surpassed on the Continent. 
There is not one of our contemplated set who is not at least 
independent, none very rich, all intelligent, some highly
18Tucker to St. George Tucker and to John Coalter, both on 
September 24, 1816, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary; 
Brugger, Tucker, 45-49, 50-52.
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cultivated, and almost all sincerely and eminently pious.
When the people of Missouri prepared their territory for 
statehood, Tucker's new-found satisfaction came to an abrupt end. 
In Congress, Representative John Tallmadge of New York moved to 
gradually eliminate slavery from Missouri. Tucker was mortified. 
He took pen in hand and, under the pseudonym "Hampden," wrote a 
series of editorials for the St. Louis Missouri Gazette & Public 
Advertiser entitled, "To the People of Missouri Territory." He 
warned that the Tallmadge amendment threatened the gravest 
possible consequences for Missouri and the entire South.
Congress, he explained, must leave it to the people of each state 
and territory to create their own constitutions. If the people 
of Missouri yielded the right to make any part of their 
constitution. Tucker declared. Congress could claim the right to 
make the entire constitution for her. Tucker warned further that 
if the people lost this right they would "become the veriest 
political slaves, divested of the only right which gives value of 
citizenship —  the right of governing themselves." Tucker 
claimed that if Congress acquired the power to legislate within 
states and territories that, "after emancipating our slaves they 
may bring them to the hustings, and into the legislature, and 
into the judgment seat." If a hostile northern majority could 
implement these kinds of laws despite the objections of the
19Tucker to Randolph, September 21, 1817; Tucker to St. 
George, September 26, 1819, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William 
and Mary. For more on the Dardenne settlement, see Brugger, 
Tucker, 57-61, 70-71.
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people, Tucker cautioned, the integrity of the Union would be 
gone. "It is power alone which can enable one people to govern 
another without their consent, and power so exercised is lawless 
domination." Under these circumstances the Constitution would be 
"but waste paper," and the "bonds of Union," if drawn too 
tightly, "will burst asunder.
Tucker at last found a sense of self-esteem in the role he 
played during the Missouri crisis. He reported to Randolph that 
"having been called to act an important and perilous part in the 
vindication of good principles... I find that sort of a paternal 
feeling toward that infant State has grown up in my mind." 
Especially when compared to his feelings of insignificance in 
Virginia, Tucker considered Missouri "my own Liliput."
But the compromise reached in Congress in 1820 quickly 
soured Tucker's attitude toward Missouri, the West, and the 
Union. Congress defeated the Tallmadge amendment and allowed 
Missouri to retain slavery; however, it also prohibited future 
expansion of slavery above a boundary of 36°30' north latitude. 
During a subsequent sectional debate. Tucker looked back on the 
Missouri Compromise as a watershed. "Had it depended on me 
Missouri would not have come into the Union" under the terms of 
the compromise, he told Hammond. To another friend he explained 
that since 1820 he considered the Union a curse and "vowed then.
20Missouri Gazette & Public Advertiser, April 21, May 5, 
June 16, 1819.
21Tucker to Randolph, May 16, 1825, Tucker-Coleman 
Collection, William and Mary.
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and have repeated the vow, de die in diem, that I will never give 
rest to my eyes nor slumber to my eyelids until it is shattered 
into pieces.
Tucker's attitude toward the people of Missouri shifted 
quickly from respect to disgust. He now believed "Vanity and 
Cupidity are the master passions of the west." He was appalled 
at living under "the degrading domination of a set of miscreants 
whom every days experience teaches me more and more to despise 
and detest." Tucker told Randolph the "rabble" of the West could 
no doubt be bribed with federal money and promises of internal 
improvements, and that the people knew nothing of state rights or 
state sovereignty. He predicted the only way to save the West 
would be a protracted political conflict which would unite 
southerners and westerners "under one banner, until the cavalier 
spirit and devotion to principle which characterize the south may 
infect the west."^^
Tucker did not have long to wait until the next crisis. In 
1828 Congress passed a protective tariff with rates so high its 
opponents called it the "Tariff of Abominations." Southerners 
objected most strenuously; many considered all protective tariffs 
unconstitutional. Most southerners believed the measure was 
strictly sectional, designed to promote northern industrial
22Tucker to William Gilmore Simms, [no date], 1851, in 
William P. Trent, William Gilmore Simms (New York: Greenwood 
Press, Publishers, 1969; originally Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1893), 183.
23Tucker to Randolph, March 22, 1826, March 25, 1827, 
Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary.
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growth at the expense of higher prices on consumer goods in the 
South. John C. Calhoun, formerly a South Carolina congressman 
and currently Andrew Jackson's vice-president, secretly wrote the 
South Carolina Exposition and Protest in response to the tariff 
in December, 1828. In it, he set forth his theory of state 
interposition and nullification. Like Beverley Tucker and a host 
of others, Calhoun believed that the ultimate source of power —  
sovereignty —  belonged to the people of each individual state. 
According to Calhoun's theory, the federal government was merely 
the common agent of a collection of states, and the Constitution 
a compact delineating the limits of federal activity. He 
reasoned that each state, as a sovereign unit, had the right to 
decide for itself whether or not federal legislation was 
unconstitutional. He called this mechanism interposition; the 
people of a state could hold a convention and, because of their 
sovereignty, declare a federal law null and void within their 
state. Calhoun hoped this process would redress the 
grievances of states and keep them in the Union. However, if 
three-fourths of all states ratified a constitutional amendment 
embodying the law in question, the nullifying state had two 
options: submission to the national will or secession.
After four years of debate in Congress, a modified tariff 
became law in 1832. Dissatisfied with the adjustment, South
For an excellent discussion of the Nullification Crisis 
and Calhoun's theory, see William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil 
War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966).
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Carolina held a convention in November and overwhelmingly passed 
an ordinance of nullification which prohibited the collection of 
duties within the state beginning February 1, 1833. A flurry of 
activity followed. South Carolina radicals, like Robert Barnwell 
Rhett, called for secession. President Jackson asked Congress 
both to reconsider the tariff and to pass a "force bill" enabling 
him to use the army and navy, if necessary, to collect tariff 
revenue in South Carolina. Under the leadership of Governor 
James Hamilton, Jr., the South Carolina legislature passed laws 
authorizing the raising of a military force and appropriations 
for arms. Calhoun resigned the vice—presidency and returned to 
his state.
Beverley Tucker observed these developments from the 
relative quiet of the West. Already tempted to return to 
Virginia and rally the Old Dominion in support of South Carolina, 
Tucker received an urgent note from his brother. Quite ill, 
Randolph told his brother, "Come to me."^^
Tucker hesitated only a few weeks, but when he heard the 
force bill had passed, he concluded, "The die is cast —  The 
Rubicon is crossed." This was the occasion he had hoped for. 
Missouri would join the South in any action they might take, he 
believed. He foresaw an apocalyptic conflict. Before leaving 
Missouri he prophesied that, should the South acquiesce in this 
conflict, "there is nothing left for any of us but to lie down
25Randolph to Tucker, November 9, 1832, Tucker-Coleman 
Collection, William and Mary.
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and be trampled on, or go away to some country where Liberty 
still exists, or was never known. Any thing better than to be 
slaves where once we were free." He expressed concern that 
nullification, secession, and rebellion would become confused 
with one another, and that the confusion would aid "the Tariff 
party." And after his participation in the Missouri Crisis 
Tucker believed, "I shall be among those who govern events" in 
Virginia.
Before he left Missouri, Tucker began his self-imposed task 
of clarifying issues and teaching southerners about the right of 
secession. "The views of the nullifier on this subject are 
manifestly confused," he said. According to Tucker, 
nullification placed the people of a state in a quandary. The
president of the United States must enforce its laws, but state
governments must also "punish all who impede their execution."
The people, therefore, find themselves placed between two 
conflicting authorities, "commanding and prohibiting the same 
thing on pain of death." He asked rhetorically if a people could 
be accountable to both simultaneously. "Assuredly not," he said. 
How could the people of a state remedy such a situation? He
answered, "BY CEASING TO BE ONE OF THE UNITED STATES." If a
state attempted to remain in the Union after nullification, he 
claimed, its people must be considered "rebellious citizens," who 
federal authorities must act against "at all hazards, and to all
2 gTucker to General T.A. Smith, December 25, 1832, Crump 
Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society.




After a joyous reunion with Randolph in Virginia, Tucker 
renewed and expanded his campaign. As his brother's health 
continued to deteriorate. Tucker first looked for someone to 
replace Randolph in the struggle against the federal government. 
The first person he turned to was Senator Thomas Hart Benton of 
Missouri, a man Tucker admired during his residence in that 
state. He asked the senator to carry the "banner of State 
Rights" that Randolph had unfurled, and assured Benton that 
Randolph shared his own high estimation of him. He urged Benton 
to meet the issue of secession boldly and to avoid "the paradox 
of nullification." In editorials in the Richmond Enquirer he 
chastised Virginians for allowing South Carolina to suffer the 
burden of a federal confrontation unaided. He warned that unless 
a Virginian would take a leading role in the drama, "Virginia is 
not FIT TO BE LED, and there is nothing left, but to be slaves in 
condition, as sooner or later all slaves in spirit are sure to 
be." Tucker offered, "on behalf of the whole planting and slave 
holding country," to say to "our oppressors...'If this is the way 
the bargain is to be read, we must be off; and if YOU mean to 
continue the Union, the principles of that Proclamation [the 
Force Bill] must be DISTINCTLY AND FOREVER RENOUNCED.'"^®
27Tucker's speech in St. Louis of April 24, 1832, in the 
Richmond Enquirer, February 7, 1833.
2 8Tucker to Thomas H. Benton, February 6, 1833, Tucker- 
Coleman Collection, William and Mary; Tucker editorials were 
signed "A Friend of State Rights," and "A Friend of State Rights, 
because a Friend of the Union," in Richmond Enquirer, February
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Through Randolph's "eloquent lips" Tucker found an 
opportunity to address the people of Virginia. He wrote a series 
of resolutions which his brother read at a Charlotte Court House 
meeting early in February. Tucker and Randolph pledged their 
full support for South Carolina even "while we utterly reprobate 
the doctrine of nullification." They declared that Virginia was 
a "free, sovereign and independent State," and had never done 
anything to impair her sovereignty. The Union, they claimed, was 
merely a "a strict league of amity and alliance," and asserted 
that any state may secede "whensoever she shall find the benefits 
of Union exceeded by its evils." They castigated Jackson for 
turning his back on "his true friends and supporters" —  state 
rights men —  and succumbing to the influence of those who wanted 
power consolidated in the federal government. Governor James 
Hamilton, Jr., of South Carolina, who assumed Randolph wrote the 
Charlotte Resolutions, asked Tucker to thank his brother for "his 
bold manly & glorious assertion of our rights." The governor 
even forgave the condemnation of nullification. He told Tucker 
that he considered the resolutions "dignified polished & elegant 
in the extreme," and believed "they draw blood at every 
thrust.
Pleased with his initial effort. Tucker next strove to 
correct the views of two of the principles in the nullification
19, April 5, 1833. 
29Richmond Enqui rer, February 9, 1833 ; James Hamilton, Jr. 
to Tucker, February 23, 1833, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William 
and Mary.
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showdown. President Jackson and Governor Hamilton. In February 
Tucker traveled to the white House and obtained an interview with 
the president. He warned Jackson that unless he rescinded the 
Force Bill the president would "provoke a practical trial of the 
right to secede." In a letter to Jackson a few weeks later, 
Tucker adopted a more conciliatory tone. He suggested that if 
Jackson rejected the Force Bill, "a door is open to you for 
correcting...all the misapprehensions of the Proclamation." Once 
the southern states regained "that sense of political security 
which has been alarmed by the proclamation," he might avoid a 
collision between state and federal authorities. But Tucker 
restated that if Jackson forced a confrontation, the South would 
turn to secession as "the only practical arbitrament." Calling 
nullification "superfluous," Tucker suggested to Governor 
Hamilton that South Carolina should declare the tariff both null 
and unconstitutional, "and invite the other aggrieved states to 
meet you in convention" within two years. Tucker thought the 
last chance to both "save the Union and the States" would be to 
have this convention affirm the right of secession.
The Nullification crisis ended more rapidly than it began.
In March, Congress worked out a compromise tariff acceptable both 
to Jackson and most Carolinians. South Carolina held another 
convention and repealed her ordinance of nullification. Tucker's
Tucker to Andrew Jackson, March 1, 1833, Tucker-Coleman 
Collection, William and Mary; Tucker's account of his meeting 
with Jackson is dated February 21, 1833, Bryan Family Papers, 
Alderman Library, University of Virginia; James Hamilton, Jr., to 
Tucker, March 22, 1833.
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beloved brother died soon afterward. These developments left 
Tucker gloomy and despondent for many years. He thought Calhoun 
had acted boldly at first, but Tucker alleged that Calhoun 
quickly yielded to presidential ambitions and, in the process, 
sacrificed principle and integrity. Of the Quids, Tucker moaned, 
"Our little army is purged." He wondered what state rights men 
like himself could do next, and in his depression answered, 
"Nothing.... The trial is past; the sentence is pronounced; our 
earthly doom is fixed, and we can only pray 'God have mercy on 
our souls' ! !
The results of the Nullification Crisis, however, did not 
extinguish Tucker's fiery spirit. In the summer of 1834, the 
Board of Visitors at William and Mary offered Tucker the Chair of 
Law, the same position once held by his father. Now fifty years 
old. Tucker looked upon the position as a unique opportunity to 
pass along the knowledge he had acquired and the principles he 
valued to a new generation. He wanted to draw upon his 
interactions with Randolph and his experiences in the Missouri 
and the Nullification crises in order to prepare the southern 
mind to handle any future crisis with unity and clarity of 
purpose. By this time Tucker also hoped to prevent northern 
influences from reaching southern youth. He thought it essential 
for southerners to teach southern students and wished more
Tucker to the Editors of the Richmond Whig, February - 
April, 1838; Tucker to Richard C. Cralle, February 18, 1838, 
Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary. When South Carolina 
met in this second convention, it nullified the Force Bill in one 
last act of defiance.
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southerners would write textbooks for southern schools. Through 
his lectures and writings, therefore. Tucker hoped to "supply the 
materials for the reconstruction of the States Right party."
More important. Tucker wanted to show his students that if they 
could not preserve state rights within the Union, they could 
through secession and the creation of a Southern Confederacy.
As an intellectual, as a man of letters, he believed he had a 
mission "'To make his mind the mind of other men/ The enlightener 
of nations.
Tucker told his students that in every country the exclusive 
function of government is the preservation of liberty. He 
cautioned his students that defining liberty, "and how far it may 
be enjoyed by all, are questions of acknowledged difficulty." In 
common with most Enlightenment thinkers. Tucker believed man
was born in a natural state of freedom, one with no conditions or 
restraints. Thus isolated, however, individuals faced a variety 
of threats and therefore formed societies. Members of a society 
created an authority to enforce the rules of conduct all members 
had established. "Such authority is government, and such
3 gcommission is the constitution establishing it." People create 
government out of their need for arbitration, to provide a means 
of adjusting differences, and to restrain "the vicious
32Notice of Tucker's appointment in Southern Literary 
Messenger, I (December 1834), 145; William C. Preston to Tucker, 
September 22, 1835, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary; 
Tucker to Hammond, December 29, 1846, Hammond Papers, Library of 
Congress; Tucker, Lectures, 356.
^^Tucker, Lectures, 30-39, 53, 293.
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propensities of men." Because "the true idea of liberty" is "the 
enjoyment of every right," Tucker continued, governments must 
place restraints on some people in order to preserve the liberty 
of others. Thus, as he later explained to Hammond, liberty is 
"the most difficult problem in the world.
The need for restraint occupied a central place in Tucker's 
theory of government because of his conception of power. In 
common with many other Americans, Tucker viewed power as the very 
antithesis of liberty. He saw it as virtually an entity, 
something that feeds upon itself if left unchecked. Because too 
much governmental power threatened liberty. Tucker emphasized the 
need to keep the accumulation of federal power under control. He 
told his students that any government, "however weak, having 
power to assume more power, has already too much." He reminded 
his students that Patrick Henry believed a lack of governmental 
powers could always be filled, but excess power could not be 
checked.
Tucker offered the same lesson to President John Tyler in 
1841. As Tucker recalled, every president from Jefferson to 
Jackson, although professing state rights and "correcting federal 
abuses" when they took office, all found it impossible to resist 
the temptation to accumulate power. Just as he had lectured to 
his students. Tucker told the President, "All Federal powers aid
^^Ibid., 144-45, 252; Tucker to Hammond, May 7, 1850, 
Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
^^Tucker, Lectures, 365, 366.
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each other. Every usurpation facilitates other usurpations." He 
warned Tyler that those who supported the consolidation of 
federal power had worked systematically for fifty years, 
resulting in a "corresponding depression and degradation of the 
State authorities." He promised Tyler a place of distinction in 
the nation's history if the president would but refrain from 
continuing the aggrandizement of federal power. "The experiment 
is worth trying; for," he offered, "success would be a blessing 
to your country, and even failure must be glorious." If Tyler 
would not even make the attempt, however, he would confirm 
himself as "a mere tool...for the accomplishment of their grand 
plan of consolidation, and the re-establishment of the 
abominations of 1828."^^
Throughout his life. Tucker believed drastic consequences 
would follow from unchecked power. During the Missouri Crisis he 
had warned his fellow citizens if they yielded any power to deal 
with slavery they would lose all power to control their peculiar 
institution. Tucker returned to this idea during the territorial 
controversy in the late 1840's. If the central government found 
enough power, he warned Hammond, "What is to hinder the 
emancipation of our slaves?" His alarm over consolidation of 
power grew almost to paranoia by 1849. When he heard that the 
government contemplated the creation of a new Bureau of 
Agriculture, Tucker feared it meant "the Federal Govt, is to
^^"To John Tyler, President of the United States," signed "A 
State Rights Man," Richmond Enquirer, August 10, 13, 17, 31,
1841.
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assume a new jurisdiction, extending to the very soil of the 
states." He cautioned his students that once the federal
government accumulated sufficient power, even the states of the
Union could "be obliterated and absorbed by it."^^
Because the tendency for power to build upon itself was so
great. Tucker explained, means to control it had to be 
institutionalized and codified. He told his pupils the Founding 
Fathers diffused power as widely as they could between various 
branches of the federal government "to afford a reasonable 
security against...an accumulation of power" in any one branch, 
and thereby protect "the liberty of the whole community." All 
constitutions, according to Tucker, provide restraints on power, 
not grants of power. He emphasized that the Constitution set 
specific limits on what the federal government could do to the 
states, and argued the Bill of Rights was "mainly intended to 
guard the rights of the States." He professed the "sole and 
avowed motive" for the adoption of the United States Constitution 
was "to place the external relations of all the states on the 
same footing, and to unite the power of all for the common 
defense." Using an exceptionally strict interpretation of the 
Constitution, Tucker accused government officials of violating 
the spirit —  if not the letter —  of the Constitution when they
37"To the People of Missouri Territory," Missouri Gazette & 
Public Advertiser, May 5, 1819; Tucker to Hammond, March 16,
1648, December 27, 1849, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; 
Tucker, Lectures, 429.
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used it for any end besides those he had mentioned.^® Tucker
obviously favored the weak central government his father found 
under the Articles of Confederation.
Tucker pointed to the constitution of Virginia as closest to 
an ideal compact, and used Thomas Jefferson to illustrate his 
argument. He compared Jefferson's tenure as governor of 
Virginia, with the narrow limits placed upon him by the 
constitution of that commonwealth, and his record as president, 
armed with more potential power by the federal constitution. 
Tucker recalled, from the Quid perspective, that as president 
Jefferson "has been seen to exercise a power over the thoughts, 
the affections, the will of his countrymen, without example 
before his time." But under the restraints placed upon him by 
the constitution of Virginia, Tucker asked "what was he but an 
official drudge, bound down to the literal execution of his 
limited functions."®^ Clearly Tucker wanted his students to 
agree the latter situation was preferable.
While Tucker considered the checks and balances created by 
the Founders wise and prudent, he also believed they could not 
possibly have prepared enough restraints for a future when "the 
maxims of consolidation are habitually received as the true
38Tucker, Lectures, 23,361-62, 384; Tucker to Hammond, March 
13, 1847, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; "To John Tyler, 
President of the United States," Richmond Enqui rer, August 13, 
1841. Tucker used very similar arguments in "To the People of 
Missouri Territory," Missouri Gazette & Public Advertiser, May 5, 
1819.
39Tucker, Lectures, 363.
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interpretation of the Constitution."^® Although he thought the 
Constitution valuable as a restrainer of power, he knew it was 
inert, lifeless. He therefore tried mightily to awaken 
southerners to the danger of "trusting too much to forms." His 
lectures spoke of the need for constant vigilance. "No people 
should ever permit themselves to feel secure in the enjoyment of 
their rights." Again drawing from Revolutionary thought. Tucker 
warned that rights and liberties "are always in danger from some 
quarter." He stressed that in a free, republican society every 
citizen had a duty to remain vigilant in defense of his rights. 
"We must not only be awake, and watch," he told his students,
"but we must learn where to watch.
Tucker had emphasized these positions for over a generation. 
During the Nullification Crisis he futilely tried to warn his 
fellow Virginians that "our sentinels are sleeping on their 
posts: our camp is assaulted." He once remarked that keeping 
watch on the federal treasury served as a better safeguard of 
liberty "than all our finespun theories about checks and 
balances." As early as Jefferson's administration Tucker had 
warned that if Americans did no more to preserve their rights 
than entrusting their preservation to the Constitution, "the 
people may go to sleep with parchment under their heads and
^®Tucker to Thomas H. Benton, February 6, 1833, Tucker- 
Coleman Collection, William and Mary.
^^Tucker, Lectures, 21, 64, 93, 394.
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awaken with fetters on their hands.
Along with a vigilant citizenry, Tucker believed a self- 
governing society required tremendous public virtue. When 
"ambition, and avarice, and the love of pleasure, and the love of 
display, have gained the mastery of the heart, freedom no longer 
exists, except by sufferance." He fervently believed liberty was 
"the reward of virtue," and conversely warned if "the simplicity 
and plainness of our ancient manners" were replaced by "the 
dominion of passions," the country risked destruction and 
domination by "any master who will pamper them."^^
Everywhere Tucker looked, however, he saw "a flood tide of 
corruption," not virtue. In the earliest years of the century he 
had complained of "prating youngsters who disgrace the halls of 
our assembly, and sometimes that of congress." In Tucker's mind 
venality, not virtue, insubordination and servility marked most 
politicians of the day. By the time he began teaching at William 
and Mary, Tucker found virtue completely lacking in the West and 
all but absent in Virginia. In 1851 he warned his fellow 
southerners the North had come to count on southern "supineness, 
upon our cupidity and our cowardice," and added ominously, "They
Richmond Enquirer, February 19, 1833; Tucker to Daniel 
Call, March 14, 1835, Tucker Family Papers, Southern Historical 
Collection; Tucker to Randolph, July 19, 1807, Tucker-Coleman 
Collection, William and Mary.
^^Tucker, Lectures, 108, 237-38.
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may be safe in doing so."^^
What Tucker perceived as a lack of virtue among the more 
prominent southern politicians alarmed him the most. Calhoun, he 
told Hammond, "is the greatest riddle in the world to me."
Tucker had often observed the Carolina politician adhering to 
principle and making personal sacrifices for the good of the 
South. Yet Tucker believed that "once in four years" Calhoun 
deserted his loftier ideals in an attempt to gain a presidential 
nomination. Before the Nullification Crisis, Tucker blamed the 
"ill weaved ambition of that restless aspirant" for diluting 
southern political cohesion and strength. He lumped Calhoun 
together with John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, and Henry Clay 
of Kentucky as people "utterly destitute of principle." At the 
end of the 1830's, Tucker looked at Calhoun as morally dead and 
eulogized his "fallen greatness." Tucker admired Calhoun's 
talents as a politician, but accused him of having an 
"overweening self-confidence" which led him to pursue personal 
interests and abandon those of the S o u t h . T u c k e r  wondered why 
Calhoun looked for personal glory within the Union instead of in
4 4Tucker to Randolph, March 10, 1806, May 23, 1807, March 
22, 1826, May 2, 1833, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and 
Mary; Tucker to Hammond, February 17, 1836, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress; Tucker to Littleton W. Tazewell, June 26, 
1826, Nathaniel Beverley Tucker Letter, Alderman Library, 
University of Virginia; Tucker, "South Carolina," Southern 
Quarterly Review, IV (October, 1851), 281.
^^Tucker to Hammond, October 11, 1848, February 6, 1847, 
Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; Tucker to Randolph, March 
22, 1826, March 25, 1827; Tucker to Richard Cralle, April 24, 
1838, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary.
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the creation of a Southern Confederacy:
Why does not Ambition look forward to the rewards which
popular favour is eager to bestow, at the end of any
revolutionary movement, on those who began it? Why can Mr. 
Calhoun never take his eye from that chain, which, in such 
event, would vanish into air? Why do those who expect to 
rise with him cherish more the shadowy prospect of 
future? and seats in the cabinet, than their own private 
interests, and all the honours that the Southern people 
have in store for him who shall be first to break the chain
which fetters them, and crushes the very heart of hope and
enterprise?
Tucker saw no more clear sign of the lack of virtue in the 
South than in that region's adherence to political parties.
Among his other sins. Tucker accused Calhoun of buckling under 
the dictates of the Democratic party. He condemned Henry Clay 
for betraying, degrading, and compromising the rights of the 
South for the sake of his advancement in the Whig party. He 
found his countrymen —  especially Virginians —  easily lured 
into the support of parties by the promise of federal patronage 
and money. He accused political parties of presenting party 
hacks as their presidential nominees, transforming elections from 
a "horse race" into an "ass race." He described Congress, racked 
by party squabbling, as "that synagogue of Satan," filled with 
men "whose valour oozes out of their fingers' ends" for the four 
brief months of each session. He called the two major parties 
"the curse of the Union," and blamed them for "running down State
^^Tucker to Hammond, December 27, 1849, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress.
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sovereignty" since 1833.^^
The greatest threat Tucker saw in political parties was in
their appeal to the masses for support. The rapid expansion of
suffrage during the early nineteenth century alarmed Tucker. He
blamed contending parties for bringing more and more people into
the political process, arming them with votes, and thereby
increasing the power of the masses. Tucker maintained that the
worst form of oppression was "the tyranny of numbers." He argued
that power spread widely among a mass of people posed as great a
threat to liberty as power concentrated in the federal
government. Tucker said advocates of democratic rule really
preached "the divine right of numbers." He adamantly denied that
majorities could do anything they chose without hinderance or
restraint; this antecedent would inevitably lead to the trampling
of the rights of minorities. In a representative government.
Tucker could conceive of "no thraldom so hopeless as that of a
4 8fixed local minority." In his classroom he said if
Tucker to the editors of the Richmond Whig, February to 
April, 1838, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary; "To 
John Tyler," Richmond Enquirer, August 24, 1841; Tucker, "South 
Carolina," Southern Quarterly Review, IV (October, 1851), 276, 
292; Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, Prescience; Speech Delivered by 
Hon. Beverley Tucker of Virginia, in the Southern Convention, 
Held at Nashville, Tennessee, April 13, 1850 (Richmond; west & 
Johnson, 1862), 33.
4 8Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, "Discourse on the Dangers that 
Threaten the Free Institutions of the United States, being an 
Address to the Literary Societies of Hampden Sidney College, 
Virginia," (Richmond: John B. Martin & Co., Printers, 1841), 21; 
Tucker, "A Lecture on the Study of Law," Southern Literary 
Messenger, I (December, 1834), 151; Tucker to Hammond, April 24, 
1847, February 18, 1836, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
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representatives of a majority could do anything they pleased,
they could ignore the rights of a minority and oppress them, even
while acting within the forms of free government. With
particular reference to the rise of abolitionism. Tucker
predicted a northern majority might soon try to pass legislation
on matters concerning slavery, even if by doing so they ignored
the wishes and rights of the southern minority. If this were
free government. Tucker concluded, "then freedom is of little
worth. If not, it shows well the forms of freedom may coexist
with the worst evils of slavery." As with all other forms of
power. Tucker believed "the Union between power and the Democracy
of Numbers" knew no limits. He described this bond as similar to
"the union of the sexes, and as indissoluble. Once joined it is
not for man to put them asunder.
Tucker envisioned terrible consequences for liberty under
this union of power and numbers. He feared a demagogue might
appeal to the passions of the "dumb brute voiceless multitude."
He warned his students the skillful demagogue would use these
passions to manipulate the people:
he corrupts them with the spoils of the treasury; he tempts 
them with the plunder of the rich; he engages them in the 
services of his profligate ambition; he gilds the fetters he 
prepares for them; and teaches them to wear them as badges 
of party, and the trappings of distinction, until, familiar 
with their weight, they permit them to be rivetted on their 
limbs. [This occurs during] the season of tumultary 
elections.... It is the season when leaders, drunk with
49Tucker to Hammond, February 18, 1836, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress; Tucker, Lectures, 142-43; "To John Tyler," 
Richmond Enquirer, August 13, 1841; Tucker to Richard Cralle, 
February i8, 1838, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary.
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ambition, and a rabble, drunk with flattery and alcohol, 
unite to plunder and oppress the middle-classes, and shout 
the praises of parties and demagogues.
Tucker believed the "meddling spirit of Democracy" threatened the
entire fabric of society. Property, which Tucker considered as
valuable as liberty, would become "the prey of the poor." He
felt the "low-bred insolence of upstart ignorance intruding by
unhallowed means into the throne of legislation" would result in
the violation of contracts, printing valueless paper money, and
the loss of incentive for investment. In the final stage of
democracy run rampant, he explained to Hammond, the masses would
invest their power in one man "who feels himself absolutely
5 1  ■secure in the use of power."
Believing himself and his country faced with these 
possibilities. Tucker sought a "controlling power over the brute 
force of the multitude," so that "they who want will not take 
from they who have." He taught his students the most basic step 
in this direction was to prevent universal suffrage, and even to 
disfranchise many voters. He admitted that limits on suffrage 
seemed "an absurd and preposterous incongruity" to many who 
studied free government, but pointed to the past to support his 
views. He reminded his students the founders of Virginia and the 
United States had institutionalized a freehold suffrage. They
^^Tucker, Lectures, 44.
51Tucker, "Discourse on...Free Institutions," 14; Tucker, 
Lectures, 125, 329-30; Tucker to St. George Tucker, January 20, 
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did this, he explained, not because they felt "it ought to work," 
but because over one hundred years' experience had shown "the 
thing worked well."^^ Only if "the affairs of a people will 
be most discreetly administered by the ignorant; if the reign of 
virtue will be best secured by the authority of the most 
vicious," then. Tucker told his students, universal suffrage 
suited a society. Until then. Tucker claimed, "the MIND of the 
community" must remain in control, and refrain from yielding "the 
tasks of thought to the unthinking, and the authority of law to 
those who should be the subjects of its corrective discipline."
He argued a natural order existed in every society, and that the 
conservatism inherent in property owners uniquely qualified them 
to defend personal rights and liberties.
Professor Tucker went to great lengths to justify these 
positions to his students. His basic principle behind a limited 
franchise was his denial of a universal capacity for self- 
government. The idea that "there is no best in government" 
permeated his lectures. He remarked that what was best for "a 
horde of poor and ignorant barbarians" would not suit "an 
enlightened, refined, rich and luxurious community," and the best 
form of government for one individual may not work well for 
another. He repeatedly argued that no government was good unless 
it allowed freedom, but he vehemently denied that any government
52Tucker to Hammond, February 17, 1836, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress; Tucker, Lectures, 262-63.
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could impose freedom on anyone. He once told Hammond "compulsory 
Liberty is a solecism." He told his students, "The capacity for 
freedom is the capacity for self-government." Without that 
capacity, Tucker thought a people given freedom "will but use it 
to seek a master.
To qualify for participation in free government. Tucker 
insisted that an individual had to demonstrate certain 
capabilities. He regarded self-control as "the inseparable 
condition of political freedom." He emphasized the need for 
proper education and training because, "In proportion as 
government is free, so is its structure intricate and delicate, 
and liable to derangement from the unskillful hand of meddling 
ignorance." He charged the statesman with the responsibility of 
checking "the expansive growth of the germ of evil" that exists 
within every government. No doubt his students understood when 
their teacher spoke of the "solemn and awful duty" of self- 
government. Tucker emphasized the difficulty of self-government 
at the conclusion of his first lecture with the thought, "whether 
we mount the hustings or go to the polls, we may well tremble to 
give or receive the power which is there conferred.
When Tucker observed the different ways northerners and 
southerners dealt with the question of democracy, he found stark
^^Tucker to Hammond, January 27, 1850, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress; Tucker, Lectures, 62, 64, 131, 144-45, 279.
55Tucker, Lectures, 14, 22, 236, 276-81; Tucker to Randolph, 
September 21, 1817, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary; 
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contrasts. In discussing the issue with Hammond, Tucker asserted 
that northerners had "surrendered their authority to the mob on 
compulsion." However, in the South no power existed "to extort 
the concession, because the great body of the disfranchised were 
slaves." While he continued to fear the "epidemic" of democracy, 
he assured himself and Hammond "Slavery... is a perfect antidote." 
Throughout Tucker's teaching career he referred to African 
slavery as the South's "most sacred and fundamental institution, 
the only basis on which the temple of [white people's] freedom
can stand firm and enduring.
In common with other advocates of slavery. Tucker claimed a 
fundamental inequality existed between blacks and whites and, 
most important, that blacks lacked the capacity for self- 
government. Moreover, Tucker denied that blacks had the same 
"passions and wants and feelings and tempers" as whites. He said 
God had invested Anglo-Saxons with "moral and political truth"
and created them as "a master race of unquestionable
superiority." Africans, on the other hand, barely bore "the 
lineaments of humanity, in intellect scarcely superior to the 
brutes." Therefore Tucker justified slavery on the grounds that 
it forced to labor those "who are unable to live honestly without
Tucker to Hammond, February 17, 1838, January 2, 1851, 
Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, 
"Slavery," reviews of J.K. Paulding, Slavery in the United 
States, and H. Manly, The South Vindicated from the Treason and 
Fanaticism of Northern Abolitionists, Southern Literary Messenger 
TÎ (April, 1836), 337; Tucker, "South Carolina," Southern 
Quarterly Review, IV (October, 1851), 275.
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l a b o r . " 5 7
Tucker never meant to imply that whites could act 
capriciously towards slaves, no matter how great he claimed their 
differences were. In his lectures he said God must have mixed 
the two races in order to achieve some "moral good." Besides 
allowing the control of a supposedly shiftless people, Tucker 
asked his students to think of slavery as a "great school" 
through which blacks, some day, may achieve full civilization. 
Under the loving and benevolent tuteladge of their white masters. 
Tucker believed blacks had already learned much. Christianity, 
he said, had softened the Africans' fierceness, enlightened them, 
curbed their sensual appetites, and inspired feelings of self- 
respect, cleanliness, and manners. He claimed slaveholders in 
America had reached more souls "than all the missionaries that 
philanthropy and religion have ever sent forth."5® Tucker argued 
that if a slave would but accept his fate, he would discover 
there are "none so free as those the world calls slaves." 
Motivated by the kindness of the heart. Tucker stated the 
slaveholder would make his slaves' lives secure, protect them 
from injustice and want, and care for the infirm and aged.
57Tucker, "Slavery," Southern Literary Messenger, II,
(April, 1836), 338; Tucker, Lectures, 298-302; Nathaniel Beverley 
Tucker, "Note to Blackstone's Commentaries, Being the Substance 
of Remarks on the Subject of Domestic Slavery," Southern Literary 
Messenger, I (January, 1835), 230.
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Tucker hoped southerners would spread this benevolent and 
necessary institution with them everywhere they went. He had 
personally helped to implant and protect slavery in Missouri. As 
war raged against Mexico in 1847, he wished "the pupilage of the 
race of Ham" prolonged until whites had expanded African slavery 
from the western parts of the continent to the banks of the 
Amazon River. He even dreamed of spreading slavery to the 
western shores of the Pacific.
Of more immediate concern than possible future expansion. 
Tucker found African slavery essential to republican government. 
In his opinion domestic slavery underlay unity among whites and 
political and social stability for the entire slaveholding 
society. Because white southerners could observe living examples 
of freedom and slavery. Tucker believed this fostered "a jealous 
passion for liberty in [even] the lowest class of those who are 
not slaves." In a slaveholding society, the color of a white 
person "is his certificate of freedom." Tucker stated that all 
white southerners —  even non-slaveholders —  benefitted from the 
institution :
slave labor pre-occupies and fills the low and degrading 
stations of society. Menial offices are altogether 
discharged by it; and the tasks of mere brute strength are 
left to it. To the freeman belong those services which 
imply trust and confidence, or require skill; which 
therefore command higher wages than mere animal labor, and 
give a sense of respectability and a feeling of self-
59Tucker, Lectures, 303, 349; Tucker, "Note to Blackstone's 
Commentaries," Southern Literary Messenger, I (January, 1835), 
229; Tucker to Hammond, April 24, 1847, March 13, 1850, Hammond 
Papers, Library of Congress.
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respect.GO
By maintaining "a class lower than all, and more numerous than 
all, of a different race," white people would unite to control 
and manage them "in a common spirit and in perfect harmony." He 
promised racial antagonism would prevent poor whites from both 
helping slaves launch insurrection and from enlisting the aid "of 
NEGRO slaves" in attempts to extort political power.
Tucker's opinions about slavery had changed rapidly during 
his tenure at William and Mary. When he arrived there he 
believed slavery was "an evil in itself, and in all its modes."
At that time he justified slavery as a necessary evil, one with 
which whites had to deal as best they could. As northern 
abolitionists grew in numbers and increased their campaign 
against slavery in the 1830's, Tucker, like many other 
southerners, quickly grew defensive about the institution and 
searched for ways to rationalize and justify it. Professor 
Thomas R. Dew, one of Tucker's colleagues, soon convinced him 
that slavery was not an evil, but a blessing. One of the 
originators of a coherent pro-slavery argument. Dew held that the 
institution violated neither human nor divine law. Tucker 
eagerly followed Dew's example, and now argued a "manly 
discussion" of slavery would reveal "the South will derive much
G^Tucker, Lectures, 331, 332; Tucker, "Note on Blackstone's 
Commentaries," Southern Literary Messenger, I (January, 1835),
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more of good than of evil from this much abused and partially- 
considered institution." After his own lengthy consideration of 
slavery, Tucker concluded that it was a great, paternalistic 
institution that benefitted slave and master alike. He told a 
later generation of students that the Founding Fathers had 
sanctified slavery by their mere refusal to abolish it. Tucker's 
pro-slavery zeal culminated in a letter he wrote to Hammond in 
1848. If slavery were to be abolished, Tucker said, "I shall go 
to my grave thanking God that he was pleased to allot me my time
c non earth during its existence."
No matter how enthusiastically Tucker supported African 
slavery, he knew "it was not easy for any one to sit down under 
the reproach of the world." In both England and the northern 
United States, Tucker observed growing numbers of Abolitionists. 
Tucker denied these people had a right even to debate the merits 
of slavery. Only slaveholders themselves, he explained, had such 
a right. In fact Tucker did urge his fellow southerners to 
discuss the issues pertaining to slavery. Confined in this 
manner. Tucker pointed out that no one could condemn the 
institution "without standing self-condemned." He also hoped the 
self-interest of slaveholders would prevent them from 
implementing schemes for emancipation. By applying so many 
restrictions. Tucker clearly separated his father's efforts
6 2Tucker, "Note to Blackstone's Commentaries," Southern 
Literary Messenger, I (January, 1835), 228; Tucker, "Slavery," 
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toward emancipation from any association with later 
abolitionists. At any rate, Tucker encouraged the study of 
slavery within the South. Whether or not others shared his 
conclusions, he warned prophetically, a thorough understanding of 
slavery "may become necessary to man our hearts and brave our 
nerves for the impending struggle.
As the debate over slavery spread to the floor of Congress 
in 1836, Tucker campaigned to back his words with action. He 
wrote to Hammond —  a congressman from South Carolina at the time 
—  begging him to lead his state out of the Union. If 
sanctimonious northerners tried to impose their will upon the 
South, Tucker promised that secession would give southerners the 
ability to escape the "contagion" of abolitionism and leave them 
free "to regard as enemies those who hate us and whom we hate." 
Tucker believed that if South Carolina seceded all other slave 
states "would draw together in a new confederacy made wise by the 
experience of the past."®^
In regulating slavery, suffrage, and every other state 
institution, the sovereignty of the states was Tucker's paramount 
concern. State sovereignty was the cornerstone of his political 
philosophy, the key to his understanding of the nature of the 
Union, and his justification for secession.
Tucker never provided a single, concise definition of
^^Tucker, "Note to Blackstone's Commentaries," Southern 
Literary Messenger, I (January, 1835), 228.
^^Tucker to Hammond, February 17, 18, 1836, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress.
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sovereignty, but instead developed one in the course of his 
lectures. He taught that sovereignty included the rights to 
command, to be obeyed, to protect, to hold individuals 
responsible to the community, and to impose the collective 
responsibility of the community between the community and anyone 
external to it. The execution of sovereignty included 
enforcement of retribution, infliction of punishment, and the 
oversight of the life, liberty, and property of every member of 
the community. During the Nullification controversy he 
graphically summarized sovereignty as "the power of pit and 
gallows." The people of a state held all sovereign power. 
According to Tucker, when the people met in a convention no 
limits to their potential power existed except those they placed 
upon themselves. The people, not their governments, were 
sovereign; governments were their creatures, not creators, and 
elected officials their servants, not masters.
Whenever possible Tucker tried to convince southerners that 
the people of each state retained sovereignty. He used Virginia 
as an example for his college students. Repeating his statement 
at Charlotte Court House, Tucker declared Virginia was "a free, 
SOVEREIGN and independent state" ever since her people declared 
her so on June 29, 1776. He told his students the people of 
Virginia assumed sovereignty and independence without making any 
obligation or alliance with other colonies and had done nothing
GSfucker, Lectures, 53, 73-74, 77, 362, 375-76, 387; 
Richmond Enquirer, February 7, 1833; Tucker, "South Carolina," 
Southern Quarterly Review, IV (October, 1851), 288.
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since that date to dilute or alter their sovereignty.®^ Tucker 
had used these same arguments during the debates over Missouri 
statehood. Because he believed only the consent of the people, 
freely given, made a constitution binding, he argued "that 
Missouri was already a Sovereign State" during the territorial 
period. The people of any territory or state perform a sovereign 
and independent act when they elect members to a constitutional 
convention; therefore. Tucker defined the creation of a 
constitution as "the highest act of Sovereignty." He called the 
territorial phase one of "pupilage and wardship," but one which 
left the sovereignty of its people untouched.®^
The importance Tucker assigned to state sovereignty 
explained his conception of state and federal relations. He 
described each state as a separate and distinct body politic, a 
society of men united to promote their common welfare and 
possessing the right, obtained by the consent of all its members, 
to regulate their conduct. He told his students that when two or 
more states unite to form a confederacy each retains its own 
government and the power to enforce its rules of conduct among 
its own people. Such a union, according to Tucker, had no effect 
upon the bodies politic of its constituent parts and therefore
6 6Tucker, Lectures, 251,374-75, 376; Richmond Enquirer, 
February 9, 1833.
®^"To the People of Missouri Territory," Missouri Gazette & 
Public Advertiser, April 21, 1819; Tucker to John C. Calhoun, 
November 13, 1844, in Chauncey S. Boucher and Robert P. Brooks, 
eds.. Correspondence Addressed to John C . Calhoun 1837-1849 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930), 259.
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resulted in "no loss of nationality" for member states. Re­
formation of a body politic only occurs in a union which 
explicitly abrogates the sovereignty of each state. Tucker 
taught that sovereignty was indivisible; "There can be but one 
Supreme." He viewed the American federal system as this sort of 
confederation, one in which states delegated some of their 
authority to the central government without surrendering any of 
their sovereignty. The decision of the people of Virginia to 
join the United States was therefore an act of sovereignty, not a 
rejection of it. When it entered the Union, the state compelled 
its members to obey federal laws. In this light, when the people 
of a state complied with federal laws, they did so only because 
their state commanded them to. "Virginia is your country,"
Tucker informed his students. "To her your allegiance is due.
Her alone you are bound to obey." Conversely, as long as one did 
not violate federal laws agreed upon by his state, "he may rob, 
and burn, and murder," and the federal government has no more 
authority over him "than the Emperor of China.
Using this framework Tucker tried to show his students the 
United States did not constitute a single body politic. He said 
a number of bodies politic may unite to use their combined 
resources and authority to accomplish a common purpose. When 
they did so, however, they formed only a league of clearly 
divisible units. Such was the case with the United States. The
®®Tucker, Lectures, 68, 77, 380, 388-89.
^^Tucker, Lectures, 79; Richmond Enquirer, February 7, 1833.
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"people of the United States," he said, was "an imaginary body 
politic.... there is no such body politic, and no such people," 
only a "mere multitude of men." As proof. Tucker asked his 
students to recall the Virginia constitutional convention of 
1832. All acts of the convention represented the will of the 
people. The meeting "annihilated" the old constitution; by 
taking away the old constitution of Virginia, "the government 
[was] abolished, but the people and commonwealth remain[ed]." He 
then asked his students to imagine taking away the Constitution 
of the United States. "The people of the United States vanish," 
and can never appear again without the consent of every separate 
state. If there were a single body politic that possessed 
sovereignty over all the states. Tucker asked why the 
Constitution reserved certain rights to the individual states.
If the words, "We, the people of the United States" meant the 
members of the Union constituted one people, it would be 
tantamount to "an absolute surrender of all power, by the fixed 
Southern minority, to the fixed Northern majority." If the 
United States represented a single body politic. Tucker believed 
it would transform each state into a mere municipal division, 
"liable at any moment, to be obliterated and absorbed by it."^^
If states, as sovereign units, could delegate certain powers 
to the federal government. Tucker argued they could just as 
surely withdraw them. Like his father and other leaders of the
^^Tucker, Lectures, 381-82, 387, 429; Tucker, "South 
Carolina," Southern Quarterly Review IV (October, 1851), 280-81.
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Revolution, Tucker asserted that a people may chose to reform,
alter, or abolish their government whenever they believed it
failed to protect their r i g h t s . W h e n  parties in a
constitutional compact disagreed over whether their government
continued to serve its original purpose. Tucker said final
arbitration belonged to the people of each state. Because they
originally entered the compact through the consent of the people
as expressed in a state convention, the people meeting in another
such convention had the right and authority to withdraw consent.
No clause in the Constitution, no rule of government, could stop
secession because "the great and essential rights of men are not
to be sacrificed to technicalities and abstractions." A state
might secede unilaterally and even against the expressed wishes
of the remainder of the Union because secession was an act of
sovereignty. As Tucker put it, "On such matters, nations never
7 ?consult the rest of the world."
After a state seceded, Tucker believed it faced two choices. 
Referring specifically to the slave states. Tucker suggested that 
secession might be temporary. If the secession of one or more 
states led to changes which would place state sovereignty and 
state rights "beyond dispute," Tucker claimed he would support a 
reunion. He said slave states might feel safe within the Union 
if other states passed certain constitutional amendments. He
^^Tucker, Lectures, 108-109, 270, 380; Tucker, "South 
Carolina," Southern Quarterly Review IV (October, 1851), 277-78.
72Tucker, Lectures, 257, 270; Tucker, "South Carolina," 
Southern Quarterly Review, IV (October, 1851), 282, 288-89.
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proposed two particularly vital ones; two-thirds approval in 
Congress for all tariff legislation, and a positive affirmation 
of a state's "right to secede for a good cause, and their right 
to judge of the cause." Because he never expected the North to 
make these concessions. Tucker preferred the second option; 
permanent separation. if only one southern state would muster 
the courage and boldness to secede. Tucker believed it would form 
the nucleus for a Southern Confederacy. Tucker promised Hammond, 
"I...foresee a great destiny for the South, if...we take that 
step like men.
At least since 1833 Tucker longed for the creation of a 
Southern nation. In letters to his intimate friends he gave form
and substance to his dream. He thought a Southern Confederacy
would command the trade of all industrial nations because of the 
importance of its staple crop production. Through substantial 
reduction on tariffs this nation would become the "most 
flourishing and free on earth." The rest of the United States
would "break to pieces" if they no longer had the slave states to
plunder and oppress. He foresaw expansion of slavery to Cuba, 
Jamaica, and far into South America if only slaveholders would 
free themselves from northern domination. Tucker believed past 
mistakes would be corrected in this new nation if it would avoid 
democratic influences. As he explained to one friend, "neither 
you nor I would have our Southern Confederacy swallow up the
73Tucker to Hammond, December 4, 1849, June 23, 1851, 
Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
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States, and we have had enough of the difficulty of guarding 
against misconstruction on this point." Tucker asked Hammond, 
"Have I written a world of nonsense; or is here matter on which a 
wise man might think a volume?"^^
Whenever Tucker perceived a lack of popular support for his 
vision of Southern glory, he grew somber. He knew the painful 
reality of a maxim he offered his students: "he, who in political 
life would act alone, must always act without effect." Tucker 
often felt the isolation of his small Williamsburg classroom and 
his lack of oratorical skills prevented him from spreading his 
ideas to more than a handful of people at a time. He knew others 
looked upon isolated thinkers like him as "'abstractionists' —  
politicians of the absurd school of poor old Virginia, who, it 
seems, is one of these days, to die of abstraction." But after 
more thoughtful reflection Tucker consoled himself with the 
thought the classroom and his essays provided an adequate forum 
"to accustom the public mind to think of that which must come," 
and allow him to "act through others.
Tucker concluded his textbook on government by claiming 
partial credit for anything his students might go on to achieve. 
In fact. Tucker felt a great sense of accomplishment and pride in
74Tucker to Hammond, February 17, 18, 1836, May 29, 1849, 
March 13, April 18, May 7, 1850, Hammond Papers, Library of 
Congress; Tucker to Simms, [no date], 1851, in Trent, William 
Gilmore Simms, 183.
^^Tucker, Lectures, 463; "To John Tyler," Richmond Enquirer, 
August 17, 1841; Tucker to Hammond, March 15, 1836, December 27, 
1849, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
passing his political views along to his students. He once 
boasted that each of his students each entered his classroom "a 
staunch Whig or a rabid democrat," but all left "a Southern man 
in feeling, and a States-right man in conviction." Tucker 
claimed certain resolutions in the Virginia legislature "were my 
work —  indirectly;" one of his former pupils had proposed them. 
Tucker's students came from some of the most prominent families 
in Virginia, and included sons of state and national political 
leaders. The son of future president John Tyler studied under 
him in the 1830's. He looked with special favor on one student, 
a son of Virginia Senator James M. Mason. Through him, Tucker 
pledged, "I am resolved to try to act on the minds of those to 
whose hands the destiny of the South is now committed." He 
rejoiced when he found a former student the "private and 
confidential advisor" to the editor of the Richmond Enquirer.
His graduates spread out from Virginia to North Carolina,
Georgia, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama. He once toyed with 
the idea of leading an expedition of fifty students to 
territorial California in order to make its laws and 
constitution. Tucker no doubt received his reward in a letter 
from former student, John Murdaugh. In 1841, Murdaugh wrote 
that several newspapers had reported a "Williamsburg influence; 
and from what I have read, I suspect such talk is not without 
truthfulness.
7 6Tucker, Lectures, 459; Tucker to Hammond, January 30, 
December 4, 1849, February 8, 1850, Hammond Papers, Library of 
Congress; The History of the College of William and Mary, from
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Tucker's most important and influential student never set 
foot in his classroom and never met him until the two had 
corresponded for fourteen years. Tucker's first letter to 
Congressman James H. Hammond began a friendship that ended only 
with Tucker's death in 1851. The two immediately realized they 
held similar political values and goals. Tucker discovered 
Hammond shared his "deepest convictions." He eagerly shared his 
thoughts on a variety of subjects and received joyful 
confirmation in Hammond's replies. The young Hammond came to 
admire the Virginia professor, "The cast of your mind, your 
historical, political & legal information, your long & close 
observation of our Government & of the men who have administered 
it." He asked Tucker to send him copies of everything he had 
ever written, and told him, "I wish to become one of your pupils, 
& will be thankful for all the time you can bestow upon me. 
Encouraged by the Virginian's positive response, Hammond asked if 
his friend, the writer William Gilmore Simms, could also 
"enter...under your tuition." Simms, who found Tucker an "able 
thinker and a charming writer," used his influence to help Tucker 
publish some of his political essays in journals which circulated 
among the most influential men in the South. Tucker thanked God
its Foundation, in 1660, to 1874 (Richmond: J.W. Randolph & 
English, 1874 ), 124-43 ; John Murdaugh to Tucker, September 18, 
1841, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary.
77Tucker to Hammond, December 29, 1846, February 6, 1847; 
Hammond to William Gilmore Simms, April 1, 1847, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress; Hammond to Tucker, January 24, March 2, May 
12, 1847, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
he had met friends "whose station gives them access to the public
ear." The easily impressionable Hammond promised to yield his
own judgment to that of his mentor's. In times of confusion
Hammond told Tucker, "I see clearly, with your eyes."^®
From the start Tucker and Hammond agreed state rights would
only be safe after secession and the formation of a Southern
Confederacy. In 1836 Tucker sketched their strategy: "An opening
must be watched for and struck at. If this be not the fit
occasion, see what is wanting to make it so." Tucker explained
to Hammond that the southern people feared secession carried some
sort of evil with it. The task of these men, therefore, was to
show that this evil was imaginary, "and then demonstrate the
advantages which a Southern Confederacy must enjoy." If the two
could "excite the South to something of what we feel" about the
glory awaiting a Southern nation. Tucker promised secession would 
7 9rapidly ensue.
Tucker clearly exercised tremendous influence over Hammond. 
As early as 1836 Tucker suggested southern congressmen, 
representing a fixed minority, could accomplish nothing in
78Hammond to Tucker, May 12, 1847, December 26, 1848,
January 23, 1850, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William & Mary; 
Tucker to Hammond, March 15, 1836, Hammond Papers, Library of 
Congress; Simms to Hammond, [c. April 4, 1847], Oliphant, éd.. 
Letters of william Gilmore Simms, III, 300. Drew Faust, A Sacred 
Circle: The Dilemma of the Intellectual in the Old South 
(Baltimore ; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), discusses 
in detail the friendship between these three and George Frederick 
Holmes and Edmund Ruffin.
^^Tucker to Hammond, February 18, 1836, April 18, May 7, 
1850, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
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Washington. He spent several years and many letters developing a
strategy of "masterly inactivity" which he hoped a southern state
might use if it balked at secession. "Has it ever occurred to
you," he posed to Hammond, that by refusing to select
presidential electors and withdrawing congressional delegations a
handful of states could practically "dissolve the [federal]
government." Tucker said Hammond might find this idea appealing;
indeed, in 1851 Hammond proposed just such a scheme for South 
8 0Carolina. For years Tucker had lectured Hammond about the 
power of southern cotton in world trade; in 1858, Hammond 
announced "Cotton is King" in a landmark speech in the United 
States Senate. In the same speech Hammond articulated Tucker's 
description of the role slaves played in uniting and elevating 
whites in his famous "mud-sill" theory. So powerful was 
Tucker's influence that shortly before his death he informed 
Hammond, "I can easily feel as if I have a hand in all you do."
So ambitious was Tucker for Hammond that the Carolinian once 
complained "you seem to expect so much more from me than I can
8 0Tucker to Hammond, February 18, 1836, April 24, October 
13, 1847, January 30, December 4, 1849, December 18, 1850, 
Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; Tucker, "South Carolina," 
Southern Quarterly Review, IV (October, 1851), 283, 288-90, 293; 
Drew Gilpin Faust, James Henry Hammond and the Old South: A 
Design for Mastery (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University 
Press, 1982), 333; Charleston Mercury, May 2, 1851.
81Tucker to Hammond, February 17, 1836, January 27, 1850, 
Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; Faust, Hammond, 346-47; 
Congressional Globe, 3 5th Congress, 1 ^  Session, Appendix, 69-71
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ever do."®^
However great his reliance on Hammond, Tucker never 
abandoned his own efforts to convince southerners to secede.
While he urged Hammond to lead South Carolina out of the Union in 
1836 over the issue of northern abolition agitation, Tucker took 
quill to hand and wrote "the best exposition of the advantages of 
dissolution that I could give, presented in popular form." His 
efforts resulted in The Partisan Leader. Simms once described 
this novel as "a curious anticipative history." Published late 
in 1836, it bore the pseudonym Edward William Sydney and the 
false date of 1856. Designed to show the ghastly results of 
continued consolidation of federal power, Tucker's book showed an 
effete and decadent Martin Van Buren, serving in his fourth 
consecutive term as president, helping his party entrench itself 
in power and effectively destroy constitutional restraints. In a 
curious parallel to the actual secession crisis in 1860-1861, 
Tucker's novel had states of the lower South seceding first and 
being joined later by other slave states. The Partisan Leader 
showed Virginia racked with internal divisions, some supporting 
secession and some backing Van Buren's attempt to keep the 
commonwealth in the Union by force. Those already acquainted
8 2Tucker to Hammond, February 4, 1851, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress; Hammond to Tucker, October 1, 1850, Tucker- 
Coleman Collection, William and Mary.
O 3
Tucker to Hammond, February 8, 1850, Hammond Papers, 
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with Tucker's politics found many familiar ideas. One character 
explained he fought to prevent Yankees from making blacks and 
whites do "what we are not fit for." Another agreed, adding,
"the Yankees want to set the negroes free, and make me a slave." 
Virginians finally resisted after decades of submitting to 
federal usurpation of power, as though "the spirit of John 
Randolph had risen from the sleep of death." During the course 
of the war, free trade policies helped the Southern nation grow 
more prosperous; at the same time, the loss of tariff revenue 
from the South crippled the northern financial structure.
Duff Green, a publisher in Washington, D. C., gladly helped 
Tucker publish Partisan Leader. He allowed almost no one to read 
the manuscript prior to publication and assured Tucker "we will 
profit by the mystery" surrounding the future date and fictional 
author. Green prepared 2000 copies of the two volume work, but 
his other duties forced him to postpone the first printing until 
September, after Congress adjourned. Green's only complaint 
about the arrangement concerned a "defect" in Tucker's plot.
Green wished Tucker had made slavery, not the tariff, "the basis 
of your supposed separation."®^ Tucker complained that 
publication came too late "to produce the effect intended." He 
remained convinced, however, of the potential usefulness of his
84Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, The Partisan Leader (New York: 
Rudd & Carleton, 1861), especially l4, 40, 251, 320.
®^William C. Preston to Tucker, March 22, May 24, November 
6, 1836; Duff Green to Tucker, May 2, September 13, 1836, Tucker- 
Coleman Collection, William and Mary.
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book. During the debates over secession in 1850 he urged Hammond 
and Simms to republish the novel, hoping it might sway the 
popular mood toward secession. Although Hammond remained 
unenthusiastic, Tucker continued to promote a new edition, and 
even wished he could afford to give away copies. Even though 
The Partisan Leader did not hasten secession. Tucker vowed, "I 
would rather be known, ten years hence, as the author of that 
book, than anything ever published on this continent."®®
The sectional conflict of 1850 brought Tucker a greater 
opportunity for fame than anything he had written or said before. 
The acquisition of territory from Mexico in 1847 renewed a 
national debate over the expansion of slavery. Attempts in 
Congress to resolve the crisis eventually included several other 
national issues, becoming known as the Compromise of 1850.
Tucker complained that all past sectional compromises had only 
resulted in the forfeiture of southern rights. Scheming 
politicians like Henry Clay and Lewis Cass of Michigan would
Tucker to Hammond, December 29, 1846, February 8, July 17, 
1850, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; Hammond to Tucker, 
February 15, 1850, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and Mary; 
Hammond to Simms, March 8, 1850, Hammond Papers, Library of 
Congress. Ironically, both Union and Confederate presses 
republished Partisan Leader in 1861, properly citing Tucker as 
author. In a preface to the northern edition (the one used in 
this study), publishers offered the novel as proof that Tucker 
and other southern radicals had been working for decades to 
overthrow the government. Furthermore, they claimed men like 
Rhett and William L. Yancey "have done little else than servilely 
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book." (pages v-vi). After reading Tucker's book in 1862, one 
southern reader commented, "Just such a rosewater revolution he 
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Civil War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 339.)
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gladly betray and bribe the South in order to advance their own 
careers. He considered all sectional compromises "bargains made 
with the Devil," and felt particularly offended that southern 
soldiers may have spilled their blood "like water" on Mexican 
battlefields only to benefit "Northern harpies."®^ When 
southerners decided to hold a regional convention in Nashville, 
Tennessee, in the summer of 1850, Tucker believed he faced a 
rendezvous with destiny. Desperately seeking an appointment to 
the Virginia delegation. Tucker felt the "blood of my ancestors" 
stir within him at the thought of launching a southern 
revolution. If he could assume a leading role in the 
proceedings, he hoped, future generations would remember that in 
the struggle for Southern freedom "one of the first blows struck 
was mine."®®
With eager anticipation Tucker prepared himself for his 
chance to go to Nashville. Hammond called on his mentor for "a 
trumpet blast." Tucker gathered his thoughts for a speech 
designed to "make men's nerves tingle." Besides giving him an 
opportunity to lecture to the entire South, Nashville would give 
Tucker the chance to satisfy two additional desires. One was to
p n
Tucker to Hammond, December 4, 27, 1849, April 18, 
September 21, October 9, 1850, Hammond Papers, Library of 
Congress; Tucker, "South Carolina," Southern Quarterly Review, IV 
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finally meet Hammond, already chosen as a delegate from South 
Carolina. The other was "to trim and feather a shaft for that 
prince of humbugs charlatans and traitors Henry Clay." For once 
fate was kind to Tucker. Originally bypassed as a delegate, the
Û Qgovernor of Virginia turned to the professor as an alternate.
When Tucker arrived in Nashville, he found himself in the
unaccustomed position of the center of attention. His reputation
at William and Mary and his essays led many of the assembled
delegates to solicit his opinions and ask his help in writing
resolutions. Tucker worked around the clock in the days
preceding the convention. His ego swelled when people told him
that he reminded them of John Randolph. In anticipation of his
remarks reporters asked if they could sit near him when he spoke.
"There is my misfortune," Tucker remembered suddenly, "the want
of voice." Nevertheless, Tucker prepared himself as best he
could for a moment he considered the culmination of his life's
9 0experience and work.
"I have come here with my mind charged to bursting with 
thoughts that struggle for utterance," Tucker told the assembly. 
He announced his intention to make his fellow delegates aware of 
their rights and inspire them to defend those rights "at all 
hazards and to the last extremity." First he tried to convince 
them that maintaining the Union could only result in atrocities
89Tucker to Hammond, January 27, February 2, May 7, 1850, 
Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
90Tucker to Lucy S. Tucker, June 3, 8, 1850, Tucker-Coleman 
Collection, William and Mary.
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for the South. The "fierce philanthropy and malignant love of 
our northern brethren" would soon result in the forcible 
abolition of slavery. If northerners destroyed this sacred and 
essential institution, southerners would lose the millions of 
dollars they had invested in slave property, land values would 
consequently topple, and whites would face "the necessity of 
destroying the negroes or of amalgamating with them, or of 
succumbing to them."^^ He gave members of the convention the 
same lecture he offered to his students; they must chose "between 
Union, and all the rights and interests the Union was intended to 
protect." He begged his colleagues to throw off their idolatrous 
and blinding worship of political parties. He warned them that a 
sinister plot existed to rob them of their liberties. An evil 
triumvirate —  Clay, Cass, and Daniel Webster of Massachusetts —  
had contrived the congressional compromise as a delusion. He 
announced that southerners would no longer listen to the scheming 
Clay. "They followed him in the Missouri Compromise, the root of 
all this present evil," they followed him again in the compromise 
tariff of 1833, but Tucker swore the South would follow him no 
longer. He dismissed Cass as a "claptrap charlatan," a tool of 
Clay and Webster, used "to fool us —  to bamboozle us," to cheat
Q nsoutherners out of their rights.
Having appealed to southern outrage. Tucker shifted his 
attention to solutions. In the most dramatic effort of his life.
91Tucker, Prescience, 8,9,28. 
*2lbid., 10, 11-14, 16.
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Tucker began, "I would speak of the magnificent future, and 
glorious destiny of a Southern Confederacy." If only South 
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi would 
secede, they had all the resources necessary to form a powerful 
new country. Tucker warned of the "fatal consequences" that 
would befall any industrialized nation if these states stopped 
exporting cotton. After a single year without cotton. New 
Englanders would see "ships lie rotting at wharves; the factories 
tumbled into ruins." The social and political fabric of England 
would fall victim to Fourierism and communism. United by a "mere 
central agency for independent states" and supported by revenue 
from a modest tariff, this Southern nation would soon draw other 
slave states out of the Union. Intoxicated with the thought of 
these anticipated glories. Tucker even argued that Pennsylvanians 
would see the advantage of becoming a workshop for the South and 
eventually secede. Along the Ohio River, states would see the 
advantages of slave labor; some day Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois 
would join the Southern nation. The Mississippi River, "like an 
iron clamp," would bind these additions to a Southern 
Confederacy. Tucker depicted an ideal society, a union "of 
congenial not conflicting interests" replacing the old union 
"between power and w e a k n e s s . T h e  "great school of domestic 
slavery" would continue and flourish. Tucker must have shocked 
his listeners by elaborating a plan to make Haiti a colony for 
free blacks, "established under a provincial government.
®^Tucker, Prescience, 18, 19-20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30
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protected, regulated, and controlled by a Southern Confederacy." 
In some distant era, he predicted, blacks might learn enough from 
their paternal former masters to govern themselves. After 
stirring the imagination of the assembly. Tucker chided that only 
a "dull ass," a "coward cur," would now refuse to act. If 
southerners refused to act boldly to defend their liberty. Tucker 
vowed his life would have been lived in vain.^^
The aftermath of Nashville left Tucker with great 
ambivalence. Pleased with his extraordinary speech, he wished 
only that he could have said more, "but my voice failed me." 
Hammond had hoped Tucker's speech would stir lethargic 
southerners, but told Simms, "Such a philippic has not been seen 
lately." Another friend wrote to Hammond complaining about 
Tucker's "fire & brimstone" remarks about Clay, Cass, and 
Webster. "The easiest thing in is to tear down," he pointed out; 
the South needed constructive s o l u t i o n s . T h e  convention 
adjourned without recommending secession or any other form of 
resistance to the Compromise. Instead, delegates only voted to 
reconvene in fall. Exhausted by his efforts in Tennessee and 
weeks of travel. Tucker collapsed as soon as he returned to 
Williamsburg.
After regaining his strength. Tucker resumed his efforts to
 ̂ Ibid., 30-32, 38.
95Tucker to Lucy S. Tucker, June 8, 1850, Tucker-Coleman 
Collection, William and Mary; Hammond to Simms, June 27, 1850, W. 
W. Hodgson to Hammond, August 6, 1850, Hammond Papers, Library of 
Congress.
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encourage secession. He set to work editing his Nashville 
address for publication. He bombarded Hammond with letters 
urging him to continue the fight, and refused to accept Hammond's 
conclusion that Nashville had been a failure. He even pledged to 
leave Virginia if South Carolina seceded alone and offered to 
command troops there. He anxiously observed the fate of 
Mississippi Governor John Quitman, who Tucker believed had 
incurred the wrath of the federal government for his own disunion 
activities.^® He penned a long essay for the Southern Quarterly 
Review calling unequivocally for disruption of the Union, whether 
by secession or "masterly inactivity." Even when his spirits 
fell and he realized secession was not soon likely. Tucker found 
consolation. After his efforts of over twenty years, he 
concluded, "our cause has gained ground. The open discussion of 
the question of disunion, and the clear admission...that disunion 
is not the worst of possible evils, and that Union is a means not 
an end, place us far in advance of any position heretofore 
occupied." As death approached in August, 1851, Tucker felt 
confident the South would never "fall back" from this position.
Tucker never witnessed secession or the creation of a 
Southern nation. In the South he never achieved the popularity 
or mystique of someone like John C. Calhoun. Few of his
9®Tucker to Hammond, June 27, July 17, October 9, 15, 1850, 
February 4, March 15, June 6, 23, 1850, Hammond Papers, Library 
of Congress.
97Tucker to Hammond, December 18, 1850, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress.
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successors quoted Tucker in defense of state rights or to justify 
secession. Tucker's political philosophy was not unique; his 
most original thoughts were his most fanciful. But one cannot 
minimize his contribution to the secession movement. He 
constantly and consistently told his countrymen they could take 
their destiny into their own hands. In his classroom and through 
his writings he left a legacy of resistance to federal power, 
defense of minority rights, and the promise of change. His
message spanned two generations and reached thousands. His only
regret was that he could not reach more. "Oh that I had the 
voice of J. Randolph," he cried, "to make myself heard by the 
assembled multitude!" He agreed with Hammond that only continued 
agitation would bring secession. "Yes; I would agitate. But how
Q Ocan I make my voice heard." When Tucker died he left his ideas
for others to pass on. Fortunately for his cause, most of his
successors had louder, more powerful voices.
98Tucker to Hammond, December 27, 1849, February 8, 1850,
Ibid.
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Chapter II 
"WE SHALL FIRE THE SOUTHERN HEART"
William Lowndes Yancey's brilliant oratory and violent 
temper left a profound impression on everyone who met him. Some 
believed him the greatest public speaker in the South since 
Patrick Henry or John Randolph. In 1860 a newspaper reporter 
dubbed him "the prince of the fire-eaters." The fire-eating 
editor of the Charleston Mercury acknowledged Yancey's prowess as 
an orator and debater, but criticized him for "an evident want of 
leadership." An Alabama colleague said "he has great talent in 
some things, but his temper is impracticable." Some southerners 
saw Yancey as a Confederate Garibaldi; some eulogized him as a 
latter day Moses. Unionists in a north Alabama town once burned 
him in effigy. Aware of his ability to provoke stormy reactions, 
Yancey actively cultivated his image as an agitator. He once 
humorously described himself "as a disunionist, twenty seven 
feet high, weighing three thousand pounds and eating a little 
nigger broiled every morning for breakfast and a roasted Union 
man for dinner."^
John Witherspoon DuBose to Robert Alonzo Brock, November 8, 
1890, Brock Collection, Huntington Library, San Marino, 
California; William Kauffman Scarborough, ed.. The Diary of 
Edmund Ruffin (2 volumes; Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University 
Press, 1972- ), I, 479, 663-65; James P. Hambleton to William F. 
Samford, February 5, 1866, William L. Yancey Papers, Alabama 
Department of Archives and History; William P. Hesseltine, Three 
Against Lincoln: Murat Halstead Reports the Caucuses of 1860 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), 8; Robert 
Barnwell Rhett, Jr., to William Porcher Miles, May 10, 1860,
Miles Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill; j. Bragg to Genl. [McRae], January 21,
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Those who knew Yancey best confirmed his public image. One 
of his earliest associates, Benjamin Franklin Perry of South 
Carolina, described him as "a man of genius & talents, a man of 
impulse and feeling; but not a wise & sagacious man in politics." 
Perry found Yancey charming, cordial, and well-mannered, but "too 
much devoted to politics & literature to make great progress in 
his legal studies," and too "susceptible to the charms of the 
other sex." Yancey could be cheerful and jocular in public.
Perry remembered, but "in private he was subject to feelings of 
gloom & despondency." Thomas H. Watts, who at various times 
opposed and supported Yancey in legal and political contests, 
recalled, "There was a charm peculiar to him and his oratory." 
Watts said Yancey's mastery of facts and power of analysis was 
considerable, but that the key to his success lay in "his sweet 
voice, and the annunciation of every word and every syllable... so 
that even in a conversational tone he was distinctly heard in any 
room and at a great distance when speaking in the open air." He 
always spoke earnestly, "from the innermost recesses of his
1861, Colin J. McRae Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and 
History; Montgomery Advertiser, November 14, 1860; Atlanta 
Intelligencer, in Montgomery Advertiser, August 5, 1863; Clarence 
P. Denman, The Secession Movement in Alabama (Montgomery: Alabama 
State Department of Archives and History, 1933), 149-50; Yancey 
quoted in Ollinger Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Presidential 
Election of 1860 (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1969), 
123-24.
Yancey has provoked a similar reaction among some 
historians. Joseph Hergesheimer called Yancey "The Pillar of 
Words," in Swords and Roses (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), 
35-64, and Clement Eaton compared Yancey to Adolph Hitler in The 
Mind of the Old South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1976), 268.
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heart," and thereby exercised a "magnetic power" over his 
audiences. Watts also remembered Yancey's great flaw: his "fiery 
temper... sometimes permitted his passion to get the better of his 
judgment." Another colleague, William R. Smith, contrasted 
Yancey's speaking style to that of his long-time Whig opponent, 
Henry W. Hilliard. Smith claimed Yancey "had a better knowledge 
of men, was a more perfect master of the passions." Hilliard, 
Smith said, excelled in "all that was soft and smooth and easy, 
graceful and persuasive." But "in all that was fierce, stormy, 
vituperative, denunciatory, impetuous, and scornful, Mr. Yancey 
excelled."^
Yancey's fiery spirit and impetuosity found their 
antecedents in his early years. He was born on August 10, 1814, 
at the Shoals of the Ogeechee River in Warren County, Georgia.
His parents, Caroline Bird and Benjamin Cudworth Yancey, had 
their own reputations for tempestuousness. His father lived in 
South Carolina before his marriage to Caroline, and shared a 
small law office with the young John C. Calhoun. Shortly after 
moving his family to Charleston and the birth of Benjamin C. 
Yancey, Jr. in 1815, William's father died of yellow fever. The 
Yanceys returned to Georgia. Caroline sent William to Mount Zion 
Academy, a Presbyterian school headed by the Reverend Nathan
2Benjamin F. Perry to William F . Samford, August 29, 1866; 
"Reminiscences of Thomas H. Watts," folder #10, both in DuBose 
Correspondence, Alabama Department of Archives and History; 
William R. Smith, Reminiscences of a Lon^ Life: Historical, 
Political, Personal" and Literary (Louisville: Lost Cause Press, 
1Ô61, originally Washington, D.C.: W.R. Smith, Sr., 1889), 223.
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Sidney Smith Beman. Beman had moved from New England to Georgia 
in 1812. He and Mrs. Yancey married in 1821, and after Beman 
sold his wife's slaves the family moved to Troy, New York, in 
June, 1823, where Beman became pastor of the First Presbyterian 
Church. Beman participated in the great religious revival in 
upstate New York in 1826 and zealously joined the movement to 
abolish slavery. While Beverley Tucker admired and strove to 
emulate his father, Yancey saw Beman as a vile personification of 
the Abolitionist: a hypocrite who condemned all aspects of 
slavery even though he once owned and sold slaves. The young 
William also witnessed frequent arguments between Beman and his 
mother, which further alienated him from his stepfather. As one 
of Yancey's biographers put it, Yancey grew accustomed to a 
"blend of bitter argument and religious evangelism" in an 
"emotionally charged atmosphere of family feud and religious 
crusade.
Beman provided Yancey with a good education. William 
attended the academies of Troy, Bennington, Chitteningo, and 
Lenox. In 1830 he entered Williams College in Massachusetts.
The president of the college at the time was Edward Dorr Griffin, 
a friend of Beman's and another evangelist. Yancey developed his 
unique oratorical style under Griffin's guidance. His classroom 
attendance, however, was erratic, and he withdrew from the school
Ralph B. Draughon, "William L. Yancey: From Unionist to 
Secessionist, 1814-1852," PhD Dissertation, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1968, 1-29; and Draughon, "The Young 
Manhood of william L. Yancey," Alabama Review 19 (1966), 28-37.
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in 1833. His family later claimed he left out of a desire to
save his stepfather some money. A contemporary rumor, however,
said he was expelled after hurling a pickle barrel through the
window of a nearby church.*
After a brief return to Georgia, Yancey moved to Greenville,
South Carolina, and studied law under the guidance of Benjamin
Perry. Yancey arrived just in time to take part in the
resolution of the Nullification Crisis. His father and his
family had all been staunch Federalists. The elder Yancey had
bitterly opposed Calhoun during his residence in South Carolina a
generation before, and Perry was the leading Unionist in the
Carolina upcountry. Yancey naturally opposed the Nullifiers and
sided with the Unionists.
Although the confrontation between state and federal
authority had just ended, the test-oath controversy forced
Carolinians to continue debating many of the issues which arose
during Nullification. Before the South Carolina Nullification
Convention adjourned, its members recommended that all state
officials take an oath of allegiance to their state, obliging
them to disobey federal authority in case of any future conflict.
Eager to jump into the fray, the eighteen year old Yancey
addressed the people of Abbeville District in a Fourth of July
oration which later events would prove ironic:
Listen, not then, my countrymen, to the voice which 
whispers... that Americans ... can no longer be mutual 
worshippers at the shrine of Freedom —  no longer can exist
*Draughon, "Yancey," 30-35.
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together, citizens of the same Republic.... Designing men 
have, indeed, effectually destroyed, in the minds of but too 
many in our State, the charm which has, until of late, 
invested our Federal Union. [Who can look at] the last few 
years, and not see the evident tendency of their proceedings 
to be, disunion and a Southern Confederacy?
That fall, Yancey became editor of a Unionist newspaper, the
Greenville Mountaineer, and as Perry recalled, "wielded a fierce
& terrible pen against Nullification and disunion." Never afraid
to challenge any foe, Yancey assailed Calhoun's theories of
government as "the loathsome offspring of failed Ambition.
On August 13, 1835, Yancey married Sarah Caroline Earle,
daughter of the wealthy Earle family of Greenville. The marriage
instantly changed Yancey's fortune; his bride's thirty-five
slaves suddenly elevated him to planter status. Yancey had
already grown accustomed to plantation living while residing with
relatives at Rosemonte and Oak Wood Place near Greenville. His
slaves provided him with a new means of support. He stopped his
study of law in 1836 and decided to move west to Alabama. He
purchased land near the town of Cahawba, close to an aunt and
uncle. Yancey lived with his uncle, Jesse Beene, for a year and
a half until his own home was completed. Beene v/as a prominent
state rights leader in Alabama and his influence on Yancey soon
supplanted that of Benjamin Perry's.
On a trip back to Greenville in 1838, Yancey's quick temper
Draughon, "Yancey," 38-51; Perry to Samford, August 29, 
1866, DuBose Correspondence, and William L. Yancey, "Address at 
Lodi, Abbeville District, July 4, 1834," typescript copy of 
speech in Greenville Mountaineer, July 12, 1834, Yancey Papers, 
Alabama Department of Archives and History.
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and sense of honor created an incident which would haunt him for 
years. While listening to congressional candidates debate,
Yancey shouted out an abusive remark about one of the speakers.
A nephew of the alleged "blackguard," Elias Earle, heard and took 
exception to the comment. Yancey and the young Earle, who was 
also Sarah's cousin, struck each other repeatedly but parted 
peacefully. After hearing his son's story. Dr. Robinson Earle, 
Sarah's uncle, became enraged and set off for Greenville to find 
Yancey, armed with a heavy walking stick and a small pocket 
knife. Yancey hoped to reason with the elder and much larger 
Earle, but also took a knife, a swordstick, and a pistol. After 
an abortive effort to talk calmly, Earle called Yancey a "g-d d-d 
liar." From his jail cell Yancey later recalled, "I then got my 
passions aroused. I told him to take back what he had said or 
take a shot." Earle refused to retract his damnation and 
advanced on Yancey, his cane raised menacingly over his head.
The two scuffled. Yancey fired at close range, beat Earle on the 
head with his empty gun, and "was in the act of running him 
thro'" with a knife when the two were separated. Earle died 
later that night.
A month later Yancey was tried, found guilty of 
manslaughter, sentenced to a year in jail and fined $1,500.
Yancey showed no remorse. He boasted to his brother, "I have 
done my duty as a man, & he who grossly insulted me lies now, 
with the clod upon his bosom." He felt that the episode would 
serve as a warning "to others who feel like brow beating a
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Yancey." He was released after he served three months, and had 
$1,000 of his fine returned.^
Yancey returned to Alabama with his honor vindicated but he 
soon faced a new series of problems. Caught in the Panic of 
1837, he watched in dismay as his cotton production flourished 
but prices and profits dropped steadily. In 1838 he bought 
control of the Cahawba Southern Democrat, but had difficulty 
collecting from subscribers. After a year of frustration he sold 
the Democrat and purchased the Wetumpka Argus. His energetic 
efforts at simultaneous plantation and newspaper management taxed 
his ability to deal with either very efficiently. Then, disaster 
struck in the summer of 1839. Almost all of his slaves were 
accidently poisoned, the unintended victims of two feuding 
overseers. Most died, and the survivors were too weak to work. 
Unable to harvest his cotton, Yancey was forced to sell all but 
six of his slaves to get enough money to survive the year. He 
returned to his legal studies and moved to Wetumpka in February, 
1840, so he could better supervise the Argus.
These crises led Yancey to review his outlook on local and 
national politics. He came to believe the Bank of the United 
States was responsible for many of the nation's financial 
problems. Continued abolitionist attacks on slavery made him 
more defensive about the peculiar institution. These issues 
tested his commitment to unionism, and Yancey quickly found John
Draughon, "Yancey," 61-68,71-76; William L. Yancey to 
Benjamin C. Yancey, September 8, 1838, typescript, Yancey Papers, 
ADAH.
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C. Calhoun and his state rights principles both admirable and 
useful against a menacing North.^
Yancey demonstrated his new commitment to state rights and 
southern rights by his activities in the presidential election of 
1840. In April he and his brother established the Wetumpka 
Southern Crisis, a weekly publication advocating the reelection 
of Martin Van Buren. As the newspaper's title suggested, the 
editors went to great lengths to prove to Alabamians that the 
election of Whig candidate, William Henry Harrison, would bring 
catastrophe to the South. Yancey told his readers that a Whig 
administration would reenact alien and sedition laws, pass a 
higher protective tariff, recharter a National Bank, tax 
southerners for northern internal improvements, tamper with 
slavery, and obliterate constitutional restraints on power, 
"making the President a King in all but name," and transforming 
Washington into "the centre of a vast, consolidated domain." He 
reminded his readers that "vigilance is the price of Liberty," 
and dutifully devoted his editorial attention to a relentless 
search for harbingers of evil. The Yancey brothers reprinted 
stories from other newspapers which claimed that Harrison had 
been a Federalist during the 1790's. They insisted that Harrison 
accepted political support from Abolitionists. The Yanceys 
repeated a fantastic story in which they claimed that Harrison, 
while a state senator in Ohio in 1821, had voted for a bill 
allowing county sheriffs to sell men, imprisoned for non-payment
^Draughon, "Yancey," 80-100.
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of fines, into bondage. Because the prisoner had to be sold to 
the highest bidder, so the story went, a white man could be 
"DRIVEN INTO SLAVERY BY A FREE NEGRO." As November drew closer, 
Yancey began the weekly publication of a short biography of 
Harrison. Designed solely to arouse indignation, it repeated 
every derogatory comment previously published, and added 
accusations of cowardice during wartime, charged Harrison with 
the desire to create a large, standing army, and listed a string
Oof his past electoral defeats.
Yancey's vigorous participation in the campaign impressed 
many of his fellow Democrats and helped propel him to a term in 
the Alabama General Assembly. After his election he passed the 
bar exam, sold the Argus, and devoted his full attention to 
politics. As a legislator he was not preoccupied by national 
issues. Instead, he promoted state-supported public education, 
the right of married women to own their own property, bank 
reform, and reform of the penal code and prisons. He also 
supported the re-districting of Alabama based on white population 
only; he thought that the "federal basis" of representation, 
which included slave population, favored a wealthy, aristocratic
Qminority.
Yancey moved from state to national politics in 1844 when he 
was elected to fill a vacant seat in the House of
O
Wetumpka Southern Crisis, especially May 16, 23, October 
24, 1840.
^Draughon, "Yancey," 103, 119-20.
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Representatives. Opposing protective tariffs and internal 
improvements, favoring the acquisition of both Texas and Oregon, 
he soon became one of the many southern Democrats who looked to 
John C. Calhoun for leadership. Yancey considered Texas 
annexation the most vital issue in the country. He sensed "a 
deeply seated hostility to the South" among northerners, and a 
desire "to alter her fundamental system of government" by 
shutting slavery out of the federal territories. Yancey claimed 
that the Missouri Compromise gave the North enough territory to 
create over twenty new states, but left the South only Florida. 
And yet, he charged, "a talk is kept up to frighten northern men 
out of their wits about the enormous preponderance which [Texas] 
annexation would give the South!
Yancey used Texas as a political litmus test and condemned 
southern politicians he considered weak on the issue. In his 
maiden speech in Congress, he levelled his oratorical guns at 
Thomas L. Clingman, a Whig from North Carolina. Yancey rose to 
give the official Democratic response to Clingman's opposition to 
Texas annexation. Every year, Yancey said, southerners lost 
strength in Congress due to "the fatal Missouri compromise." 
Scheming New Englanders were in the vanguard of a general 
northern effort to circumscribe the growth and power of the slave 
states. Yancey insisted the enormity of this sectional conflict 
was so great it demanded the united action of all southerners.
Yancey to J.R. Powell, J.A. Whetstone, B.L. Defreese, and
B.L. Rye, June 6, 1844, Yancey to John D. Kellog, et al, January 
25, 1845, both typescript copies in Yancey Papers, ADAH.
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regardless of party divisions. Clingman, he noted, thought
otherwise. "With him, the extension of our institutions... its
effect upon the institution of slavery...have not sufficient
interest or dignity to draw his intellect, or his passions."
Yancey exclaimed Clingman "had given a stab to the institutions
of his own land, and wears the garb of its enemy." Clingman's
position on Texas, said Yancey, "merits the scorn and execration
1 1of every honest heart of the South."
Yancey's zeal resulted in another violent confrontation.
Believing that Yancey's comments had tainted his honor, Clingman
challenged the Alabamian to a duel. The two agreed to meet in
Maryland even though that state had outlawed duelling years
before. Local officials sent police to stop the encounter, but
the two congressmen slipped away. On a cold winter day the two
faced each other on the field of honor, shot and missed. Both
felt vindicated, returned to Congress, and never exchanged
12hostile words again.
Yancey's famous temper manifested itself throughout his term
11William L. Yancey, Speech of Hon. Wm. Lowndes Yancey, of 
Alabama, on the Annexation of Texas to the United States (n.p.; 
Harris & Heart, "Constitution" Office, n.d.), in Yancey Papers, 
ADAH; Congressional Globe, 28th Congress, 2nd Session, 100-102.
1 2 .William L. Yancey, Memoranda of the Late Affair of Honor 
between T. L. Clingman, of North Carolina, and Hon. William L. 
Yancey, of Alabama, in Yancey Papers, ADAH; Draughon, "Yancey," 
l33-40. At least one southern Democrat, rooting along partisan 
lines, complained, "What a misfortune Yancey did not bore his man 
through..." George D. Phillips to Howell Cobb, February 21,
1845, in U. B. Phillips, ed.. The Correspondence of Robert 
Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens,~~and Howell Cobb (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1913), 66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
in Congress, sometimes with little provocation. When someone 
objected to his motion to adjourn in honor of George Washington's 
birthday, Yancey angrily demanded that the objector show his 
face. Sometimes Yancey realized that he overreacted. After 
calling some colleagues "pretended Democrats" during a discussion 
over internal improvements, he apologized, explaining "I regret 
that I too frequently, in the excitement of a general debate, use 
language that reflection convinces me were [sic] better left 
unused.
Yancey's congressional years saw his final rejection of his 
former unionism. He now considered the United States a mere 
"cluster of Governments, each of which has yielded certain powers 
to a federal head for purposes which are designated in the chart 
of union [the Constitution]." He believed all other powers 
belonged to the sovereign states. If the central government 
continued to enact sectional legislation, such as protective 
tariffs, Yancey warned that action would stir "sectional 
divisions, jealousies, and hatreds" in both the North and the 
South. "Economy, low duties, a scrupulous regard for State 
rights, a non-exercise of doubtful powers, will preserve the 
Republic," Yancey said.^^ His growing sensitivity to the plight 
of the South's fixed minority status changed his views of recent 
events. Referring to the South Carolina nullifiers, Yancey told
^^Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, l^t Session, 413, 499.
^^Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, l^t Session, 85, 360; 
Ibid., Appendix, 994.
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the House of Representatives, "a band of more honorable men never 
existed." He excused his former opposition to nullification by 
denying his ability "to have had fixed opinions upon such grave 
matters when under age." During a tribute to Andrew Jackson, 
Yancey explained the sole function of government was to provide 
for "the greatest good for the greatest number, consistent with 
the inalienable rights of the minority.
Although reelected without opposition in 1845, within a year 
Yancey had had enough of national politics. He resigned from 
Congress, claiming that financial considerations demanded his 
departure from Washington. But his primary reason for leaving 
was his belief that representatives in Congress compromised 
principle for the sake of party unity. Nothing satisfied Yancey. 
He had condemned politicians, like Clingman, who he said were 
overly partisan. He also blasted northern Democrats for 
abandoning their party to support sectional issues, "with one 
brilliant exception," David Wilmot of Pennsylvania. Ironically, 
only a few weeks after Yancey left Congress, Wilmot offered his 
famous Proviso which called for the prohibition of slave 
expansion into any territories the United States might acquire 
from Mexico.
Upon his return to Alabama Yancey moved to the capital.
Ibid., 626, 652; William L. Yancey, An Oration on the Life 
and Character of Andrew Jackson (Baltimore: Printed by James 
Lucas, 1846), 2T1
^^Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 1st Session, 995-96; 
Draughon^ "Yancey," 168-69.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
80
Montgomery, and made an impressive return to state politics.
There he established a law firm with John A. Elmore, a relative
of Robert Barnwell Rhett. He continued to be active in state
politics and quickly gained the respect of city officials. When
John A. Quitman, former Governor of Mississippi and more recently
a hero of the Mexican War, traveled through the capital late in
1847, city leaders chose Yancey to give the official reception
oration. His most significant work at this time suddenly brought
him back into the national spotlight. With the aid of Mobile
politician John A. Campbell and the support of Senator Dixon H.
Lewis, Yancey co-authored a series of resolutions known
collectively as the Alabama Platform. A direct response to the
Wilmot Proviso, these resolutions, passed in the Alabama state
Democratic Convention, expressly forbade Congress from preventing
the expansion of slavery into the territories. One plank bound
Alabama delegates to the upcoming national party convention to
withhold support from any presidential candidate who did not
1 7endorse the Platform.
Elected delegate-at-large to the Baltimore convention.
17Journal of the Democratic Convention, Held in the City of 
Montgomery on the 14th and 15th of February, 1848 (Montgomery; 
M'Cormick & Walshe, Printers, 1848 ) , 10-14; J .  Mills Thornton, 
Politics and Power in a Slaye Society; Alabama, 1800-1860 (Baton 
Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 173, credits 
Yancey with primary authorship of the Platform. Ralph Draughon, 
in "Yancey," 182-90, shows the influence of others was at least 
as important. Senator Lewis himself warned Yancey at the time, 
"Attempts have been made to get up the impression that the 
Alabama Platform was made up by you —  & to express your 
individual opinions." Lewis to Yancey, June 29, 1848, Yancey 
Papers, ADAH.
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Yancey spent the early months of 1848 preparing himself and his
party for a confrontation over the Platform. He sent letters to
all leading Democratic candidates for the presidency, Lewis Cass,
James Buchanan, Levi Woodbury, and George M. Dallas, explaining
the Platform and asking each to respond so he could publish their
answers and help his delegation determine which man to support.
He warned these men that the territorial question was of the
utmost importance to southerners,and that failure to endorse the
Platform would jeopardize "the perpetuity of the union" and risk
losing "the equality of privileges, which that union was designed
18to confer upon the people."
When the convention met in May, delegates nominated Lewis 
Cass of Michigan and George M. Dallas of Pennsylvania for 
president and vice-president, respectively. They also soundly 
defeated the Alabama Platform by a vote of 36 to 216. Yancey and 
one other Alabama delegate, P. A. Wray, believed they no longer 
had any business in Baltimore and abruptly stormed out of the 
convention.
Yancey's actions created tremors throughout the South. A 
former North Carolina congressman found Yancey's course unduly 
provocative, the Platform characterized by "hair-splitting 
distinctions," and the combined effect of the Platform and 
Yancey's antics likely only to antagonize and abuse the 
friendship of northern Democrats. A prominent Georgia Democrat
18For example, see Yancey to James Buchanan, May 2, 1848, 
James Buchanan Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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called the Platform "a pack of nonsense," and was incredulous 
that all nine Georgia delegates voted for it. He suspected 
Yancey, Calhoun, and the editors of the Charleston Mercury had 
formed some sort of "clique" to gain control of the Democratic 
party. The Alabama delegates who remained at the convention 
condemned Yancey for leaving and labelled him a traitor to his 
party. Yancey answered his colleagues' accusations in a seventy- 
eight page pamphlet. It was the rest of the delegation, he 
maintained, not William Yancey, who had acted treacherously; the 
thirteenth and fourteenth resolutions forbade them from 
supporting any candidate who did not unequivocally avow the 
principles of the Platform. He accused the others of remaining 
for petty political purposes, such as trying to secure the vice- 
presidential nomination for an Alabamian, even though rejection 
of the Platform meant "there was a real, palpable danger hanging 
over the South.
Nothing Yancey said or wrote persuaded many Alabama 
Democrats to withhold support for Cass. In June, Yancey and a 
handful of other extremists decided to adhere to the Alabama 
Platform even if Alabama would not. A self-appointed committee, 
which included Yancey, Campbell, and Elmore, looked beyond the 
organized political parties for an acceptable presidential
19James C. Dobbin to Howell Cobb, June 15, 1848, Henry R. 
Jackson to Howell Cobb, June 21, 1848, in Phillips, ed.. 
Correspondence, 108, 110-11; William L. Yancey, An Address to the 
People of Alabama, by W.L. Yancey, Late a Delegate, at Large, for 
the State of Alabama, to the National Democratic Convention, Held 
at Baltimore, on the 22d May, A.D. 1848 (Montgomery; Flag and 
Advertiser Job Office, 1848), 3, 4, 23, 27, 33, 40-43, 50, 79.
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candidate. They wrote to former Senator Littleton W. Tazewell of 
Virginia. They explained to the seventy-four year old Virginian 
that Cass's failure to embrace the Alabama Platform was proof the 
Democrat was ideologically unsound on the questions of slave 
expansion, southern equality, and the power of the federal ,
government. They told Tazewell "we...have refused to recognize 
his nomination as binding on us, and we are resolved to war 
against his election." They turned to Tazewell because of the 
senator's vigilant defense of state rights earlier in the 
century, and asked him to stand as a presidential candidate for 
their planned new party. Before Tazewell responded, Yancey wrote 
to Calhoun, whom he now looked to as a political advisor, both to
complain of the problems involved in creating a new party and to
discuss strategy. "I have labored incessantly, but I begin to 
despair," he told Calhoun. "I have hardly yet struck a spark 
from the flinty bosom of the [Democratic] party." He found his 
fellow citizens "determined to vote for the regular ticket," a 
decision he believed one could only reach out of "great ignorance 
of the political character of Cass." Yancey believed it 
essential for his faction to promote its cause through its own 
newspaper. Without one, he explained, "I greatly fear that we 
can not make even a start in Alabama." Yancey hoped at least to 
split the Democratic vote and secure the election of the Whig 
candidate, Zachary Taylor.
^^Henry C. Semple, William L. Yancey, S. Heydenfeldt, John
A. Campbell, W. Harris, J.A. Elmore, and Thomas Mays to Littleton
W. Tazewell, June 20, 1848, Henry Churchill Semple Papers, ADAH;
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By his own admission, Yancey's dream of a third party had
little chance of success. Tazewell dealt the vision a fatal blow
by refusing to run, because of his advanced age. On the same day
that Tazewell sent his letter. Senator Lewis of Alabama wrote
Yancey to dissuade him from continuing to back a third party
movement. Lewis began by approving all of Yancey's actions
during the Baltimore Convention. He expressed great confidence
in Yancey's "power of carrying a crowd," but warned him "you had
not even a half of a chance" of creating a viable new party in
Alabama. The senator then offered Yancey advice which would soon
have a profound effect on Yancey's thinking:
But why talk of a 3rd Party? You have given me the names of 
several of the most respectable men in the State —  I know 
none more so —  They are now all Democrats —  ...with half 
the activity & zeal required to start a new Party —  they
might to any desirable extent... control the party to which
they now belong. Cut off these gentlemen however, into a 
separate party —  & how powerless —  With all due respect to 
them & to you, I doubt if they could carry a single County 
in the State.
Yancey had learned many important lessons during the campaign of
1848, but twelve years would pass before he would implement
21Lewis's strategy.
When Californians clamored for admission to the Union late 
in 1849, the debate over the expansion of slavery again dominated 
Congress and preoccupied the nation. As the Nashville Convention
Yancey to John C. Calhoun, June 14, 1848, in Chauncey Boucher and 
Robert P. Brooks, eds., Correspondence Addressed to John C. 
Calhoun (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930 ), 441.
21Littleton W. Tazewell to Semple, Yancey, et al, June 29, 
1848, Semple Papers; Lewis to Yancey, June 29, 1848, Yancey 
Papers, ADAH.
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met to discuss possible southern responses to the situation,
Yancey worked to bolster opposition to the Compromise of 1850 in
Alabama and to convince all southerners of the necessity for
secession in case southern rights were not vindicated. A month 
before the Nashville meeting, Yancey had participated in a non­
partisan gathering in Montgomery which resolved to support any 
positions recommended in Tennessee.
Although delegates reached no consensus in Nashville, Yancey
wholeheartedly endorsed Robert Barnwell Rhett's impassioned call
for southern resistance to the Compromise, and marshalled his
energies to rally the spirit of resistance in the deep South. On
the Fourth of July, 1850, Yancey used the double occasion of
Independence Day and the official Montgomery observance of the
death of John C. Calhoun to argue against the pending Compromise.
Yancey admitted he had once opposed Calhoun's notions about state
and federal relations, but explained he had "neither appreciated
nor understood" the Carolinian's genius. Now, Yancey insisted,
he did. He repeated Calhoun's plea to southerners "to crush the
golden idol of party" and join in a common crusade to protect
southern rights. He reminded his audience that as early as 1833
Calhoun had warned the South that the "spirit of Abolitionism"
would relentlessly attack slavery. Yancey added that since that
date southerners had compromised and conceded so much one might
2 2well wonder if they had any spirit of resistance left. The
22William L. Yancey, An Address on the Life and Character of 
John Caldwell Calhoun (Montgomery: Job Office Advertiser and 
Gazette Print, 1850), 7, 43-48, 56-58, 65.
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next month Yancey participated in "an immense Southern meeting"
in Montgomery which adopted "moderate yet firm ground" on the
Compromise issue and appointed two delegates —  Yancey and John
Cochran of Eufaula —  to join Barnwell Rhett at "the great Mass
Meeting" planned for Macon, Georgia, the next week. There, one
critic noted, "The godlike Rhett and his adjutant Yancey preached
most eloquently in behalf of treason." Indeed, Rhett gave a
long, inspired plea for disunion. Yancey followed by repeating
Rhett's assertion that the Compromise would allow the North to
trample on the rights of the South, and called on Georgians to
cease all discussion and prepare themselves for war. When
Congress passed the Compromise package in September, Yancey
21returned to Alabama to campaign for secession.
During the autumn of 1850 Yancey began promoting the 
creation of Southern Rights Associations throughout Alabama, 
organizations designed to promote secession. He inaugurated one 
himself in Montgomery, and through it called for a state-wide 
convention of Southern Rights Associations to assemble in the 
capital in February. Eighty-four delegates gathered, 
representing seventeen associations and eleven south Alabama 
counties. Yancey turned this small meeting into his personal 
forum. With the Compromise of 1850 a reality, Yancey argued
23Yancey to Benjamin C. Yancey, August 17, 1850, Benjamin 
Yancey Papers, University of North Carolina; James A. Meriwether 
to Howell Cobb, August 24, 1850, in Phillips, ed..
Correspondence, 210; Draughon, "Yancey," 212-15; Allan Nevins, 
Ordeal of the~Union: Fruits of Manifest Destiny 1847-1852 (New 
York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), 354.
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there was no longer any "middle ground between submission and 
secession." He had not yet accepted Senator Lewis's opinion that 
creating a third party was futile; he called on his fellow 
delegates "to know no party but the great Southern Party." The 
resolutions adopted confirmed Yancey's position "That the 
question of the secession of Alabama from this government is 
reduced to that of time and policy only." Anticipating the 
actions of a similar convention ten years later, the Southern 
Rights convention issued a call to other slave states to secede, 
send representatives to Montgomery, "and use all proper efforts 
to the formation of a Southern Confederacy."
Yancey and twelve others wrote an appeal to the people of 
Alabama that stressed protecting both slavery and the 
inalienable rights of white southerners. Before the convention 
presented the appeal, Yancey had one final resolution adopted; 
"That African slavery, as it exists in the Southern States of 
this Union, is both politically and morally right, and that the 
history of the world furnishes no proof that slavery is either 
evil or sinful." The appeal was based on this resolution. With 
the federal territories closed to slave expansion, it stated, the 
South would soon be so overpopulated by blacks that slavery "will 
in time be looked upon as a curse." If circumscribed long 
enough, slave labor would become so cheap that it would drive out 
"free white labor of every description." With slavery shut out 
of the territories the "dominant free soil power in the 
government" would continue to grow and render the South a
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permanent, powerless minority. Then the "great aim" of the free- 
soil North would manifest itself in "our political destruction 
and the emancipation of our slaves." When faced with this sort 
of "absolute despotism," Yancey and his colleagues told their 
fellow citizens that their duty required them "to throw off such 
government and to provide new safeguards for their future 
safety," just as the Founding Fathers had done. To shrink from 
this obligation was to discard the Declaration of Independence. 
This group admitted that they were advocating rebellion, but 
rejoined, "Washington was a rebell LaFayette was a rebel —  and 
so was Tell and so is Kossuth —  rebels against abuse of power; 
and welcome to us be the appellation received in defense of our 
rights and liberties.
After the convention adjourned, Yancey continued to promote 
secession by drawing ever sharper distinctions between supporters 
of resistance and Unionists. He declined a request from the 
Dallas County Southern Rights Association to run for governor; he 
refused to divert his attention from "the only issue" of 
importance in 1851, whether the South should quietly submit "to 
the unconstitutional action of congress," or should resist "by 
separate State secession." He told his Dallas County supporters 
the people of Alabama must align themselves with one of two 
groups ;
Journal of the Southern Rights Convention Held in the City 
of Montgomery, February 10, 1851, and the Address of the 
Committee (Montgomery; Book and Job Office of the DailyAtlas, 
18Ô1), 3^4, 8, 10, 13-14, 17, 34-39; Draughon, "Yancey," 220, 
223-24.
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In the ranks of the Advocates of submission will eventually
be gathered whatever there is of federal and abolition
tendencies in our midst, while...beneath banners of 
secession will as inevitably be rallied all that are true, 
to the institution of African slavery as a part of the 
fundamental basis of the social and political polity of the 
South, and all that shall prefer citizenship under separate 
State Sovereignty, to a servile acquiescence in the 
consolidation of the federal government upon the basis of 
free-soilism.
Yancey predicted that the practice of "pandering to party 
prejudices....must soon exhaust itself." He promised advocates 
of secession that perfecting their organization and continuing to
explain the necessity of secession to the public would rapidly
win enough converts to accomplish their goal. In a prophetic 
afterthought Yancey said that even if southerners rejected 
secession this time, his tactics would ensure success the next 
time southerners felt "outraged and disregarded." Then, he 
stated, "we shall...not have again to await the slow process of 
the disintegration of those old parties which have heretofore 
preyed upon the vitals of the South.
Throughout the summer, Yancey futilely continued his 
campaign for secession. During debates with his Whig rival,
Henry W. Hilliard, Yancey affirmed his commitment to secession, 
but he sensed that his cause was losing ground. The debates, 
therefore, were anticlimactic. Hilliard noticed that Yancey 
spoke passionately, "but not with the vigor I had expected from 
him." Yancey split his attention between Alabama and South
25Yancey to Joel E. Matthews, C.C. Pegues, J.H. Campbell,
C.H. Cleveland, and G.W. Gayle, May 10, 1851, Yancey Papers, 
ADAH.
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Carolina. Like many other secessionists, he had hoped the 
Palmetto state would secede first and act as a catalyst for 
secession in other states. Yancey watched with frustration as 
both South Carolina and Alabama showed signs of rejecting 
secession and returning to national politics as usual. The 
unionist Alabama Journal reported that "No one could have 
defended a bad cause better than did Mr. Yancey," but that in 
his last few outings his "heart did not seem in it." "He found 
himself," the Journal said, "in a position which he recently 
deprecated —  that of tolerating expediency and milder remedies." 
By the year's end. Unionists had triumphed in Alabama, and South 
Carolina had balked at seceding alone. Yancey wrote bitterly to 
his brother that the southern rights cause had disintegrated in 
Alabama. He said half of those who had once advocated resistance 
were "as much submissionists as the union men." He correctly 
predicted that the upcoming presidential election would "kill off
all that remains of So. Rightsism" and witness a return to "old
2 6party colors."
In despair Yancey turned away from politics and busied 
himself with his law practice. He reconciled himself to lending 
tacit support to the Georgia Platform, a declaration in which 
that state both pledged to support the Compromise of 1850 
(although it considered the measures unconstitutional) and vowed
2 6George F. Mellon, "Henry W. Hilliard and William L. 
Yancey," The Sewanee Review 17 (1909), 44-47; Draughon, "Yancey," 
225, 242, 243, 247-48, 256-60; Yancey to Benjamin C. Yancey, 
November 7, 1851, Benjamin Yancey Papers, University of North 
Carolina.
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to resist future federal encroachments on southern rights, even
to secession. Yancey thought the Georgia Platform was as far as
"Southern Rights men could hope now to advance," and he believed
it would protect southern rights better than the Democratic
party. While other state and national Democrats returned to the
party fold, Yancey still insisted that all national parties only
"deaden that active, inquiring and searching sectional spirit
which alone could guard us against Northern aggression."
Throughout the South, Democratic leaders rejoiced when Yancey
decided to withdraw from party activity. In Louisiana, John
Slidell exclaimed, "As to the Rhetts, Yanceys &c, the sooner we
get rid of them the better." Two Georgia Democrats told governor
Howell Cobb that they believed only "the most violent of the
violent may follow the example of Yancey and others in Alabama,
but the masses of the party will gladly return to their old
standard." Yancey told a friend he would gladly vote for
Democratic presidential nominee Franklin Pierce in the fall of
1852 to prevent the election of Whig candidate Winfield Scott,
but he did not think Pierce's chance of election in jeopardy.
Although Yancey found the Southern Rights ticket (George M. Troup
of Georgia and John Quitman) more representative of his own
views, he offered it only lukewarm support. That November, the
27disillusioned fire-eater did not even vote.
27Yancey to Benjamin C. Yancey, November 7, 1851, newspaper 
clipping, dated February 25, 1852, both in Benjamin Yancey 
Papers, University of North Carolina; John Slidell to Howell 
Cobb, January 28, 1852, John E. Ward and Henry R. Jackson to 
Howell Cobb, February 28, 1852, in Phillips, ed.. Correspondence,
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Compared to the tense sectional conflicts of the preceding 
years, southern politics in the early and middle 1850's were 
relatively calm. The lack of exciting sectional issues forced 
all fire-eaters, Yancey included, into political hibernation.
But this period was critically important for the personal and 
political maturation of Yancey. It provided the agitator with an 
opportunity for introspection and time to revise his political 
strategy.
Yancey could not tolerate inactivity. In the summer of 
1851, he took his family to coastal Alabama for a brief vacation. 
"The sea breeze, salt water bathing & excellent fishing 
constitute strong attractions," he told his brother, but added, 
"It is dull, very dull to me." As opportunities for political 
agitation diminished, he gave his energy and attention to his law 
practice. Yancey kept his docket full. Once when John Elmore, 
his partner, fell ill, Yancey worked many days from dawn to dusk 
without stopping for meals. Although he sometimes complained 
about his burden, Yancey thrived on his work. "I am almost 
overwhelmed in business," he told Ben, "but [am] working under it 
bravely." Thomas Watts remembered that Yancey relied on Elmore 
to do the bulk of the research for their court cases while Elmore 
relied on Yancey's oratorical magic to sway judges and juries. 
This strategy usually worked. He and Elmore had a large
275-76, 286; John Witherspoon DuBose, The Life and Times of 
William Lowndes Yancey; A History of Political Parties in the 
United States, from 1834 to 1864; Especially as to the Origin of 
the Confederate States (2 volumes, reprint; New York; Peter 
Smith, 1942), I, 265, 269-70.
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clientele and made quite a bit of money. Watts explained that
the two charged reasonable fees, but pointed out Yancey "was
2 ftrather a careful collector." Not afraid to tamper with 
success, Yancey wrote to Ben in 1854 asking him to leave Georgia 
and come to Montgomery to practice law with him. "I will 
dissolve with Elmore & take you into partnership," he offered. 
Four years later, he did just that. The brothers practiced 
together for a year until Ben received a diplomatic mission to 
the Argentine Confederacy. In 1860, Yancey formed a new 
partnership with William Parrish Chilton and before the end of 
the year included his own son, Benjamin, and W.P. Chilton, Jr.^^ 
Yancey was seldom distracted by national politics at this 
time. In 1852 and 1856, some of his supporters advanced Yancey's 
name for a cabinet post. The second movement was fairly serious. 
Ben helped from Georgia by soliciting the aid of congressman- 
elect Howell Cobb. Cobb was receptive if not enthusiastic, and 
promised to use his influence to promote Yancey's cause. Yancey 
never expected anything to come of all this, but was thrilled to 
see the effect rumors of his possible appointment had on his
2 8Yancey to Benjamin Yancey, August 20, November 7, 1851, 
December 5, 1852, October 2, 1854, February 5, March 26, [April], 
1855, Benjamin Yancey Papers, University of North Carolina;
Watts, "Reminiscences," in DuBose Collection, ADAH.
29Yancey to Benjamin Yancey, October 2, 1854, Yancey to 
Caroline Beman, fragment, August 13, 1858, Benjamin Yancey 
Papers, University of North Carolina; DuBose, Yancey, I, 406.
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political opponents in Montgomery.^® In 1856 Yancey made a tour
of South Carolina, and residents of the state greeted him as a
hero. Various committees honored him for his bold advocacy of 
state rights a few years earlier by lavishing him and his wife
with gifts of silverware, silver goblets, and a watch and chain.
"Quite satisfactory exhibitions of popular favor," Yancey smugly 
reported to his brother. The next year he made a short visit to 
Washington, where he held a small reunion with some of his old 
congressional colleagues. While in the capital he approached the 
secretary of state in a successful effort to press for his 
brother's diplomatic appointment. Despite these brushes with
political favor, Yancey resolved to return to Alabama and
31relative obscurity.
Yancey's attention to his law practice did not absorb all 
his attention, however. His practice brought him back into 
professional contact with Benjamin Perry, and, in spite of their 
political incompatibility, gave them an opportunity to 
reestablish their friendship. Yancey planned a family vacation 
in Greenville. He fondly wished "for the children of the two 
families to know much of each other." Although "Mrs. Y. and the 
children, have been ready (trunks packed) for two weeks,"
West Point (Georgia) Advocate, January 20, 1853, Yancey to 
Benjamin Yancey, December 4, 25, 1Ô56, Howell Cobb to Benjamin 
Yancey, December 20, 1856, all in Benjamin Yancey Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
31Yancey to Benjamin Yancey, January 12, 1856, and to 
Caroline Beman, April 5 [1857], Benjamin Yancey Papers,
University of North Carolina. Ironically, the Secretary of State 
at this time was the despised Lewis Cass.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
business considerations prevented William from joining them. 
Referring both to this misfortune and to the shooting of Dr. 
Earle, Yancey lamented to Perry, "I am fated, I fear, never to 
visit Greenville in peace."
The time Yancey spent away from politics gave him time to 
spend with his family. He took great pride in his children and
loved them deeply. He named his eldest child, Benjamin, after
his father and brother. Yancey bragged to Perry that Ben was 
"reflecting, amiable, and a fine student, beloved by teacher 
scholar & neighbor." He boasted that his daughter, Mary, was 
"tall, fine-looking —  Yancey in all her features —  very 
affectionate —  very studious." His other children were all 
boys; William, Goodloe Harper ("very much like me"), and Dalton
Huger ("Yancey all over"). Children held an obvious charm over
the fire-eating Yancey. "Children should not have drilled into 
them the sedateness & gravity of age," he advised his brother. 
Instead, Yancey urged Ben to "let them romp...as much as they 
please.
Yancey had advice to offer on all domestic issues. He once 
counselled a friend who was about to marry, "You are entering 
upon a new sphere, a holier and happier one, than you have 
heretofore moved in." Yancey thought it crucial for a husband to
32Yancey to Ferry, December 2, 1852, July 25, 1853, May 20, 
1854, July 17, September 19, December 25, 1855, Benjamin F. Perry 
Papers, ADAH.
33Yancey to Perry, September 19, 1854, Perry Papers, ADAH; 
Yancey to Benjamin Yancey, December 12, 1851, Benjamin Yancey 
Papers, University of North Carolina.
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restrain his temper and never swear. On these two points, Yancey 
admitted, "I do not teach by example you will say, 'tis true." 
Drawing from his own experiences with Sarah, Yancey promised his 
friend that if one worked hard to make a marriage strong, he 
would be rewarded with "a sweet confidence which the world can 
never disturb.
Years after urging a friend to restrain his temper, Yancey 
began to show signs of doing the same. He had learned that 
uncontrolled emotion often undermined his best intentions when he 
spoke. As he explained to Ben, he now tried to avoid sarcastic 
remarks and provocative verbal attacks. "I endeavor to be 
entirely conciliatory," he said, "and while this detracts from 
the brilliancy and spice of one's efforts, yet it gains the ears 
of the opposition and opens the way to their hearts." Yancey 
noted that his political opponents greeted this change with 
alarm, and told him "they would rather hear my abuse." Even when 
Yancey controlled his temper, his speeches provided plenty of 
"spice." An observer described one of Yancey's speeches as 
"seasoned with the salt of argument, the vinegar of sarcasm, the 
pepper of wit, and the genuine champaigne [sic] of eloquence 
The "prince of the fire-eaters" would continue to lose his temper 
occasionally, but seldom again would he hurl verbal pickle
34Yancey to W.O. Baldwin, November 24, 1843, Yancey Papers,
ADAH.
^^Yancey to Benjamin Yancey, July 8, 1856; W. B. Figures to 
Benjamin Yancey, September 8, 1856, Benjamin Yancey Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
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barrels through windows.
Yancey first used his new speaking style against a new foe, 
the American Party. Also referred to as the Know-Nothings, this 
party emerged in the mid-1850's and campaigned to curb 
immigration and exclude Catholics and the foreign-born from 
public office. Yancey found these goals so alarming that he 
ended his self-imposed political exile to oppose them. He never 
shared the xenophobia characteristic of the Know-Nothings. On 
the contrary, he rejoiced over the prospect of new waves of 
immigration. In 1845, Yancey had argued that immigrants "make up 
the sum of our national glory," and opposed congressional 
legislation intended to restrict immigration. In direct 
opposition to the thinking of Beverley Tucker, Yancey believed 
people with the least experience in self-government (blacks 
excluded) often made the best candidates for American citizens.
In one debate he stated, "honest poverty drilled in hatred of 
despotism by the long train of suffering under its deep rooted 
and relentless oppression of the poor, is the best material for 
our simple republican principles to operate upon." He pointed 
out that all Americans had immigrant backgrounds, and hailed 
immigration as "the genius of our c o u n t r y . Y a n c e y  described 
America as a "glorious temple to... religious equality." He said 
that when the American party sought to tamper with religious
Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, l£t Session, appendix, 
43; Yancey to Benjamin Yancey, April 25, 1855, Benjamin Yancey 
Papers, University of North Carolina; undated speech, folder # 8, 
William L. Yancey Papers, ADAH,
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freedom, it attacked the first amendment guarantees written by
the Founding Fathers and, therefore, was "eminently anti-
American." If one party could legally proscribe Catholics, he
warned his fellow southerners, another could as easily proscribe
Baptists or Methodists.
While sincerely fearful the American party would destroy
fundamental rights, Yancey saw a greater threat in their
positions on slavery and secession. He stressed the origins of
Know-Nothingism in the North, where, he said, it was firmly
allied with Abolitionism. The party's platform treated slavery
"only as incidental," and thereby demonstrated the party's
willingness to "sacrifice the South" to win votes. Yancey
predicted that in a short time northerners would control every
branch of the federal government; when that happened, he doubted
that southern interests would remain safe. Should any hostile,
sectional party prevail and attack slavery with the power of the
federal government, the South would have no choice but to secede.
And yet, Know-Nothings stood for the Union "without
qualification," even if it entailed the violation of southern
rights. Therefore, Yancey concluded, "Know-Nothingism proposes
to maintain the union and crush secession, or any resistance to
3 8any kind [of] usurpation of power by the Union."
37Yancey to Benjamin Yancey, April 25, 1855, Benjamin Yancey 
Papers, University of North Carolina; Yancey to William H. 
Northington, June 23, 1855, in DuBose, Yancey, I, 294-97.
3 8Yancey to Benjamin Yancey, April 25, 1855, Benjamin Yancey 
Papers, University of North Carolina; Yancey's speech at 
Columbus, Georgia,in DuBose, Yancey, I, 297-309.
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Yancey's campaign against the Know-Nothings brought him back 
into cooperation with the Democratic party. He canvassed the 
state in support of Democrats in 1856 and worked energetically 
for the election of James Buchanan. Throughout the campaign he 
carried out his pledge to "speak respectfully, and with no 
feeling." Yancey refused the temptation to answer accusations 
his opponents levelled at Buchanan, and chose instead to "show up 
his virtues, his present position & that of our party." Yancey 
debated Know-Nothings in Alabama all summer, at one point 
confronting three at once in an effort "to weed out the whole 
thicket of KN orators." He ended the campaign with eight debates 
in eight different cities in thirteen days. The Democrats of 
Alabama rewarded him for his efforts by naming him a presidential 
elector for Buchanan.
Beginning in 1858, Yancey's health became a threat to his 
renewed political activity. Neuralgia in his back, shoulders, 
and ribs weakened him, affected his digestion, made him cry out 
in pain at night, and almost prevented him from walking. His law 
practice suffered, and he considered traveling to water-cure 
hospitals in Arkansas and even in Europe for relief. Debilitated 
through the spring of 1859, he was still observed to have "a 
decided stoop in the shoulders" as late as June, 1860. His pain 
was so intense he turned to alcohol and morphine for relief.
39Yancey to Benjamin Yancey, April 25, 1855, July 8, 
September 22, 1856, Benjamin Yancey Papers, University of North 
Carolina; undated newspaper clipping in folder #22, William L. 
Yancey Papers, ADAH.
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When Edmund Ruffin observed one of Yancey's speeches in 1858, the 
Virginian mistakenly assumed the Alabamaian required alcohol to 
brace himself for a public appearance, but there is no evidence 
that Yancey's use of alcohol ever became abusive.
When the Montgomery Commercial Convention assembled in May, 
1858, Yancey considered it so great an opportunity to renew 
sectional agitation that he participated, despite his illness. 
These conventions, which met annually in various southern cities, 
were designed to promote commercial development in the South. A 
year before, the Knoxville convention had asked Yancey to 
participate in a debate over the re-opening of the African Slave 
trade at the next meeting. A month before the Montgomery 
convention opened, Yancey wrote to his old acquaintance Louis 
Wigfall, and asked the Texas fire-eater to come to the 
convention. Although Wigfall did not attend, both Edmund Ruffin 
and Barnwell Rhett did. Under Yancey's leadership, these three 
men politicized the convention and transformed it into a forum to 
promote southern rights and secession.
40Yancey to Caroline Beman, August 13, 1858, to Benjamin 
Yancey, November 7, 1858, to Dr. J.S. Hamilton, March 3, 1859, in 
Benjamin Yancey Papers, University of North Carolina; Yancey to 
Caroline Beman, March 5, 1859, Benjamin Yancey Papers, William R. 
Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina; Yancey 
to Reverend William H. Mitchell, September 3, 1859, Yancey 
Papers, ADAH; Hesseltine, ed.. Three Against Lincoln, 274-75; 
Ruffin, Diary, I, 188. Bertram Wyatt-Brown, in Southern Honor; 
Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1982), 359, dismissed Yancey as an alcoholic without the 
slightest mention of the underlying medical problems he faced.
41Yancey to Louis T. Wigfall, April 16, 1858, Wigfall Family 
Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress; DuBose, 
Yancey, I, 360.
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Yancey's debate over the African Slave trade with Roger A. 
Pryor of Virginia dominated the convention. Yancey attacked the 
federal prohibition of the trade as a creature of abolitionism, 
as a law designed to destroy southern honor by condemning one 
facet of an institution Yancey considered good and moral in all 
its manifestations. With his intense emotions under control, 
Yancey concluded the prohibition "was not only to check the 
prosperity of the South by cutting off the main artery of its 
prosperity, but to degrade us, and brand us in the estimation of 
what my friend from Virginia (Mr. Pryor) calls the opinion of 
Christendom. Rather the opinion of devildom." After the 
convention, Yancey continued to campaign for the repeal of the 
law he found so odious. In letters to the editor of a local 
newspaper and to the editor of the influential DeBcw's Review, 
Yancey said each state government, not the federal government, 
should decide for itself whether or not to engage in such trade. 
He found it "equally monstrous and unconstitutional" to punish as 
pirates those who currently engaged in the trade.
Yancey did not expect to unite the South on this or any 
other single issue. He knew some southerners would not consider 
the slave trade important enough an issue over which to secede. 
His fellow southerners thought a better reason would be the
42Newspaper clipping. May 1858, folder #17, William L.
Yancey Papers, ADAH; Yancey to Thomas J. Orme, May 22, 1858, in 
DuBose, Yancey, I, 367; Yancey to the editors of the Montgomery 
Advertiser, June 13, 1859, in Charleston Mercury, July 9, 1859; 
Yancey to J.D.B. DeBow, March 25 [1858 or 1859], James D.B. DeBow 
Papers, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham,
North Carolina.
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election of a Republican president in 1860. Yancey objected that
the legal, constitutional election of a president would be the
worst conceivable reason for disunion. In that case, he said, "I
am asked to put myself in the position of a traitor or a rebel,"
and if the federal government used armed force to "put down the
revolution, [I would] be hung." However, Yancey promised to
support any excuse for secession because, in his mind, "the Union
had already been dissolved" by the Compromise of 1850. As he
explained to the convention.
All my aims and objects are to cast before the people of the 
South as great a mass of wrongs committed on them, injuries 
and insults that have been done, as I possibly can. One 
thing will catch our eye here and determine our hearts; 
another thing elsewhere; all united, may yet produce enough 
spirit to lead us foreward, to call forth a Lexington, to 
fight a.Bunker's Hill, to drive the foe from the city of our 
rights.4j
Edmund Ruffin listened and watched with delight. He 
believed he had at last found the man to help him breathe life 
into one of his most cherished schemes, the League of United 
Southerners. The old Virginian approached Yancey after the 
convention and discussed his plan to create organizations 
throughout the South to promote secession. Ruffin had already 
written a concise "Declaration & League," showed it to Yancey, 
and gained his wholehearted approval. The two remained in 
contact until Yancey established a Montgomery chapter of the 
League that summer.
43Quoted from DuBose, Yancey, I, 361-63.
44Scarborough, ed., Ruffin Diary, I, 195-96, 200,
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Yancey had different expectations from the League than he 
did from the old Southern Rights Associations. He finally took 
Senator Lewis's argument to heart, and decided to work within the 
Democratic party instead of working to overcome it. "If the 
Democracy were overthrown," he now believed, "it would result in 
giving place to a hungrier swarm of flies." Yancey discussed his 
plans for the League in a private letter which soon found its way 
into the nation's newspapers. In a letter to James S. Slaughter 
he said.
No National Party can save us; no Sectional Party can do it. 
But if we could do as our fathers did, organize committees 
of safety all over the cotton States...we shall fire the 
Southern heart —  instruct the Southern mind —  give courage 
to each other, and at the proper moment, by one organized, 
concerted action, we can precipitate the cotton States into 
a Revolution.
Yancey elaborated his plans later that summer in a local 
newspaper, but used much milder language. League members would 
retain associations with their current political parties, but 
work within them to support southern interests and "crush out the 
mere political tricksters, who now make the slavery question 
subordinate to the Parties." He envisioned an annual Congress of 
Southern Leagues which, freed from the contagion of national 
parties, would "vie with our Federal Congress in its influence 
on the public mind." Yancey claimed the League would either save 
the Union, if its members could bring about guarantees for
45Yancey to James S. Slaughter, June 15, 1858, in DuBose, 
Yancey, I, 376.
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Southern rights, or provide the vanguard for s e c e s s i o n . H e
answered an editorial attack by Roger Pryor, who took exception 
to Yancey's call for southern revolution, by insisting the 
Slaughter Letter was private, was published without his consent, 
and was not a statement of policy. Because Yancey believed 
secession a legal right, he denied the League would launch a 
revolution. "I am a secessionist, and not a revolutionist," he 
carefully explained, "and would not 'precipitate,' but carefully 
prepare to meet an inevitable dissolution."^^
Despite all the commotion surrounding the League, it 
disintegrated by the end of the year. Its importance, however, 
did not. In 1860, Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas accused 
Yancey of disrupting the Democratic national convention that 
spring in order to precipitate a revolution which, he alleged, 
would be led by thousands of League members still lurking 
throughout the South. Early in 1861, a Kentucky secessionist 
told a friend that he had been "'firing the Southern heart'" to 
prepare his state for disunion. In introductory notes to an 1861 
edition of Beverley Tucker's Partisan Leader, editors commented 
that secessionists were prepared for direct resistance to federal 
authority "as soon as the 'Southern heart' could be 'fired' for
46Montgomery Advertiser, July 28, 1858, in folder #18, 
William L. Yancey Papers, ADAH.
47Pryor's attack in Richmond South, September 14, 1858, and 
Yancey's reply in Montgomery Confederation, September 22, 1858, 
both in folder # 17, William L. Yancey Papers, ADAH.
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that purpose."^®
Although memories of the League and recollections of the 
Slaughter Letter lingered, neither provided Yancey with the 
sustained agitation he had hoped for. And yet, the general 
elections of 1858 left Yancey "content to abide [by] events." 
Results of the elections, he believed, "have opened the eyes of 
thousands in the South, and the foolish idea that the South is on 
rising ground is a b a n d o n e d . I n  adopting this attitude, Yancey 
demonstrated a newfound patience. Years of frustration caused 
him to plan more thoughtfully. Yancey now replaced boldness with 
caution, and carefully began preparations for his next act of 
agitation, a contest at the national Democratic convention in 
Charleston.
The initial step in Yancey's design for the convention was 
to secure the cooperation of the most radical southern state. 
South Carolina. In 1859 he went to Columbia to present his 
strategy for the meeting in Charleston to the South Carolina 
legislature. He asserted that Carolinians must not distract 
attention from the slavery issue by arguing for a reduced tariff 
at the convention. He compared southern interests to a ship, 
"That ship is slavery; the cargo may be the tariff; we must
4 8Douglas's remarks in Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 
1st Session, 2154, 2156; Blanton Duncan to William P. Miles, 
January 22, 1861, Miles Papers, University of North Carolina; 
Beverley Tucker, The Partisan Leader (New York: Rudd & Carleton, 
1861), V.
49Yancey to Benjamin Yancey, November 7, 1858, Benjamin 
Yancey Papers, University of North Carolina.
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preserve the ship or all go down together." Yancey admitted that 
if any hope remained to secure southern rights without seceding, 
then southerners had a duty to remain in the Union. "I have no 
such hope," he said, but expressed his willingness to work with 
those who did, under one condition. This was "to indoctrinate 
all parties in our midst with [southern] constitutional views."
To do this, Yancey cautioned, southern Democrats would have to 
"make a contest" at Charleston and vanquish the numerically 
superior faction headed by Stephen Douglas. Completely reversing 
his position of a year before, Yancey now argued that the South 
must secede if a Republican won the next presidential election. 
Through his travels in the South Yancey had learned that fear of 
Republican victory was the greatest potential source of southern 
unity. In Columbia he first asserted that southerners would find 
greater physical danger in a Union dominated by Republicans than 
in a Southern Confederacy. He promised his listeners that 
southern arms would provide protection, cotton would guarantee 
foreign support, and that their past experiences would enable 
them "to avoid the errors into which the [present] government has
fallen."50
Yancey returned to Alabama to supervise the adoption of his 
views by the state Democratic convention. He repeated his belief 
that national parties provided no protection for southern rights, 
that the process of compromise forfeited constitutional 
principles. And yet, he admitted, "the South cannot get rid of
50charleston Mercury, July 14, 1859.
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these parties." Their goal at Charleston, therefore, ought to be 
"to elevate and purify" the Democratic party and to persuade it 
to forego all compromise "in dealing with Southern questions." 
Again, he said, this would necessitate a confrontation with the 
Douglas supporters. If intransigence on southern rights led to 
the destruction of either the Democratic party or the Union, 
Yancey proclaimed, "I am now, as I have ever been, ready to seize 
upon the Constitution in which those rights are guaranteed," and 
"form a new Union under that Constitution." If the North opposed 
secession by force of arms, Yancey vowed "to tread a pathway in 
blood to...secure and maintain us in our rights of person and 
property." He persuaded the convention to reaffirm the Alabama 
Platform of 1848. Secure in the backing of his state, Yancey 
headed for Charleston resolved either to conquer Douglas's forces
C 1or to leave the party again.
The Charleston Convention was ill-fated. Though Democrats 
represented the only major party with a truly national following, 
internal divisions rocked the party. Douglas's supporters 
matched Yancey in their determination to prevail at the meeting, 
both with their candidate and their platform, yet most southern 
Democrats agreed that Douglas was unacceptable. Charleston,
William L. Yancey, Speech of the Hon. W. L. Yancey, 
Delivered in the Democratic State Convention, of the State of 
Alabama, Held at Montgomery, on the 11th, l^th, 13th, & 14'tE" 
January, 1860 (Montgomery; Advertiser Book and Job Steam P r e s s  
Print, 1860 ), 8, 11, 30, 31. Thornton, in Politics and Power, 
382-83, claims Yancey had no intention to disrupt the convention 
at Charleston. Clearly, Yancey was fully prepared to do so if 
his platform failed. He was prepared for domination or 
disruption, but for no third alternative.
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selected in the 1856 party convention as a concession to 
southerners, was a most unfortunate site for the assembly, as far 
as the future of the party was concerned. Recent events 
intensified the politically-charged atmosphere of the city. John 
Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry the previous fall spurred 
secessionists on to renewed calls for disunion. Robert Barnwell 
Rhett, Jr., churned out an endless stream of propaganda in his 
newspaper, the Charleston Mercury, which condemned all 
southerners who favored compromise with the Douglas forces. 
Southern rights meetings, caucuses, and speeches occurred for 
days before the convention throughout the city.
In this heated atmosphere, Yancey addressed the Charleston 
Convention on April 28, 1860, and argued for the adoption of his 
southern platform, the one adopted by the majority of the 
platform committee. In a manner which Harper's Weekly described 
as "statesmanlike" and restrained, Yancey began by stating that 
his delegation came to the convention to save the Union, not to 
disrupt it. The South, he explained, was a fixed minority. It 
could not protect itself within the Union without northern 
support. Yancey told the assembly "the great and solemn fact 
faces you" that northerners must protect southern rights or force 
the South to secede; the North, not the South, claimed Yancey,
52Steven A. Channing, Crisis of Fear; Secession in South 
Carolina (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1970 ), 195-208
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would be responsible for secession.Yancey insisted that the 
South could not grant any concessions on the slave question.
"Ours is the property invaded; ours are the institutions which 
are at stake; ours is the peace which is to be destroyed; ours is 
the honor at stake." Yancey refused to allow Republicans or 
Democrats to limit slavery's expansion. To do so, he asserted, 
would deny the equality of southerners in the territories and 
thereby stigmatize slaveholders as inferior. Northerners had no 
right to interfere with slavery in any form, he continued. "It 
does not belong to you to put your hands on it. You are 
aggressors when you injure it. You are not our brothers when you 
injure us." Yancey joked that northern delegates enjoyed the 
welcome they received in slave-holding Charleston, "even such 
hospitalities as you pay for so magnificently." He therefore 
asked his colleagues to allow southerners the full enjoyment of 
their property as they saw fit, without outside interference or 
restrictions by non-slaveholders to hinder them.^^ Yancey's 
speech drew thunderous applause from spectators in the galleries, 
but did not sway Douglas's supporters. The majority platform was 
defeated. As soon as the voting ended, Yancey stormed out of the 
convention. Unlike his experience at Baltimore twelve years
53Harper's Weekly, IV (September 15, 1860), 580-81; William 
L. Yancey, Speech of the Hon. William L. Yancey of Alabama 
Delivered inthe National Democratic Convention, Charleston, 
April^fith, i860. With the Protest of the Alabama DelegatTon 
(charleston: Walker, Evans & Co., 1860), 2, 3, l5, 16.
54Yancey, Speech... Delivered in the National Democratic 
Convention, 4, 13, 15-16.
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before, this time delegates from seven southern states followed 
him.
Yancey's bolt was dramatic but it guaranteed neither a 
permanent dissolution of his party nor secession. Many 
southerners —  Yancey included —  knew this. The night of his 
walk-out, one observer reported, Yancey held a brief conference 
with Democratic leaders to discuss the possibility of returning 
to the Convention. The editor of the Charleston Mercury must 
have heard of this meeting, for he observed "some want of nerve 
in the management of the seceders" by Yancey. Another Carolinian 
complained, "Yancey is by no means safe in the Saddle, and I 
protest against South Carolina being put upon the Gallop." Yet 
another South Carolina fire-eater, Laurence Keitt, even doubted 
Yancey's ability to continue leading events within Alabama.
Yancey, however, was guardedly optimistic. A reporter 
observed him "smiling as a bridegroom" when the delegates in 
Charleston voted on the platform. Yancey's behavior, the 
reporter added, showed that he "was not perplexed by saucy doubts 
and fears" at this "solemn moment." Yancey then returned home to 
assure Alabamians that a contest between a Republican, Douglas, 
and a southern Democrat would prevent any one man from attaining 
an electoral majority. Once the election were thrown to the
55Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction; Personal 
Experiences of the Late War (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 
1879), 12; Robert Barnwell Rhett, Jr., to William P. Miles, May 
10, 1860, Alfred Huger to Miles, June 1, 1860, and Laurence Keitt 
to Miles, October 3, 1860, in Miles Papers, University of North 
Carolina.
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House of Representatives, Yancey explained, the southern Democrat 
would prevail. At Richmond, where southern Democrats nominated 
John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky and Joseph Lane of Oregon for 
president and vice president, Yancey conferred his blessings on 
the assembly. "The storm clouds of faction have drifted away,” 
he intoned, "and the sunlight of principle... shines brightly upon 
the...Democracy.
Still, Yancey worried about the election. He had entered 
the Charleston Convention determined to carry his platform or to 
disrupt the party. Now, he decided to work for the election of 
Breckinridge and the salvation of southern rights within the 
Union, or, failing that, for secession. Hoping to unify the 
South and to issue a final warning to the North, Yancey embarked 
on an exhaustive national speaking tour.
Everywhere Yancey went during the campaign of 1860 he made a 
vivid impression. One of his first speeches drew support from 
Alabamians who had once feared Yancey and his doctrines, "dreaded 
his rashness, and recklessness," but now agreed that Yancey's 
course was the best to protect southern rights. Yancey used both 
humor and controlled rage to gain the support of his listeners in 
Tennessee. In Knoxville, when someone taunted Yancey by asking 
what he would do if Lincoln were elected, Yancey delighted his 
audience by saying, "I spent twelve years of my life in New
Hesseltine, Three Against Lincoln, 80; William L. Yancey, 
Substance of the Speech made by Hon. Wm. L. Yancey, at the 
Democratic Meeting at Marion, Perry County, May 19, 1860, 22, in 
Yancey Papers, ADAH; Montgomery Advertiser, July 18, i860.
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England and there learned how to answer a question by asking 
another," and asked the heckler what he would do in the same 
situation. When Unionist leader Parson Brownlow stepped foreward 
and pledged to defend the United States against the likes of 
Yancey with a bayonet, Yancey offered to grab one as well and 
"plunge mine to the hilt through and through his heart, feel no 
compunctions for the act, but thank God my country has been freed 
from such a foe." At city hall in Atlanta a crowd of over 1200 
turned out to hear Yancey speak; this number was several hundred 
greater than the voting population of the city.^^
As Yancey headed north, he increased his condemnation of the 
Republican party. In Washington, D.C., he warned his listeners 
that a Republican administration would lead to more raids against 
slavery like the recent attack of John Brown. The "flames of 
midnight arson" would light the southern sky while federal 
authorities looked the other way, he warned. In New York's 
Cooper Institution Yancey proclaimed that Abraham Lincoln, if 
elected, "will build up an abolition party in every Southern 
State." Abolitionist federal agents "will percolate between 
master [and] slave as between the crevices of rocks underground," 
spreading poison and fire and helping slaves escape from their 
masters. Yancey said Republicans intended to strip southerners 
of constitutional protection and make them "hewers of wood and 
drawers of water." But before that could happen, he told
57Pratville (Alabama) Southern Statesman, July 14, 1860, and 
Atlanta National American, August 21, 1860, both in Yancey 
Papers, folder #18, ADAH; DuBose, Yancey, I, 495.
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northerners, southerners would "take the banner of liberty and 
plant it on the mountains of Augusta, and there we will entrench 
ourselves as a body of freemen."^®
While Yancey attacked Republicans he also defended slavery. 
In Washington he cited Edmund Ruffin's essays to prove "Mr. 
Jefferson was wrong in his ideas about slavery," and that "the 
old fogies of that day" held beliefs about the institution "which 
we of this day are unanimously agreed were not sound." At 
Faneuil Hall in Boston, the very citadel of Abolitionist 
speakers, Yancey explained that blacks "sleep all day and prowl 
about all night. They make nothing themselves, and steal 
everything made by everybody else." He told Bostonians that 
white people constituted a "master race," and that the Founding 
Fathers intended the United States government to be a white 
government. In Syracuse, he explained that southerners treated 
slaves well and lovingly, and that free northern factory workers 
faced greater hardship and deprivation than southern slaves.®® 
Yancey's tour ended in New Orleans in late October. An 
estimated crowd of 20,000, the largest in the city's history, 
filled Canal Street to hear Yancey speak. The fire-eater 
repeated his charges that the Republican party was filled with
®®Richmond Enquirer, September 25, 1860; New York Herald, 
October 11, 1860.
59Washington States & Union, October 19, 1860, in Yancey 
Papers, ADAH; Boston speech in Montgomery Advertiser, October 31, 
1860; William L. Yancey, Speech of the Hon. William L. Yancey of 
Alabama at Wieting Hall, Syracuse, N.Y. (Published by Direction 
of the National Democratic State Committee, 1860), 8, 9, 12, 13.
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"brave, sagatious, cool, determined and fanatic" assassins like
John Brown, and that Lincoln's policies would lead to the
abolition of slavery. "But it will not be done," Yancey cried,
"because before that time comes we shall take care of ourselves."
He pointed to the thriving port of New Orleans as evidence that a
Southern Confederacy could sustain itself, and reminded
southerners that cotton would command world trade. He said that
even if the border states did not join other slave states in a
new nation, they would never allow a hostile army to invade the
South. Southerners, Yancey promised, had nothing to fear from 
60secession.
Exhausted by his speaking tour, Yancey knew more work 
awaited him upon his return to Montgomery. After news of 
Lincoln's election became official, Yancey vowed to "trod the 
path before me fearlessly" and lead Alabama out of the Union and 
into a Southern Confederacy. Yancey assured some of his 
supporters in Georgia that no further compromises could now delay 
secession. He believed southerners could organize a new nation 
quickly by leaving the old Constitution fundamentally unaltered. 
"The great defect in the Union is the public conscience and 
education of the Northern masses upon the slavery question," and 
this problem, Yancey explained, would vanish forever in a 
Southern Confederacy. Prompt, decisive action, Yancey believed.
^^New Orleans Daily Delta, October 30, 31, 1860; DuBose, 
Yancey, II, 531-34.
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would now save the South.
Yancey played a leading role in the Alabama secession 
convention, but after waiting ten years for disunion, Yancey 
briefly lost control of himself on the eve of his success. When 
one delegate suggested that secession was too important to be 
decided by a simple majority vote, Yancey proclaimed that 
Alabama's ordinance of secession, "even if it be passed by the 
meagre majority of one," would nevertheless represent the will of 
everyone in the state. Furthermore, the champion of minority 
rights now bellowed, "those who shall dare oppose the action of 
Alabama, when she assumes her independence out of the Union, will 
become traitors —  rebels against its authority, and will be 
dealt with as such." His outburst caused such chaos that the 
meeting had to adjourn for the day.®^
When the convention resumed business, Yancey regained his 
composure. After the secession ordinance passed, Yancey became 
conciliatory and called for a united, harmonious front. Under 
his leadership an invitation was issued to all seceding states to 
send delegates to Montgomery to form a new Confederacy. In an 
effort to make secession peaceful, he offered a resolution to 
return all United States military installations in Alabama to
Yancey to John W. Forney, November 8, 1860, Ferdinand J. 
Dreer Autograph Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; 
Yancey to H.R. Jackson and J.M. Guerard, December 14, 1860, in 
Montgomery Advertiser, January 2, 1861.
6 2william R. Smith, History and Debates of the Convention of 
the People of Alabama (Spartanburg, South Carolina: The Reprint 
Company, Publishers, 1975), 68-69.
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federal control. In his final address to the convention Yancey 
spoke of the "prosperity, so grand and so amazing," that awaited 
southerners in a new nation. With King Cotton to command world 
trade and threaten the North with absolute ruin, with "a 
homogeneous people, accustomed to slavery, holding it in 
reverence for its origin and its effects," with "no domestic 
enemy to excite our vigilance," a Southern nation must be 
"prosperous and powerful, for the purposes of peace or war.
With secession accomplished, Yancey looked forward to a long 
rest. "I have no idea of ever again returning to public life," 
he confided to Ben. Yancey was completely satisfied with the new 
Confederate government. He had admired the statesmanship of 
Jefferson Davis over the past year and now heartily supported him 
as the nation's first president. Just as Yancey had wished, the 
Confederate Constitution was, with few exceptions, a virtual copy 
of the United States Constitution. When he resigned his post in 
the Alabama convention, Yancey wrote a letter to the people of 
Montgomery County. The citizens of Alabama, he said, had 
achieved a "complete triumph" and established "wise policy."
Their triumph, he believed, would be supported and matched by the 
people in each of the Confederate States. The people of 
Montgomery asked Yancey to perform a final, honorary function, 
and give the official introduction for President Davis. 
Overlooking the crowds that jammed the capital grounds, the 
exhausted Yancey concluded his unusually brief remarks about
G^Ibid., 76, 116, 172, 250-52
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Davis with the words, "The man and the hour have met. We may now 
hope that prosperity, honor and victory await his 
administration.
Although the people of Alabama were now ready to let Yancey 
retire from public service. President Davis was not. Davis 
shocked many by his appointment of Yancey to a special diplomatic 
mission to England and France aimed at securing recognition for 
the infant Confederacy, Although he was again almost crippled 
with neuralgia, Yancey accepted.
Many southerners sensed that Yancey's appointment would end 
in failure. For a diplomatic assignment, one Carolinian asked, 
what good was Yancey's oratorical eloquence? Instead of a man 
like Yancey, she said, "We want someone who can hold his tongue." 
Barnwell Rhett, now a member of the provisional Confederate 
Congress, was astonished to learn that Davis had granted Yancey 
no authority to make commercial treaties or concessions of any 
kind. Rhett then implored Yancey to "take the counsel of a 
friend, do not accept the appointment. You will meet nothing but 
failure and mortification." Sharing Davis's conviction that King 
Cotton would provide all the negotiating power the South needed.
64Yancey to Benjamin Yancey, January 28, 1861, Benjamin 
Papers, University of North Carolina; Yancey to Clement C. 
Clay, May 4, 1860, Clay Letters, William R. Perkins Library, Duke 
University, Durham, North Carolina; Smith, History and Debates, 
131-32; Yancey to H.R. Jackson and J.M. Guerard, December 14, 
1860, in the Montgomery Advertiser, January 2, 1861; Montgomery 
Post, February 20, March 5, 1861.
^^Benjamin C. Yancey to DuBose, February 8, 1887, DuBose 
Collection, ADAH.
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Yancey spurned Rhett's advise and sailed for E u r o p e . A l t h o u g h  
shortly after his arrival in London Yancey believed he saw signs 
that both England and France would soon grant recognition,®^ he 
quickly learned that "important as cotton is, it is not King in 
Europe." He returned to the South after a permanent commissioner 
replaced him. When he disembarked in New Orleans, he told a 
somber crowd, "We cannot look for any sympathy or help from 
abroad. We must rely on ourselves alone." The legislature of 
Alabama relied on Yancey to represent his state in the 
Confederate Senate. When Yancey arrived at the capital in 
Richmond, the failure of his mission still haunted him.
"Hopeless Despair was written on his face," a friend remembered. 
For Yancey, the results of his mission affected him like "a 
personal execution. He seemed literally to have perished with 
his hopes."®®
After a career of agitation, Yancey found the work of 
cooperation in the Confederate Senate unfamiliar. The emotion 
and obstinacy which had brought him into innumerable 
confrontations in the past resurfaced in his efforts to secure
C. Vann Woodward, ed., Mary Chesnut's Civil War (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981 ) , l71, 177; "Autobiography," 
46, in Robert Barnwell Rhett Papers, South Carolina Historical 
Society.
6 7Yancey to Robert Toombs, May 21, June 1, 1861, and to R. 
Chapman, July 3, 1861, all in William L. Yancey Papers, ADAH.
6 AYancey to Samuel Reid, July 3, 1861, William L. Yancey 
Papers, V.C.Clay to John W. DuBose, October 13, 1887, DuBose 
Correspondence, both in ADAH; M.J. Solomons Scrapbook, page 71, 
William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North 
Carolina.
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the revolution he had helped launch. Yancey soon became a bitter 
opponent of President Davis, who he believed was building a 
centralized government almost as corrupt as the one the South had 
just abandoned. He also blamed Davis for southern military 
defeats. When Davis responded to Yancey's criticisms by denying 
a regular army commission to one of Yancey's sons, the senator 
tried again to soften his tone. "I have no interest apart from 
those of my country," he told the president. He explained that 
he had three sons in the army, two underage. Yancey told Davis 
that any differences he had with Davis were not personal, but 
those "entertained by one who has his all at s t a k e . T h e  
rupture between the two never healed.
Only months before his death, Yancey again proved himself 
better at disruption than cooperation. On January 30, while 
debating the merits of creating a national judiciary with Senator 
Benjamin H. Hill of Georgia, the two senators exchanged several 
insulting personal remarks. On February 4, Senator Robert W. 
Barnwell of South Carolina suggested that Yancey should apologize 
for his language. Although Yancey vehemently denied uttering 
anything offensive, he said that he wished he had done so. "You 
had better, then, do so now," Hill cried. Yancey stated calmly 
that he had already said everything a gentleman could say and 
started to sit down, "when I was shocked by a blow of great
69Yancey to Clement C. Clay, May 13, 1863, Clay Letters,
Duke University; Yancey to Benjamin C. Yancey, Jr., July 12,
1863, and to Jefferson Davis, June 26, 1863, in William L. Yancey 
Papers, ADAH; DuBose, Yancey, II, 677-78, 682-84, 688.
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severity upon my cheek bone, just below the outer corner of my 
right eye and the temple, which immediately flooded my collar, 
neck and bosom with blood." As Yancey rose to attack the 
Georgian, Hill threw a second glass inkstand, but missed. Their 
fellow senators forced them apart. Although no one recorded what 
Yancey had said in the secret session to provoke Hill, the 
Confederate Senate censured Yancey, and not Hill for the 
incident.
The facial wound Yancey received in February healed quickly,
but his chronic medical problems worsened by summer. Afflicted
with fever and a serious kidney ailment, Yancey remained in bed
from July 2 until his death on July 27, 1863. Before he died he
learned Vicksburg had fallen to the Yankees, and he blamed Davis
for the crippling defeat. He asked his children to get leaves
from the army and hurry back to Montgomery before he weakened
further. He knew his namesake, Willie, had been wounded in the
neck at Vicksburg and was due home soon to recover. His beloved
wife, Sarah, was also terribly ill with fever. He watched her
suffer for three days before death relieved him of his own 
71agony.
Even in death, Yancey lent his name to the cause he had 
struggled for so long. In 1858, the Mount Vernon Association had
Yancey's account of the story appears in DuBose, Yancey, 
II, 739-42. Also see Watts, "Reminiscences," and Benjamin Yancey 
to John W. DuBose, February 8, 1887, both in DuBose 
Correspondence, ADAH.
71Yancey to Benjamin C. Yancey, Jr., July 12, 27, 1863, 
William L. Yancey Papers, ADAH.
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presented Yancey with George Washington's spy glass in gratitude 
for his efforts on behalf of restoring the first president's 
home. In a posthumous effort to heal his breach with Davis, 
Yancey willed this relic to the Confederate president. His sons 
Dalton and Benjamin joined hundreds of other southern refugees 
after the war in a flight to Brazil. in what became known as the 
Confederado colony of Americana, the Yancey name still survives 
in the 1980's.^^
Throughout his life, William L. Yancey was motivated by the 
principle of southern rights. Because he often found it 
distracting from his work for southern rights, he actually 
scorned public office. His absence from public office, according 
to one historian, was a key to his popularity in Alabama. During 
Yancey's speaking tour in 1860, he explained, "I have had my fill 
of public honors and public places, and long years since I 
retired voluntarily from stations of trust." In fact, Yancey 
campaigned for no public office after 1845; apparently he desired 
none. He claimed that he based all his actions on his concern 
for the preservation of southern liberty, that personal ambition 
had nothing to do with his efforts.Although no one who seeks 
to lead a political crusade can be devoid of personal ambition,
72Jefferson Davis to Mrs. W.L. Yancey, December 23, 1863, 
Jefferson Davis Papers, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane 
University, New Orleans, Louisiana; Benjamin C. Yancey to John W. 
DuBose, February 8, 1887, DuBose Correspondence, ADAH; Eugene C. 
Harter, The Lost Colony of the Confederacy (Jackson: University 
Press of Mississippi, 1986 ) , 87-90.
7 3Thornton, Politics and Power, 236 ; Louisville Courier, 
October 24, 1860, in folder #18, William L. Yancey Papers, ADAH.
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Yancey demonstrated surprisingly little. For another fire-eater, 
no boundary existed between his desire to participate in a great 
cause and his own ambition.
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Chapter III 
"HONORABLE AND USEFUL AMBITION"
Soon after establishing himself as a prominent new member of 
society in Natchez, Mississippi, John Anthony Quitman vowed to 
"devote the vigor and strength" of his life to "honorable and 
useful ambition." Quitman knew the course he had set for himself 
would not be easy, but he promised a friend he would "not shrink 
from the labor and the struggle which that determination will 
cost." He was determined "To raise the standard of independence, 
and boldly fling it in the face of any party; sink or swim, to 
stand by the interests of our country; to brave the shock of 
public opinion when required, shall be to me a pleasure."^ 
Throughout Quitman's multi-faceted career, he searched for 
situations in which he could promote some principle and his own 
interests simultaneously. Quitman's commitment to the principle 
of southern rights indeed took on the characteristics of a 
crusade. Because of Quitman's tremendous personal ambition, 
however, the opportunities that various crusades presented him
for personal distinction often supplanted the principle which
2originally drew him to a particular cause.
John A. Quitman to J.F.H. Claiborne, July 31, 1831, in 
J.F.H. Claiborne, The Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, 
Major-General, U.S.A., and Governor of the State of Mississippi 
(2 volumes; New York; Harper & Brothers, Publishers, i860), 1, 106
2Robert E. May, John Anthony Quitman; Old South Crusader 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985 ) . Although 
May clearly addresses Quitman's crusading zeal, he does not give 
enough emphasis to the intensely personal motivation for
123
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Among the most influential fire-eaters, Quitman's background 
was unique. His father, a Lutheran minister, immigrated from the 
Duchy of Cleves, near the Netherlands, to the United States in 
1795. John was born September 1, 1799, in Rhinebeck, New York. 
His father wanted him to enter the ministry and sent him to 
Hartwick Academy in 1817. The young Quitman had already decided 
to pursue a more exciting life. After one year of teaching at 
Mount Airy College near Philadelphia, Quitman told his brother of 
his plan to "start West in search of fame and fortune." In 1819, 
the adventurous young northerner travelled to the frontier and 
settled in the town of Chillicothe, Ohio.^
A few months after settling in Ohio, Quitman briefly 
contemplated "the wild ambition that induced me to wonder so far 
from home." The limitless possibilities of life in the West, 
however, soon appealed to this very ambition. He thought he 
would become a lawyer, or a soldier, or continue west to the 
Rocky Mountains and become a fur trader, while he supported 
himself by clerking at a local land office, he began to study 
law. "I will spare no pains to perfect myself in my profession, 
and to deserve the confidence of my clients," Quitman promised 
his father.^ He took great pride in the life he was building in
Quitman's actions. 
3Quitman to his brother, August 18, 1819, in Claiborne, 
Quitman, I, 35; May, Quitman, 2-9.
^Quitman to his brother, March 29, May 1, 1820, and to 
Frederick H. Quitman, November 12, 1820, in Claiborne, Quitman, 
I, 44-45, 46-47, 54. -------
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Ohio. To his sister he boasted, "I dress as well as any young 
man in town. I have attended the balls and parties; I have not 
gambled. I owe no man a cent." Quitman passed his bar 
examination in 1821 and joined a local militia company.^ As he 
began his law practice, Quitman found that clients often paid him 
with corn, wheat, pork, or lard. This was hardly acceptable to a 
young man with high aspirations, and he began to think of moving 
again. "The Southern States," he believed, "hold out golden 
prospects to men of integrity, application, and good 
acquirements." A woman he had met on his way to Ohio, Mrs. 
William Griffith, had urged Quitman to settle in Mississippi. 
There, she had told him, good attorneys were in great demand, 
money was plentiful, and a "gay and fashionable" society awaited. 
Mrs. Griffith had offered to introduce Quitman to her son,
William B. Griffith, who already had a practice in Natchez. "I 
mean to live by the practice of law, not by clerking in a land- 
office," he told his brother. After contemplating Mrs.
Griffith's advice, Quitman explained, "my eyes are fixed on the 
South.
Quitman arrived in Natchez in November, 1821, with only 
fifteen dollars in his pockets. He found cheap lodging in town 
and sought out William Griffith. Griffith loaned him some money
^Quitman to his sister, June 26, 1820, to his brother, 
September 2, 1821, in ibid., I, 49, 65.
^Quitman to Frederick H. Quitman, May 7, 1821, to his 
brother, December 10, 1820, December 4, 1821, and to F.R. Backus, 
February 28, 1821, in ibid., I, 56, 59, 61-64, 70.
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and let Quitman use his office and books to prepare for the 
Mississippi bar exam. Quitman worked for Griffith after he 
passed his exam early in 1822, and the next year entered into a 
partnership with him. Their firm was quite successful, and 
Quitman's income and reputation both grew rapidly. Late in 1824 
he married Eliza Turner, the daughter of a wealthy Mississippi 
planter. Sixteen months later Quitman bought Monmouth 
plantation, which included an impressive mansion and thirty-one 
acres of land, for $12,000. Quitman's list of achievements 
continued to grow rapidly over the next few years. He won 
election to the Mississippi legislature in 1827. His work on the 
judiciary committee in 1828 earned him an appointment as 
chancellor of the state, the head of the state's court system.
He held this position until 1835. During his tenure as 
chancellor, he also served on the judiciary committee in the 
state constitutional convention of 1832. Quitman did not limit 
his interests or activities to politics. By the time he was 
elected to the state senate in 1835, he was also president of 
anti-gambling, anti-dueling, and anti-abolition societies in 
Natchez, president of the state rights association, of the 
Mississippi Cotton Company, and of a local railroad, director of 
the Planter's Bank, Grand Master of the local Masonic lodge, 
trustee of Jefferson College and the Natchez Academy, and captain 
of a militia unit called the Natchez Fencibles. He also acquired 
land and slaves. In 1838 he owned at least fifty-nine slaves and 
two thousand acres of land; twelve years later, he owned over 450
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slaves on five plantations in two states, totalling more than
7,000 acres.^
After only a few years in Natchez, Quitman had completely
rejected his northern origins and embraced the lifestyle of
southern society. Quitman's acceptance of southern institutions
came easily. When Quitman left New York in 1817, slavery had not
yet vanished from that state. Although New Yorkers had abolished
slavery before the turn of the century, they allowed a generation
to phase it out gradually. Throughout John's childhood, the
Quitman family had black house servants, and so he had always had
first-hand experience with slavery. in Natchez, he quickly
accepted the belief that black slaves were "a happy, careless,
unreflecting, good-natured race, who, left to themselves, would
degenerate into drones or brutes, but, subjected to wholesome
restraint and stimulons, become the best and most contented of 
0
laborers." Like all other fire-eaters, Quitman considered 
slaves better off than free workers in the North; like the 
others, he came to believe that "domestic slavery is in harmony 
with, and almost indispensable to a constitutional republic." 
Early in his political career, Quitman called for legislation 
which would prohibit the circulation of abolitionist literature 
in Mississippi. He condemned northerners for allowing
7Quitman to his brother, October 17, 1835, in ibid.. I, 138; 
May, Quitman, 20-21, 27-28, 32, 39-40, 42, 44, 63-6TTT7, 111, 
138.
0
May, Quitman, 23-24; Quitman to Col. Brush, August 23,
1823, in Claiborne, Quitman, I, 84.
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abolitionists to impose their "fanatical doctrines" on
Q
southerners. While still in Ohio, Quitman had begun to find 
Yankees repugnant. "The farther they travel, the shrewder they 
become," he observed. He observed "the proverbial keenness 
lurking about the mouth, and twinkling slyly and mischievously in 
the eyes." He complained that northerners through protective 
tariffs taxed southerners "to build palaces in northern cities, 
and to support herds of lazy cattle." Quitman vowed that "such 
thralldom must not be submitted to." After ten years in 
Mississippi, Quitman announced, "I am heartily tired of the 
North."10
From 1828 to 1832 Quitman satisfied his ambition in his 
various capacities in Mississippi politics. Although he entered 
the legislature with an exaggerated sense of self-importance, his 
vigorous work won him the respect of political leaders in the 
state. "My industry is in great demand," he reported to his 
wife. "I have much to do. My reputation requires that I should 
exert myself." His ego swelled after only a few weeks in the 
capital. He found the state senate "one of the most stupid 
bodies I have ever known." He claimed credit for scoring key 
legislative victories while on the judiciary committee, and told 
his new law partner, "I have great influence over many eastern
Q
Quitman to Claiborne, October 18, 1830, to his brother, 
October 17, 1835, in Claiborne, Quitman, I, 101-102, 138-39.
^^Quitman to his brother, February 23, 1821, to Claiborne, 
July 31, 1831, in Claiborne, Quitman, I, 57-58, 108-109; May, 
Quitman, 31-32, 47.
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members" of the assembly. As chancellor of the state court
system, Quitman worked to reform the state prison system and 
11penal code.
Quitman believed that he was most influential during the
constitutional convention in 1832. There, the thirty-three year
old Quitman condemned younger delegates for promoting
"extravagant & wild schemes," and for believing themselves
"capable of legislating for all posterity." He chastised older
delegates for their lack of leadership. Not surprisingly,
Quitman found himself a solitary source of reason and guidance
throughout the proceedings. As chairman of a committee, he told
his wife, "I am...compelled to hear a great deal of absurdity."
He sent Eliza copies of his own remarks and instructed her to
publish them in Natchez newspapers, to show "that I have not
1 9taken an inferior station in this body."
Despite his best efforts, Quitman believed the resulting new 
constitution "one of the greatest outrages ever committed on a 
free people." Its great flaw, he thought, was that it provided 
too many people with too much power. One of his complaints about 
Ohio was that it was "not the place for a wealthy man to enjoy
11Quitman to Eliza Quitman, January 20, 1828, Quitman Family 
Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill; Quitman to John T. McMurren, February 9, 
1828, in J.F.H. Claiborne Collection, Mississippi Department of 
Archives and History (hereinafter cited as MDAH); Quitman to 
Claiborne, October 18, 1830, in Claiborne, Quitman, I, 101-102; 
Quitman to A.M. Scott, April 24, 1832, John A. Quitman Papers, 
MDAH.
12Quitman to Eliza Quitman, September 16, 23, October 2, 
1832, Quitman Family Papers, University of North Carolina.
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life; it is too democratic." Now, he felt, this same democratic 
menace had invaded the South. Although he had never rejected the 
notion of universal male suffrage, Quitman in the convention 
tried desperately to prevent the electorate from voting on 
everything, especially for state court justices. Quitman, like 
many other Adams County planters, supported John Quincy Adams and 
the National Republicans just as Andrew Jackson's following began 
to gather tremendous popular support in the Southwest. Quitman 
feared the specter of mass participation in a republican 
government because he thought that it would imbue the people with 
too much political power and result in mob rule. With disgust, 
Quitman predicted, "The people's doctrine will undoubtedly 
prevail" in the convention. This antecedent, he warned, "is only 
one step removed from the rule and domination of lawless force 
and violence."
Quitman's concern about the accumulation of dangerous powers 
by the president of the United States soon overrode his anxieties 
about popular power in Mississippi. During the Nullification 
Crisis, he suddenly turned his attention to the concept of the 
Union and state rights. Quitman's biographer discovered no 
record of Quitman's "conversion" to radical state rights 
ideology, but by 1833 Quitman boldly supported both nullification 
and state interposition. Perhaps anticipating that he could
13Quitman to his brother, December 10, 1820, Quitman to the 
Electors of Adams County [1832], and to J. Fenwick Brent, March 
22, 1845, in Claiborne, Quitman, I, 56, 125, 127-28; Quitman to 
Eliza Quitman, September 16, October 2, 12, 1832, Quitman Family 
Papers, University of North Carolina; May, Quitman, 53-55.
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promote his own political career by cooperating with other 
opponents of the president, Quitman cautiously identified with 
the state rights faction of the new Whig party. When Jackson 
issued his Force Bill proclamation, Quitman hoped that "the 
sovereign state of Mississippi" would resist what he considered a 
usurpation of power by the executive. Quitman viewed the Force 
Bill as "vitally dangerous to the reserved rights of the states." 
If states submitted to the bill, he believed, the president would 
"consolidate all powers in the National Government, and...erect 
upon the ruins of the state governments, a supreme and arbitrary 
national power against which there will be no redress, no appeal 
but to revolution." If southerners failed to rally behind the 
courageous leadership of South Carolinians in this struggle for 
liberty, Quitman warned a friend, "we may as well prepare our 
necks also for the yoke of colonial bondage." Quitman believed a 
consolidated government with unlimited powers would become "an 
engine of the most grievous oppression upon the South. I wish I 
were in the Legislature," he explained. Even if he failed in his 
efforts to lead the resistance movement in Mississippi, "I would 
glory in martyrdom in such a cause.
The next year Quitman did his best to lead the state rights 
movement in Mississippi in an unofficial capacity. Although the 
Nullification Crisis had ended, Quitman continued to fear 
consolidation of federal power. In January, 1834, he
^^Quitman to Nathan G. Howard, January 14, 1833, Nathan G. 
Howard Papers, MDAH; May, Quitman, 46-48, 60-62.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13 2
participated in a state rights meeting in Jackson. One of five 
authors of the official address, Quitman called for the creation 
of an independent State Rights party to fight the president's 
"unlimited, consolidated despotism." Although he did not yet 
believe that secession was the only way to secure southern 
rights, he clearly affirmed the right of secession and denied 
that any state was "the subject of the United States government." 
Regarding both nullification and secession, Quitman claimed, if 
"the State government is not the final judge of the powers and 
rights reserved to it," then it "is therefore not a government." 
He vehemently denied that a president could use military force or 
federal money to coerce a state or to punish its citizens for 
their obedience to state laws. "Such power," he concluded, 
"reduces the State government to a corporation, to a mere 
subdivision or province of one great e m p i r e . Q u i t m a n  had a 
leading role in a later state rights gathering in Jackson. He 
called on Mississippians to oppose the president's "threat to 
enforce with the bayonets" a law he believed contrary to the 
spirit of the Constitution, "impolitic and oppressive in its 
operation in the Southern States." He claimed that President 
Jackson had planned to use the army to invade South Carolina,
"and butcher its citizens before their own altars, before their 
wives and their children." Before it adjourned, the convention 
formed the State Rights Association of Mississippi and instructed 
its members to correspond with similar committees in other states
^^Jackson State Rights Banner, January 24, 1834.
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and to publish tracts to promote their cause. Quitman also led 
by example. Now associating himself with John C. Calhoun,
Quitman declared himself "a pure Nullifier," and promised to 
"maintain and support the doctrine of State Sovereignty and state 
interposition against all the world." He also pledged to fight 
efforts at consolidating federal power whether they came from 
Democrats or from Whigs.
His duties as chancellor both conflicted with Quitman's 
campaign to resist federal power and drained his energy. His 
wife also begged him to resign his office and spend more time at 
home. Quitman decided to step down by the first of October. He 
acknowledged that he neglected Eliza, both emotionally and 
financially, and assured her that he felt "light hearted" since 
resolving to retire from public life. To his son, however, he 
added, "I consider it the solemn duty of every lover of his 
country, in times like the present to step forth and raise his 
voice against misrule & corruption." Only a month after 
returning to his family in Natchez, his relentless ambition led 
him back into state politics. When a vacancy suddenly opened in 
the state senate, Quitman quickly declared himself available for 
election. Local Whigs, though uncomfortable with Quitman's 
outspoken views on nullification, cautiously endorsed his
^^Woodville Republican, June 7, 1834; Quitman to F.S. 
Claiborne, September 5, 1834, copy, Quitman Family Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
17Eliza Quitman to John Quitman, July 12, 1834, Quitman to 
Eliza Quitman, July 16, 22, 1834, to F. Henry Quitman, September 
25, 1834, Quitman Family Papers, University of North Carolina.
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candidacy and helped him obtain a narrow victory.
An unusual series of events elevated Quitman to the 
governor's chair. The incoming governor, Charles Lynch, was 
unable to assume office until January, 1836, and Governor Hiram 
C. Runnels's term expired in November, 1835. The secretary of 
state called for a special legislative session to chose a 
president pro tempore of the state senate, who, by provisions of 
the state constitution, would serve as acting governor. Although 
Democratic strength was building rapidly in Mississippi, 
Democratic senators failed to unite behind one man. Whigs and 
others who opposed the Democrats coalesced around Quitman.
"I hope my dearest wife," Quitman wrote from Jackson, "that 
instead of repining at my absence you will feel an interest in 
the character and reputation of your husband which will give you 
happiness instead of sorrow." with only a few weeks to serve, 
Quitman worked feverishly to leave his mark on the state and to 
provide a model of leadership for the entire South. "My friends
properly insist that I should set an example to the country of
what a Nullifier can do," he told Eliza. He assured her that his
election had "animated our party" with new vitality, and he moved
quickly to capitalize on it. In his message to the legislature 
Quitman set forth both domestic and federal objectives. 
Anticipating many of the ideas that William Yancey would later 
propose in Alabama, Quitman urged the legislature to continue 
reforms of the state's penal institutions, called for the
18May, Quitman, 64
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establishment of an extensive public school system, and argued 
for state support of banks and railroads. When he shifted to 
national issues, he repeated the views on state and federal 
relations that he had enunciated in State Rights meetings a year 
before. Quitman explained that if northern abolitionists grew 
strong enough to pass federal laws which tampered with slavery, 
then southern states must protect themselves by nullifying these 
laws. If abolitionist assaults continued, Quitman suggested that 
southern states should act in concert to protect their rights.
For the first time, Quitman hinted at secession.
When his brief term expired, Quitman realized that his call 
for resistance to federal power drew little support. Unwilling 
to admit that public opinion was against him, Quitman felt that 
some other force had worked to foil him. He quickly concluded, 
"The power & patronage of the Federal Government are carrying 
everything before them." He accused Jackson's successor, Martin 
Van Buren, of bribing Mississippi politicians with the promise of 
federal jobs and positions of influence in the Democratic party. 
"I am quite disgusted with the miserable corruption I see about 
me," he told his wife. "My disposition induces me to make open 
war against it, or to retire from its influence." If this 
perceived corruption continued unabated, Quitman remarked that he 
might go "to the wilds of Texas, where at least Honor & honesty
19Quitman to Eliza Quitman, December 3, 9, 1835, Quitman 
Family Papers, University of North Carolina; May, Quitman, 70-71.
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2 0may be appreciated." Quitman was so certain he was destined 
for greatness that throughout his life he attributed personal 
setbacks not to a rejection of himself, but rather to the 
mischief of others and "corruption" which he imagined around him.
Before his brief term as governor began, Quitman had already 
taken great interest in events in Texas. He felt compelled to 
help "Freemen who are struggling for their violated rights" 
rather than remain in Mississippi with his family. He had 
promised Eliza that he would not leave her again after his duties 
in the legislature ended, but only a few weeks later, Sam Houston 
wrote to Quitman and asked for his help in the Texas Revolution. 
Ambition triumphed over love and Eliza's strenuous objections; 
Quitman began preparations to lead a militia unit into Texas.
Early in April, Quitman left Natchez with forty-five men —  
most members of the Natchez Fencibles —  and worked his way west 
to the Sabine River. A band of Virginia volunteers joined 
Quitman as he led his men over the Texas border and into the town 
of Nacogdoches. There, several fleeing Americans told him of an 
impending Mexican attack. Seventy more men joined Quitman's 
unit, and his force remained in Nacogdoches until he could 
accurately determine the size and location of the enemy.
^^Quitman to Eliza Quitman, January 16, 1836, Quitman Family 
Papers, University of North Carolina.
21Quitman to his brother, October 17, 1835, in Claiborne, 
Quijtman, I, 139; Quitman to Eliza Quitman, February 5, 1836,
Eliza to John Quitman, April 11, 1836, Quitman Family Papers, 
University of North Carolina; Sam Houston to Quitman, February 
12, 1836, in Claiborne, Quitman, I, 139-40.
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Discovering that rumors had exaggerated both the strength and 
proximity of the Mexicans, he led his band westward into the 
Texas interior where he received news of Houston's stunning 
victory at San Jacinto. Two days later, Quitman arrived at the 
battle site and met with General Houston. The field was still 
"literally strewed with dead Mexicans," and the Texans held their 
commander, Santa Anna, as prisoner. Awe—struck by the boldness 
and heroism of the Texas soldiers, Quitman also must have been 
disappointed that he arrived too late to share in the glory.^2 
The Texas adventure was anything but a complete loss for 
Quitman. "The country is truly beautiful," he reported to Eliza, 
"The eye cannot behold anything more so." Early in the 
expedition he had expressed a desire to purchase land in Texas if 
he "could be...fully assured of the acquisition of this country" 
by the United States, Before his return to Natchez in May, he 
received all the assurance he needed. For fifteen cents an acre, 
he bought 20,000 acres of land. Quitman believed it would be 
worth twenty dollars an acre after the annexation of Texas to the 
United States. Recalling his disgust with the condition of 
Mississippi politics, Quitman told his brother that he might soon 
move to Texas. He investigated the purchase of additional land 
on Galveston Bay, and promised his wife that it would make an 
ideal site for a new home. When Quitman returned to Natchez, he 
was greatly surprised to find that local newspapers had dubbed
22Quitman to Eliza Quitman, April 29, 1839, to F. Henry 
Quitman, July 31, 1836, Quitman Family Papers, University of 
North Carolina; May, Quitman, 85.
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him a hero, even though he never participated in battle. "I 
belong to the fortunate class of men," he noted to his brother. 
"Whatever I undertake, prospers and while some are laboring and 
toiling for reputation and fame without success, I obtain it 
without seeking or meriting it."^^
Hoping to capitalize on his popularity, Quitman ran for 
Congress in 1836. He ran as a Whig and had the support of most 
of the state's old nullifiers, but lost to his opponent in a 
close race. Democrats assailed him for his political 
inconsistencies, for switching his support from John Quincy Adams 
and nationalism to John C. Calhoun and nullification, yet 
remaining a Whig and supporting a presidential candidate, the 
Tennessean, Hugh L. White, who opposed nullification. Quitman 
professed to be content with the election results and pleased to 
return his attention to personal matters. In the same breath, 
however, he blamed the unintelligent, brute masses for his 
defeat. Perhaps trying to convince himself more than his son, 
Quitman told the young Henry that his supporters, though few, 
"combined 19/20ths the intelligence of the state." Before he 
withdrew from the public stage, Quitman received a vote of 
confidence and gratitude when he was elected major general of the 
Mississippi militia. Through this military capacity, he would
23Quitman to Eliza Quitman, April 13, 15, 29, May 7, 1836, 
to his brother, May 28, July 31, 1836, Quitman Family Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
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soon return to the public spotlight.
His forced retirement gave Quitman time to reassess his 
political views. He now unequivocally pronounced himself a 
disciple of Calhoun and attacked the Whig positions on tariffs 
and internal improvements as "a system of legal robbery." 
Democrats in the state welcomed Quitman to their fold; Whigs felt 
betrayed as he suddenly bolted from their party.
Before Quitman could resume an active role in politics, 
financial disaster struck. By 1840, Quitman had accumulated 
debts totalling $95,000, primarily by endorsing loans for friends 
who defaulted in the aftermath of the Panic of 1837. His 
insistence on caring for the widows and orphans of Natchez 
Fencible members further drained his resources. Despite an 
income of $45,000 in 1839 from his flourishing cotton and sugar 
plantations, Quitman's fiscal obligations forced him to cancel 
all unnecessary expenditures. "My pockets are empty," he 
complained to a friend, and when he encountered people he owed 
money to, "if I can conveniently dodge them I do." He resumed 
practicing law early in 1840 and intensified his efforts to 
extricate himself from his economic woes. "There are more than
2,000 suits on the docket," he told Eliza in spring. Quitman 
maintained this incredible pace for the remainder of the year and 
let nothing impede his work. When business took him to Jackson
^^May, Quitman, 92-94; Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, December 
7, 1836, Quitman Family Papers, University of North Carolina.
25May, Quitman, 98; Quitman to T. Bole and S. Shackleford, 
December 13, 1838, in Claiborne, Quitman, I, 165-68.
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in December, he refused to return to Natchez for either his
anniversary or for Christmas, much to his family's dismay. As
the next year began, Quitman wrote his wife that "in a few years
by close attention to the disordered state of the affairs, and by
rigid economy we shall be enabled to wipe out the debts and then
shall have one of the finest estates on the [Mississippi] river."
Not even politics could distract him from this goal. He
explained to a friend, "I have neither the time nor inclination
2 6to embark in a political cause however good."
During the early 1840's, Quitman also paid closer attention 
to the management of his plantations. Just as his financial 
problems seemed under control, he and his brother-in-law bought 
the large Palmyra plantation in March, 1842. In making this 
purchase, Quitman incurred a portion of a $75,000 debt which took 
him until 1857 to pay off. He transferred many of the slaves at 
his Springfield planation to augment the work force of 230 at 
Palmyra and realized sizeable profits in 1842 and 1843. Because 
he continued to buy land at this time, he was forced to continue 
practicing law to earn an income. To Eliza he grumbled, "My task 
is like that of a galley slave, I am as closely chained." He 
scolded his wife for not "encouraging, sustaining & supporting
2 6Quitman to Claiborne, January 27, February 26, 1840, in 
Claiborne, Quitman, I, 186-87, 187-89; Quitman to Eliza Quitman, 
May 6, 18401 Eliza Quitman to John Quitman, December 20, 1840, 
Quitman to Louisa Quitman, December 20, 1840, and to Eliza 
Quitman, January 3, 1841, all in Quitman Family Papers, 
University of North Carolina; May, Quitman, 108-109; Quitman to 
Robert J. Walker, February 14, 1842, Robert J. Walker Papers, 
MDAH.
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me" in his efforts to rebuild the family fortune. Finally, by 
1844, Quitman believed that he had his financial problems under 
control and that he could afford to renew his career in 
politics.
Quitman's friend and former law student, J.F.H. Claiborne, 
began to promote Quitman for a seat in the United States Senate 
in 1845. For the past year Quitman had added his voice to the 
popular call for the annexation of Texas. He had supported 
Democrat James K. Polk for president on a pro-annexation 
platform, when asked by Mississippi Democrats to run for office, 
he gladly accepted. Although eager to enter the political 
contest, Quitman adhered to an old philosophy that senatorial 
candidates lost their dignity by engaging in stump speaking. He 
asked Henry S. Foote, an attorney from Jackson, to speak on his 
behalf. While Quitman was correct in the knowledge that state 
legislators, and not the state's electorate, chose their 
senators, he underestimated the importance of standing before the 
public. His long-standing distaste for popular politics cost him 
dearly. Ironically, he not only lost the election, but 
legislators chose Henry Foote, instead.^®
State politics had not ceased to annoy Quitman since the
27Quitman to his brother, January 16, 1842, in Claiborne, 
Quitman, I, 191; Quitman to Eliza Quitman, January 18, 1843, 
Quitman Family Papers, University of North Carolina; May, 
Quitman, 111, 112.
28May, Quitman, 120-23, 126-29. As Robert May correctly 
emphasized, Quitman's thinking betrayed ineptitude in the era of 
Jacksonian politics.
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1830's. He was so distressed at the results of the 1843 
elections that he claimed "I would almost as soon have seen our 
house burned down." Again he complained, "The state will 
scarcely be fit [to] live in." Eliza's desire for her husband to 
spend less time in politics and more at home never diminished. 
Just before the legislature elected Foote, she told John, "I 
almost hope that you may not be elected on account of the 
children.
Just as Texas had distracted Quitman from his worries in 
1836, the renewal of tension between Texas and Mexico in the 
1840's "roused me from my lethargy." Quitman described the 
impending struggle in the most graphic of terms. As his 
political protege, John F.H. Claiborne, recalled, "He 
regarded... the great bulk of the Mexicans as a bastard and robber 
race, incapable of self-government, and fit only for servitude 
and military rule." Quitman assured a friend in Texas that 
southerners "will never permit an Indian and negro colony to be 
planted on the frontier. Come what will, that must not happen." 
Whether or not the United States government would help Texans in 
a conflict with Mexico, Quitman continued, "The people of the 
South will cheer you on and aid you.
For Quitman, war with Mexico would provide both a crusade to
29Quitman to Eliza Quitman, November 17, 1843, Eliza Quitman 
to John Quitman, January 7, 1846, Quitman Family Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
Claiborne, Quitman, I, 192—93; Quitman to [unidentified!, 
March 19, 1842, in Ibid., I, 271.
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vindicate the South from anti-slavery attacks and an opportunity 
for personal triumphs. In 1845, he asked his governor to allow 
him to recruit and command Mississippi volunteers, should war 
break out; as a major general in the militia, he demanded a 
prominent position in any contribution Mississippi might make.
He petitioned the Mississippi congressional delegation on behalf 
of the South, his state, and himself. He offered to raise five 
thousand men "to confer honor on their much-abused state, and win 
laurels for themselves." Quitman called for the conquest of all 
of Mexico. Such a victory, he argued, would also be a victory 
over northern critics. "We desire no aid from the 
Abolitionists," he explained. "The Northern States question our 
strength in war. Then let this war be the test. Let President 
Polk give us an opportunity of showing our spirit, muscle, and 
resources, and of repelling the slanders upon our institutions." 
Quitman went to Washington personally to ask Polk for an army 
commission. In the summer of 1846, Quitman received his 
commission as brigadier general and was ordered to report to the 
Texas-Mexico border. His ambition left him bitterly disappointed 
with, what he considered, so low a rank. As he entered Mexico a 
few weeks later, Quitman told Claiborne that his goal was "A 
major general's baton, fairly won on the field of battle, or a 
Mexican grave!
31Quitman to Governor Albert G. Brown, September 6, 1845, to 
Congressmen Davis, Adams, Thompson, and Roberts, May 22, 1846, to 
Claiborne, May 20, September 15, 1846, in Claiborne, Quitman, I, 
223-24, 225-26, 227-28, 241; May, Quitman, 148-49.
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Quitman's determination to achieve distinction in Mexico did
not escape the notice of his troops or his family. One of his
men reported, "in Genl Quitman I have no confidence at all. He
is a weak, vain, ambitious man, who is anxious to do something to
distinguish himself, and I believe would not care at what
sacrifice." Predictably, Quitman threw himself into the crucible
of battle at his first opportunity. He described his boldness at
the Battle of Monterrey to Eliza:
In the several actions my Brigade has gained the highest 
distinction & honor. It has suffered more severely than any 
other. I was necessarily much exposed, but was fortunate 
enough to escape injury. I had three horses shot and killed 
under me. My horse Messenger alone escaped. One ball 
passed through my hat, and a piece of a shell struck me on 
the thigh. A kind Providence watched over me, for no man 
was more exposed.
He called this battle "one of the greatest victories ever
achieved by American soldiers," and took great pride in his own
32leadership. Intoxicated by this early victory, Quitman 
insisted that American troops penetrate deeper into Mexico, or 
risk the "contempt of our national character." While disease 
ravaged his troops the next winter, Quitman "never felt better," 
and eagerly awaited another battle.
Over the next several months, Quitman began to worry that he
32William B. Campbell to Frances Campbell, January 2, 1847, 
Campbell Family Papers, William R. Perkins Library, Duke 
University, Durham, North Carolina; Quitman to Eliza Quitman, 
September 25, October 7, 1846, Quitman Family Papers, University 
of North Carolina.
33Quitman to Robert J. Walker, November 12, 1846, in 
Claiborne, Quitman, I, 272; Quitman to F. Henrv Ouitman. Januarv 
11, 1847, MDAH:
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might not get the official recognition he believed his actions 
had earned. In his fellow Mississippian, Jefferson Davis, who 
served under him at Monterrey, Quitman saw "an envious 
disposition & a selfishness which I have rarely witnessed." He 
asked his family if there were any truth to the story that, on a 
trip to Vicksburg, Colonel Davis had claimed "the merit of having 
done every thing." If this were true, Quitman feared, Davis 
might replace him in the minds of Mississippians both as the 
outstanding military hero from the state and as a leader in the 
state Democratic party. Even after President Polk appointed 
Quitman major general in April, 1847, he was not content. His 
commander. General Winfield Scott, denied Quitman an independent 
command until reinforcements arrived. Quitman protested that he 
would not "submit to the humiliating position assigned me," but 
reluctantly accepted Scott's order that he "cheerfully bend to 
circumstances.
When the American army approached Mexico City in September, 
Scott selected Quitman to lead one of the assaults on the city's 
stronghold, Chapultepec castle. Believing older officers like 
Scott too cautious and sensing his chance for glory, Quitman 
ordered his men to advance despite Scott's calls for restraint. 
Quitman was unharmed in the initial assault, but again his men 
drew heavy casualties. Undaunted, Quitman ordered them to
Quitman to Eliza Quitman, February 20, 1847, Quitman 
Family Papers, University of North Carolina; Quitman to General 
Scott, May 30, June 3, 1847, Scott to Quitman, May 3, 1847, in 
Claiborne, Quitman, I, 302-307; May, Quitman, 180-82.
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continue. After more heavy fighting, Quitman's men entered the
city. Early the next morning, the Mexican forces surrendered.
Scott used Quitman's troops to occupy the Grand Plaza and raise
the American flag over the ancient capital; he then named Quitman
Civil and Military Governor of the city.^^
Quitman's ego swelled as never before. "Here I am Governor
of Mexico and chief in the Halls of Montezuma," Quitman wrote to
Eliza from the National Palace. "Since the days of Cortes [sic]
we are the first invaders of this country & the people look upon
us with astonishment." Providence, he explained, had again
turned bullets from him as others fell by his side. "So far as
the credit of the thing is concerned, my honors sit very easy
upon me." In Mexico, the ambitious Quitman had realized the
3 fsfulfillment of his dreams; "I posses absolute powers."
While diplomats negotiated a formal settlement, Quitman made
his own views on Mexico quite clear. Throughout the military
3 7campaign, the beauty of Mexico captivated the General. Quitman 
believed, however, that the Mexican people "are unworthy of such 
a paradise." A proponent of Manifest Destiny, Quitman declared, 
"I am satisfied that we are but the instruments of a benevolent 
Providence to improve this country and its condition. Our
^^May, Quitman, 189-94.
^^Quitman to Eliza Quitman, May 21, September 18, 19, 1847, 
to Louisa Quitman, October 5, 1847, Quitman Family Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
37See, for example, Quitman to Louisa Quitman, November 28,
1846, to Eliza Quitman, December 30, 1846, January 6, 27, June 3,
1847, in Quitman Family Papers, University of North Carolina.
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invasion will result in the establishment of some good government
and in conferring blessings upon the people." After only a month
as governor, Quitman regally concluded, "My subjects consist of
the most infamous population with which any great city was ever
cursed." Like those fire-eaters who professed that only
Caucasians were capable of self-government, Quitman clearly
believed that the multi-racial population of Mexico was unable to
rule itself well. He wished to import American institutions to
this conquered province, including the institution of African 
38slavery.
General Scott sent Quitman to Washington late in 1847 to 
receive new orders directly from the secretary of war. As he 
awaited his instructions, a treaty with Mexico ended remaining 
hostilities. Simultaneously the presidential election of 1848 
heated up. Many spoke of Quitman as a possible candidate for 
president or vice-president. He received a great deal of support 
from Democrats who approved of his "all Mexico" position. Henry 
Foote rallied Mississippi Democrats behind the General. In the 
national party convention, Quitman finished a strong second on 
the first ballot for vice-president, but William 0. Butler of 
Kentucky won the nomination. Again refusing to accept a personal 
rebuff, Quitman accused Jefferson Davis and other Mississippians 
of conspiring against him. Realizing that his political future
38Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, May 25, 1847, John A. Quitman 
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Quitman to Eliza 
Quitman, January 6, February 15, April 23, October 11, 1847, 
Quitman Family Papers, University of North Carolina.
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depended on cooperation with his party, he resigned himself to 
his fate and dutifully supported the ticket of Lewis Cass and 
Butler.
While military governor of Mexico, Quitman had correctly 
observed, "The effects of the taking of Mexico have not yet been 
felt, and no correct speculation can be made as to immediate 
r e s u l t s . A n  immediate result was the renewal of the national 
debate over the expansion of slavery into the territories. Many 
southerners had hoped that the new president, Zachary Taylor, a 
slaveholding southerner, would engineer a solution favorable to 
southern interests. When Taylor's administration supported the 
initiative of Californians to form a free state, southern 
indignation intensified. In Mississippi, 1849 was an election 
year; Democrats asked Quitman to run for governor and lead the 
fight to extend slavery into the territories that he had recently 
helped conquer. Quitman could hardly restrain his enthusiasm.
"I will be easily elected," he predicted, and "by a large 
majority." He was right. Choosing to rely on his fame as a war 
hero and his reputation as a state-rights man, Quitman won by a 
wide margin without making a single speech. He considered his 
election a "severe rebuke to the imbecile and anti-southern
39Quitman to Eliza Quitman, May 21, June 6, 1848, Quitman 
Family Papers, University of North Carolina; Quitman to Gen. 
Shields, September 9, 1848, in Claiborne, Quitman, II, 15-16;
May, Quitman, 196-98, 205-209. For Quitman's position on Mexico, 
see Quitman to John 0. Knox, March 8, 1848, in Claiborne,
Quitman, II, 13-14.
^^Quitman to Eliza Quitman, September 19, 1847, Quitman 
Family Papers, University of North Carolina.
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administration of Genl Taylor.
Before the election that November, Quitman attended a 
Southern Rights meeting in Jackson. The assembly declared that 
any attempt by the federal government to tamper with slavery 
would be unconstitutional. Delegates then called for 
representatives of slave states to meet at Nashville, Tennessee, 
in June, 1850, to discuss strategies of southern resistance to 
anticipated northern aggression against slavery.
Believing that the sentiments expressed in this meeting 
accurately reflected the popular mood of his state, Quitman 
prepared a radical southern rights message for the state 
legislature. He began by asserting that every state in the Union 
retained sovereign powers and he reminded legislators that the 
Constitution left all control over slavery to the individual 
states. In the South, he stated, slavery "is entwined in our 
political system, and cannot be separated from it, without 
destruction to our social fabric." While some northerners 
condemned slavery, Quitman argued, "We do not regard it as an 
evil, on the contrary, we think that our prosperity, our 
happiness, our very political existence, is inseparably connected 
with it." He insisted that the right to own slaves "is one of 
those essential rights which cannot be yielded up without 
dishonor and self-degradation. None who believes that we have
^^Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, July 2, September 7, November 
11, 1849, Quitman Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
^^May, Quitman, 224.
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inherited the free spirit of our fathers," the governor 
continued, "can doubt our determination at all hazards to 
maintain these positions essential to our security." Quitman 
asserted that the South had already submitted to too many federal 
usurpations of power, and warned, "Dishonor, degradation and ruin 
await her, if she submits further." He charged that "a 
systematic and deliberate crusade against our sacred rights is 
now in progress," and that Congress was now "the theatre of this 
war against slavery." Only two results were possible from this 
confrontation, Quitman claimed; "the ultimate destruction of our 
domestic institutions, or the dissolution of the Union.
In 1850, congressmen searched for a compromise solution to 
all outstanding sectional disputes and southern radicals began to 
campaign for secession. Quitman believed that northerners would 
not yield in their efforts to ban slavery from the federal 
territories, and therefore thought that the Union "is on the 
verge of dissolution." Viewing the crisis as another link in his 
destiny, as an honorable means to promote his own fame by 
defending the South, Quitman determined to take charge of events 
in Mississippi. As governor, he ordered an inventory taken of 
the state's military supplies in case secession led to war. As a 
private citizen, he chaired a meeting in July that called for the 
creation of Southern Rights Associations in every county.
43Inaugural Address of Governor John A. Quitman, Delivered 
before both Houses of the Mississippi Legislature, January 10, 
1B50, in John A. Quitman Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi 
Valley Collections, LSU Libraries, Louisiana State University.
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Although the Nashville Convention failed to promote secession, 
Quitman continued to believe that "the South will not submit to 
be robbed of the territory acquired from Mexico." If California 
were admitted as a free state, Quitman maintained, "we should 
secede from the Union." Quitman suddenly became the most 
influential secessionist outside South Carolina.
Quitman offered his leadership to any state that resisted 
compromise efforts. When Congress included federal assumption of 
the state debt of Texas as part of the Compromise of 1850,
Quitman urged his friends there not to "sell their sovereignty," 
and promised to head a military expedition to Texas if resistance 
to the national government led to war. He responded 
enthusiastically when Governor Whitemarsh Seabrook of South 
Carolina tried to rally other states against the Compromise.
Because Seabrook feared South Carolina still bore the odium of
its radicalism in the 1830's, he desperately looked for some
other state to lead the fight for southern rights. Quitman
gladly volunteered. He told Seabrook that if Congress tampered 
with slavery in any way, he would call a special session of the 
Mississippi legislature "to take into consideration our Federal 
relations, with full powers to annul the Federal compact, 
establish new relations with other States, and adapt our organic 
laws to such new relations." As for himself, Quitman explained, 
"Having no hope of an effectual remedy for existing and
44Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, March 2, 1850, Quitman 
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; May, Quitman, 234, 241-42. -------
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prospective evils, but in separation from the Northern states, my 
views of state action will look to secession." The people of 
Mississippi, he assured Seabrook, would do the same.^S
When Congress admitted California as a free state and 
adopted the Compromise of 1850 in September, Governor Quitman 
called a special session of the legislature to meet in November. 
Although he professed to have "not a selfish motive connected 
with these questions," the intensely personal nature of the 
conflict manifested itself at this time. He blamed 
"conspirators" for using a "widely extended scheme of fraud & 
deception" to foil his efforts to achieve secession. Quitman 
told his son, "I defy these assaults from the miserable 
submissionists who would lick the hand that smote them." He 
promised a friend in Louisiana that, "so far as it depends on 
me," Mississippi would not "quietly submit to be robbed of her 
share in the broad harbours of the Pacific coast, and the vast
territories" which southerners had helped win with their lives.
Such submission would be tantamount to accepting a brand of 
inferiority, and, he vowed, "I will not be the instrument of
surrendering our birthright of liberty and equality.
Quitman to General J. Pinckney Henderson, August 18, 1850, 
Whitemarsh Seabrook to Quitman, September 20, 1850, in J.F.H. 
Claiborne Collection, MDAH; Quitman to Seabrook, September 29, 
1850, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers, Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress. Seabrook had sent a circular letter to all 
southern governors. See Seabrook to [Gov. Henry W. Collier], 
September 20, 1850, Seabrook Papers, Library of Congress.
46Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, August 26, November 16,1850, 
Quitman Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Quitman to 
Eliza Quitman, September 21, 1850, to Louisa T. Quitman, October
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Quitman knew that his message to the legislature "will no 
doubt excite great interest and produce much sensation both here 
and at the North." Governor Seabrook assured Quitman that South 
Carolina would secede as soon as any other southern state or a 
second Nashville Convention called for secession. In his 
message, Quitman stated that the most southerners could concede 
was an extension of the Missouri Compromise line of 36°30' 
through all remaining territories. He argued, however, that 
southerners could no longer seek equal treatment in the Union and 
recommended "secession in preference to submission." The most 
extreme step the legislature was prepared to take, though, was to 
schedule elections in September, 1851, to elect delegates for a 
state convention in November to consider secession. Although 
Quitman wished the convention would be held earlier. Unionist 
strength had grown so strong that he considered the delay a 
triumph for the radicals. After the special session, Quitman 
asked the leader of the secession movement in South Carolina, 
Robert Barnwell Rhett, for suggestions "in relation to the proper 
course to be pursued by the South" in the upcoming year. When 
Governor Seabrook again assured Quitman that South Carolina would 
follow Mississippi out of the Union, Quitman believed that he had
1, 1850, Quitman Family Papers, University of North Carolina; 
Quitman to Samuel A. Cartwright, October 2, 1850, Samuel A. 
Cartwright and Family Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi 
Valley Collections, LSU Libraries, Louisiana State University.
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successfully set the South on the road to independence.^^
Writing from New York, Quitman's sister, Louisa, proclaimed, 
"I care not how soon the word of secession is spoken." His 
daughter told him, "I am a terribly hot Southern rights advocate 
—  a perfect fire-eater of the most voracious kind."*^ other 
southerners, however, did not share the convictions of these 
women, while John Quitman remained hopeful that his state would 
secede, he began to worry that his ambitious schemes might 
falter. "The imaginary evils" of secession, he feared, might 
cause some to "recoil and pause a long time in doubt and 
uncertainty." The border states, he thought, might never secede 
unless "forced to choose between a Northern and Southern 
confederacy." Even though he argued, "Great political movements 
must be bold, and must present practical and simple issues," 
Quitman wished that South Carolina would act first, "and force 
the other states to meet the issue plainly." He plead his case 
to Seabrook. Mississippi, he wrote, was "unarmed, in debt, 
seriously divided and have [sic] no sea ports, nor commercial 
outlets." Throughout the South, he observed, the people had sunk 
into apathy "under the greatest aggressions, merely because they
47Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, August 26, November 16, 1850, 
Quitman Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Seabrook to 
Quitman, October 23, 1850, Claiborne Collection, MDAH; May, 
Quitman, 247; Quitman to Robert Barnwell Rhett, November 30,
1050, Seabrook Papers, Library of Congress; Seabrook to Quitman, 
December 3, 1850, Claiborne Collection, MDAH.
48Louisa S. Quitman to Quitman, December 18, 1850; Louisa T .  
Quitman to Quitman, July 25, 1851, Quitman Family Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
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are distant and indirect. Our equality is already lost, and our 
rights and domestic institutions endangered, and yet the people 
of the South are not aroused." The destiny of the South, he told 
Seabrook, "now depends upon the bold and prompt action of your 
noble state.
As signs of southern vacillation grew, Quitman's friends in 
South Carolina feared that their state would be left to challenge 
federal power unaided, just as it had done back in 1832. 
Secessionist Maxcy Gregg cautioned Quitman that lack of support 
from Mississippi "might cause some fatal defection" in South 
Carolina. Seabrook warned him that failure to resist the 
national government would lead to "oblivion" for both states. 
Rhett echoed the report of the newly elected governor, John 
Means, that secession sentiment in South Carolina continued to 
grow. Rhett asked Quitman if foes of immediate secession had 
written to him "to draw from you some support of their policy."
If so, Rhett said, "the[ir] design is to use you, to overthrow 
the Secession party of this State." Gregg wrote again, and 
struck at Quitman's most sensitive nerves by appealing to his 
ambition and ego. "in this great struggle, the South wants a 
great leader, with the mind and the nerve to impel and guide 
revolution. Be that leader," Gregg urged, "and your place in 
history will remain conspicuous for the admiration of all ages to
49Quitman to John S. Preston, March 29, 1851, in Claiborne, 
Quitman, II, 123-27; Quitman to [Seabrook], January 26, 1851, 
Seabrook Papers, Library of Congress.
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come.
In the midst of this crisis, Quitman's incessant desire to 
lead a great movement jeopardized his influence in Mississippi 
and the South. Narciso Lopez, a Cuban expatriot, planned to 
launch a private expedition in 1850 which he hoped would spark a 
revolution in Cuba. Basing his operations in New Orleans, Lopez 
appealed to many American expansionists by promising that a free 
Cuba would apply for annexation to the United States. Lopez 
correctly supposed that Quitman would be interested in the affair 
and asked the General if he would consider commanding the 
assault. With great reluctance, Quitman refused, but he did put 
Lopez's agents in contact with others who might supply money and 
arms. After an abortive landing on Cuban soil, Lopez was 
arrested in New Orleans on June 7 for violation of American 
neutrality laws. When a United States District Court grand jury 
concluded its investigation, it indicted, among others. Governor 
Quitman.
Quitman was in a dilemma. His initial response was to 
resist arrest. Because he considered himself the head of a 
sovereign state, he believed that no other authority, not even 
the federal government, could either arrest him or force him to 
stand trial. But resisting arrest, he conceded, might entice
S^Maxcy Gregg to Quitman, May 9, 15, 1851, Seabrook to 
Quitman, June 9, 1851, Rhett to Quitman, July 22, 1851, Claiborne 
Collection, MDAH; John Means to Quitman, May 12, 1851, in 
Claiborne, Quitman, II, 133-34.
^^May, Quitman, 237-40.
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federal authorities to remove him forcibly from office. After 
consulting with friends and lawyers, he chose a "middle course" 
between submitting to federal authority and "bringing about a 
collision of arms between this state and the general government
prematurely." He decided to face trial, but as a private
citizen. He resigned from office on February 3, 1851.^^
Quitman's resignation did not mean that he refused to fight. 
In fact, Quitman pledged to transform his trial into a contest 
against federal power. Quitman proclaimed, "I shall feel honored 
with being the first subject of the experiment." He would either 
defeat the federal prosecutors or "fall in the breach" and become 
a martyr for the cause of state rights. He asked Barnwell Rhett, 
who was recently selected as a United States senator, to unleash 
"a vigorous assault upon the judicial encroachments of the 
federal courts." He told Rhett that the neutrality laws were "so
vague as to furnish a suitable cloak for the boldest tyrant." In
his letter of resignation, he tried to heighten southern 
indignation by suggesting that the federal government seemed more 
concerned with removing a governor from office than it did with 
retrieving fugitive slaves from the North.Quitman's boldness
52May, Quitman, 237-41, 248-49; Jacob Thompson to Quitman, 
September 2, l850, in Claiborne, Quitman, II, 62-65; Quitman to 
Rhett, January 24, 1851, Claiborne Collection, MDAH. The 
emphasis in the quotation is mine. Also see Ambrosio J. Gonzales 
to Quitman, April 5, March 20, 1850, John Henderson to Quitman, 
May 2, 25, 27, 1850, Quitman Papers, MDAH.
53Quitman to Jacob Thompson, August 15, 1850, in Claiborne, 
Quitman, II, 62; Quitman to Rhett, January 24, 1851, in Claiborne 
Collection, MDAH; Claiborne, Quitman, II, 66, for Quitman's 
message to the people of Mississippi upon his resignation.
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was grounded in his confidence that he had violated no law. "I
would not hesitate to publish to the world, whatever connection I
may have had with the [Lopez] matter," he said. Quitman saw
Cuba's struggle as identical to that of Texas in 1836. As an
American, he believed, he could only take part in the revolution
"if invited to by the people of Cuba after they should have
erected the standard of independence."^^
Before Quitman's trial began, he found evidence that his
strategy of challenging federal authority was achieving the ends
he desired. From all over the South, supporters urged him on.
From Tennessee and Missouri, enthusiasts offered to raise
military units if Quitman wished to invade Cuba, regardless of
federal laws. "You can defy a 'world in arms,'" said one
Mississippian. Another promised Quitman, "The people are
beginning to look to secession as the only effectual remedy"
against federal power. A newspaper editor in Savannah assured
Quitman of sympathy for him in Georgia, but asked for a delay in
the acquisition of Cuba until after the formation of a Southern 
55Confederacy. It appeared to Quitman that all of New Orleans 
had rallied behind him. "My room is sometimes crowded for hours. 
All approve of my course." With great satisfaction, he reported 
to Eliza, "I now believe that my message & letter of resignation
^^Quitman to E.T. Griffith, July 22, 1850, Quitman Papers,
MDAH.
55George Muncy to Quitman, May 24, 1850, J.H. Sims to 
Quitman, February 19, 1851, T.J. Wharton to Quitman, July 9, 
1851, J. McDonald to Quitman, March 9, 1851, Thomas Jones [Pope] 
to Quitman, May 5, 1851, all in Quitman Papers, MDAH.
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have given me more reputation than the Mexican war."^^
After federal prosecutors failed to convict others involved
in the Lopez Expedition they dropped their charges against
Quitman. Suddenly he was free to resume his campaign for
southern rights in a more conventional manner. He decided to run
for governor again in 1851. "We claim redress for the past, and
guarantees for the future," he told Seabrook. He insisted that
the North either extend the Missouri Compromise line or repeal
all laws that prohibited slavery from the territories. "If our
just demands are refused, we propose to prepare ourselves to
unite with other dissatisfied states in a new confederacy."
Quitman announced his political creed in a letter to a Southern
Rights Association in March:
The political equality of the states is the vital principle 
of the Constitution. Upon its strict maintenance depends 
our liberties. We are not permitted to surrender it even to 
purchase temporary peace for ourselves. It is a sacred 
inheritance, bequeathed by our sires, which it is our duty 
to transmit unimpaired to our children. If assailed, we 
must defend it, even though the Union perish in the contest. 
But firmly and inflexibly to insist upon all our 
constitutional rights, and to maintain them at all hazards, 
is the only mode of preserving the Union of the 
Constitution. All that we ask is justice and equal rights. 
If they have been extended, we have no right to complain.
If not, we should demand them, insist upon them with 
confidence and without fear of consequences.
Quitman's opponent was his once loyal lieutenant, Henry S.
^^Quitman to Eliza Quitman, February 22, 1851, Quitman 
Family Papers, University of North Carolina.
57Quitman to Seabrook, January 26, 1851, Seabrook Papers, 
Library of Congress; Quitman to C.S. Tarpley, G.T. Swann, and E, 
Barksdale, March 31, 1851, in Claiborne, Quitman, II, 131; 
Clearly, Quitman was not, as Robert May claimed, a "reluctant 
secessionist." (May, Quitman, 228.)
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Foote. After a period of indecisiveness, Foote had become a 
devout Unionist. Quitman felt betrayed. He sickened at all 
"hosannas to the 'glorious Union,'" and agreed to a series of 
debates against the "wily and adroit" Foote. Never a good 
public speaker, Quitman was at a distinct disadvantage against 
Foote, who was among the best stump speakers in the state. 
Exasperated by Foote's forensic displays, which often included 
cutting personal remarks, Quitman assaulted Foote during one of 
their encounters. After the brawl, Quitman cancelled the 
remainder of his engagements. Foote, however, adhered to the 
schedule and therefore spoke throughout the state without 
opposition. Quitman himself received a debilitating blow when 
elections for the legislature that summer showed that 
Mississippians overwhelmingly rejected secessionist candidates 
and voted, instead, for Unionists. "I bow in respectful 
submission to the will of the people," Quitman told a group of 
Democrats in September. Rather than face certain defeat in 
November, Quitman withdrew from the race. Foote excitedly 
announced, "Quitman and Quitmanism are dead in Mississippi 
forever.
Quitman to Tarpley, et al, March 31, 1851, in Claiborne, 
Quitman, II, 129; Quitman to Seabrook, January 26, 1851, Seabrook 
Papers, Library of Congress.
59May, Quitman, 261-63; Henry S. Foote, Casket of 
Reminiscences (reprint. New York; Negro Universities Press,
1968 ), 354-55 ; Quitman to the Democratic State-rights Party of 
Mississippi, September 6, 1851, in Claiborne, Quitman, II, 146- 
47; Henry Foote to Howell Cobb, July 8, 1851, in U.B. Phillips, 
ed., The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, 
and Howell Cobb (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913 ) ,
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Quitman, of course, disagreed with Foote. Still convinced 
that he was destined to lead a southern crusade, Quitman 
acknowledged only the defeat of secession, not of southern 
rights, and set to work on a new strategy. After making such 
loud and ominous threats to secede, Quitman knew that "wishy- 
washy resolutions" would convince no one that southerners still 
insisted upon certain rights. Instead, he advocated voting 
against all southerners who supported the Compromise of 1850,
"who assisted to rob us of our equality, and to cheat us out of 
the public domain." Replacing these men with those who insisted 
upon recognition of southern rights would allow the South to 
maintain "an armed neutrality." Southern politicians would 
either "assume positions consistent with our equality and safety 
in the Union," or, one day, lead them out of it.^®
The first opportunity for Quitman to test his new policy
came during the presidential election of 1852. As the year
began, Quitman recommended that advocates of state rights
continue to work within the Democratic party, "because I know not 
where else to look...for effective help in this day of 
tribulation to the South." Quitman planned to support the 
Democratic presidential candidate, unless the party chose a 
southerner who had supported the Compromise of 1850. "I may 
pardon the advocacy of the measures by a Northern man," he
242.
^^Quitman to W.D. Chapman, December 29, 1851, in Claiborne, 
Quitman, II, 152-55.
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explained, "because, in the struggle for supremacy, he but sided 
with his section; but the Southern man who deserted us in the 
hour of need I can never trust." When he ran for governor the 
previous summer, he recalled, "the contest was noble and 
sublime," but having no personal stake in this election, Quitman 
took "but little interest in the struggle." Hoping the "Old 
Guard" of secessionists would adopt his plan of "armed 
neutrality," the General was distressed to see many former 
radicals abandon principles, like "a deserter casts off his 
uniform." If radicals would but remain prepared to stand for 
state rights, "We may succeed in securing our equality in the 
Union, or our independence out of it, or at least fall 
gloriously" in the attempt.
As the election neared, Quitman decided that the only 
glimmer of hope for southern rights in 1852 came from "the 
movement in Alabama in favor of a separate state's right ticket." 
A group of radicals held a convention in Montgomery in the summer 
of 1852 and nominated George M. Troup of Georgia, an old 
nullifier, for president, and Quitman for vice president. 
Anticipating that the new party would offer him a nomination, 
Quitman wrote to his son, "I should regret this, but whenever & 
wherever the flag of state's rights is unfurled, I shall be under 
it." In November, the State Rights party drew votes only from
Quitman's address at the Democratic State Rights 
Convention, January 8, 1852, in Claiborne, Quitman, II, 156-61; 
Quitman to B.F. Dill, February 20, 1852, and to W.D. Chapman, 
June 9, 1852, in Ibid., II, 161-64, 165-67.
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Alabama and Georgia. It received less than five percent of the 
votes cast in Alabama, and a pathetic 126 votes in Georgia.
Not even Quitman could blame some sort of conspiracy for so 
complete a repudiation. Stung by the election results, he 
realized that if he were to lead any southern crusade, at least 
for a time, it could not be a political one.
Only a few months after the disheartening defeat of the 
Southern Rights ticket, Cuba again grabbed Quitman's attention.
A group calling itself the "Cuban Junta" solicited Quitman's help 
for another attempt to wrest Cuba from Spanish domination.
Rumors that Spanish officials intended to abolish slavery on the 
island made many southern expansionists —  including Quitman —  
anxious that this might be their final opportunity to acquire new 
slave territory. Publicly, Quitman described Cuba as "the battle 
ground" which would decide European or American ascendancy in 
North America. Cuba, he said, must fall under American control 
or become "a strong negro or mongrel empire" which "would forever 
put a stop to American progress and expansion on this continent." 
After the Compromise of 1850, Quitman knew that the federal 
government would do little to help southerners obtain Cuba as a 
new slave territory, and asked, "would I perform my duty to God, 
to my country, to humanity, and to civil freedom, were I to 
refuse to devote a portion of my life to such a cause?"
Undeterred by his previous experience with Cuba, Quitman jumped
62Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, September 12, 1852, Quitman 
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; May, Quitman, 268.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
164
at the Junta's offer. He insisted upon full and exclusive 
control of the expedition, and the Junta gladly complied. They 
not only appointed him commander-in-chief, but also offered him 
"all the powers and attributes of dictatorship" once they landed 
in Cuba. If that were not enough, the Junta promised him "the 
compensation of one million dollars" for his e f f o r t s . C u b a  
provided an irresistible combination of opportunity for personal 
distinction and the expansion of southern territorial and 
political power; it was another vehicle for both honorable and 
useful ambition.
Quitman carefully began planning his "great & glorious" 
project. Offers of help poured in from all over the country, not 
just the South. By the middle of 1854, he coordinated the 
recruitment of men and arms from San Francisco to Mobile and New 
York to Savannah. As they had done a few years before, 
volunteers offered their manpower and advice. From New Orleans, 
John Quitman Moore petitioned his namesake for a part in the 
expedition. One of Quitman's associates wrote from Vera Cruz to 
ask the General to expand his operations to include a conquest of 
Mexico. By taking both Cuba and Mexico, he suggested, southern 
rights would no longer be "at the mercy of fanatical Northern 
demagogues, or entrusted to the feeble hands of our compromising.
61Quitman to Thomas Reed, August 23, 1854, The Cuban Junta 
to Quitman, April 29, 1853, Quitman to the Cuban Junta, April 30, 
1853, in Claiborne, Quitman, II, 206-208, 386-88. The agreements 
between Quitman and the Junta are reproduced in Ibid., II, 389- 
90. For a full discussion of the expedition, see May, Quitman, 
270-95.
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vacillating brethren."®^ The filibustering expedition proved too 
unwieldy for Quitman. Never able to raise enough money and 
investigated again by federal authorities, Quitman's operation 
collapsed in 1855.®^
Quitman's certainty that destiny had great things in store 
for him helped him to rebound quickly from the Cuban affair. 
Quitman had always pursued several interests simultaneously, and 
continued to throughout his involvement in the Cuba project. As 
early as 1853, he contemplated running for Congress. Two years 
later, he made a concerted effort to run for office. He based 
his campaign on a defense of all aspects of slavery. He blamed a 
"violent and strained construction of the neutrality laws" for 
preventing enterprising southerners from spreading slavery to 
Cuba. He therefore promised to eradicate all federal impediments 
to the expansion of slavery. Quitman warned, "The hosts of anti­
slavery are everywhere rallying their forces, for a final assault 
upon our institutions." Anticipating the sentiments of William 
L. Yancey's Slaughter Letter, Quitman claimed that "no national 
party will fully protect us." He vowed to work with congressmen 
who "concur with me on the slavery question," regardless of party
Quitman to F. R. Witter, February 11, 1855, John A Quitman 
Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress; Quitman to 
L. Norvell Walker, August 24, 1854, C.R. Wheat to Quitman, June 
15, 1854, John A. Winston to Quitman, June 2, 1854, Louis 
Schlessinger to Quitman, November 7, 1853, J. Quitman Moore to 
Quitman, December 28, 1854, J. T. Picket to Quitman, March 20, 
1854, all in Quitman Papers, MDAH.
^^Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, July 1, 1854; Claiborne, 
Quitman, II, 392; May Quitman, 292-95.
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affiliation. He fully expected other representatives to turn to
him for leadership because, as he told a friend, "I feel that I
have the nerve to meet the onslaught of our foes."®®
Although he had hoped for a seat in the Senate, Quitman
gladly accepted a nomination for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the summer of 1855. He believed "the destiny
of the South" might be decided in the next session of Congress,
and promised to remain a "sleepless sentinel" for southern
interests. When he received a clear majority in the general
election, Quitman vowed to act "as boldly as if I had been
6 7unanimously elected." in language that recalled his quest for 
glory in Mexico, Quitman told his son, "My destiny is action, and 
I will prostrate all opposition or die in [the] harness." At 
least one southerner was overjoyed that the valiant Quitman was 
prepared to wage war upon the abolitionist menace. Describing 
himself as a "Strict construction State Rights Secession democrat 
out & out, in fact a Red Southern rights man," R.O. Love thanked 
God that the South had "one man in Congress that we can depend
Quitman to C.R. Clifton, November 18, 1853, Claiborne 
Collection, MDAH; Quitman to B.F. Dill, July 14, 1855, Quitman 
Papers, MDAH; Quitman to W.A. Stone, July 19, 1855, in Claiborne, 
Quitman, II, 210-12.
®^Quitman to Dill, July 14, 1855, Quitman to Edward Pickett, 
H.L. Van Eaton, and James McDonald, July 29, 1855, in Quitman 
Papers, MDAH; Quitman to Claiborne, November 18, 1855, in 
Claiborne, Quitman, II, 215-16. Quitman defeated his opponent, 
Giles M. Hillyer, by a vote of 6,558 to 4,543.
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on."68
Upon his arrival in Washington, Quitman acted much as he had 
as a freshman legislator in 1828. "I find myself in high 
consideration here," he boasted to his son. He told his children 
that President Franklin Pierce often requested his company for 
walks, and that rumors abounded that he would receive a vice 
presidential nomination in 1856. "Of course the old politicians 
are a little jealous," he smugly reported, because "no man 
receives more attention than I do.
Quitman's sense of self-importance quickly gave way to one 
of frustration. He made few speeches and seldom took part in 
debates. He found that his duties as chair of the Military 
Affairs Committee brought him "a formidable pile of papers," but 
no glory. While most southerners were concerned over the fate of 
slavery in Kansas territory, the neutrality laws and expansion 
into Latin America continued to obsess Quitman. He called for 
the acquisition of Mexico, Nicaragua, and especially Cuba.
Quitman insisted that Congress repeal all laws which prevented 
individuals from launching private efforts at territorial 
acquisition. Obviously recalling his own frustrated ambitions, 
he claimed that the neutrality laws prevented a citizen from
6 8R.O. Love to Quitman, December 2, 1855, in Quitman Papers, 
MDAH; Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, October 28, 1855, Quitman 
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
6^Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, January 26, 1856, Quitman 
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Quitman to Rosalie 
Quitman, January 2, 1855, Quitman Family Papers, University of 
North Carolina.
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availing himself "of the rewards of his skill, his ingenuity, or 
his labor." He argued that the federal government had no 
specific grant of power to circumscribe this entrepreneurial 
spirit, and therefore concluded that filibustering must be 
recognized as one of the many "reserved rights" of each state.
Soon after his reelection in 1857, Quitman realized that 
Kansas was the most crucial issue in Congress. Referring to the 
debates over the Lecompton constitution, which proposed to make 
Kansas a slave state, Quitman told fellow Congressman Laurence 
Keitt, "The test struggle is before us....It will soon be seen 
whether we will maintain our equality, or sink into a degrading 
subserviency to political masters." If southerners compromised 
again, Quitman warned that they would "become the willing slave 
of an insatiable master." The South, he now believed, must 
"finally and irrevocably" insist upon spreading slavery to Kansas 
and stand or fall on Lecompton. He thought the southern states 
would have no alternative but secession if Congress admitted 
Kansas as a free state. "I am sick to death of compromises, and 
will not bend an inch to dodge the naked question," Quitman 
thundered. The growing militance of Quitman's remarks paralleled 
a rapid decline in his health. Weakened after eating
Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, January 26, 1856, Quitman 
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Quitman to Rosalie 
Quitman, March 24, 1856, and to Eliza Quitman, January 6, [1857], 
Quitman Family Papers, University of North Carolina; Speech of 
John A. Quitman, of Mississippi, on the Subject of the Neutrality 
Laws (Washington; Printed at the Union Office, 1856), in Southern 
Filibusters Collection, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley 
Collections, LSU Libraries, Louisiana State University.
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contaminated food in 1857, the normally robust Quitman died from 
a fever on July 17, 1858, at his home in Natchez.
Throughout his life, John Quitman strove to distinguish 
himself. As a young man, he paid homage to the Founding Fathers 
not only for their gift of liberty but also for leaving "ambition 
uncontrolled." His political, military, and financial success 
stand as testimony to his life-long drive to achieve fame. From 
the Mexican countryside, Quitman tried to inspire his young son 
to follow his example. He told young Henry to "give your utmost 
attention to those studies which are to fit you for a life of 
usefullness & reputation." Although he also told the boy, "I 
trust in all things your conduct will be high-toned, honorable 
and respectful," Quitman's own actions often betrayed a greater 
concern for personal renown than for "high-toned" principles. 
Concerned that Quitman had lost sight of principle in the closing 
days of the secession crisis in 1852, E.C. Wilkinson said, "You 
are expected to carry out your creed in all its severity, and not 
to flinch in the least from its conclusions... for when the State- 
rights party is formed again...it will naturally turn at once to 
you, who have stood, and stand now, like old Torquil in the 
romance of [Sir Walter] Scott, all alone, battered, but not 
beaten, while every living soul has fallen around you. But, to
71Quitman to Laurence Keitt, July 23, 1857, Quitman Family 
Papers, University of North Carolina; Quitman to John Marshall, 
February 2 and 5, 1858, and to William W.W. Wood, April 3, 1858, 
Claiborne Collection, MDAH; Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, February 
27, 1858, Quitman Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania;
May, Quitman, 328-29, 349.
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be perfectly frank with you," Wilkinson concluded "...this must 
be what you wish." After the Civil War, Henry S. Foote 
remembered Quitman as a truthful, honest, and brave man. But 
Foote also recalled, "He was over ambitious, fond of taking the 
lead in all things, [and] somewhat given to selfishness."^^
72Quitman to his brother, March 29, 1820, in Claiborne, 
Quitman, I, 44-45; Quitman to F. Henry Quitman, March 2, 1847, 
August 26, 1850, Quitman Papers, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania; E.C. Wilkinson to Quitman, August 18, 1852, in 
Claiborne, Quitman, II, 176-77; Foote, Reminiscences, 356.
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Chapter IV 
"HOW BEST TO CONTROUL AND USE...MAN"
The most powerful politician in antebellum South Carolina, 
John C. Calhoun, died in March, 1850. Carolinians mourned his 
passing for months. In his eulogy for Calhoun, Robert Barnwell 
Rhett listed Calhoun's accomplishments, extolled his virtues, and 
praised his leadership. But he also criticized. In his 
characteristically blunt manner, Rhett told the South Carolina 
legislature that Calhoun's "great defect was, that he pursued 
principles too exclusively." Principles, Rhett said, were 
unerring; to apply them, however, "we have to deal with erring 
man." Too rigid an adherence to principle, therefore, endangered 
political effectiveness. Again referring to Calhoun, Rhett 
explained.
He understood principles —  he understood how they should be 
enforced —  but he did not understand how best to controul 
[sic] and use, for their enforcement, that compound of truth 
and error —  reason and prejudice —  passion and weakness —  
man.
Although Rhett never claimed to achieve control over either men 
or politics, he strove throughout his life to do so. Entering 
the political stage even more doctrinaire than Calhoun, Rhett had 
learned the futility of unadulterated idealism, and the need for 
political pragmatism. More than any other fire-eater, Rhett
The Death and Funeral Ceremonies of John Caldwell Calhoun, 
Containing Speeches, Reports, and other Documents Connected 
Therewith, the Oration of the Hon. R.B. Rhett Before the 
Legislature, &c. &c. (Columbia, South Carolina; A . S .  Johnston, 
1850), 164.
171
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 7 2
became an adroit political tactician.
Even the name "Rhett" showed his awareness of political 
realities. Born Robert Barnwell Smith on December 21, 1800, in 
Beaufort, South Carolina, Rhett changed his name in 1837 when he 
embarked on his congressional career. Though proud of his 
father, James Smith, who had fought in the American Revolution, 
he preferred the name of his ancestor. Colonel William Rhett, who 
once served as Governor General of the Bahamas. Realizing that a 
name of distinction would fetch more attention in aristocratic 
South Carolina, Rhett also eschewed his first name and preferred 
instead to be called Barnwell.^
Before Robert Smith became Barnwell Rhett, he had already 
begun a promising career in law and politics. His early 
education was poor. His grandmother taught him to read and write 
on his family's plantation in North Carolina, and his formal 
studies at Beaufort College ended abruptly when his father needed 
help on the plantation. At age nineteen, he began his legal 
training in Charleston under the direction of Thomas Grimke, and 
was admitted to the bar in South Carolina two years later. At 
first he established a law practice in Beaufort District, but in 
1823 entered a partnership with his cousin, Robert W. Barnwell, 
in Colleton District. There he developed both a lucrative 
practice and a reputation for oratorical prowess. In 1826, the 
people of St. Bartholomew's Parish in Colleton District elected
2Laura White, Robert Barnwell Rhett: Father of Secession 
(New York: Peter Smith, 1965) , 4-9. Rhett's brothers also 
changed their names at the same time.
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the impressive young lawyer to the lower house of the South 
Carolina legislature. Soon after taking his seat, he married 
Elizabeth Washington Burnet. Her calm and even temper helped 
sustain him through one of the stormiest political careers in 
American history.^
Rhett entered state politics just as the tariff issue began 
to shake the political foundations of his state. Radicals like 
Thomas Cooper, president of South Carolina College, advised 
Carolinians to consider seriously the value of remaining in the 
Union. Rhett was most impressed by the series of essays entitled 
The Crisis, written by Robert J. Turnbull. Taking the positions 
of these men to heart, the young, enthusiastic Rhett quickly 
became the most radical politician in his state.^
Rhett addressed his constituents in Colleton with what 
became the opening salvo in the Nullification Crisis. A 
protective tariff, he argued, was unconstitutional because the 
Constitution gave Congress no clear authority to administer one. 
Furthermore, if Carolinians permitted a northern majority in 
Congress to tax them against their will, they would consent to a 
dangerous precedent. "All the property we possess," he 
explained, "we hold by their boon; and a majority in Congress, 
may, at any moment, deprive us of it and transfer it northward."
^Ibid., 10-13,
Ibid., 10-13; For a complete account of the Nullification 
Crisis, see William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War; The 
Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, I6l6-l836 (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers , 1966 ) .
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He warned that the federal government had already grown too
powerful, that time would only augment that power and
simultaneously weaken the power of each state. Rhett therefore
called for a state convention to take decisive action. The task
before them was difficult, he acknowledged,
But if you are doubtful of yourselves —  if you are not 
prepared to follow up your principles wherever they may 
lead, to their very last consequence —  if you love life 
better than honor, —  prefer ease to perilous liberty and 
glory; awake not! stir not! —  Impotent resistance will add 
vengeance to your ruin. Live in smiling peace with your 
insatiable Oppressors, and die with the noble consolation, 
that your submissiverpatience will survive triumphant your 
beggary and despair.
While Calhoun searched for a mechanism to save both state 
rights and the Union, Rhett became more radical. Returned to the 
legislature by his faithful supporters in Colleton, Rhett led a 
state rights meeting at the capital in the fall of 1830. With 
even more shrill rhetoric, he asserted that Carolinians faced two 
political alternatives: resistance to the federal government, or 
absolute submission. If they submitted to federal power, Rhett 
said, "yo[u] are the vassals and slaves of a consolidated 
empire." He claimed that he would give his life to save the 
Union, if it were one "of equal liberties and equal rights," one 
that respected the interests of each state. But rather than 
submit to a union of unlimited powers, Rhett said he preferred 
secession.
Aye —  disunion, rather, into a thousand fragments. And 
why, gentlemen! would I prefer disunion to such a 
Government? Because under such a Government I would be a
^Charleston Mercury, June 18, 1828
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slave —  a fearful slave, ruled despotically by those who do 
not represent me, & whose sectional interests are not 
mine...with every base and destructive passion of man 
bearing upon my shieldless destiny.
Rhett knew that many would consider such sentiments treasonable,
but he refused to "tremble at epithets, or shake when a tongue
rails." He claimed that the true friend of the Union would
struggle to preserve its principles, and the best way to do so
now was by nullifying the tariff. "if to think, to speak, to
feel such sentiments as these, constitute me a disunionist and a
traitor," Rhett concluded, "...then, gentlemen, I am a
Disunionist! —  I am a Traitor!"^
At this point the more thoughtful and mature Calhoun urged
Rhett to abandon his inflammatory, extreme political rhetoric and
work instead for a peaceful, constitutional settlement of the
tariff conflict. In the legislature, Rhett dutifully obeyed
Calhoun by calling for a state convention to consider nullifying
the tariff. For a while, Rhett tempered his language, but when
Congress passed a new tariff in 1832, Rhett again exploded.
Invited to give a Fourth of July address at Walterborough,
Rhett used the occasion to heighten Carolinians' spirit of
resistance.
Revolution! Sir, I feel no chilling fears, no appalling 
terrors come over me at the sound: on the contrary, I feel 
my mind elate, and my spirits rise....What, sir, has the 
people ever gained, but by Revolution? What have Tyrants 
ever conceded, but by Revolution? From the beginning of 
time. Liberty has been acquired but at the price of blood, 
and that blood shed in Revolution...What, sir, has Carolina 
ever obtained great or free, but by Revolution?
^Ibid., October 19, 1830.
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Rhett warned his listeners that an oppressed people who dared not 
resist tyranny faced "one evil, worse, far worse in its existence 
and consequences, than Revolution —  Slavery." This prospect, he 
said, was particularly horrible for "those who own our peculiar 
property." In South Carolina, where slaves outnumbered whites, 
complete control over black slaves was viewed as the only way to 
maintain peaceful relations between the races. Furthermore, like 
other fire-eaters, Rhett believed that only a slaveholding people 
truly knew what it was "to be the creature of the will of 
others." Again he vowed to support a Union of equal rights and 
laws, but rather than becoming political slaves to the North, he 
called on the assembly to "let our free spirits wing the glorious 
way in the death of freemen."^
Rhett's speech sent other nullifiers scrambling to 
"counteract the recklessness of their too honest subordinate."
The Charleston Mercury, Calhoun's political organ, retreated from 
its previous unqualified support for Rhett. Rhett's cousin, 
Robert W. Barnwell, told residents of St. Bartholomew's Parish 
that it was ridiculous to link nullification with war. Calhoun 
himself assured Carolinians that state interposition would be 
peaceful. Nullification, Calhoun said, was not the bloody 
resistance that Rhett spoke of, but merely a referendum on a 
disputed issue to be settled by the states.®
Whether they listened to Calhoun or to Rhett, most
7White, Rhett, 20; Charleston Mercury, July 14, 1832.
®White, Rhett, 24-25.
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Carolinians supported nullification by the fall of 1832. In 
October, the legislature passed an ordinance which declared the 
federal tariff null and void in South Carolina, effective 
February 1, 1833. The success of nullification, however, was 
short lived. Even before President Andrew Jackson, armed by 
Congress with the Force Bill, threatened to send federal troops 
into Charleston to collect tariff revenue, Calhoun, true to his 
word, began to work for a peaceful resolution. He worked with 
Congressman Henry Clay to construct a compromise tariff. At 
Columbia, Carolinians met in convention to determine their 
response. The promise of a lower tariff, Jackson's constant 
threats to invade the state, and the dubiousness of joint 
resistance by other southern states all combined to convince even 
Rhett that they must repeal nullification.
Even in defeat, Rhett refused to temper his personal 
beliefs. Elected attorney-general by the legislature in 
December, 1832, Rhett used his new stature to salvage a measure 
of resistance to federal power. Nullification, he said, must be 
repealed in the same spirit that gave rise to its passage. When 
the convention proposed to term the compromise tariff a 
"triumph," Rhett's hackles rose. "Let us...unsay nothing of what 
we have already said, so nobly and so well," he argued. He moved 
to strike the words "congratulations" and "triumph" from the 
official repeal message. South Carolina was forced to bow to 
political realities, he stated, and "I will not praise that 
which, under the abused names of Union and Liberty, attempts to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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inflict upon us every thing that can curse and enslave the land." 
The enemy —  consolidated federal power —  had been beaten back 
with the compromise tariff, but, according to Rhett, it would 
return to menace the state some day, "with thicker numbers, and 
redoubled fury." Before the convention adjourned, it struck the 
word "triumph" from its official message.^
As the first episode in Rhett's career ended, he was 
determined to set his personal views on record. "Once indeed, my 
pulse beat high for this Union," he explained, but the American 
flag "no longer waves in triumph and glory for me." He told a 
gathering at Columbia, "I fear, that there is no longer any hope 
or liberty for the South, under a Union, by which all self- 
government is taken away." Although in later years Rhett would 
date his conversion to secessionist at 1844, in March of 1833 he 
proclaimed, "if a Confederacy of the Southern States could now be 
obtained, should we not deem it a happy termination —  happy 
beyond expectation, of our long struggle for our rights against 
oppression?" He summarized why he believed extreme resistance so 
necessary in what became his political watchwords: "A people, 
owning slaves, are mad, or worse than mad, who do not hold their 
destinies in their own hands." Every instance of consolidation 
of power, he believed, brought the federal government ever nearer 
to the South's peculiar institution; unless they resisted quickly 
and effectually, Rhett feared, southerners would lose all power
gCharleston Mercury, March 20, 1833; Freehling, Prelude to 
Civil War, 296.
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over s l a v e r y . F o r  now, Rhett admitted defeat. For the rest of 
his life, however, he would adhere to the principles of strictly 
limited federal power and exclusive southern control of slavery; 
he would spend over a quarter century searching for ways to 
enforce them.
Rhett involved himself in a variety of interests for several 
years while he recovered from the defeat of nullification. He 
continued to serve as attorney general until 1835, but the 
remainder of his tenure was uneventful. He devoted time to his 
law practice and to a new plantation in St. Bartholomew's parish. 
Always a devout Christian, he became active in the Charleston 
Bible Society and the Charleston Port Society for promoting the 
gospel among seamen. He lent his aid to the Young Men's 
Temperance Society and the South Carolina Society for the 
Advancement of Learning. Politics, however, continued to attract 
Rhett's attention. When friends suggested that he run for 
Congress in 1836, he leapt at the opportunity. In a close race,
Rhett was elected to represent the third congressional district
11of South Carolina.
Rhett entered the House of Representatives in the midst of 
the Gag Rule controversy. As northerners sent abolitionist 
petitions to Congress, southern representatives grew alarmed, 
none more so than Barnwell Rhett. Insisting that only slave
^^Charleston Mercury, March 26, 1833.
11White, Rhett, 32-33; Robert Barnwell Rhett to Col. John 
Stapleton, January 16, 1841, Robert B. Rhett Papers, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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states could touch the institution and that Congress had no 
business entertaining petitions for things it could not do 
constitutionally, Rhett searched for a strategy to control the 
discussion of slavery in the capitol. First, he called for 
constitutional amendments. He proposed one which specifically 
denied Congress the power to tamper with slavery in the District 
of Columbia and the federal territories, another to extend and 
make permanent the Missouri Compromise line, and a third to 
prohibit congressional debate on all matters connected with 
slavery. When lack of support killed the young parliamentarian's 
elaborate scheme, he turned to an alternate plan. He insisted 
that the South Carolina legislature should withdraw its 
congressional delegation if abolitionist "fanatics" continued 
their agitation in Congress. Rhett hoped this would show 
northerners that Carolinians earnestly believed only slaveholders 
could deliberate over slavery. If all else failed, Rhett called 
for disunion "rather than suffer the discussion of the Abolition 
question in Congress." If other slave states continued their 
"apathy and lukewarmness," then South Carolina should proceed 
alone. Rhett's ire was spared. In a procedural move called the
Twenty First Rule, Congress resolved to table all anti-slave
1 ?petitions without discussion.
His spirited entry into national politics earned Rhett the
12Charleston Mercury, September 6, 10, 1838; White, Rhett, 
38-43. Ironically, one of Rhett's greatest adversaries during 
these congressional debates was John Quincy Adams, a distant 
cousin of his through the Smith family and Adams's mother, 
Abigail Smith Adams.
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accolades of many Carolinians. The citizens of Beaufort District 
dined and feted him during the summer of 1838. His constituents 
cheered long and loud every time Rhett condemned "the venality 
and corruption of their rulers" in Washington. One of Rhett's 
supporters in St. Luke's Parish hailed the "disunionist and 
traitor" who battled fearlessly on their behalf. Although unable 
to attend one of these gatherings, John C . Calhoun wrote to its 
organizers to express "my very high regard for one, who, on the 
great question of the day, has so nobly stood up for the cause of 
the people and the Constitution." Calhoun said that he had 
already come to respect Rhett, but lately his friendship for the 
young congressman had grown immensely. As a mark of his 
friendship and support, Calhoun gave instructions to have this 
letter published in newspapers in Charleston, Columbia, and 
Washington, D.C.^^
With the essential support of Calhoun, Rhett's influence and 
power in South Carolina grew rapidly. From 1837 to 1844, Rhett 
shared the leadership of a powerful political clique with former 
nullifier, Franklin H. Elmore. Elmore served with Rhett in 
Congress from 1837 to 1838, but while the two were in Washington 
they continued to wield tremendous influence at home. Elmore 
controlled the Columbia South Carolinian, and his brother served 
in the legislature. Rhett's brother-in-law, John A. Stuart, was
Charleston Mercury, August 23, 27, September 6, 10, 1838; 
John C. Calhoun to G.P. Elliott and others, August 19, 1838, in 
Clyde N. Wilson, ed.. The Papers of John C. Calhoun (16 volumes 
to date; Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981), 
XIV, 402-403 and 403 note.
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editor of the Charleston Mercury. Although that newspaper was 
ostensibly Calhoun's mouthpiece, Calhoun often needed Rhett to 
put Stuart "on his guard." Rhett's brothers, Albert and James, 
represented Colleton and Charleston in the legislature. Elmore 
left Congress in 1839 to become president of the Bank of South 
Carolina; one of the bank directors was Benjamin Rhett, another 
brother.
The Rhett-Elmore faction, variously called the "clique" and 
the "Regency," acquired power; "Rhett arrogance" brought them 
many enemies. One friend of Calhoun, perhaps not realizing that 
the senator backed Rhett, charged that Barnwell Rhett was 
"entirely selfish," and because of financial troubles "is now 
looking solely to office." "I know the respect in which your 
talents are held by your Colleagues —  but I also know that some 
of them have little love for you," Elmore reported to Rhett.
When James H. Hammond ran for governor in 1840 without the 
clique's support, he lost to John P. Richardson, the machine- 
backed candidate. When he ran again in 1842, Hammond grudgingly 
accepted Rhett's support. Rhett-Elmore backing was instrumental 
in his narrow victory; the power Rhett held, and Hammond's 
awareness of it, caused Hammond to worry about Rhett for the rest
White, Rhett, 41-42, 56; Calhoun to R.B. Rhett, September 
13, 1838, in Wilson, ed.. Papers of Calhoun, XIV, 425-26. For 
more on the control of the Mercury, see John S, Coussons, "Thirty 
Years with Calhoun, Rhett, and the Charleston Mercury; A Chapter 
in South Carolina Politics," Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State 
University, 1971.
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of his career.
Personalities began to factionalize South Carolina politics. 
As Albert Rhett explained, his family began to "resemble the 
'Bunch of Sticks,' we are something of Lucifers —  dipped one end 
in Sulphur, and extremely apt, if any one or two ignite from 
severe [friction], the whole to flame up in sympathetic 
conflagration." In the fall of 1842, Albert reported that during 
his campaign for the legislature, "Down with the Rhetts was the 
war-cry" among his opponents. Although his victory was narrow, 
he noted with satisfaction that Edmund had also won election in 
Beaufort, "so that, after all, the Anti-Rhett cry, instead of 
putting one Rhett down, only put two up." Governor Richardson 
trusted Barnwell Rhett implicitly. He once told Rhett, "I must 
depend on some one to think for me on matters not pertaining to 
Office —  and there is no one I am sure that I would sooner 
depend on than yourself." Robert W. Barnwell, though not always 
in agreement with his cousin, also turned to Rhett for "your 
counsel & your sympathy in many... important things.
The Rhett-Elmore faction overextended itself in 1842 while
Drew Gilpin Faust, James Henry Hammond and the Old South:
A Design for Mastery (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1982), 222-23, 232-33, 235; Francis W. Pickens to Calhoun, 
November 8, 1842, in Wilson, ed.. Papers of Calhoun, XV, 535; 
Franklin H. Elmore to Rhett, November 18, 1844, Rhett Papers, 
University of North Carolina; Albert Rhett to Hammond, February 
6, 26, 1842, James H. Hammond Papers, Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress.
^^Albert Rhett to R.B. Rhett, June 18, October 22, 1842;
John P. Richardson to Rhett, January 21, 1842; Robert W. Barnwell 
to Rhett, May 15, 1841, all in Rhett papers. University of North 
Carolina.
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trying to tighten its control of the state. Because of his 
political acumen and personal loyalty, Rhett won a special 
closeness to Calhoun. In 1842, Calhoun planned to resign from 
the United States Senate in order to focus his attention on the 
presidential contest of 1844; he wanted Rhett to succeed him in 
the Senate. The Rhetts prepared an elaborate plan to capitalize 
on this opportunity. Albert would run for Barnwell's seat in 
Congress, James would run for Congress from Charleston, and 
Edmund would enter the legislature from St. Helena's parish.
This time, however, "Rhett arrogance," caused a backlash. In the 
legislature, Barnwell lost the senatorial election by a vote of 
82 to 71. James lost his bid for Congress, and Albert withdrew 
from his campaign as Barnwell scrambled to retain his seat in the 
House of Representatives. Elmore's brother had died a year 
before, and Albert died suddenly in 1843. The clique was 
crippled. Even so, it sputtered on with Calhoun's support. As 
late as 1846 —  two years after Barnwell would challenge 
Calhoun's control of the state —  the envious Hammond reported, 
"Rhett is stronger than many think.
In 1843, Rhett received a renewed vote of confidence from 
Calhoun when the senator chose Rhett to manage his presidential 
campaign for 1844. To be a successful manager, Rhett first had 
to test the power of Martin Van Buren, the leader of the
17White, Rhett, 58-59; Calhoun to James H. Hammond, January 
23, 1843, in Wilson, ed.. Papers of Calhoun, XV, 628; Hammond to 
William Gilmore Simms, November 10, 1846, Hammond Papers, Library 
of Congress.
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Democratic party. In September Rhett traveled to New York to 
gauge electoral support for Calhoun in the northeast, "You are 
daily encreasing [sic] in popularity," he told Calhoun, perhaps 
optimistically. He found Massachusetts Democrats unwilling to 
support Van Buren, and received news of support for Calhoun from 
Rhode Island and Connecticut. In Van Suren's home state. New 
York, Rhett believed Calhoun Democrats might win the backing of 
Tammany Hall. Rhett's sources stated that Van Buren "is out of 
the question" in Pennsylvania. He concluded that Calhoun would 
carry the South and run well in the West, and in imperial tones 
prophesied, "On the whole, our prospects are bright and growing 
brighter; and judging from the past, we have only to keep matters 
as they are, and we must control the next presidential 
election.
Rhett's faith in Calhoun's chances of victory matched a 
rising self-confidence. He began to assert his own strategy more 
aggressively. When Calhoun hinted that he might return to the 
Senate, Rhett sternly (but politely) told him to remain out of 
Congress and avoid "the cross fire of your enemies." While 
claiming to respect Calhoun's other advisors, Rhett boldly 
suggested, "I may be a far better judge of the effect of 
political questions, and the temper of the People of the Union." 
So sure was Rhett that he had the situation under control that in 
September of 1842 he began writing editorials attacking Henry
18Rhett to Calhoun, October 3, 13, 1842, in Wilson, ed.. 
Papers of Calhoun, XV, 485-87, 493-96.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
186
Clay, the most likely Whig nominee for 1844.^^
Despite his confidence in popular support for Calhoun, Rhett 
worried about Van Buren's influence among party regulars. In 
1843, therefore, Rhett began a campaign to wrest control of the 
Democratic nomination process from the New Yorker. As matters 
stood, state party conventions chose delegates for the national 
convention, where they voted in state units. Rhett feared that 
this method favored Van Buren. In his pamphlet, "An Appeal to 
the Democratic Party," Rhett proposed popular elections for 
delegates in each state. Although he hoped this plan would 
capitalize on his perceived grass-roots support for Calhoun, he 
couched his "Appeal" in the language of Jacksonian democracy.
The president, he said, represented all the people; all the 
people, therefore, not just a few professional politicians,
"ought to have the power of choosing him." Never before had 
Rhett encouraged mass participation in politics. During the 
Nullification Crisis he had believed that the state legislature 
must lead the people. But now, with the underlying motive of 
securing a presidential nomination for Calhoun, he taunted Van 
Burenites by asking, "Do you dread the voice of the people? Or 
would you have them to be mute, either from an incapacity of
2 Ahaving an opinion, or a slavish fear of expressing it?"
^^Ibid., and 487 note.
20 "An Appeal to the Democratic Party, on the Principles of a 
National Convention for the Nomination of President and Vice 
President of the United States," published in pamphlet form and 
in Charleston Mercury, January 25, 1843, and New York Herald, 
January 26, 1843. See Wilson, ed.. Papers of Calhoun, XV, 584-
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The "Appeal" drew an enthusiastic response from Calhoun and 
his followers. To a supporter in northwest South Carolina, 
Calhoun explained that Rhett's pamphlet "will show the ground we 
assume." He regally suggested, "It would be well to have it 
published in the [Pendleton] Messenger, with proper remarks." 
Former congressman R.M.T. Hunter of Virginia called on Calhoun 
men in his state to support "the principles of Rhett's pamphlet." 
Democrats wrote from New York, New Jersey, and Indiana wrote to 
Rhett pledging their support for the Appeal.
During the next year, however, several events undermined 
Rhett's attempt to control the party. Van Burenites committed 
one state after another to the old convention system. Calhoun 
tried to pump life into his dying campaign in September 1843 by 
making Rhett editor of the Washington Spectator, a newspaper the 
senator had begun in 1842 to promote his candidacy. But as the 
convention drew closer Democrats turned away from both Van Buren 
and Calhoun, turning instead to James K. Polk of Tennessee. 
Running on a platform of vigorous territorial expansion, Polk not 
only captured the nomination but also swept into the 
presidency.
In the months before Polk's nomination, political
85.
21 Calhoun to T.G. Clemson, February 6, 1843, Hunter to ? , 
February 20, 1843, both in Wilson, ed., Papers of Calhoun, XV, 
660, 681; B. Bates to Rhett, January 26, 1843, Peter C. Manning 
to Rhett, January 26, 1843, Tilgham A. Howard to Rhett, January 
28, 1843, Rhett Papers, University of North Carolina.
^^White, Rhett, 57, 62-67.
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developments in Congress attracted Rhett's attention. From
December, 1843, to May, 1844, Rhett had worked stoically but
futilely to fight a new tariff. Simultaneously, the congressman
opposed new federal appropriations for internal improvements, but
again his efforts were in vain. These revenue measures, he
insisted, would "sink the government into a hopeless corruption
and imbecility," transform it into "a mighty machine of
oppression," and make its citizens "political slaves." Rhett
wrote directly to Van Buren and threatened to bolt the Democratic
party and launch a movement to nominate Calhoun as an independent
presidential candidate unless Van Buren used his influence to
oppose the tariff. In the same session of Congress, Rhett also
threatened disunion. When Congress abolished the Gag Rule, Rhett
warned that southerners would defend their right to be the
exclusive judges and arbiters of slavery "in the Union or out of 
2 3the Union." When the issue of Texas annexation emerged, Rhett 
lost his faith that the Democratic party could or would protect 
southern interests. While Calhoun reconciled himself to work 
with the party and angle for the presidency in 1848, Rhett 
decided to leave it.
When Congress adjourned, Rhett returned to South Carolina to 
warn his constituents that their liberty was under attack. A 
northern majority, he explained, was plotting the destruction of
23Congressional Globe, 28th Congress, l£t Session, 44, 98, 
appendijTi 174-75, 656-59, 775-77; Rhett to Van Buren, February 
26, 1844, Martin Van Buren Papers, Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress.
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African slavery. The tariff and the abolition of the Gag Rule, 
Rhett explained, belied the northern strategy. "The tariff takes 
the revenue of our [slave] property, but our property itself, is 
not left to us unmolested." Once southern institutions became 
ordinary topics of discussion in Congress, Rhett asked, could 
federal legislation on slavery be far behind? And why did so 
many northerners object to Texas annexation? "It is because 
Texas is in the South," Rhett insisted, "and may aid in 
protecting your institutions from the open assaults and meditated 
overthrow of internal...enemies.
His indignation aroused, his self-confidence high from 
seventeen years' experience in state and national politics, Rhett 
launched a daring effort to seize control of South Carolina. "I 
am sick and disgusted with the meanness and falsehood of the 
Democratic Party, whilst I detest the open, impudent despotism of 
the other [party]," he told a friend. Rhett would not allow 
"Polk born, equivocating letters" to restore his trust in the 
Democrats, nor "have I any hope in the South generally." Fully 
aware that he risked isolation and again being labelled 
"Disunionist, Mischief-maker Traitor etc.," on July 31, at the 
town of Bluffton in St. Luke's Parish, Rhett challenged the 
leadership of Calhoun in South Carolina, and threatened the 
nation with disunion.
^^Charleston Mercury, June 27, 1844.
25Rhett to R.M.T. Hunter, August 30, 1844, in Charles H. 
Ambler, ed.. Correspondence of Robert M.T. Hunter, 1826-1876 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918), 70-71; Charleston
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At Bluffton, Rhett brought the ever-present resistance 
spirit of his faithful constituents to a fever pitch. He 
repeated his accusations that Democratic deceit had encouraged 
abolitionism and protective tariffs, and might cost the South the 
acquisition of Texas. He denied that either the election of Polk 
or a Southern convention could return the government to its 
proper course. He therefore demanded nullification, secession, 
"or any thing else," but "base and cowardly submission." The 
Bluffton Movement had begun.
In Beaufort, Colleton, Orangeburg, and Barnwell districts, 
the Movement gathered momentum. A resident of St. Luke's Parish 
said of Rhett, "we not only admire him, but we go with him." 
Rhett's supporters began a series of dinners and rallies even 
more numerous than similar meetings six years before. Noting 
this rising public support, John Stuart wrote in the Mercury,
"The ball seems to be moving on." Stuart himself gave the ball a 
shove by siding with Rhett and against Calhoun. Throughout the 
state, Rhett's supporters proudly referred to themselves as 
"Bluffton Boys."^^
As Rhett had expected, opposition came quickly. An
Mercury, July 27, August 8, 1844.
2 6charleston Mercury, August 8, 1844. See Chauncey S. 
Boucher, "The Annexation of Texas and the Bluffton Movement in 
South Carolina," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VI (1919), 
3-33, and White, Rhett, 68-84.
27Charleston Mercury, August 10, 12, 28, September 5, 10,
19, 1844; Coussonsl '*Thirty Years with Calhoun, Rhett and 
the...Mercury," 168.
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anonymous correspondent to the Mercury warned, "in all time past,
no public man in this state has ever pitted himself in direct
hostility to JOHN C. CALHOUN, who has not fallen for it." Rhett
tried to minimize his conflict with Calhoun by writing in the
Mercury that the two merely differed "as to the course the State
should now pursue," and that he had no intention of replacing
Calhoun's leadership after this crisis ended. Calhoun, however,
was unwilling to accept even a temporary challenge. Rhett soon
discovered that his long-time associate, Franklin Elmore, "is not
in the movement;" he opted to remain in Calhoun's camp. Rhett
found fellow Congressman Armistead Burt, who he had counted upon
for support, unwilling to join the Movement for fear of Calhoun's
wrath. "By your silence," Rhett complained, "you are all
supposed to be opposed to any State action at any time. My
constituents have marched out into the open field, and placed
themselves and me, in open line for battle. You and your
Constituents are back in the woods, and lying so still and
concealed that they are claimed as a post of our enemies." Rhett
understood the freshman congressman's reluctance to defy Calhoun,
"but your silence had nearly killed our Party in Charleston."
Indeed, Rhett could not fault Burt, for he himself realized that
2 ftCalhoun aimed "to crush me."
At this point, Rhett was almost ready to admit defeat.
2 ftcharleston Mercury, August 12, September 3, 1844; Rhett to 
R.M.T. Hunter, August 30, 1844, in Ambler, ed.. Correspondence of 
Hunter, 70; Rhett to Armistead Burt, September 9~, 1844, Armistead 
Burt Papers, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, 
North Carolina.
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Stuart returned support of the Mercury to Calhoun in September, 
and Rhett returned to Washington. Thinking that Rhett had 
learned his lesson and eager to repair internal divisions in 
South Carolina, Calhoun treated Rhett like a prodigal son.
Calhoun allowed Rhett back into his camp, and even let him resume 
the editorship of the Spectator. But in Rhett's absence, the 
movement gathered a second wind. The widely respected former 
congressman, Langdon Cheves, though opposed to Rhett's call for 
separate state action, lent his support to united southern 
resistance and even a Southern Confederacy. Senator George 
McDuffie also supported the spirit of Bluffton, though he wished 
for "no noise, no excitement" from the volatile Rhett. James 
Rhett even spread the word of Bluffton to the citizens of Georgia 
in a stirring speech in Macon. Again choosing to defy Calhoun, 
Rhett resigned from the Spectator and returned to South 
Carolina.
When Rhett resumed leadership of the movement he knew that 
he faced powerful opposition. His language, therefore, became 
more confrontational. Rhett concluded one speech by quoting 
scripture; "I call Heaven and Earth to record this day against 
you, that 1 have set before you life and death, blessing and 
cursing; therefore chose life that both you and your seed may
29Coussons, "Thirty Years with Calhoun, Rhett, and 
the...Mercury," 173; White, Rhett, 79.
^^White, Rhett, 79-82; Charleston Mercury, September 10, 27, 
1844; Coussonsl “Thirty Years with Calhoun, Rhett, and 
the...Mercury," 174.
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live." Again Rhett dismissed the possibility of cooperation from
other southern states. In a letter published in the Mercury
Rhett explained cynically "it will be very easy to obtain their
aid and cooperation...after the proper issue is made by the
conduct of a single State." In other words, South Carolina must
act alone, and force other slave states to join her or remain in 
31the Union. Within six weeks, however, the Bluffton Movement 
collapsed. A unionist defeated Blufftonite candidate Whitemarsh 
B. Seabrook in the gubernatorial election. Polk captured the 
presidency, and Calhoun made known his determination to work with 
the new administration. Rhett realized that no one could set a 
new political course for South Carolina while Calhoun remained in 
control.
One anonymous Carolinian suggested that "none but an idiot 
would...risk incurring odium with the great majority of South 
Carolinians," by defying Calhoun. Barnwell Rhett had challenged 
him twice; but he was no idiot. Rhett could bank on support from 
his congressional district. In fact, in the midst of the 
Bluffton conflict, Rhett's constituents reelected him without 
opposition. Rhett indeed incurred a healthy dose of odium, and 
this condition plagued him the rest of his life. Many 
Carolinians never forgave the man who could so impudently say no 
to Calhoun. Many more found Rhett's periodic calls for
^^Charleston Mercury, September 12, 20, 1844.
32White, Rhett, 83-84; Coussons, "Thirty Years with Calhoun, 
Rhett, and the...Mercury," 182-83.
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unilateral, forceful resistance to federal power disquieting and 
worrisome. But the vast majority of voters in southeastern South 
Carolina did not. Rhett knew this —  so did Calhoun. Even after 
Rhett's second effort against him, Calhoun took his old 
lieutenant back into the fold. Although the two would never be 
as close as they had before Bluffton, Calhoun continued to 
respect Rhett's organizational abilities and political 
adroitness. Calhoun needed Rhett to keep the third congressional 
district under control and depended on the Rhett-Elmore faction 
to enforce his agenda in the state while he remained concerned 
with national politics. Neither Rhett nor his allies suffered 
from their breech with Calhoun.
Not only did Rhett avoid personal disaster, but he also laid 
the foundation for future secession movements. His "Bluffton 
Boys," as the name indicated, were relatively young. In the fall 
of 1844, Calhoun was sixty-two years old. Rhett, almost twenty 
years younger, attracted many young men to his movement who had 
had little or no previous political experience. At age fifty- 
one, the oldest prominent Bluffton Boy was Whitemarsh Seabrook. 
Although he lost his bid for the governorship in 1844, he won 
several years later and played a critical role in the sectional 
contest of 1850. John McQueen, a forty year old lawyer from 
Marlboro District, launched his political career by running for
33Charleston Mercury, September 3, 1844; Coussons, "Thirty 
Years with Calhoun, Rhett, and the...Mercury," 182-83; John B. 
Edmunds, Jr., Francis W. Pickens and the Politics of Destruction 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 50-53, 
55, 56-58, 98.
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Congress on a pro-Bluffton platform. During the 1850's, 
Congressman McQueen would help Rhett keep abreast of political 
developments in Washington. David Flavel Jamison, thirty-three 
years old in 1844, would serve as president of the South Carolina 
secession convention in 1860 as well as influence an even younger 
fire-eater, Laurence Keitt. These and countless other, less 
distinguished men entered politics with a baptism of resistance 
and a benediction of secession. They also shared a reverence for 
the political leadership of Barnwell Rhett.
Rhett's political proficiency extended beyond the borders of 
South Carolina. Although he had defied both Calhoun and Polk 
during the Bluffton summer, once he returned to Washington Rhett 
began to court the favor of both. He met with his brother, 
Franklin Elmore, and several other Carolinians in the spring of 
1845 to discuss the best strategy for Calhoun's next presidential 
campaign. During the course of the Mexican War, Rhett won for 
himself a place of great influence with President Polk. "I 
suppose it is the result of a personal respect for me," and not a 
partisan matter, Rhett postulated, because he had voted against 
Polk's assertion that Mexico had started the war. By the end of 
1847, the artful Carolinian had become one of the few 
congressional leaders who Polk turned to for advice.
^^Charleston Mercury, August 8, 16, 22; White, Rhett, 84.
35D.H. Lewis to Calhoun, May 9, 1845, in Chauncey S. Boucher 
and Robert P. Brooks, eds., Correspondence Addressed to John C. 
Calhoun 1837-1849 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930), 
293; Rhett to Hammond, September 11, 1847, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress; Milo M. Quaife, ed.. The Diary of James K.
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Despite Rhett's renewed ties to the Democratic party, his 
passionate desire for resistance never abated. He explained his 
situation in a parable. He remembered once seeing a master 
whipping a slave for some offense, "and after giving him more 
[lashes] than I thought he deserved, I went to interceed [sic] 
for him; Oh says the Master, I am now only flogging him because 
he hollers! So it is with us. We are not allowed to holler." 
Silently, therefore, Rhett resolved, "I will keep up the fire [of 
resistance], if like the lost hunter in a Priarie [sic] I have to 
kindle it slow, with my flint, and watch by the blaze, rifle in 
hand, to keep off the wolves." Rhett told Congressman Burt that 
if South Carolina resisted federal power again, "it will be the
impulse of your constituents & mine. Mine are ready," he
, 36 promised.
After 1844, Rhett's alliance with Calhoun remained 
precarious. Beverley Tucker put it best when he described "that 
mischievious faction of which C[alhoun] is the head, and Rhett 
the tail (it is you know a sort of political amphisbeana and 
sometimes goes tail foremost)." During these years, Rhett showed 
no remorsefulness for Bluffton. In fact, he often opposed or 
ignored Calhoun. in 1846, he argued against an internal 
improvements bill for the Mississippi River, a bill Calhoun 
supported. In the summer of 1848, Rhett contemplated backing
Polk During his Presidency, 1845-1849 (4 volumes; Chicago: A.C, 
McClurg & Co., 1910), III, 236.
^^Rhett to Burt, June 24, 1845, Burt Papers, Duke 
University.
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John A. Quitman for the Democratic presidential nomination. 
According to Burt, Rhett had not consulted with Calhoun about 
that or "about anything this session.
With the presidential election of 1848 came yet another 
disagreement between Rhett and Calhoun. Quietly and 
unenthusiastically, Calhoun threw his support to the Whig 
nominee, Zachary Taylor. Rhett considered Taylor and his party 
unsound on all questions of interest to the South, and instead 
supported Democrat Lewis Cass. Speaking in Charleston, Rhett 
admitted that the Democrats had proven themselves inconsistent on 
tariffs, internal improvements, and slavery, but he argued that 
the Whigs were avowed enemies. Rhett denied Calhoun's contention 
that Taylor, a southern slaveholder, would protect the peculiar 
institution. Without an unambiguous promise to veto the Wilmot 
Proviso (a congressional proposal to prohibit the expansion of 
slavery into the territories acquired from Mexico), Rhett 
insisted that southerners should not trust Taylor.
Rhett spoke of the election of 1848 as a turning point for 
the South. For years southerners had talked of resisting federal 
usurpations of power, but had done nothing to stop it. "You must 
act, and act decisively," he demanded. "You have talked and 
threatened until you were despised." Like other fire-eaters, 
Rhett warned southerners that they could not rely on political
37Nathaniel Beverley Tucker to Hammond, December 6, 1848, 
Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; Congressional Globe, 29th 
Congress, 1 ^  Session, 529, appendix, 447-49; White, Rïïëtt, 88; 
Burt to H.W. Connor, July 4, 1848, Armistead Burt Papers, South 
Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, South Carolina.
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parties to save them. "The South must protect itself," he said,
and repeated his old warning that "no slaveholding communities
can be safe but by their own energies." If southerners allowed
others to tamper with slavery, it would provide "proof conclusive
of your imbecility, and prove also that the Constitution has
failed in affording you that 'domestic tranquillity [sic]' which
on its face it was established to secure." If Southerners could
no longer protect their rights within the Union, particularly
"this great question of slavery," then they must dissolve it.
"Gentlemen!" he cried, "I long for the union of the South for the
sake of the South. I care not what may be the measure that
produces it." As he had said many times before, if other
southern states would not act. South Carolina must, and force the
rest to chose sides.
When Taylor captured the presidency —  and a substantial
portion of the southern vote —  Rhett grew despondent. He worked
with Calhoun, who tried to rally southern unity by sponsoring a
bi-partisan Southern Address which declared that Congress could
not interfere with slavery in the territories. Despite the
efforts of the two Carolinians, less than half of all southern
39congressmen signed the Address. These occurrences convinced 
Rhett that the South had grown weaker and more divided than ever. 
He looked desperately for any new strategy to restore southern
38Charleston Mercury, September 29, 1848.
^^William J. Cooper, Jr., The South and the Politics of 
Slavery 1828-1856 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
lè7è), 253, 266-68; White, Rhett, 99-100.
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unity and power. "On this account," he told Calhoun, "I am sorry 
to come to the conviction that there is no chance for the Wilmot 
Proviso, or the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia 
at the approaching Congress. Would to God, they would do both, 
and let us have the contest, and end it once and forever. It 
would then accomplish our emancipation, instead of that of our 
slaves."*^ When he ended his seventh and final term in Congress
in 1849, the dejected Rhett felt that the South could not count
upon northerners to commit such a blunder.
Only a few months passed, however, before measures proposed
in Congress to settle the territorial question suddenly brought
about the conflict Rhett had wished for. In March, 1850, the 
single greatest obstacle to Rhett's political ascendancy 
disappeared with the death of John C. Calhoun. The impending 
congressional compromise and Calhoun's death presented Rhett with 
the most difficult but promising challenge he had yet faced; he 
now had an opportunity to control his state and through it lead 
the South to secession. Events over the next two years would 
test his political acumen and try his organizational agility. 
While he fixed his gaze firmly on secession, he began to modify 
his tactics to capitalize on each opportunity that presented 
itself.
The first such opportunity was the Nashville Convention. 
Previously, Rhett had never believed cooperative southern
^^Rhett to Calhoun, July 19, 1849, in Boucher and Brooks, 
ed., Correspondence to Calhoun, 517-18.
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resistance possible. Instead, he had feared that southern 
conventions would compromise principle for the sake of partisan 
harmony and political o f f i c e . W h e n  southerners met the call 
for Nashville with enthusiasm and apparent earnestness, however, 
Rhett decided to give cooperation a try. During most of the 
proceedings at Nashville, Rhett remained silent. The rest of the 
Carolina delegation —  Elmore, Hammond, Langdon Cheves, and 
Robert W. Barnwell —  eclipsed their more radical colleague.
Even when the assembly resolved only to insist upon an extension 
of the 36°30' line, Rhett did not speak out. He did, however, 
write the official "Address of the Convention" to the people of 
the Union.
The Address was filled with familiar Rhett verbiage. For 
fourteen years, it began, the North had tried to meddle with 
slavery through Congress. It did so "not from a mere lust of 
power," but also "to assail and destroy slavery in the South."
Yet the South had done nothing to defend itself. Rhett argued 
that southerners should have met the issue boldly in 1844 by 
either forcing the North to maintain the Gag Rule or by seceding. 
Instead, he lamented, the South did neither, "and their 
forbearance has had the effect of inspiring the Northern people 
with the belief that we value a union with them more than we 
value the institution of slavery." He concluded the Address with 
his old warning that a slaveholding people "must rule themselves
^^See, for example. Charleston Mercury, June 27, August 8,
1844.
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or parish.
The extremism of Rhett's Address in no way matched the mood 
of the Convention. It did, however, illustrate how Rhett 
interpreted cooperation. He issued the Address less to cooperate 
with the convention than to use and control it. By having the 
final word at Nashville, Rhett was able to impose his views on 
others by sheer assertion. He continued to insist that Nashville 
marked "the beginning of mighty changes" when he reported on its 
actions to the people of Charleston. Rhett's boldness succeeded 
to a certain degree. Newspapers in Mississippi and Georgia 
hailed his Address and joined his call for resistance. In South 
Carolina, Rhett's actions left some of his opponents baffled.
None showed greater confusion than Hammond. In a single letter 
he said, "Although I concur on every sentiment of Rhetts... I 
regret extremely that he gave utterance to them just now," and, 
"Such men [as Rhett] spoil all movements," and, "I must not 
object to anything from Rhett.
Rhett did not, however, use cooperation exclusively to 
manipulate others. Two months after Nashville, he participated 
in a genuine act of cooperation. In August, 1850, Rhett made his 
first and only public appearance outside South Carolina, except 
for Congress. He joined William Lowndes Yancey of Alabama and 
others at a secession rally in Macon, Georgia. His message and
^^Charleston Mercury, June 20, 1850.
^^Charleston Mercury, July 2, 3, 20, 1850; Hammond to 
William Gilmore Simms, June 27, 1850, Hammond Papers, Library of 
Congress.
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his presence marked his honest support for united southern 
action. Wherever there was "a Southern heart to beat with 
indignation at Southern wrongs," Rhett announced, all southerners 
should confer together and offer counsel to each other.
The failure of cooperative efforts like Nashville and Macon 
to result in effective political resistance led Rhett back to the 
conclusion that South Carolina must act alone and force other 
southern states to choose sides. Over the next year, as South 
Carolinians formed Secessionist and Cooperationist parties, Rhett 
spared no effort to attack cooperationism and vilify its 
advocates. But even while Rhett tried to convince Carolinians 
they had nothing to fear if they seceded first, his exchange of 
letters with John A. Quitman suggests that Rhett also worked 
covertly to foster cooperative resistance with Mississippi. If 
he could help push another state out of the Union, Rhett no doubt 
realized that he would eliminate forever the question of separate 
state action versus cooperation, and achieve his goal of a 
Southern Confederacy. No wonder that both he and Quitman, who 
also ostensibly favored separate state action, lied about their 
correspondence.
4 4"Speech of the Honorable R.B. Rhett Delivered at the Mass 
Meeting at Macon, Georgia, on the 22 Aug 1850," fragment, Rhett 
Papers, University of North Carolina.
^^Rhett to Quitman, July 22, 1851, JFH Claiborne Collection, 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History; Quitman to Rhett, 
November 30, 1850, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers, Division of 
Manuscripts, Library of Congress; Robert E. May, John A. Quitman; 
Old South Crusader (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1985 ), 260 ; John Barnwell, Love of Order: South Carolina's 
First Secession Crisis (Chapel Hill: The University of North
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Rhett's few attempts at cooperation in no way reduced the 
need he felt for South Carolina to force other states into 
action; they merely demonstrated his awareness that many 
Carolinians were reluctant to risk repeating the embarrassment, 
alienation, and odium they incurred by acting alone in 1832.^^ 
These efforts to promote southern unity, however, never 
distracted him from his more immediate goal, the secession of his 
own state. He would have gladly let any other state lead the 
secession movement, and gave others the opportunity to try. But 
in his heart he believed everything depended on the action of 
South Carolina. He therefore expended most of his energies in an 
attempt to achieve separate state action.
The first step in Rhett's effort to control his state 
involved Southern Rights Associations. Many of these 
organizations arose spontaneously out of popular indignation over 
the compromise measures pending in Congress. Rhett determined to 
tap this popular energy. His call for the immediate secession of 
South Carolina at the meeting of a Charleston association drew 
the overwhelming approval of most of its members, including 
Hammond's closest friend, William Gilmore Simms. Rhett made 
similar appearances and remarks at Southern Rights meetings 
throughout the tidewater region; many of the Bluffton Boys 
reemerged to do the same further inland. Everywhere the message
Carolina Press, 1982), 178-79.
46For example, see D. Wallace to Whitemarsh Seabrook, 
November 7, 1849, Seabrook Papers, Library of Congress.
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of Rhett and his lieutenants was the same. As Laurence Keitt
said. South Carolina "should withdraw alone from the Union.
Rhett's determination to control his state also led him into
a confrontation with James Hammond. After Calhoun died, these
two were the obvious contenders to replace Calhoun in the United
States Senate and, presumably, as political master of the state.
The legislature would not select a new senator until December,
1850; the intervening months proved that Rhett possessed both a
greater awareness of the political mood of his state and more
cunning than his often-confused opponent.
Rhett correctly perceived that Carolinians continued to wish
for united southern resistance, even after the Nashville
Convention failed to produce concrete results. Hammond,
disgusted at how ineffective Nashville was, chose not to attend a
second convention there later in 1850. Rhett went. As Simms
later pointed out, these developments gave many Carolinians the
impression that Hammond lacked commitment to any kind of
resistance. Rhett's attendance proved his willingness to seek
4 8redress either alone or with a united South.
The competition between Rhett and Hammond continued into 
autumn, literally over the bones of Calhoun. The citizens of
^^Charleston Mercury, October 4, 12, 1850, April 8, 12, 
August 8, 27, September 4, 18, 20, 1851.
4 8white, Rhett, 115; William Gilmore Simms to Hammond, 
January 30, 1851, in Mary C. Oliphant, Alfred Taylor Odell, and 
T.C. Duncan Eaves, eds., The Letters of William Gilmore Simms (5 
volumes; Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1955 ), 
III, 88.
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Charleston selected Hammond to give the city's official funeral
oration for Calhoun; Governor Seabrook chose Rhett to do the same
in the legislature. Both speakers traced Calhoun's illustrious
career and lauded his accomplishments. But while Hammond spoke
of Calhoun's death as a crippling blow to the South, Rhett
invoked the Senator's name to further his own objectives. In
the same speech that Rhett criticized Calhoun for his failure "to
use and controul...man," Rhett attempted to do just that. He
boldly put words in Calhoun's mouth and, through a singular
interpretation of Calhoun's actions, promoted secession.
After Calhoun collapsed in the lobby of the Senate shortly
before his death, Rhett claimed, he extended his hand and said,
"Ah 1 Mr. Rhett, my career is nearly done. The great battle must
be fought by you younger men." What was the "great battle"
Calhoun spoke of? Rhett claimed to know what Calhoun meant.
Had his mighty spirit devised some way to save the Union, 
consistent with the liberties of the South? Or did he wish 
to utter there that word which all his lifetime he could not 
speak, although wrong and oppression tortured him —  that 
word, which dying despair could alone wring from his aching 
heart —  disunion!1
Whether Calhoun came to believe that the South must secede is
arguable; that he hand-picked Rhett as his successor, after years
of friction with him, is improbable. Nevertheless, that was the
picture that Rhett presented to the legislature. He also
designed his closing remarks to force lawmakers to commit
themselves to secession. If they truly mourned the passing of
Calhoun, he said, "we cannot but hate the tyranny that hurried
him to his grave, —  and love the liberty for which he lived, and
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wasted, and died. Cherishing his memory," Rhett announced, "we
4 Qdare not be slaves."
In December, the legislature selected Rhett over Hammond by 
a vote of 97 to 46. Unable to accept this roadblock to his 
ambition, Hammond lashed out at Rhett. He called Rhett a 
Robespierre. He said that Rhett possessed no statesmanship 
whatsoever. To his friend Edmund Ruffin he said of Rhett, "I 
have long thought he was not sincere in his Revolutionary 
tactics. They were too wild & insured defeat." In his calmer 
moments, Hammond's anger turned to a smoldering jealousy. To 
Simms he lamented that Rhett was indeed the new master of South 
Carolina, that the political elite of the State had "anointed him 
leader.
When Hammond discovered that Simms had asked their friend 
Beverley Tucker to review Rhett's and his own oration for Calhoun 
together in the Southern Quarterly Review, he erupted. "Do I 
belong to Rhett?" he demanded of Simms. "He has crushed me it is 
true so far [as] my present & future political prospects & moral 
character are concerned," Hammond conceded. But, he protested, 
"Am I, soul & body, to be blasted by him?...What is there between 
us & associating us but that he has been my conqueror and 
destroyer...?" To Tucker, Hammond said that he could "never
49Faust, Hammond, 300-301; Death and Funeral Ceremonies of 
Calhoun, 117-68, especially 162-65, 168. "
^^Charleston Mercury, December 19, 1850; Hammond to Simms, 
February 14, May 2T~, l85l ; Hammond to Edmund Ruffin, November 21, 
1851, Edmund Ruffin Papers, Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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comprehend the necessity of placing Rhetts oration & mine in the
same caption, nor why he should thus be gratuitously & by my
friends be made to neutralize me in literature after destroying
51me in politics." Not even when Simms said that he wished "the 
Rhetts & Co may be decapitated" could Hammond find consolation. 
After straining his relationship with the aged and dying Tucker,
c nHammond resigned himself to submit to his fate.
Neutralizing Hammond, however, was but a part of Rhett's 
strategy. He knew that he must convince the voters of South 
Carolina they had no alternative but secession. To do this,
Rhett tried a variety of rhetorical devices. The first was his 
standard approach; allusions to the gallantry of the Founding 
Fathers and exhortations to emulate their heroism. As he had 
done during the Nullification Crisis, Rhett loudly proclaimed in 
1850, "I am a Traitor," a "Traitor in the great cause of liberty, 
fighting against tyranny and oppression." While speaking to a
William Gilmore SimnfS to Beverley Tucker, March 2, [1851], 
in Oliphant, éd.. Letters of William Gilmore Simms, III, 93-94; 
Hammond to Simms, May 29, 1851 ; Hammond to Tucker, June 13, 1851, 
Tucker-Coleman Collection, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of 
William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.
52Tucker to Hammond, May 25, June 23, 1851, Hammond to 
Simms, July 1, 7, 1851, in Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; 
Hammond to Tucker, April 8, 1851, Tucker-Coleman Collection, 
William and Mary; Simms to Tucker, June 26, 1851, in Oliphant, 
Letters of William Gilmore Simms, III, 132-34.
His defeat by Rhett aggravated Hammond's sense of political 
powerlessness. Seven years earlier, Hammond's brother-in-law, 
Wade Hampton II, a prominent South Carolina planter and 
politician, discovered Hammond's sexual liaison with Hampton's 
daughters. Hampton used his considerable influence to impede 
Hammond's political career. Rhett's victory in 1850, therefore, 
compounded Hammond's frustrations. See Faust, Hammond, 241-45.
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gathering in Charleston, he explained, "To meet death a little 
sooner or a little later, can be of consequence to very few of 
us."^^ The prosperous businessmen and merchants of the city, 
however, were no more eager to embrace Rhett's call to risk their 
lives and fortunes than were most people in the state. By the 
next summer, Rhett realized that his clarion call for a Southern 
Revolution cost him more support than it attracted.
With this realization came a determination to stand his 
message on its head. Henceforth, Rhett would not only deny that 
the South entertained revolutionary intentions, but also accuse 
the North of overthrowing the Constitution and waging an 
aggressive, methodical campaign against the conservative and 
passive South.
Rhett had already begun to adapt his language in 1850. If 
southerners allowed the North to prevent them from expanding 
slavery into the federal territories, he said, all new states 
would be free and, in time, enable the North to abolish slavery 
constitutionally, through the amendment process. Rhett warned of 
an evil, menacing conspiracy growing in the North which plotted 
to "degrade and ruin the South." He claimed Abolitionists 
designed to "place upon your front, the brand of inferiority."
For the innocent, law-abiding slave states, liberty, honor, and 
"existence itself" hung in the balance. If Congress could 
prohibit the spread of slavery or tax the southern people against 
their will, Rhett explained, "you are ruled by the North." If
^^Charleston Mercury, July 20, 1850, April 21, 1851.
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the North ruled the South, he asked Carolinians, "are you a free 
people?"^^
Not merely a Cassandra, Rhett also offered a solution. Just 
as Beverley Tucker had done at Nashville and Yancey and other 
fire-eaters would do increasingly, Rhett began to emphasize how 
secession would bring redemption and honor, liberty and 
prosperity to the South. Nowhere was this shift in rhetoric more 
apparent than in his address at Macon. After another long 
recitation of northern trespasses against the South, Rhett 
focused on the supposed benefits of secession. The South, he 
predicted, would have a free hand in the West after secession. 
"New Mexico and Utah, contiguous to us, will be easily ours; and 
how long will California keep out of a Southern Confederacy?" he 
asked. Californians, he promised, joined southerners in their 
desire for lower tariffs and required slaves to work in their 
gold mines "—  need them more than any people in the world; —  
the South alone can supply her with them." Soon, a Southern 
nation would absorb all of Mexico. With "so glorious a destiny 
before them," Rhett said that southerners would prove "the most 
stupendous instance of imbecility, folly and cowardice, the world 
has ever seen" if they did not form their own nation. Later, in 
South Carolina, Rhett repeated his vision of territorial glories 
and added that secession would also bring a new age of commercial 
prosperity. Free trade, he claimed, would increase European 
commerce with the South, cripple northern business, and thus
^^Charleston Mercury, June 20, July 20, 1850.
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preclude the possibility of a northern naval blockade or civil 
war. According to Rhett, the South had much to lose by remaining 
in the Union, and much to gain by seceding.
Senator Rhett's initial confidence that his many-layered 
strategy would work diminished as the year 1851 progressed. In 
February he felt certain that the nation would split apart over 
the slavery question. His wife reported from South Carolina that 
"the prospects of the State are brightening, the country is 
coming out bravely for secession," although she noted that the 
residents of Charleston demonstrated "a craven spirit of doubt & 
fear." Despite the activities of Southern Rights Associations 
all summer, the people of South Carolina began to shy away from 
separate state action. Rhett panicked. In July he urged 
Governor John Means to seize federal forts in the state in order 
to precipitate an armed conflict and force southerners to unite 
behind secession. Means refused. "Although I see much force in 
the reasons you give, as to the Union of the South in case of 
success," the governor calmly responded, "yet were it to fail, I 
should look upon it as a death blow to our cause."
In an October election for delegates for a state convention, 
the voters of South Carolina backed Cooperationists over 
Secessionists by an aggregate of 25,045 to 17,710. The Rhetts 
grew sullen. The "submissionists" had triumphed, Elizabeth told
55"Speech of the Hon. R.B. Rhett delivered at the Mass 
Meeting, at Macon, Ga., on the 22d August, 1850," in Abraham 
Watkins Venable Scrapbook, William R. Perkins Library, Duke 
University, Durham, North Carolina; Charleston Mercury, April 21, 
1851. ------
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her husband. She could not believe that sentiment for secession 
had collapsed so quickly after Barnwell had helped raise it to a 
peak only months before. She lashed out at "this ungrateful, 
cowardly, stupid State" in which politicians, made aware of their 
duty by Rhett, refused to act like men. "My heart actually 
sickens, at the prospect before us —  what abject humiliation, 
what deep degradation is ours," Elizabeth moaned. "I think death 
preferable to dishonor.
As influence over the state slipped from his grasp, so did 
Rhett's self-control. After the fall elections presented 
secessionists throughout the South with a fait accompli, formerly 
avid secessionists in Congress scrambled toward unionism. All 
except Rhett. "I am a secessionist —  I am a disunionist," he 
trumpeted on the Senate floor. When a colleague challenged 
Rhett's claim that he had only been a secessionist for a few 
years, Rhett snapped, "I do not care whether you say twenty or 
one hundred years, if I was so old." The Compromise of 1850, he 
said, effectively dissolved the Union by violating the equality 
and rights of southerners in the territories. "Others may 
submit; I will not," he announced defiantly. "I will secede, if 
I can, from this Union. I will test, for myself and for my 
children, whether South Carolina is a State or an humbled and 
degraded province, existing only at the mercy of an unscrupulous
C C
Rhett to N. Foster, February 1, 1851, Elizabeth Rhett to 
R.B. Rhett, February 5, [1851], October 17, [1851], Rhett Papers, 
South Carolina Historical Society; John H. Means to Rhett, July 
30, 1851, Rhett Papers, University of North Carolina; Barnwell, 
Love of Order, 177-81.
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and fanatical tyranny.
In April, 1852, a state convention resolved, by a vote of 
136 to 19, that South Carolina "has good cause to secede from the
Union, and forbears to do so only from motives of expediency." A
few days later, Rhett resigned from the Senate. His action 
surprised many who, like Hammond, had assumed that Rhett's 
ambition centered on political office, rather than secession. In 
a letter to Governor Means, Rhett explained that even after the 
October elections he could not believe his countrymen would opt 
for "absolute submission" until he received news of the recent 
convention. Rhett said that he could not honorably represent a 
state which had so completely repudiated his extreme political 
positions.
"Mr. Rhett is the most consistent of politicians," an 
editorial in a Virginia newspaper stated. "He pushes his 
doctrines to their legitimate conclusions. He is rigidly
logical, but remarkably impracticable. He is something of a 
fanatic withal." This accurate assessment pointed to a great 
irony; while working for his political objectives, Rhett had 
committed many of the same tactical errors that he had criticized 
Calhoun for only a few months before. It is doubtful that any 
individual could have maneuvered South Carolina out of the Union
^^Congressional Globe, 32nd Congress, 1st Session, 655, 
appendix, 43-48, 57.
C QCharleston Mercury, May 1, 10, 1852; Rhett to Means, May 
5, 1852, in Mercury, May 10, 1852. For an example of Hammond's 
attitude, see Hammond to Simms, January 21, 1851, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress.
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in 1851 or 1852. His experiences in this crisis, however, taught 
Rhett much both about principles and political effectiveness. 
Appeals to reason, it seemed, had proven futile; consistency and 
personal integrity had not resulted in action. Certain that 
another sectional conflict was inevitable, Rhett waited for a new 
opportunity to exploit both this new knowledge and "that compound 
of...reason and prejudice, passion and weakness —  man.
While Rhett waited, fate tested his the fortitude of his 
entire family. In December, 1852, Elizabeth died after giving 
birth to their twelfth child. Barnwell's eldest son, Robert 
Barnwell Rhett, Jr., suffered a series of bad crops on his 
plantation. To one of his brothers, the junior Rhett quipped, 
the only way out of his financial troubles was if "one of you 
loafers marries a rich girl quick and lends me some money." The 
elder Rhett had problems of his own. In 1855 he sailed to Paris 
to see a doctor about a growth on the side of his nose which had 
plagued him for years. He was relieved to hear "that it is a 
lesion of the skin merely and not at all dangerous. Sadly, 
the physician misdiagnosed the symptoms. After the Civil War, 
Rhett's cancer would spread, horribly disfigure his face, and 
lead to his death.
The early 1850's, however, were not entirely bad for Rhett.
59Petersburg Democrat, reprinted in Charleston Mercury, May 
15, 1852.
^^White, Rhett, 133-34; Robert Barnwell Rhett, Jr., to A. 
Burnet Rhett, July 17, 1854; Barnwell Rhett to R.B. Rhett, Jr., 
August 15, 1855, Rhett Papers, South Carolina Historical Society.
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In these years he married Catherine Herbert Dent, who brought
much cheerfulness and happiness back into his life. He devoted
his time to his law practice in Charleston and his plantations.
Rhett already owned a plantation on the Ashepoo River, and during
the 1850's purchased a rice plantation in the Altamaha district
of Georgia; 190 slaves worked Rhett's properties.®^
Although refusing to take a public role, Rhett kept his
hands in politics. He published anonymously a "Tract on
Government" in the April, 1854, issue of the Southern Quarterly
Review. In it, while carefully avoiding the issue of secession,
he filled its pages with his concepts of limited governmental
powers, the perpetual struggle of liberty against tyranny, and
the necessity for a slaveholding people to rule themselves.
Through former Bluffton Boy, John McQueen, Rhett gathered
information about the goings-on in the capital. From his
advantageous seat on the House Territorial Committee, McQueen
told Rhett of the status of the Kansas-Nebraska bill. Although
both men favored its passage, wrangling over the bill in Congress
made McQueen agree with Rhett that "we are at the mercy of the
6 2plundering unscrupulous North and are not freemen."
Sentiments such as McQueen's convinced Rhett that he had not 
been wrong in his political strategy, but only that "I have been
®^White, Rhett, 134-35.
62Southern Quarterly Review, IX (April, 1854), 486-520; R.B. 
Rhett to Daniel London, n.d., Daniel H. London Papers, Virginia 
Historical Society; John McQueen to Rhett, February 3, 1854,
Rhett Papers, South Carolina Historical Society.
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ahead of the times, and have fallen."®^ in 1856, after the 
surprisingly strong electoral performance of the new Republican 
party, Rhett believed it time to renew his work for secession.
He began his campaign with an open letter to Governor James H. 
Adams. After a generation of northern agitation on the tariff 
and slavery, according to Rhett, a "complete revolution" had 
transformed a once free government into "a sheer despotism." 
Southerners, he asserted, were ruled by a hostile northern 
majority in Congress, "vulgar and fanatical, hating us and hating 
our institutions." Secession, he said, was the only solution to 
this problem. Rhett then tipped his hand concerning what he 
would do over the next few years to promote secession. "To 
induce any people to desist from any policy," he explained, 
"...you must place before them an alternative, which presents to 
them the impossibility of their policy being carried out, or that 
greater evils are to result from its continuance than its 
abandonment." Rhett then presented just such a set of choices. 
The evil was unionism, he said, manifested in the humiliation of 
southern congressmen forced "to sit in a legislative body 
controlled by Abolitionists" and by the murder of southern 
citizens in Kansas territory. The alternative that he suggested 
was secession. "If we are true to ourselves," Rhett held, "a 
glorious destiny awaits us, and the South will be a great, free
6 3Rhett to Henry Wise, November 7, 1856, Autograph 
Collection of Simon Gratz, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
216
and independent people!"®^
In order to facilitate the propagation of his message, Rhett 
acquired control of the Mercury. His son, R.B. Rhett, Jr., 
bought out William R. Taber early in 1857 and jointly edited the 
paper for a time with John Heart. The younger Rhett remained 
steadfastly loyal to his father, and often left the senior Rhett 
in charge while he was out of town. Indeed, one cannot separate 
the two in the tenor, style, or substance of their editorials.
"If we could only now get a great sectional issue like that of 
1850," said the young editor, "the Union would not last a month." 
And yet, Rhett's son knew that he had to exercise extreme caution 
in setting an editorial tone because of the odium his family 
"incurred by the controversy of '51". For the next three years, 
therefore, as Barnwell Rhett's biographer has stated, the two set 
a "devious course.
Their first step was to infiltrate the enemy camp. By 
feigning a tone of moderation and conciliation, the Rhetts tried 
to prove that they renounced their radicalism and that, once 
again, they were willing to work within the Democratic party. 
Whether secession or cooperation was preferable, they now said.
^^Rhett to James H. Adams, November 7, 1856, in Charleston 
Mercury, November 10, 1856.
^^Charleston Mercury, February 5, 1857; Simms to Hammond, 
April 12, 1858, in Oliphant, éd.. Letters of William Gilmore 
Simms, IV, 49; R.B. Rhett, Jr., to William Branch, May 23, T857, 
William H. Branch Papers, Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; R.B. Rhett, Jr., to 
Edmund Ruffin, April 5, 1860, Ruffin Papers, University of North 
Carolina; White, Rhett, 140, 149.
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was a dead issue. "The Mercury has long abandoned the separate
action of the state, and seeks bona fide the union of the South
for action on any proper occasion," they claimed. If southerners
united behind such leaders as Jefferson Davis and James Hammond
(who was finally elected to the Senate in 1857), the Mercury said
southern rights would be safe.®®
To many, the Rhetts' new policy seemed genuine. For
example, they abandoned their editorial support for the revival
of the African slave trade after controversy over the issue
threatened southern unity. The Rhetts even denied other fire-
eaters access to the Mercury. To one radical, this treatment
constituted nearly "the greatest mortification which I have ever
suffered in political affairs." A supporter of the Rhetts
commended the editor for balancing firmness and moderation, and
for defending himself "ably & triumphantly" from critics'
6 7attacks. The junior Rhett easily convinced Hammond that he and 
his father completely backed the new senator. Kind treatment in 
the Mercury's columns convinced the gullible Hammond to support 
his old nemesis. Hammond now told Simms, "I rather like the
®®Charleston Mercury, November 27, December 1, 5, 1857, June 
28, July 5, 15, 18TB1
®^Charleston Mercury, June 25, 1857; Maxcey Gregg to 
Barnwell Rhett, September 14, 1858, Rhett Papers, South Carolina 
Historical Society; William H . Branch to R.B. Rhett, Jr., August 
26, 1858, Robert Barnwell Rhett Papers, William R. Perkins 
Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.
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Rhetts."68
The Rhetts' public policy, however, was a charade.
Occasionally their real intentions found their way into print.
For example, at the same time that they decided to retract their
call for the reopening of the African slave trade, they suggested
that southerners should reconsider the issue later —  after they
seceded. Their endorsement of Yancey's League of United
Southerners proved that they, like Yancey, believed in working
within existing parties only in order to control them. The
Rhetts clearly betrayed their true policy in the summer of 1858.
"Absolute union in the South to resist any of its aggressions is
impossible," they said. It would require only a few states,
however, to "force the issue of protection in the Union or
independence out of it."^^
A careful and critical reading of the Mercury, therefore,
showed that Barnwell Rhett remained totally unchanged from where
he stood in 1852. With this insight, one observant reader
accurately described what the coming years would decide. In a
letter to Hammond he said,
I think Mr Rhett the logical consequence of Mr Calhoun. I 
think you the logical correction of Mr Calhoun. But then 
there is a logic also of facts and the question is whether 
the facts of the last few years have so developed that 
either you or he can square the logic of your theories with
R.B. Rhett, Jr., to Hammond, August 2, November 5, 1858, 
Hammond to Simms, October 2, 1858, Hammond Papers, Library of 
Congress.
6^Charleston Mercury, June 25, 1857, July 26, August 10,
1858.
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living, voting realities.
Rhett believed that the growth of the Republican party
provided him with a great opportunity to "square the logic" of
his theories with the voters of South Carolina. He renewed his
effort to control the state, not through the Mercury, but in his
first public address in seven years. He used a Fourth of July
celebration at Grahamville to dramatize the perils of remaining
in the Union and to show the advantages of secession. Since his
retirement from politics, Rhett said, compromises had failed to
leave the South in peace. Sectionalism "is no longer a spasmodic
evil," he continued, but was now a permanent feature of American
politics. By refusing to act decisively before, southerners now
found themselves a helpless, defenseless minority, one ruled by
an antagonistic North and threatened by a party pledged to the
eventual extinction of slavery. Rhett predicted that soon
northerners would incite slave insurrections in the South, and
even more insidiously, might use the pretense of these
insurrections to impose military rule and, by using emergency war
71powers, emancipate slaves.
After carefully describing the threat, Rhett offered an 
alternative. An independent South, he claimed, would be 
invincible. Eight million whites, holding four million slaves, 
"are too mighty in their strength to trust any other people to
^^William H . Trescot to Hammond, December 5, 1858, Hammond 
Papers, Library of Congress.
71Charleston Mercury, July 7, 1859.
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shape their destiny," Rhett argued. "They must be independent 
and free in the high station for which they are designed amongst 
the great nations of the earth." Furthermore, Rhett asserted 
that southerners had a "high mission" imposed upon them, that 
they had a duty to show the world a slaveholding republic could 
not only exist, but also thrive. And a thriving future, he said, 
was inevitable. Freed from the restraints of Yankee domination, 
he pledged, "Expansion shall be the law of the South." He 
painted an incredible picture of the future; a Southern nation 
would consume all potential plantation regions in the western 
hemisphere, reaching thirty degrees north and south of the 
equator (roughly from Virginia to the southern tip of Brazil). 
Southern institutions would thus remain safe for centuries. 
Southern economic power would dominate the world, and liberty for 
white southerners would never again be in jeopardy. If 
northerners joined southerners to elect a Democrat president in 
1860, the South might choose to remain in the Union a while 
longer. But if a Republican were elected, said Rhett, 
southerners must chose between a dangerous Union and a "glorious
7 0Southern Confederacy."
A few months after this speech, John Brown's raid on 
Harper's Ferry made Rhett's warnings seem prophetic. In 
relatively restrained language, the Mercury explained how the 
raid was "the legitimate fruit of the Union," and that 
southerners could only expect more such acts of "hostility and
72lbid.
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insurrection." Only secession, it argued, could prevent the
recurrence of such raids. The Rhetts claimed that the South
could better protect itself out of the Union than within it. "If
we had a separate government of our own, the post office, all the
avenues of intercourse, the police and the military of our
country, would be under our exclusive control." After John
Brown, when Rhett said "The South must control her own destinies
7 ?or perish," more and more southerners agreed.
Before the excitement over Brown's raid faded, the Rhetts 
began their drive to influence the upcoming Democratic national 
convention in Charleston. They had already proposed a virtual 
copy of the Alabama Platform; if nominees for president or vice 
president would not clearly endorse the expansion of slavery into 
the territories, southern states should withdraw their 
delegations.^^ The Rhetts then began taunting and threatening 
southerners in an attempt to stifle the influence of national 
Democrats. Southerners, they demanded, must rid themselves of 
the "brood of Southern toadies to Northern opinion, whose 
statesmanship consists in periodically saving the Union by 
compromising the rights and safety of their section." If the 
South permitted Stephen Douglas's faction to dominate at the 
convention, they warned "it will establish the enemy in her midst
^^Ibid., October 31, November 1, 1859. 
^^Ibid., October 13, 1859.
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and paralyze her for any efforts at extrication and 
redemption.
Ultimately, the Rhetts hoped to see the Democratic party 
destroyed. They believed this would ensure a Republican victory 
and provide southerners with the impetus for secession. The 
younger Rhett traced their strategy for fire-eating Congressman 
William Porcher Miles. "The South must dissever itself from the 
rotten Northern element," he began. He knew that there was no 
chance for state rights men to gain control of the entire party, 
and therefore pinned his hopes on the disruption of the 
convention. "Hence the importance of attaining the secession of 
the Alabama and Mississippi delegations.... If they will do 
it...the game will be ours." As far as attaining united action 
by southerners at the convention, the junior Rhett explained,
"the idea is as absurd, as it is unnecessary." if only two 
states acted together, he thought, it would be enough to "break 
down the spoils Democracy and, on the election of a Black 
Republican, to dissolve the Union." "Rhett arrogance" surfaced 
once again;
Those who are not prepared to face opposition at home are 
not fit for the crisis. The South must go through a trying 
ordeal before she will ever achieve her deliverance, and men 
having both nerve and self sacrificing patriotism must head 
the movement and shape its course, controlling and 
compelling their inferior contemporaries.
^^Ibid., January 13, 14, 19, 23, February 28, April 18,
1860.
^^R.B. Rhett, Jr., to William Porcher Miles, January 29, 
1860, William P. Miles Papers, Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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In April, when Yancey led the bolt of southerners from the
convention, the Rhetts were overjoyed and hailed Yancey as the
champion of southern rights. When they discovered, however, that
Yancey entertained the notion of reunion with the national
Democrats, the Rhetts determined to do everything in their power
7 7to keep the party splintered. When Carolinians assembled in a
state convention to elect delegates to the Southern Democratic
convention in Richmond, Rhett influence asserted itself again.
Barnwell Rhett, his brother Edmund, and R.B. Rhett, Jr., were all
7 8selected to go to Richmond.
Speaking in the capital of Virginia, Rhett echoed the 
message of Yancey at Charleston. "I have never been an enemy of 
the constitutional Union," he proclaimed. "I am not now." 
Southerners, he later explained in the Mercury, were the true 
conservatives; Republicans "are the practical revolutionists and 
hatchers of trouble." When Rhett used this language in the early 
1850's, he won few converts. John Brown's raid and Republican 
pledges to eventually eliminate slavery, however, gave Rhett new 
credibility. Both he and his son knew this. Therefore, 
throughout the summer of 1860 the Mercury continually asserted 
that the Southern Democrats were committed to perpetuating the 
Union, and that the menacing, meddling Republicans plotted to
77Charleston Mercury, April 30, 1860; R.B. Rhett, Jr., to 
Miles, May 10 (letter and telegram), 12, 1860, Miles Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
^®White, Rhett, 165-66.
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destroy slavery, the Constitution, and the South.
A befuddled Hammond actually believed Rhett "has come [out] 
for the Union." A wiser Porcher Miles, while admitting his own 
surprise at Rhett's latest tactic, understood it as "ingenious." 
In 1851, he recalled, "Secessionists certainly would have 
indignantly repudiated the title of 'Union-savers.'" But because 
Rhett found "that his ultra course has not given him the control 
of the State [he] is now bidding for the suffrages or at least 
the approbation of the more moderate States Rights men."®®
While depicting themselves as good unionists, the Rhetts 
continued their campaign to prove how the "terrors" of a 
Republican regime "are ten-fold greater even than the supposed
Q 1
terrors of secession." To dramatize this, they flooded the 
Mercury with editorials designed to show how Republicans would 
degrade, plunder, and destroy the South, and others showing the 
supposed advantages of a Southern Confederacy.
"No people degraded," the Rhetts reminded their honor­
conscious readers, "can be free." And yet, according to the 
Rhetts, degradation awaited them under Republican rule. They 
wrote that New Yorkers might soon enfranchise free blacks. The 
"fugitive slaves of the South," they said, would then achieve 
political equality with their former masters. The Rhetts made
79Charleston Mercury, June 7 (Rhett's remarks), July 11, 18, 
19, 20, 27, August l3, 15, 20, 21, 25, September 3, 7, 12, 1860.
8 0Hammond to l.w. Hayne, September 19, 1860, Miles to 
Hammond, August 5, 1860, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
O  1
Charleston Mercury, October 4, 11, 1860.
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the wild accusation that Republicans might place Frederick 
Douglass, a former slave, in the cabinet. Aiming at the most 
base emotions of southerners, the Rhetts claimed that Hannibal 
Hamlin, the Republican vice presidential candidate, was a 
mulatto, "to which fact he probably owes his nomination." The 
Rhetts knew that southerners could not accept the idea of a
o 2mulatto presiding over their senators in Congress.
The insidiousness of Republicans, said the Rhetts, extended 
further. They maintained that Republicans, representing a 
sectional majority, would create a despotic government, one 
"totally irresponsible to the people of the South, without check, 
restraint, or limitation." Republicans, therefore, threatened "a 
total annihilation of all self-government or liberty in the
O OSouth." Republicans, the Rhetts added, "will plunder us before
destroying us," through protective tariffs and other
8 4discriminatory taxes. Once looted and degraded, the South 
would watch helplessly as Republicans abolished slavery and "an 
ignorant, semi-barbarous race, urged to madness by the licentious 
teachings of our northern brethren" either amalgamated with
O Cwhites or launched bloody racial warfare.
Simultaneously, the Rhetts maintained that "the South, in
8 2Ibid., July 13, 27, September 13, October 4, 23, November 
8, December 13, 1860.
O 3
Ibid., July 19, 20, August 20, September 3, 28, October 3,
1860.
ft 4Ibid., August 11, October 23, 1860.
G^ibid., October 3, 4, 8, 15, 31, 1860.
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the control of her own commerce and destiny, will bound forward
in a career of prosperity and power, unsurpassed in the history 
86of nations." Cotton and other staple crops, they said, would 
supply a Southern nation with an economic might unattainable 
within the Union. Unencumbered by protective tariffs, a Southern 
Confederacy would attract more trade than the United States ever 
had. Southern port cities such as New Orleans, Charleston, 
Mobile, and Savannah, they pledged, would quickly supplant 
northern commercial centers. Increased foreign trade would spur 
a boom in railroad construction and thereby promote economic
p *7development in the interior. If the border between the North 
and South became an international frontier, the Rhetts explained, 
civil and military forces, once purged of Yankees, would be able 
to stop the escape of fugitive slaves to the North. Furthermore, 
the Mercury stated that the North would never attack a Southern 
nation. Eight million southerners, trained "from boyhood to the 
horse and gun...are unconquerable by any power on this 
continent," the Rhetts boasted.®®
When Abraham Lincoln was elected in November, the Mercury 
proclaimed, "The tea has been thrown overboard —  the revolution 
of 1860 has been initiated." The Rhetts' message was now "ACT —  
ACT." They announced that Carolinians were finally prepared to
®®Ibid., July 30, 1860.
87Ibid., July 28, 30, August 7, 8, September 25, October 2, 
6, 25, T T T I860.
DO
Ibid., July 30, October 2, 19, 1860.
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secede and warned "they do not expect their representatives to be
behind them." They endorsed the actions of private citizens who
formed "Minute Men" organizations throughout the state. They
called for the immediate resignation of southerners from service
in the United States military forces and urged the governor to
obtain weapons for the state by sending commissioners to Europe
8 9—  even though the state had yet to secede. The Rhetts
appealed to passion and emotion by telling Carolinians that
northerners considered them "a blustering, weak, timid people —
demoralized and paralyzed by your institutions, just fit to serve
9 0or to be tortured and destroyed." When the governor called a
special session of the legislature to consider secession, the
Rhetts were ecstatic. "The long weary night of our humiliation,
oppression and danger is passing away," Barnwell Rhett told a
crowd in Charleston, "and the glorious dawn of a Southern
91Confederacy breaks on our view."
On the eve of his victory, Rhett again lost his self- 
control. After years of defending himself as a conservative and 
blaming northerners for revolutionizing the country, he proved 
that, in fact, he had changed not at all since 1828. In 
December, he congratulated Carolinians for "the great revolution 
you have inaugurated." Although he had recently promised that
8 9 Charleston Mercury, October 15, 19, November 8, 9, 29, 30, 
December 3, 1860.
9 0=^Ibid., November 12, 21, 27, 1860.
91 Ibid., November 12, 21, 1860.
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secession would bring only good for the South, he now warned, "be
prepared to meet all the usual troubles and sacrifices of
revolutions." Entirely unable to restrain himself, he said.
For thirty-two years, have I followed the quarry. Behold! 
it at last, in sight! A few more bounds, and it falls —  
the Union falls; and with it falls, its faithless 
oppressions —  its insulting agitations —  its vulgar 
tyrannies and fanaticism. The bugle blast of our victory 
and redemption is on the wind; and the South will be safe 
and free.
For once, the people of South Carolina matched Rhett's
enthusiasm for secession. On December 20, the state convention
unanimously adopted an ordinance of secession. One southerner
recalled the "thrilling scene" when Rhett joined his fellow
delegates to sign the document. "As he approached the desk he
sunk upon his knees and uplifted his hands to heaven, and for a
moment bowed his head in prayer. Naturally," this observer
9 3concluded, "the proceeding was electric."
With the secession of South Carolina, Rhett's work only 
began. Selected by his colleagues to write "The Address of the 
People of South Carolina... to the People of the Slaveholding 
States," Rhett now turned his attention to nation building. His 
Address repeated his accusations of northern aggression against 
southern rights, and his maxim that a slaveholding people must 
rule themselves. He called on all slave states to send 
representatives to Montgomery and form a "great, free, and
qp Ibid., November 28, December 10, 1860.
93George S. Bernard Scrapbook, page 195, William R. Perkins 
Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.
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Û Aprosperous" Southern Confederacy.
Once again chosen to represent the people of Beaufort and 
Colleton, Rhett played a prominent role in the Provisional 
Congress of the Confederate States of America when it assembled 
in February, 1861. He served on the foreign affairs committee 
and chaired the committee to draft a permanent constitution. For 
his work on the latter, he had "prepared a Book containing 
certain amendments to the Constitution of the United States" 
which he hoped fellow delegates would support. Rhett's model 
included prohibitions on protective tariffs and internal 
improvements, an article that enabled any three states (through 
state conventions) to summon a constitutional convention, and 
limiting the president to a single six-year term. So much of his 
plan was adopted that his son heralded the Confederate 
constitution as "the best constitution, we believe, ever devised
95by man." Although other fire-eaters, according to one rumor, 
wanted Rhett to be President, Rhett himself followed the advice 
of Louis Wigfall and Robert W. Barnwell and backed Jefferson 
Davis. The Mercury followed suit. It hailed Davis's selection
94The Address of the People of South Carolina, Assembled in 
Convention, to the People of the Slaveholding States of the 
United States (Charleston; Evans & Cogswell, 1860).
95Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of 
America (7 volumes; Washington; Government Printing Office,
1904 ) , 1, 42, 44; Rhett to Stuart Rhett, April 13, 1868, Rhett 
Papers, South Carolina Historical Society; Charleston Mercury, 
February 12, 16, March 15, 1861.
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and enthusiastically endorsed all of his cabinet selections.^®
By exciting the emotions of Carolinians, Rhett had finally 
discovered a way to influence his state and, through it, the 
South. Even his critics acknowledged that secession was a 
personal triumph for "King Barnwell the first." Diarist Mary 
Chesnut conceded that Rhett had "exasperated and heated" 
Carolinians into such a state "that only bloodletting could ever 
cure [them] —  it was the inevitable remedy." A petulant Hammond 
said of Rhett and the fire-eaters, "It is certain that these men 
brought on this great movement. They were instruments in the 
hands of God (as Judas was, —  though it was denied me to see
it[.)]"97
Rhett's mastery of South Carolina, however, was fleeting.
By the summer of 1861 he again proved himself better at 
alienating his countrymen than at winning their hearts. The 
stubborn independence that characterized his early career 
resurfaced with a vengeance. The Mercury, Mary Chesnut noted, 
"calls everyone a submissionist but R.B. Rhett." William Gilmore 
Simms reported that "the Mercury has been making itself very 
odious" because of its sudden criticism of President Davis and
C. Vann Woodward, ed., Mary Chesnut's Civil War (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 6; Rhett to Louis Wigfall, 
April 15, 1864, Wigfall Family Papers, Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress; Charleston Mercury, February 5, 21, 23, 
March 7, 1861.
97David S. Fraley to Andrew Johnson, February 17, 1861, in 
Leroy P. Graf and Ralph W. Haskins, eds.. The Papers of Andrew 
Johnson (7 volumes; Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 
1976), IV, 302-303; Woodward, ed., Chesnut, 4; Hammond to John 
Ashmore, April 2, 8, 1861, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
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the war effort. Rhett blamed the administration for the chaos 
exhibited in the army during and after the battle of Bull Run. 
Even a direct appeal from General P.G.T. Beauregard could not 
dissuade the junior Rhett from printing military intelligence in 
the Mercury. By the fall, when Rhett considered running for the 
Senate, his son realized that the anti-Rhett backlash would 
defeat him. When Barnwell Rhett's term in Congress ended in 
June, 1862, so did his political career.^®
The Rhetts' sudden disillusionment with the Confederate 
government stemmed from their unrealistic belief that the act of 
secession would purge southern politics of all undesirable 
characteristics. Only months before, the Rhetts had predicted 
"the better parts of our nature will appear" after secession and 
relieve a Southern nation of the discord caused by party 
politics. In a Southern Confederacy, they believed, unity and 
harmony would prevail. They had thought that secession would 
enable southerners to "make the welfare of the South the welfare 
of their representatives." No longer tempted to yield their 
section's interests to northern demands, the public good in the 
South would become politicians' only "road to distinction and 
official preferment." The Rhetts also deluded themselves into
98Woodward, ed., Chesnut, 12; William Gilmore Simms to 
Hammond, November 18, 1861, in Oliphant, et al, eds.. The Letters 
of William Gilmore Simms, IV, 385; Rhett to R.B. Rhett, Jr., July 
25, 1861, in Civil War Collection, Huntington Library, San 
Marino, California; R.B. Rhett, Jr., to P.G.T. Beauregard, July 
13, 1861, Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard Papers, William R. 
Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina; R.B. 
Rhett. Jr., to Edmund Rhett, October 29, 1861, Rhett Papers, 
University of North Carolina; White, Rhett, 223.
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believing that, without the distractions of political parties or
"toadies to Northern opinion," all Southerners would embrace the
Rhetts' ideals, their philosophy of government, their devotion to 
99the South. Naturally, they were mistaken. With their dreams 
frustrated so soon after their initial triumph, the Rhetts began 
to lash out at the very government they had just helped to 
create.
The Rhetts focused their wrath on the most visible symbol of 
this government. President Jefferson Davis. They condemned 
Davis's military strategy. They opposed conscription. They 
censured Davis for allegedly usurping power in an "unchecked 
career of mischief." Their indignation climaxed when Davis and 
General Robert E. Lee proposed arming slaves for service in the 
Confederate army and rewarding them later with emancipation.
"The freemen of the Confederate States," they trumpeted, "must 
work out their own redemption, or they must be the slaves of 
their own slaves." If the Confederate government could claim the 
power to emancipate slaves, the Rhetts said, the Confederacy "is 
stone dead." In 1865, they began equating Davis with the devil 
and lashed out at Lee for supporting "this scheme of nigger 
soldiers and emancipation.
99Charleston Mercury, January 23, October 15, November 13, 
14, 15, December 2W, i860, February 9, 26, 1861.
^^^Charleston Mercury, November 6, 1861, February 27, 1862, 
November 3, 12, 18611 January 13, 16, 17, February 3, 1865; Rhett 
to Wigfall, April 15, 1864, Wigfall Family Papers, Library of 
Congress. Also see Charles E. Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to 
War 1860-1865 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1450), chapter 15.
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War brought a crushing personal defeat to Rhett as well as 
devastation to the South. Until the end of his life, Rhett 
strove to vindicate his career. He made at least three different 
attempts at writing history; all of them failed. The first was 
an abortive attempt at fiction. Only thirteen handwritten pages 
exist of Rhett's "A Conversation Concerning the Late War in the 
United States," told in the form of a dialogue between an 
Englishman and a southerner. In it, Rhett spoke of state 
sovereignty and the right of secession. The fact was, 
"Southerner" claimed, the South did not rebel against the North, 
but rather the North waged a war of aggression upon the South in 
"the grand crime of the century." Rhett then shifted to slightly 
more factual accounts. Because his own library had been 
destroyed by the Union army, Rhett asked his son and former 
Congressman Miles for help in gathering documents upon which to 
base his writing. The proposed title of this project left 
nothing to the imagination; "The Last Decade, seen in the 
extinction of Free Government in the United States, and the 
Downfall of the Southern Confederacy, in connexion with political 
Life and Services of the Honorable Robert Barnwell Rhett." This, 
and a subsequent "Autobiography," each totalled over one hundred 
pages; presumably, he never finished either one.^®^
"A Conversation Concerning the Late War in the United 
States," Rhett Papers, University of North Carolina; Rhett to 
Miles, March 22, 1871, Miles Papers, University of North 
Carolina; R.B. Rhett, Jr., to Rhett, January 7, 1876, Rhett 
Papers; "Life and Services," and "Autobiography," all in Rhett 
Papers, South Carolina Historical Society.
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In the preface to his "Life and Services," Rhett explained 
that "if you tell a man a lie, every Day in the year, at the end 
of the year, he will believe it." The purpose of his writings, 
therefore, was to refute the alleged lies told recently by two 
northern authors. Horace Greeley's The American Conflict; A 
History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America 
and John W. Draper's A History of the American Civil War were, 
according to Rhett, filled with "misrepresentations and 
falsehoods... repeated with a boldness and ingenuity." Rhett 
could not sit by idly in this contest for the control of men's 
minds; through his writing, he vowed, "the South will yet be 
heard." Since the War of 1812, he wrote, the North had engaged 
in a systematic effort to restrain and destroy slavery. The 
South had always reacted defensively, and eventually fought "for 
conservatism and political liberty, against the revolutionary 
violence and despotism of sectional Numbers." Rhett held Abraham 
Lincoln responsible for the final assault on slavery, and said, 
therefore, the President deserved to be assassinated. After the 
war, with the South desolated, the Constitution "all rags," and 
the Union "a mockery," Rhett also sought to absolve himself of 
any blame for the failure of secession. In his autobiography, he 
concluded that the history of the Confederacy proved only that 
the "greatest blunder" of the South "was in not seceding from the 
Northern States long before." Ironically, to Rhett, defeat in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1865 was vindication for his calls for secession decades 
before.
While he wrote, his health declined. In 1872 he moved to 
the plantation of a son-in-law in St. James Parish, Louisiana.
The cancer on his face was spreading, and a series of operations 
in New Orleans only made his appearance more alarming. Soon he 
was warning all but those closest to him not to expose themselves 
to his hideous deformities. He managed to publish one last 
outburst at northern society. In a book review for the Southern 
Magazine, Rhett warned that the "money power" which he alleged 
was propping up the administration of President Ulysses S. Grant 
would lead the United States to communism. His wrath and much of 
his credibility spent, Rhett died on September 14, 1876. His 
body was returned to Charleston, and buried in an unmarked 
grave.
102Rhett, "Life and Services," and "Autobiography," 
especially 117, 120, Rhett Papers, SCHS.
^O^Rhett to Catherine Rhett, undated, and R.B. Rhett, Jr., 
to Rhett, January 7, 1876, Rhett Papers, South Carolina 
Historical Society; Rhett, "Fears for Democracy," Southern 
Magazine (September, 1875), 306-332, especially 328; White, 
Rhett, 242-43.
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Chapter V 
"PALMETTO RECKLESSNESS AND DARING"
As Confederate batteries continued their fire on Fort Sumter 
on April 12, 1861, a tall, powerfully built man, with "wild 
masses of black hair, tinged with grey," appeared suddenly at a 
Confederate installation on Morris Island. Dressed in a blue 
coat, a red silk sash tied around his waist and a silk 
handkerchief tied around his thick neck, wearing "formidable 
brass spurs," Louis Trezevant Wigfall, a United States senator 
from Texas, made a memorable return to his native South Carolina. 
An English observer, enthralled by Wigfall's face, noted that his 
hair rose up "like the vegetation on a riverbank." His coarse, 
black eyebrows, his square jaw, his scrubby moustache and beard, 
contrasted with eyes "of wonderful depth and light, such as I 
have never seen before but in the head of a wild beast."
Wigfall's face "was flashing, fierce, yet calm —  with a well of 
fire burning behind and spouting through it, an eye pitiless in 
anger, which now and then tried to conceal its expression beneath 
half-closed lids, and then burst out with an angry glare, as if 
disdaining concealment."
When a shot knocked down the American flag that had been 
flying over Fort Sumter, Wigfall felt his moment had come. While 
cannon fire continued to rage in Charleston harbor, he 
commandeered a small boat and ordered his two black oarsmen to 
row toward the walls of Sumter, despite the shouts from his
236
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comrades to return. Shots splashed all around, but the defiant 
Wigfall made it safely to a wharf, and, with a white handkerchief 
tied to the end of his sword, climbed through an embrasure and 
into the fort; encountering a startled Union soldier, he insisted 
upon meeting with his commanding officer. After terms of 
surrender were agreed upon, Wigfall returned to his boat, and set 
off triumphantly for shore. Carolinians thrilled to the 
gallantry of their home-bred hero. A northern newspaper 
described his actions as an example of "Palmetto recklessness and 
daring.
During the 1850's, a South Carolina unionist described 
secessionists as "a set of young enthusiasts inspired with
notions of personal honor to be defended and individual glory,
2fame and military laurels to be acquired." His observations 
suited perfectly both Louis Wigfall and a fellow Carolina fire- 
eater, Laurence Massilon Keitt. Each had gained reputations as 
inflexible secessionists and eloquent, though rash, spokesmen for 
the South. Their youth lent vitality to the secession movement.
William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South 
(Gloucester, Massachusetts; Peter Smith, 1969), 62-63 ; Journal of 
engineer, Capt. J.G. Foster, April 13, 1861, and Brig. Gen. James
Simons to Brig. Gen. Beauregard, April 23, 1861, in The War of
the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies (130 volumes; Washington; Government 
Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series I, volume I, 23-24, 38; D.
Girard Wright, A Southern Girl in '61: The War-Time Memories of a
Confederate Senator's Daughter (New York; Doubleday, Page & 
Company, 1905), 41-46.
2Benjamin Perry, quoted in John Barnwell, Love of 
Order:South Carolina's First Secession Crisis (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1982), I?0.
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When the Confederacy was formed, Wigfall was forty-five years 
old, and Keitt only thirty-six; yet each had already worked for 
disunion for over a decade. To contemporaries, Keitt represented 
the personification of the southern gentleman. His gallantry and 
daring in both politics and war gave him the reputation of a 
"chivalrous knight," whose "proud spirit rebelled against Yankee 
domination."^ Wigfall, however, achieved ignoble notoriety. 
Although professing an adherence to a code of gentlemanly 
conduct, Wigfall's behavior frequently demonstrated crass 
selfishness and wanton violence, and his fearlessness often 
mocked the honorable values both he and Keitt had sworn to 
uphold. For both men, the idealism and vigor which set them 
apart from their peers led them alternatively to glorious 
triumphs and to stupendous failures.
A proclivity for violence and disruptiveness, unmatched even 
by the young William L. Yancey, marked Louis Wigfall's youth. He 
was born on a plantation near Edgefield, in western South 
Carolina, on April 21, 1816. His parents both died by the time 
he turned thirteen; they left him to the care of a guardian,
Allen B. Addison, and over $13,000 to provide for him. Addison 
tutored Louis at home until 1834 when the youthful Wigfall left 
for Rice Creek Springs School, a military academy near Columbia. 
After a year, Wigfall enrolled at the University of Virginia. 
There, his fiery temper and immature sense of honor surfaced at a 
dance given by a professor. A woman Wigfall had been dancing
^DeBow's Review XXXV (July and August, 1864), 103.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
239
with thought him drunk and walked off on the arm of another man. 
As the couple departed, the woman's escort said something to 
Wigfall to which he took exception. Wigfall promptly challenged 
the offender to a duel. College authorities interposed and 
convened a court of honor to resolve the situation. The woman in 
question testified that she had been mistaken about Wigfall's 
condition at the dance; the court concluded that the entire 
episode had arisen out of a misconception and that no point of 
honor had been involved.^
Wigfall returned to the Palmetto State in 1836 to complete 
his education at South Carolina College. His behavior, however, 
only became more disruptive. He found the orations sponsored by 
the college Euphradian Society more to his liking than classes; 
his attendance was erratic, and he often excused himself for days 
at a time. He developed an interest in law and used his raw 
talents to write petitions and expositions regarding student 
rights. He was fond of visiting taverns off campus, and throwing 
food in the commons on campus. In his first year back he and a 
few other students left college for three months to fight in 
Florida as volunteers in the Seminole Indian War. Wigfall rose 
to the rank of lieutenant of volunteers; years later, he brashly 
called himself "colonel." Despite all these distractions, he
^Alvy L. King, Louis T. Wigfall; Southern Fire-eater (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), 8-12.
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managed to complete his studies and was graduated in 1837.^
In many ways, Laurence Keitt's early years were similar to 
Wigfall's. Born in St. Matthews on October 4, 1824, Keitt grew 
up in Orangeburg District in the midlands. Like Wigfall, Keitt 
attended a private school. A childhood friend once reminisced 
with Keitt that while they attended St. Matthews Academy, "You 
were famous for foot races, the gift of gab, and for never 
wincing when your [sic] were flogged," implying, of course, that 
the young Laurence often incurred the wrath of his teachers.
Also like Wigfall, Keitt attended South Carolina College.
Although Keitt found the activities of the Euphradian society as 
alluring as did Wigfall, the study of history and political 
economy also captured his interest. He studied under Francis 
Lieber, professor of political economy and a devout unionist.® 
Keitt and Wigfall believed that they would do great things 
in their lives. They knew that South Carolina College served as 
a breeding ground for the state's leaders; throughout the 
antebellum period, the college produced almost half of the state 
and federal officers for South Carolina. In fact, Wigfall's 
closest friend at school was John L. Manning, who would become 
governor in 1852. The social status of their respective families 
further enhanced their sense of destiny. Wigfall's mother, Eliza
®Daniel W. Hollis, University of South Carolina, volume I, 
South Carolina College (Columbia; University of South Carolina 
Press, 1951), 138, 253; King, Wigfall, 16.
®John Holt Merchant, Jr., "Laurence M. Keitt: South Carolina 
Fire-Eater," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1976, 
11—16.
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Trezevant, descended from one of the state's oldest families, 
French Huguenots who settled in the colony in the 1690's. His 
father, Levi Durant Wigfall, was a successful merchant in 
Charleston before he moved to an upcountry plantation. The 
sizeable inheritance he left for his son seemingly guaranteed a 
life of success, comfort, and ease for young Lewis, as he was 
then called. Keitt's ancestry was equally notable. His 
grandfather, George Kitts, moved from Bermuda to Big Bull Swamp 
near Orangeburg around 1760. Three of his four sons, preferring 
a more unusual name, changed the spelling of theirs to Keitt. 
Laurence's father, also named George, owned Puritan Hall, a 
plantation near St. Matthews. By his death in 1861, George 
Keitt's holdings included 2,500 acres and over fifty slaves. 
Coming from wealthy families and an influential college, both 
Keitt and Wigfall left school with great expectations.^
Initially, both young men turned to law. Wigfall soon 
discovered, however, that success was far from automatic. In 
1839 he returned to Edgefield where his brother, Arthur, had a 
lucrative practice. Arthur planned to retire soon, enter the 
ministry, and leave his business to his younger brother. Right 
away, the ambitious junior partner had problems. He found "mere 
office business" deadening. Worse, over the past several years, 
he had not only squandered his inheritance, but also accumulated 
debts. Even when he began to make money through his practice, he
Hollis, South Carolina College, 256-58; King, Wigfall, 8- 
9; Merchant, "Keitt," 10.
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could not support himself on his earnings. He soon began a "very 
foolish course" of borrowing and spending. At first, he blamed 
his troubles on "my gentleman-blackleg friends," but after 
careful introspection realized that "my entire want of common 
sense damned nearly ruined me." For the present, he could only 
dream of a time "when juries shall hang upon my lips & courts 
shall bow to my decisions," and large fees would fill his 
pockets. When he stopped dreaming, he knew that it might take 
him a decade to "establish some reputation as a back-country- 
lawyer" and earn a decent income.®
Wigfall's recklessness, however, continued. Occasionally he 
tried to reform himself, "to see some things 'face to face,'" in 
the hope that "I will not be such a damned fool as I have been." 
To his old college friend, John Manning, he once declared, "Wine, 
women & cards and your humble servant have...finally shaken 
hands." The new Wigfall would be "virtuous & sensible & like 
other people." Either to convince Manning or himself, he 
repeated, "Wine & women have lost their charmes [sic] for me. 
Ambition shall be my mistress & Law my Liquor!" He admitted that 
the old Wigfall did not adhere to such resolves, but he now 
swore, "I have lost all relish for the things that once gave me 
pleasure." As proof, Wigfall told Manning of a trip he had just
O
L.T. Wigfall to John L. Manning, March 23, n.d., April, 
n.d., 1839, Wigfall Family Papers, Barker Texas History Center, 
University of Texas, Austin.
The Wigfall papers in the Barker Texas History Center are 
typescript copies of those in the Williams-Chesnut-Manning 
Collection, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, South Carolina. 
They will be referred to henceforth as the Wigfall Papers, BTHC.
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made to Augusta, Georgia. "I neither attended the race-course, 
houses of a certain description or got even tipsey at dinner," he 
boasted. "I am a predestined old bachelor," Wigfall added. "I 
have calmly determined never to marry.
But Wigfall was a weak as well as a passionate man. Despite 
his awareness that indulgence almost ruined him, he could 
tolerate his new lifestyle for only a few months. "All my 
pleasures are past," he complained to Manning late in 1839. "I 
live now with no brighter prospect than that of being able to 
kill time." He grew so depressed that he briefly contemplated 
suicide. Because he could not both control his urges and be 
happy, he quickly abandoned his efforts at personal reform.
Soon, he was again spending beyond his means. And in 1841, he 
married. Even after his bride-to-be, Charlotte Cross, had loaned 
him some money, Wigfall owed over $1,300 to various creditors by 
October, 1841. His financial difficulties cost Wigfall the 
respect of many in Edgefield, and eventually alienated him from 
M a n n i n g . O v e r  the next five years Wigfall's troubles 
increased. A son, John Manning Wigfall, died at the age of three 
after a short lifetime of illness. When the Wigfalls could no 
longer appease their creditors, they lost their home and property 
in a sheriff's sale in 1844. They recovered briefly, but by the 
spring of 1846, the Edgefield sheriff returned. This time the
QWigfall to Manning, n.d., and March 23, n.d., Wigfall 
Papers, BTHC.
^^Wigfall to Manning, September 24, 1839, October 24, 1841, 
July 29, 1843, Ibid.; King, Wigfall, 36.
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Wigfalls lost everything: their home, their four slaves, their
livestock, his books. This time the plaintiffs included his
brother Arthur.
For Laurence Keitt success came as easily as recklessness
and ill fortune did for Wigfall. After college, Keitt moved to
Charleston and read law under the tutelage of James L. Petigru,
one of the leading attorneys in South Carolina. Keitt passed his
bar examination in 1844 and eagerly returned to Orangeburg to
12open his own practice.
Although law occupied his time, politics captured his 
imagination. Early in 1846, he travelled to Washington, D.C., to 
observe the process of government first hand. Initially, the 
United States Senate confirmed his naive and fantastic notions 
about American politics. He reported to his former teacher. 
Professor Lieber, that the Senate was "as august and noble a body 
as ever dignified the fame of old Rome." Soon, however, Keitt 
discovered that the political process and the nation's leaders 
were not so pristine as they had appeared to him in his college 
studies and at first glance in the capitol. He observed that 
debate over territorial expansion turned the House of 
Representatives into a den of "intrigue and corruption." After
^^Wigfall to Manning, October 1, 1843, January 3, 1844, 
Wigfall Papers, BTHC; King, Wigfall, 38; Edgefield Advertiser, 
May 13, 27, 1846.
^^Merchant, "Keitt," 17. Merchant notes that the lack of 
extant records pertaining to Keitt's law practice is due to 
destruction caused by the army of General William T . Sherman on 
its march through the Carolines in 1865.
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reflecting upon his visit, and with characteristic cockiness he 
told Lieber, "I was astonished last winter at Washington to 
discover the fat and cumbrous errors of hoary headed and renowned 
Politicians, upon points which appeared to me lucid and obvious." 
To Keitt, congressmen had transformed the rather simple 
territorial issue into a "gordian Knot," one which they might 
find themselves unable to unravel without a s w o r d . K e i t t ' s  
trip had a profound impact on him. Confident in his own 
intellect and abilities and disappointed by the quality of 
representation in Washington, he decided to run for public 
office.
When Keitt turned his attention to politics, he found that 
sectional issues continued to command the most attention in South 
Carolina. People of Keitt and Wigfall's generation could not 
recall a time when the relationship of state and federal 
governments had not been seriously questioned; Wigfall was only 
sixteen when the tariff controversy first rocked the state in 
1828, and Keitt was but eight years old when the compromise 
tariff of 1833 temporarily quieted it. For most of their lives 
men like Keitt and Wigfall heard people like Barnwell Rhett issue 
ominous warnings about the danger the South faced in the Union as 
well as demands for firm resistance. As Keitt entered adulthood, 
he viewed the conflict between North and South as "momentous" and 
the Union as filled with potential "catastrophe to the South."
L.M. Keitt to Francis Lieber, January 18, September 2, 
1846, Francis Lieber Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, 
California.
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He therefore responded to Rhett's calls for defiance. In 1847, a 
year before he ran for state office, Keitt began to build his 
political platform. Because several northern states had enacted 
laws which interfered with the retrieval of fugitive slaves,
Keitt determined that these "forays, of such an insolent and 
rapacious kind, as have been perpetrated upon us by the North, 
should not pass unnoticed and unredressed." "Piracy justifies 
Letters of Mark and Reprisal," he believed. Confident that he 
would be elected to the legislature, he pledged to introduce a 
bill to prohibit South Carolina "from extending any aid in the 
collection of debts, due to citizens of any State," which had 
circumvented the federal fugitive slave laws.^^
The people of Orangeburg elected Keitt to the first of three 
consecutive terms in the lower house of the legislature in 1848. 
As he waited for sectional issues to reach the floor, he 
participated in a brief surge of reform. Keitt, like Yancey and 
John Quitman, supported the establishment of free schools and a 
state penitentiary. He also served on a committee charged with 
nominating trustees for South Carolina College. The moment the 
legislature turned its attention to national politics, however, 
Keitt seized his opportunity. The speech that accompanied his 
resolution regarding fugitive slaves drew the attention and 
praise of the Charleston Mercury. Later, Keitt endorsed fire-
14L.M. Keitt to John C. Calhoun, October 1, 1847, in 
Chauncey S. Boucher and Robert P. Brooks, eds.. Correspondence 
Addressed to John C. Calhoun 1837-1849 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1930 ), 402.
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eating state representative Whitemarsh Seabrook's resolution that 
either passage of the Wilmot Proviso or the abolition of slavery 
in the District of Columbia would be grounds for disunion. 
Furthermore, Keitt moved that the South Carolina legislature 
support any southern congressman who refused to vote for anyone 
for Speaker of the House of Representatives who was "in the 
slightest degree tainted with unsoundness on the slavery 
question." This resolution drew the approval of Seabrook and of 
Benjamin C. Yancey, the brother of Alabama's premier fire- 
eater.^^
As the sectional conflict intensified in 1850, Keitt grew 
more strident. In March, he joined former Blufftonite David F.  
Jamison at a public meeting in Orangeburg. Keitt called for 
firm, resolute southern resistance to the impending congressional 
compromise; Jamison said that unless the forthcoming Nashville 
Convention could salvage southern rights, the South must dissolve 
the Union. After Nashville failed to satisfy southern radicals, 
Keitt helped Jamison create a Southern Rights Association in 
Orangeburg to promote secession. The Mercury reported that Keitt 
delivered "a brilliant and powerful address" at the association's 
first meeting, one which "rivetted the attention and kindled the 
feelings of his auditory [sic] into burning indignation against 
our oppressors and intense enthusiasm in defence of the rights of 
the South." If necessary, the young orator announced. South
15Merchant, "Keitt," 18; Charleston Mercury, November 29, 
December 8, 10, 20, 22, 1849.
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Carolina must secede alone. By 1851, Keitt had placed himself 
irrevocably in the camp of Barnwell Rhett and the seceders.
South Carolina "must stand erect or crouch," he once explained.
"I shall offer no objection to her crouching, if it be only the 
crouching of the lion, preparing with strained sinews and 
contracted muscle to spring with more deadly aim upon his foe." 
For the rest of the year, Keitt preached, "Loyalty to the Union 
is treason to liberty." He spoke throughout Orangeburg and in 
Charleston, appearing with Jamison, with Rhett, and alone.
In October, 1851, Carolinians chose cooperationists over 
secessionists by an overwhelming margin in an election for 
delegates to a special convention to discuss secession. Keitt 
was stunned. He could not believe that the convention would not 
act; he could not believe the people had rejected secession.
When he faced the reality that secession had failed, he grew 
sullen. For the remainder of his tenure in the state house he 
spoke but infrequently and without the fire and zeal which had 
already made him famous. His daring stand for secession, 
however, won a special place for him in the hearts of voters in 
the third Congressional district (the one Rhett had represented 
for over a decade). When a special election was held there to 
fill a vacancy, Keitt won by a large majority. He would continue 
to represent this district until his state seceded in 1860. When 
he departed for Washington in the fall of 1853, the new
^^Charleston Mercury, March 27, October 16, 1850, June 19, 
August 8, September 4, 18, 20, 1851.
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congressman had just turned twenty-nine.^^
Keitt thoroughly enjoyed life in Washington. He frequently
attended balls and mingled with members of the South Carolina
congressional delegation. James H. Hammond became a close
friend? the two once caroused until early in the morning and lied
18to their wives when they came home. Representative John 
McQueen recalled a "flying visit" from Keitt in which he spent 
"two or three hours with a fair one near us two weeks ago, & 
about thirty minutes at my house, & was off about as rapidly as 
they send word across the Atlantic by Telegraph." To Keitt, only 
the charms of women rivaled his love of politics. Before his 
marriage to Sue Sparks of South Carolina in 1859, Keitt had 
established quite a reputation. "We must limit Keitt as to the 
Belles," another colleague remarked, "he will interfere too much 
with the other single men." For a time Keitt turned his romantic 
attention to Harriet Lane, niece of President James Buchanan and 
acting first lady in the bachelor's White House.Politics, 
however, remained his true love. Keitt bragged to Sue about "the 
cheers of my own success," and he believed, "I may fairly grasp
^^Ibid., December 9, 1851? Merchant, "Keitt," 36-40.
18Keitt to Sue Sparks, January 20, 1855, April 30, 1856, Sue 
to her mother, December 26 [1859], Laurence M. Keitt Papers, 
William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North 
Carolina.
19John McQueen to W.P. Miles, September 28, 1858? M.L.
Bonham to Miles, January 30, 1858, William P. Miles Papers, 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill? Merchant, "Keitt," 275-76.
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at anything.
In contrast to Keitt, Wigfall never held public office 
before he left South Carolina. For years he denied even having 
any interest in a political career, though he admitted that 
political affairs fascinated him. His first public speech, 
however, gave him more satisfaction than his fledgling law 
practice. Although it was entirely apolitical, the Fourth of 
July oration he delivered in 1839 "proved more agreeable to the 
palates of 'my friends & fellow citizens' than I had even hoped." 
Smugly he told Manning, "I am told it has done me some credit. 
After this speech, Wigfall began to participate in public affairs 
in various unofficial capacities. When Manning's uncle, John 
Richardson, ran for governor in 1840, Wigfall and Manning 
acquired control of the Edgefield Advertiser and used it as a 
campaign organ for Richardson, with Wigfall serving as editor.
His outspoken denunciation of Richardson's foes later resulted in 
a series of duels and fights which, combined with his chronic 
debt, would drive him from the state.
Two years before he left, however, he gained his first 
experience in the politics of sectionalism when he joined the 
ranks of the Bluffton Boys. A settlement of the tariff question
^^Keitt to Sue Sparks, n.d.. May 9, July 11, September 11, 
1855, Keitt Papers, Duke University.
21Wigfall to Manning, March 23, n.d., April, July 27, 1839, 
Wigfall Papers, BTHC.
22Wigfall to Manning, January 29, February 17, 1840, Ibid.; 
Edgefield Advertiser, January 30, February 27, May 14, 1840; 
King, Wigfall, 26-27 .
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in 1844, Wigfall said, should not "be hindered by our supposed 
allegiance to the Federal Government." He claimed that 
southerners could not trust the Democratic party on either the 
tariff, preventing Congress from discussing slavery, or Texas 
annexation. Wigfall considered the latter "the paramount issue 
of the times." Although he believed the Democrats' presidential 
candidate, James K. Polk, favored Texas annexation, Wigfall 
asserted that Polk's party was an impotent "airy nothing." Like 
other Blufftonites, Wigfall called for a state convention to take 
appropriate action if the new administration failed to promote 
southern interests. "I confess my decided preference of 
Secession over Nullification," he announced.
The Bluffton controversy waned, and Wigfall's political 
activity in South Carolina ended with it. Wigfall once told 
Manning that if he ever felt compelled to leave South Carolina, 
he would first run for a seat in the legislature. "I can I 
believe be elected & it would give a young man in a new state 
some reputation to be a member of the S.C. Legislature." If he
did leave, Wigfall explained, he would move west, perhaps to
24Texas. When he did depart for the Lone Star state in 1846, 
however, Wigfall took with him only a reputation for violence, 
drunkenness, and insolvency, and not the prestige of having been 
a legislator.
Upon his arrival in Texas in the fall of 1846 Wigfall tried
23Edgefield Advertiser, June 5, September 11, 25, 1844. 
^^Wigfall to Manning, March 23, n.d., Wigfall Papers, BTHC.
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to put his tumultuous past behind him and once again focused his 
attention on law. He settled first in Nacogdoches where he 
shared a practice with William B. Ochiltree, a friend of one of 
Wigfall's cousins who had already moved to Texas. Discovering 
that his skills as an attorney compared favorably with those of 
most frontier lawyers, he established his own law office in 
Marshall, the seat of Harrison county in northeastern Texas. 
Wigfall received so much satisfaction from his new success and 
recognition that he seemingly ceased worrying about his continued 
financial problems. He borrowed money from Benjamin Yancey and
from creditors in Texas, only to lose it all in bad
2  5investments.
Once established as a lawyer, however, Wigfall resumed an 
active interest in politics. In 1848, he represented Harrison 
County at a Democratic meeting in Galveston. As chair of the 
resolutions committee, he supported and presented the 
convention's declaration that the Wilmot Proviso was 
unconstitutional. The next year, Wigfall tried to put teeth into 
that resolution by announcing that passage of the Proviso might 
lead to dissolution of the Union. During the summer of 1849, he 
boldly attacked the popular Senator Sam Houston's position on the 
territorial question. Wigfall chastised Houston for failing to 
sign John C. Calhoun's Southern Address. He claimed that the
2 5.King, Wigfall, 49-50; Benjamin C. Franklin to Benjamin C. 
Yancey, November 5, 1852, William L. Yancey to Benjamin C.
Yancey, February 5, 1855, Benjamin C. Yancey Papers, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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former president of Texas placed "our liberties and our 
lives...upon the political gaming table" in order to appease 
northerners and enhance his chances of becoming president of the 
United States. Why else, Wigfall asked, would Houston "gag 
Texas, when her sister states are speaking?" Wigfall publicly 
condemned Houston for "placing himself upon the free-soil 
platform.
The people of Harrison County rewarded Wigfall for his 
boldness by sending him to fill a vacant seat in the lower house 
of the Texas legislature. In 1850, that body in turn selected 
him as a delegate to the Nashville Convention. Unwilling to 
leave his first elective office even temporarily he declined to 
go, but asked another delegate, John P. Henderson, to bring his
n nproposal for five constitutional amendments to Nashville.
Wigfall thought his amendments would bring a final adjustment to 
the sectional conflict. The first two explicitly denied Congress 
the power to tamper with the interstate slave trade and slavery 
in the District of Columbia. The third stated that the people of 
the territories, and not Congress, would create all laws 
concerning their territories except those concerning slavery, 
which no one could prohibit during the territorial period. The 
fourth prohibited Congress from "receiving, discussing, referring
or reporting, upon any petition upon the subject of slavery."
   /
2 6King, Wigfall, 51-52, 55; Marshall Texas Republican, July 
6, November 8, 1849 (hereinafter cited as Texas Republican).
27King, Wigfall, 55; Wigfall to J.P. Henderson, March 9,
1850, in Texas Republican, April 18, 1850.
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The last was the most drastic. It called for a ban against
future consitutional amendments that pertained at all to slavery,
"except by the unanimous consent of all the states." Wigfall's
proposals gained editorial support from DeBow's Review, but had
no impact at Nashville. Nevertheless, when Henderson returned
from Tennessee, Wigfall joined him at a public meeting in
Marshall which endorsed both Rhett's radical Nashville Address
and a decision to send a Texas delegation to a second Nashville 
2ftConvention.
The Compromise of 1850 and the failure of southern
resistance did nothing to quiet Wigfall. Returned to the
legislature for the rest of the decade, he established a
reputation as "a thorough going fire eater from South 
29Carolina." Wigfall denounced both the new Know-Nothing and 
Republican parties as tools of abolitionism and as enemies of the 
South. He called for a filibustering expedition to seize 
Nicaragua for southern expansion and argued for the re-opening of 
the African slave trade.
During the 1850's, Wigfall also campaigned against Sam 
Houston and unionism in Texas. While delegates assembled at
2 8Texas Republican, April 18, July 6, 1850; DeBow's Review, 
IX (July, 1850), 123-24. --------------
29John E. Campbell to his brother, November 16, 1859, John 
E. Campbell Papers, BTHC.
^^Texas Republican, October 11, 1856; William L. Yancey to 
L.T. Wigfall, April 16, 1858, Wigfall Family Papers, Division of 
Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Dallas Herald, June 1, 1859; 
King, Wigfall, 67-68.
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Nashville, Wigfall helped state rights Democrats in the Texas 
legislature pass a resolution which condemned Houston for laxity 
in protecting the rights of Texas in the United States Senate. 
When the Senator ran for reelection in 1857, he refused to engage 
in public debate, so Wigfall followed him throughout the state 
and spoke wherever Houston did. This infuriated Houston. He 
began to call Wigfall "Wiggletail," and said that his antagonist 
had come to Texas only to escape the law in South Carolina where, 
as a lawyer, he had swindled his clients. Either Wigfall never 
heard these barbs or decided that the effort to dethrone Houston 
required him to control himself because, uncharacteristically, 
Wigfall did not respond in kind. This campaign earned Wigfall a 
reputation as the only man in Texas who ever proved a match for 
Houston on the stump; his efforts also helped force the Senator 
out of office that fall.^^
Wigfall's assault on Houston captured the attention of many 
Texans. By 1859, some talked of sending him to the United States 
Senate, even though the Marshall Texas Republican noted that no 
one in the state was "more obnoxious to Houston and his
31A.W. Terrell, "Recollections of General Sam Houston," The 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly XVI (October, 1912), 118-19; 
Amelia W, Williams and Eugene C. Barker, eds.. The Writings of 
Sam Houston 1813-1863 (8 volumes; Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1942), VII, 2Q) C.W. Raines, ed.. Six Decades in Texas, or 
Memoirs of Francis Richard Lubbock, Governor of Texas in War- 
Time , 1861-6? (Austin: Ben C. Jones & Co. Printers, 1900 ), 256- 
57; King, Wigfall, 63-64.
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3 2followers." After news of John Brown's raid into Virginia 
reached Texas in October, however, Wigfall emerged as a serious 
candidate. Because they believed the Republican party 
responsible for fomenting Brown's attack on the South, many 
Texans decided to retaliate by sending "the most violent partisan 
in the state" to Congress. When the legislature convened to 
elect a senator in December, 1859, anti-Republican hysteria 
prevented Senator John Reagan, a moderate, from having his name 
considered for reelection and prevented Houston's forces from 
effectively opposing Wigfall. Intoxicated by his recent triumph 
over Houston —  and, perhaps, by alcohol —  Wigfall stood at a 
hallway in the capitol and told a friend sarcastically, "A lot of 
those fellows are fine specimens of legislators to be vested with 
the power of electing a gentleman to the United States Senate." 
When his friend warned him not to voice such reckless statements, 
Wigfall snapped, "I don't care a d— n. The fact remains that a 
whole lot of 'em are copperas breeched hayseeds and have no 
business here." After heated debate and three ballots, the 
legislators chose Wigfall over six others. When Sam Houston 
heard of Wigfall's election, he supposedly exclaimed, "Thank God 
this country is so great and strong, it can bear even that."^^
32Lorenzo Sherwood to L.T. Wigfall, February 8, 1858, Thomas
B. King Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Dallas Herald, July 3, 1858; Texas 
Republican, October 8, December 10, l7, 37859.
33Norman G . Kittrell, Governors Who Have Been, and Other 
Public Men of Texas (Houston; Dealy-Adey-Elgin Co., Publishers, 
1921), l50; Texas Republican, December 24, 1859; C. Vann 
Woodward, ed., Mary Chesnut's Civil War (New Haven: Yale
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Wigfall took his seat in Congress in January, 1860,^^ and 
joined Keitt in the "grand and glorious field" of politics. Each 
believed he could alter or control public affairs through his own 
actions. Both exemplified the commitment to individualism, 
passion, and intuition so pronounced in nineteenth century 
romanticism. Beginning as a philosophical reaction against the 
reason and rationality of the Enlightenment, romanticism 
emphasized the internal drives of man over the external laws of 
nature, change and dynamism over uniformity and structure. 
Romantics viewed institutions as malleable, and instead of trying 
to force government to conform to natural laws they believed that 
governments must reflect the changing nature of man and society. 
In the American South, romanticism supported the concept of honor 
and its emphasis on personal distinction and bold action. For 
the individual, romanticism meant freeing the personality and 
taking risks in life. To Keitt and Wigfall, it meant the more 
daring the better.
"Life, in the very texture of the word, means struggle, 
motion, purpose, object," said Keitt. By defining a purpose in 
life and focusing upon it, Keitt believed that one attained
University Press, 1981), 86; King, Wigfall, 70-74.
^^Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 1 ^  Session, 322.
35See Russel B. Nye, The Cultural Life of the New Nation 
1776-1830 (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, I960 ), 6^9, 
and A.O. Lovejoy, "The Meaning of Romanticism for the Historian 
of Ideas," Journal of the History of Ideas II (1941), 257-78; 
Clement Eaton, The Mind of the Old South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1976), 245-48.
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strength and power. One could only win power in the political
world "by superiority, at least by haughty self-independence and
assertion, and not by dexterous trimming and whining submission."
In order to fully realize one's destiny in life, one's purpose
and potential power, Keitt said, "We may not —  and often, cannot
—  control our spirit, soul, intellect." Keitt believed that
people must let their hearts lead them, and follow vigorously the
dictates of the spirit instead of the mind. "Power lies in the
blood, in its motion," he thought. "Where it dances wildly there
cannot be weakness." For Keitt, action generated by impulse was
not only infallible, but it was also mystical. He held that
"enthusiasm is of kin to divinity and to high purpose." Every
person —  and particularly every politician —  therefore had a
duty to remain active, not passive, to take their destinies into
their own hands. According to Keitt, one could never allow
another to impede one's course in life, no matter the
consequences. He pitied or despised those who allowed "grass and
stubble and straw" to block their actions, those who sought "no
perils and no earnestness of purpose" in life's struggles.
"Audacity drew the people to me and gave me a hold upon them,"
Keitt boasted early in his congressional career. "Boldness," he
told Sue, "is the key to success." Only once in his life did he
37ever fear that this daring had made him "a reckless man."
^^Keitt to Sue Sparks, February 14, July 11, 1855, and n.d., 
Keitt Papers, Duke University.
37Keitt to Sue Sparks, January 20, 1855, July 7, September 
11, November 6, 1856, Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
259
The event that tested Keitt's faith in spontaneity was the 
assault by Preston Brooks on Charles Sumner. On May 19 and 20, 
1856, Sumner, a Republican senator from Massachusetts, delivered 
a speech on the senate floor which he later called "The Crime 
Against Kansas." In it, he singled out a senator from South 
Carolina, Andrew P. Butler, for embracing "the harlot slavery," 
ridiculed the infirm southerner for discharging "the loose 
expectoration of his speech," and called him a liar. Butler was 
absent when Sumner made these remarks, but Brooks, a 
representative from South Carolina and Butler's cousin, heard 
about the speech and decided to punish Sumner unless he 
apologized for dishonoring his kinsman. On May 21, Brooks told 
three of his closest friends —  Keitt, and representatives Henry 
Edmundson of Virginia and James L. Orr of South Carolina —  of 
his intentions. The next day, Keitt and Edmundson accompanied 
Brooks to the senate chamber. There, Brooks found Sumner seated 
at his desk, chastised him, and beat him repeatedly with his 
cane. Blood gushed from Sumner's head as he lunged from his seat 
and collapsed to the floor. Keitt, who had hoped to witness the 
assault, had his view blocked when a constituent detained him 
behind the president's chair. When he heard the commotion, Keitt 
rushed out only in time to see others coming to Sumner's aid. 
Furious that anyone would interfere with what he considered a 
chivalric act, Keitt himself brandished a cane and warned 
bystanders to stay away. He then led Brooks from the room and 
helped him clean a cut he had received on his head from the
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recoil of his cane; Sumner lay unconscious and seriously 
38wounded.
The House of Representatives formed a committee of five to 
investigate the affair. The committee issued two reports; a 
majority report by the three northern members, and a minority 
report by the two southerners. The majority said that Brooks 
should be expelled from the House forthwith and Keitt and
Edmundson be censured for knowing about plans for the assault but
doing nothing to stop it. The minority, in characteristic 
southern fashion, found no specific provision in the Constitution 
that empowered the House to punish its own members for "alleged" 
assaults, and therefore refused to express an official opinion. 
The House acted on the majority report on July 14, and voted to 
expel Brooks. The congressman, however, resigned before 
expulsion could take effect. The next day, the House voted to
censure Keitt; on July 16, Keitt resigned.Neither would allow
Congress to impugn his honor. Both decided to seek vindication 
for their actions from the people of South Carolina by seeking 
reelection to the seats they had just vacated.
Shortly after the attack on Sumner, Keitt wrote to his 
fiancee that Brooks "combined in happy proportion freedom of 
speech and freedom of the cudgel." He reported that everyone in
3 8Merchant, "Keitt," 99-106, is the best account of this 
episode for Keitt's role. Also see Congressional Globe, 34th 
Congress, 1st Session, 1289, 1292-93, 1348-52, 1355-59, and 
Appendix, 6^6, 886.
39Congressional Globe, 34th Congress, 1st Session, 1348-49, 
1349-52; 1628, 1641. —
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Washington "feels as if we are upon a volcano. I am glad of it," 
he explained, "for I am tired of stagnation." After a few weeks 
of reflection, Keitt briefly doubted the correctness of his own 
actions in the a f f a i r . A f t e r  he resigned and returned to South 
Carolina, however, he vigorously defended himself and Brooks. 
Brooks acted, Keitt said, in compliance with the code of honor. 
Attacks upon honor could not be corrected by lawyers or courts, 
he stated. According to Keitt, southerners believed that without 
defense of honor "a man's person is not worth protecting."
Brooks had "redressed a wrong to his blood and his State, and he 
did it in a fair and manly way." According to the code of honor, 
Keitt noted, a gentleman like Brooks could not challenge a "cur" 
such as Sumner to a duel, but had to beat him as though he were a 
b e a s t . A s  for his censure, Keitt claimed that Abolitionists 
had conspired to discredit him. He told Carolinians that even 
though he knew of Brooks' intentions there was no complicity in 
carrying out the act. Keitt said that his only offense was that 
he did not turn informer, and that he believed it dishonorable to 
betray even a bitter enemy's confidence to one's closest friend. 
He therefore decided to take his fate out of the hands of those 
with no understanding of southern honor and place it in those 
"among whom honor is maintained." The people of South Carolina 
sustained him and Brooks in fall; they reelected Keitt without
^^Keitt to [Sue Sparks], May 29, July 7, 1856, Keitt Papers, 
Duke University.
^^Charleston Mercury, July 25, 1856; New York Times, October 
14, 1856.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
262
opposition.
Despite his commitment to the code of honor, Keitt worried 
that "rudimental notions of what is truly honorable and great" 
led many southerners to forsake "the intenser glories of the 
intellect" in favor of "the daring of the violent." Louis 
Wigfall shared Keitt's dedication to honor and a life of action, 
but not the apprehension that this sort of life might impede 
intellectual enrichment. In fact, Wigfall once stated that he 
would rather risk his life "than possess the intellect of a Bacon 
or a L o c k e . I n  contrast to Keitt, for Wigfall the code of 
honor served merely as a rationalization for violence, and the 
unfettering of the spirit as a justification for recklessness.
From 1839 to 1841 Wigfall engaged in a series of fights and 
duels which left him with a reputation for bloodthirstiness. In 
1839 he served as a second for a friend in a duel with Joseph 
Glover of Edgefield. During this duel Wigfall himself risked an 
encounter with Glover when he shouted to his friend, "Blow the 
damned scoundrels brains out." A few months later, Preston 
Brooks resurrected Wigfall's conflict with Glover by stating 
publicly that Wigfall had called the latter a coward. Wigfall 
denied this, and therefore called Brooks a liar. When Wigfall 
and Brooks confronted each other in June, 1840, a fistfight broke 
out. When it ended. Brooks said that he would challenge Wigfall
^^New York Times, July 17, 1856; Charleston Mercury, July 
24, 25, October 16, 1856.
‘̂ ^Charleston Mercury, June 29, 1858; Wigfall to Manning, 
March 23, n.d., Wigfall Papers, BTHC.
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to a duel unless wigfall challenged him first. Some of Brooks's 
friends urged him to wait a few weeks and practice, because 
Wigfall was already known to be "a good shot."^^
Friends of both belligerents quickly interceded. A group of 
prominent men, including Franklin Elmore, Pierce Butler, and Wade 
Hampton, formed a board of honor in an attempt to prevent 
hostilities. After an investigation, the board concluded that 
Brooks had heard Wigfall insult Glover prior to a reconciliation 
between the two and, therefore, Wigfall's charge that Brooks had 
lied was invalid. The findings of the board, however, only 
delayed a confrontation. Brooks stated publicly that Wigfall had 
backed down and continued to insist that Wigfall had called 
Glover a coward. Wigfall published his response to Brooks in the 
Edgefield Advertiser, but Brooks was out of town at the time. In 
Preston's absence his father, Colonel Whitfield Brooks, published 
an abusive letter to Wigfall. Wigfall challenged the colonel to 
a duel.^^ Whitfield Brooks refused, so in accordance with the 
code duello Wigfall began to post placards in Edgefield 
denouncing the colonel as a coward and a scoundrel. J.P. Carroll 
and Thomas Bird, both related to the Brooks family, tried to meet 
Wigfall and reason with him before he posted the colonel, but 
they were too late. When Carroll tore down a placard. Bird
44Wigfall to Manning, March 23, n.d., Wigfall Papers, BTHC; 
J.P. Carroll to James H. Hammond, June 30, 1840, James H. Hammond 
Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress; King, 
Wigfall, 21, 29-30.
*̂ K̂ing, Wigfall, 31-32; Edgefield Advertiser, November 5,
1840.
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thought Wigfall was about to shoot Carroll, so Bird fired twice 
at Wigfall. He missed. Wigfall then shot at Bird, "taking cool 
and deliberate aim," and mortally wounded him. Carroll then 
approached Wigfall, "and calmly said to him that he was a cold­
blooded murderous scoundrel." For this, Wigfall immediately 
challenged Carroll to a duel.^^ In November, the two met on an 
island in the Savannah River. Both fired and missed, and their 
seconds arranged an end to that a f f a i r . A  week later, Wigfall 
and Preston Brooks met on the same site. Both missed with their 
first shot; with the second. Brooks struck Wigfall in the thigh, 
and Wigfall shot Brooks through the hip. As they laid weakened 
from their wounds, they agreed to allow a board of honor try 
again to resolve their conflict.^®
The board's settlement seemed to favor Wigfall, yet he was 
not satisfied. "I can stand any thing but being told that my 
honor is as good as Preston Brooks'," Wigfall fumed. He still 
wanted to publish a statement condemning Brooks as a liar. 
Brooks's injury was severe, however, and forced him to use a cane 
the rest of his life. Although later he would use this cane to 
assault Charles Sumner, for the time being Brooks determined to 
avoid violent confrontations. Carroll believed that Wigfall had
46J.P. Carroll to Hammond, November 1, 1840, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress; D.C. Ray to C.W. Lord, June 9, 1925, in 
Wigfall Papers, BTHC.
47J.P. Carroll to Hammond, November 7, 8, 1840, Hammond 
Papers, Library of Congress.
â ftKing, Wigfall, 33.
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learned of Brooks's resolution to reject all future challenges to 
duels and would continue to harass Brooks as long as he knew that 
his nemesis would no longer "call him to account."'*® In March, 
1841, Wigfall told Brooks, "I do not consider all matters 
connected with our late difficulties entirely satisfied, and I 
shall take the earliest opportunity practicable to vindicate 
myself." All Edgefield believed yet another duel would 
transpire, "and a feeling akin to horror is inspired by Wigfall's 
supposed bloodthirstiness." Others interposed again. They 
agreed to another board's finding which finally laid the matter 
to rest.®®
"These difficulties in which I have for the last eighteen 
months been engaged have ruined my [law] practice," Wigfall 
conceded. They also stigmatized him for life. At least one 
Carolinian wished that Wigfall would leave Edgefield. James H.
Hammond found Wigfall "wholly unprincipled & treacherous to the
51last degree." Even after he left the Palmetto state, Wigfall 
could not escape his notoriety. Sam Houston denounced him as a
49Wigfall to Manning, April 25, 1841, Wigfall Papers, BTHC; 
J.P. Carroll to Hammond, June 19, 1841, Hammond Papers, Library 
of Congress; John B. Edmunds, Jr., Francis W. Pickens and the 
Politics of Destruction (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1986), 52.
®®Wigfall to Brooks, March 5, 1841, in Edgefield Advertiser, 
July 22, 1841; J.P. Carroll to Hammond, June 12, 1841, and J.H. 
Hammond, J.S. Preston, Thos. Stark, W. Hampton, et al, June 15, 
1841, in Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
®^Wigfall to Manning, October 17, 1841, Wigfall Papers,
BTHC; M.L. Bonham to Hammond, June 15, 1841, Hammond to Marcellus
C.M. Hammond, May 20, 1843, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
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murderer. After the dissolution of the Union, the New York 
Tribune referred to him as a "brawling traitor," and Harper's 
Weekly erroneously reported that he had shot eight men in various 
duels. His reputation preceded him to Fort Sumter, where a Union 
officer worried about this "parlous man" who he had heard was 
"quick to settle disputed points with the pistol.
Wigfall once told his daughter that he believed the code of 
honor improved "both the morals and the manners of a community" 
by engendering "a most restraining tendency on the errant fancy." 
It certainly would in any community that included Louis T.
Wigfall and his hypersensitivity to attacks upon his perception 
of his honor. Although he never duelled again after 1840, 
Wigfall's commitment to other forms of violence parodied 
chivalric notions of gentlemanly behavior. In 1844 he based his 
preference for governor on the willingness of one candidate to 
use force against the federal government. "Seabrook is for 
resistance —  war at once —  war to the knife —  He would 
therefore get my vote." When discussing the guerilla warfare 
which led to the sobriquet "Bloody Kansas" in the 1850's, Wigfall 
dispassionately remarked, "Let Kansas bleed if she has a fancy 
for it." "Blood is a very common fluid," Senator Wigfall said 
while discussing the possibility of civil war. "It is worth very 
little. A man is killed, it does not matter much; it is really a
52Terrell, "Recollections of General Sam Houston," 119; New 
York Tribune in Texas Republican, February 23, 1861; Harper's 
Weekly in Texas Republican, May 18, 1861; Abner Doubleday, 
Reminiscences of Forts Sumter and Moultrie in 1860-61 (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1876), 164.
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matter of small consequence to him, to his family, or to the 
country.
For both Wigfall and Keitt southern honor was as important 
as personal honor. They agreed with the Rhetts when they said, 
"No people degraded can be free."®^ Keitt had believed that the 
Compromise of 1850 so insulted the South that its people must 
either dissolve the Union or be "degraded and manacled." Because 
southerners owned slaves, Keitt asked his northern counterparts 
in Congress, "Would you 'form a more perfect union' by 
stigmatizing and degrading us (the South) from equality with you? 
'Establish justice' by excluding us from territory won by our 
common blood and treasure, and seizing the whole of it to 
yourselves, (the North?)" The South, he explained, would be 
"base" and "craven" to "submit to the overthrow of her honor, 
peace, and existence." To Keitt, this sort of submission would 
"make us change places with our slaves." Rather than allow the 
North to dishonor the South by surrounding her with "a belt of 
fire," Keitt threatened that southerners would "burst the wall of 
fire, though the flames should shrivel our sinews and blast our 
eyeballs, resolved to fall, if fall they must, struggling blindly
Wright, A Southern Girl in '61, 31-32; L. Wigfall to A. 
Burt, April 7, 1844, Armistead Burt Papers, William R. Perkins 
Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina; Wigfall to S.S. 
Thompson and others, August 25, 1858, in Dallas Herald, December 
8, 1858; Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 1st Session, 1301- 
1302. ~  —
^^Charleston Mercury, July 27, 1860.
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it may be, but struggling like m e n . W h e n  the Republican party 
emerged in the 1850's and pledged to place slavery on the road to 
ultimate extinction, Keitt's concern over southern honor grew.
He warned southerners that if Republican John C. Fremont won the 
presidency in 1856, "you have to chose between submission and 
dissolution." The South must never bow her head to "Black 
Republican rule," Keitt insisted. Rather than submit to the 
election of a Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives 
in 1859, Keitt announced, "I would shatter this Republic from 
turret to foundation stone.
Wigfall agreed that the South could never honorably submit 
to "Black Republican rule," but adopted more vulgar rhetoric than 
K e i t t . I n  1856, the Republican party had condemned slavery and 
Mormonism as "twin relics of barbarism." Would southerners allow 
others to compare George Washington with Brigham Young, "the pure 
patriot and the lecherous beast," he asked. Did southern women 
—  "our mothers, our wives, our daughters" —  fall into the same 
category as "vile harlots who, herded like cattle, live in their 
keeper's harems in promiscuous concubinage," just because they 
own slaves? "It is deliberately-written libel on fair women and 
brave men," Wigfall said, and he insisted that no constitutional
55Ibid., June 19, September 4, 1851; Congressional Globe, 
33rd Congress, l£t Session, Appendix, 465, 467.
^^New York Times, October 14, 1856; Charleston Mercury, 
October 13, 1858; Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st 
Session, 24.
^^Texas Republican, October 20, 1860.
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reform could prevent such insults.^® Like Keitt, Wigfall 
declared that the South would never permit the North "to belt us
round with free States, to starve us out or cause us like
poisoned rats, to die in our holes." In the Senate Wigfall 
assailed northerners even more vehemently than Keitt had in the 
House :
You denounce us, degrade us, deride us, tell us we shall 
live under a Government that we say is not tasteful to us; 
you tell us that we are degraded, that we are not your 
equals.... and when we say to you, if we cannot live together 
in peace, we will separate, you say we shall not; and then, 
because I do not choose to make a ninny of myself, because I 
do not choose to stultify myself, and vote for resolutions 
that mean nothing, in order that Senators may telegraph over 
the country that all is peace and quiet —  because I do not 
choose to do that, or to be led by the nose as tenderly as 
asses are, I am charged with a conspiracy...to dissolve the Union.
Before accepting inequality and degradation, Wigfall vowed he 
would indeed dissolve the Union. "I would burst it; I would 
fracture it, splinter it into more fragments than gunpowder would 
blow glass.
Vindicating southern honor occasionally led Keitt to commit 
the reckless acts of violence that he had once claimed to 
deplore. For instance, while representatives debated what action 
to take after the Sumner-Brooks affair, Keitt leapt suddenly at 
John Hickman of Pennsylvania. A congressman from Alabama grabbed 
Keitt by the coat tail as he rushed by and prevented a fight. A
58Louis T. Wigfall, Speech of Louis T. Wigfall, on the 
Pending Political Issues; Delivered at Tyler, Smith County,
Texas, September 3, 1860 (Washington. D.C.; Lemuel Towers. 1860),
27-28.
59Congressional Globe, 36j^ Congress, 2nd Session, 74, 667.
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New York Times correspondent found the incident "a mystery." 
Another Washington correspondent, however, had observed Keitt's 
"nervous gesticulation" on the House floor. He noted that Keitt 
moved "restlessly about as if suffering from a continual 
succession of electric shocks." Keitt admitted an inability to 
control this nervous energy. Because of "my nervous 
irritability," Keitt confessed that he could not even hold still 
long enough to have a daguerreotype of him made.®®
Keitt's testiness led to the most reckless act of his 
political career. At two o'clock in the morning on February 6, 
1858, the House of Representatives remained locked in a series of 
debates and parliamentary manuevers concerning Kansas. Keitt lay 
across two desks in a restless sleep, one shoe dangling from his 
toes. Galusha Grow, a Republican from Pennsylvania, had crossed 
over to the Democrats' side of the floor to confer briefly with 
his colleague, John Hickman, when he objected to a motion by John 
Quitman. Keitt rose slightly from his improvised couch and 
grumbled, "What business have you over on this side, any how?" 
"This is a free hall," Grow replied, "and I have a right to 
object from any part of it, when I choose." After a further 
exchange of words Keitt moved toward Grow and shouted, "I'll show 
you, you d— d Black Republican puppy I" Grow rejoined, "You may 
think me what you please, Mr. Keitt; but let me tell you that no 
nigger-driver shall come up from his plantation to crack his lash
New York Times, July 10, 1856; Merchant, "Keitt," 113-14; 
Charleston Mercury, April 12, 1856; Keitt to Sue Sparks, June 6, 
1855, Keitt Papers, Duke University.
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about my ears!" "We'll see about that," muttered Keitt as he 
leaped upon Grow and grabbed his throat. At least six 
congressmen joined the melee. When Cadwalleder Washburne of 
Wisconsin, in an attempt to pick up William Barksdale of 
Mississippi by the hair in order to punch him, found himself 
swinging wildly at air with one hand while the other clutched 
Barksdale's wig, laughter conquered anger and the brawl ended.
Even Keitt realized that he had gone too far. On February 
8, he apologized to the House for "violation of its order, its 
dignity, and its decorum." Although he accepted full 
responsibility for the affair and expressed his profound regret, 
he never apologized to Grow. Furthermore, when a report surfaced 
that Grow had struck him during their scuffle, Keitt denounced it 
as "a foul lie." Although the Charleston Mercury hailed Keitt 
for his "chivalrous and manly apology" and some Carolinians 
thought that, having again proven his mettle, Keitt should run 
for senator, most people were appalled. An anonymous writer in 
Punch, the London magazine, was moved to write.
Sing, oh goddess, the wrath, the ontameable dander of 
KEITT —
KEITT of South Carolina, the clear grit, the tall, the 
ondaunted —
Him that hath wopped his own niggers till Northerners 
all unto KEITT
Seem but as niggers to wop, and hills of the smallest
^^New York Times, February 8, 1858.
6 2Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st Session, 623;
Keitt to Ellison [Keitt], February 17, 1858, in C.C. Jones 
Autograph Letters, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, 
Durham, North Carolina; Charleston Mercury, February 13, July 28, 
1858.
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potatoes...
One Carolinian, who expressed great admiration for Keitt's 
talents, felt "contempt and disgust." Another asked Keitt's 
colleague. Congressman William Porcher Miles, "With what Kind of 
ammunition was Keitt's gun charged to make so furious an 
explosion
Although Keitt often carried the defense of southern honor 
to ridiculous extremes, his actions resulted from a conviction he 
shared with Louis Wigfall that northerners were a people whose 
values and culture were so different from southerners that they 
could not be reasoned with, much less treated as equals. Both 
Keitt and Wigfall were southern nationalists; they considered the 
southern people unique and the Union an unnatural bond that 
trapped them together with a foreign North. They agreed with 
Beverley Tucker that neither an American nation nor an American 
people existed, but only a union of different peoples. To Keitt 
and Wigfall, secession would not only vindicate southern honor 
and promote southern interests, but also allow the South to 
develop fully its own nationality.
Keitt most likely derived his concept of southern 
nationalism from his kinsman and political confidant, David 
Flavel Jamison. Jamison has been called "the mouthpiece of
®^"The Fight over the Body of Keitt," Punch, XXIV (March 6, 
1858), 100. -----
^^William H. Trescot to W.P. Miles, February 7, March 20, 
1858, Allan Macfarlan to Miles, February 14, 1858, Miles Papers, 
University of North Carolina. Also see Alfred Huger to Miles, 
February 18, 1858, in Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
273
romantic Southern nationalists." As a student at South Carolina 
College in the days of Thomas Cooper, Jamison leaned toward 
southern radicalism early in life. A planter, author, and 
lawyer, he also represented Orangeburg in the South Carolina 
legislature from 1836 to 1848 when Keitt succeeded him. He was 
one of Rhett's Bluffton Boys in 1844 and a delegate to the 
Nashville Convention in 1850. During the ensuing secession 
movement, he led the call in Orangeburg for immediate secession. 
By that time he had already immersed himself in the ideas of such 
European writers on romantic nationalism as Guizot, Herder, 
Mignet, Michelet, and Lamartine. Later, he joined the literary 
circle of William Gilmore Simms, the South's foremost man of 
letters and himself a firm believer in southern nationalism. In 
December, 1860, when a secession convention declared South 
Carolina a free and independent state, David F. Jamison presided 
over the assembly.
Jamison and Keitt worked together closely in the campaign 
for secession in 1851, and Jamison's ideas clearly influenced his 
young associate. "We have now," Keitt declared in 1855, "in 
interest, two Confederacies, with a debauched Constitution, and a 
tyrannical and irresponsible Congress." Appeals to northerners 
would therefore be futile. "The South must organize to save 
herself," he stated, and South Carolina must lead that effort.
Keitt to Sue Sparks, May 9, 1855, Keitt Papers, Duke 
University; Rollin G . Osterweis, Romanticism and Nationalism in 
the Old South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1971 ) , 150-52 ; Charleston Mercury, September 16 , 1844.
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Keitt asserted, "South Carolina has led the column of Southern 
civilization: and that civilization, peculiar and original, I 
believe to be now in peril." Keitt found "Southern civilization" 
a uniquely moral and spiritual one. All other nations, he 
claimed, "are material." European nations and the North both 
suffered from "effete social forms," suffocated from dense 
populations, and were racked by conflicts between labor and 
capital. Slavery set the South apart, Keitt believed. "At the 
South we have...a harmonious and permanent adjustment between 
labor and capital," he claimed, harmonious because slave labor 
was a form of capital. Repeating the "mud-sill" idea formulated 
by Beverley Tucker and enunciated by James Hammond, Keitt 
remarked that individual liberty was a "rank and privilege" 
appreciated by southerners more than any people on earth.
Concepts of state rights, federal relations, and the morality of 
owning slaves differed so sharply above and below the Mason-Dixon 
line that Keitt concluded "a whole world lies between the North 
and the South, both upon the question of slavery, and the 
character of the government.
Wigfall shared these convictions, but he developed them 
without the refinement or scholarly guidance of Keitt. Instead, 
Wigfall's concept of southern nationalism crudely synthesized 
popular contemporary truisms and dutiful loyalty to "King 
Cotton." An English observer found Wigfall's thoughts on the
^^Charleston Mercury, August 16, October 18. 1855. Seotember 
27, 1860.
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matter affected and "of logic all his own." "We are a peculiar 
people, sir!" Wigfall patiently explained.
You don't understand us, and you can't understand us, 
because we are known to you only by Northern writers and 
Northern papers, who know nothing of us themselves, or 
misrepresent what they do know. We are an agricultural 
people; we are a primitive but a civilised people. We have 
no cities —  we don't want them. We have no literature —  
we don't need any yet. We have no press —  we are glad of 
it. We do not require a press because we go out and discuss 
all public questions from the stump with our people. We 
have no commercial marine —  no navy —  we don't want them. 
Your ships carry our produce, and you can protect your own 
vessels. We want no manufacturers: we desire no trading, no 
mechanical or manufacturing classes. As long as we have our 
rice, our sugar, our tobacco, and our cotton, we can command 
wealth to purchase all we want from those nations with which 
we are in amity, and lay up money besides.
Because of their belief in Southern nationality, Keitt and
Wigfall thought a sectional conflict inevitable. "It needs but a
weak horoscope to see future events, in momentous convulsions,
sweeping like a magnificent thundercloud through the sky," Keitt
predicted in 1855. He believed, however, that men of fortitude
and daring could direct the course of the coming storm.®® Both
he and Wigfall saw themselves as such men, as politicians with
unique abilities to guide the South through anticipated political
convulsions and into a new national existence.
In 1859 Keitt's devotion to the South triumphed over his new
commitment to his bride. While on their honeymoon in Europe, the
6 7Russell, Diary, 99. Also see Congressional Globe, 36th 
Congress, 2nd Session, 73.   —
®®Keitt to Sue Sparks, July 11, September 19, 1855, Keitt 
Papers, Duke University; L. Keitt to J. Pettigrew, May 15, 1860, 
Pettigrew Family Papers, North Carolina Department.of Archives 
and History, Raleigh, North Carolina.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
276
newlyweds learned of John Brown's attempt to lead a slave 
insurrection at Harper's Ferry, Virginia. Keitt decided he must 
return to Washington. "Disappointed, disappointed," sighed Sue. 
"And the cause Politics. How I hate the word." When she looked 
beyond her own frustration, however. Sue must have recalled 
Laurence's words to her early in their courtship. He had told 
her that he believed South Carolina had "more weight in the 
federal councils than any state in the Union." And he believed 
that he possessed the power "to turn the tide in this state." 
"Sue, shall I seek the strength of the eagle," he had asked her, 
"or cower like the linnet?" Sue knew the answer.
Excitement over John Brown lingered in Washington when Keitt 
returned in December, 1859. He immediately met with Congressman 
Miles and others to obtain information and discuss appropriate 
responses. In the House Keitt declared "there is an indissoluble 
connection between the principles of the Republican party...and 
their ultimate consummation in blood and rapine on the soil of 
V i r g i n i a . H a r d l y  had Keitt vented his rage at Brown and 
Republicans when he received the alarming news that his brother. 
Dr. William J. Keitt, had been killed by his own slaves while he 
lay sick in bed at his plantation near Ocala, Florida.
Keitt to Miles, May 18, 1859, Miles Papers, University of 
North Carolina; Sue Sparks Keitt to Carrie, [1859], Keitt to Sue, 
n.d. [1855 or 1856], July 11, 1855, Keitt Papers, Duke 
University; Merchant, "Keitt," 277-80.
70Sue Keitt to "Dear Mar," December 4, 1859, Keitt Papers, 
Duke University; Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 1st Session, 
220. ~
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Vigilantes there hung the slave who slit Dr. Keitt's throat; 
three accomplices awaited sale out of the state. Keitt had 
always believed that "the relationship between master and slave 
is one of kindness and protection" and that slaves only rebelled 
against their masters when incited to by northerners. He refused 
to believe that his brother's conduct towards his slaves or the 
institution of slavery itself could drive a black to commit such 
a ghastly act. The fact that three of the four slaves involved 
in this incident had recently been purchased from Virginia helped 
Keitt rationalize that slavery on his family's plantations was 
benevolent and that geographic proximity to the North and 
abolitionists disrupted the kindly relationship between master 
and slave. In Keitt's mind, the threat that a Republican regime 
would turn slave against master had become horrifyingly real.^^ 
The dangers of remaining in the Union went beyond mere 
rhetoric for Keitt. "Our Negroes are being enlisted in 
politics," he complained to Hammond. "I confess this new feature 
alarms me, more even, than every thing in the past. If Northern 
men get access to our Negroes to advise poison and the torch, we 
must prevent it at every hazard." For northerners, Keitt 
explained, the election of 1860 was just another election. 
"Although with us," he said, "it is life or Death." Publicly and 
privately Keitt demanded immediate disunion if the Republicans
71R.B. Rhett, Jr., to W.P. Miles, January 24, 1860, Miles 
Papers, University of North Carolina; Keitt to Sue Keitt, January 
29, 1860, Keitt Papers, Duke University; Congressional Globe,
33rd Congress, 1 ^  Session, Appendix, 465; Merchant, "Keitt," 302.
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72won the presidency. When news of Lincoln's election reached 
South Carolina, Keitt told the citizens of Columbia, "Take your 
destinies in your own hands, and shatter this accursed Union."
In Charleston he promised to carry Orangeburg and Beaufort 
Districts during the forthcoming secession convention in honor of 
Barnwell Rhett. In language identical to Rhett's, Keitt asserted 
that submission to the Union was slavery, "And when I am called 
upon to choose whether I will be a traitor or a slave, God help 
roe —  I am a traitori" Carolinians had built the United States, 
he said, and repeated his promise "now we mean to pull it down 
from turret to foundation-stone." As a delegate to the secession 
convention, Keitt helped to fulfill that promise.
"Liberty is a serious game," Keitt once said, "to be played 
out...with knives and hatchets, and not with drawled epigrams and 
soft petitions." Unafraid of warfare against his northern foes, 
Keitt was anxious to play the game. While in Congress, he 
responded to "attacks upon the revolutionary history of South 
Carolina" with a long, detailed speech that dramatized southern 
military prowess and denigrated that of the North. Soon 
thereafter he published an article based on his speech in DeBow's 
Review, in which he added a similar account of the sections' 
participation in the Mexican War. In the event of civil war.
72Keitt to Hammond, August 4, September 10, October 23, 
1860, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; Keitt to Miles, 
October 3, 1860, Miles Papers, University of North Carolina; 
Charleston Mercury, July 20, 1860.
73Charleston Mercury, November 13, 21, 1860; Merchant, 
"Keitt," 337-40.
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Keitt truly believed that Southern military might would bring an 
easy victory over a cowardly North. Emboldened by these views, 
Keitt declared that he had had as much as he could stand from the 
North, "except on the battle-field.”^^
Romanticism affected Keitt's attitudes about warfare as well 
as politics, about death as well as life. He remained convinced 
that only action could make life meaningful, that without 
struggle and "self-sacrificing efforts" liberty would be lost.^^ 
He cited Milton's injunction that the man who would write a 
heroic poem must make his entire life heroic, and he believed 
that heroes must take risks. From his earliest days in politics 
Keitt proclaimed, "It is our duty to ascertain our rights," 
defend them, "and leave consequences to G o d . T o  accomplish 
his political goals Keitt expressed his willingness to "perish in 
the struggle." For Keitt, risking one's life was ennobling.
"Not only in the victory shout may the laurels be bound around 
the brow;" he explained to Sue, "the kingdom of civil warfare is 
richer in dangers, and gives greener and more lasting laurels." 
Death in the struggle for a virtuous cause did not signal failure 
to Keitt, but rather sublime success. Keitt thought it glorious
Charleston Mercury, July 20, 1860; Congressional Globe, 
34th Congress, l^t Session, Appendix, 833-39; Laurence M. Keitt, 
"Patriotic Services of the North and the South," DeBow's Review 
XXI (November, 1856), 491-508; New York Times, September 29, TF56
^^Keitt to Sue, n.d., Keitt Papers, Duke University; 
Charleston Mercury, September 27, 1860.
7 6 Keitt to Sue, n.d., Keitt Papers, Duke University; 
Charleston Mercury, June 19, 1851.
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to die "with the consciousness that yours is a noble mission, and 
trying to the last articulately to utter the high message given 
you, though the death rattle stifles at half-delivered." To die 
while fighting for one's country, "to become intermingled with 
the very life, infused into the very heart, and associated with 
the organized existence of a great people," brought immortality. 
Carolinians, he said, held their liberty not only because the 
Founding Fathers "lived as freemen, or died as martyrs, but 
because we can furnish many more men to live as they lived, and 
die as they died."^^
Romantic literature, particularly the works of Sir Walter 
Scott, also affected Keitt's views of warfare. "Epic dreamings" 
pervaded his thoughts and crept into his rhetoric. In 1851 he 
said, "South Carolina, single and alone, mailed and weaponed, can 
cleave her way to the falling pillar [of liberty], and uphold the 
sinking temple, or bravely perish in the very sanctuary of 
liberty." He told Sue that in one session of Congress, "I had 
won a crown here and a chaplet there, I had broken a sword in 
this fight and beaten down a castle wall in another contest."
In the capitol he warned northerners that if they tampered with 
slavery "the South will meet you with gauntlets on." He believed 
that when the South would meet its northern foe, it would "meet
77Keitt to Sue, n.d., July 29, September 19, 1855, Keitt 
Papers, Duke University; Charleston Mercury, July 20, 1860.
7 8Charleston Mercury, June 19, 1851; Keitt to Sue, July 29, 
1855, February 17, 1856, Keitt Papers, Duke University.
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him with helmet on, with visor down, and lance c o u c h e d . I f  
South Carolina would secede, Keitt said in October, 1860, he 
would abandon politics; "I intend to take the field."®®
Wigfall shared Keitt's views, if not his knightly 
imagination and demeanor. in Texas he campaigned briefly though 
vigorously for Breckinridge and Lane, always sure to remind his 
audiences that if Lincoln won they had no alternative but 
secession. Both in Texas and Washington Wigfall blamed
Republican "John-Brown men" for a recent, mysterious outbreak of
81fires in his state. After Lincoln's election, Wigfall both 
defended the right of a state to secede "whether there be cause 
or not," and urged South Carolina to do so immediately. Like 
Keitt, neither death nor the failure of southern resistance 
mattered to Wigfall. He said that even if northern armies made 
the South "a graveyard of freemen," it could never make it "the 
habitation of slaves."®^
In the Senate Wigfall did all he could to encourage
79Congressional Globe, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, Appendix, 
468; 34th Congress, l£t Session, Appendix, 4T3.
8 0Keitt to Miles, October 3, 1860, Miles Papers, University 
of North Carolina.
81Texas Republican, August 4, 11, October 20, 1860; Wigfall,
Speech of Louis T. Wigfall, Walter L. Buenger, Secession and the
Union in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984 ), 75, W9-
82Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd Session, 12-13,
14, 73, 86. wigfall's son, HaTsey, shared his father's views.
He looked forward to "glorious war, with the spirit-stirring drum 
and ear-piercing fife..." Halsey Wigfall to Louly Wigfall, March 
3, 1861, Wigfall Family Papers, Library of Congress.
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secession. In December, 1860, he urged South Carolina to secede 
and seize all federal military installations and munitions within 
her borders. A week before South Carolina left the Union,
Wigfall and twenty-nine other southern congressmen signed the 
"Southern Manifesto." They declared that all argument had been 
exhausted, that no legislation or constitutional amendments could 
possibly satisfy the South. "We are satisfied the honor, safety, 
and independence of Southern people require the organization of a 
Southern Confederacy," they concluded. In January, 1861, When 
Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky tried desperately to save 
the Union with a series of compromise bills, Wigfall led the
Q  *3southern opposition.
Although other southern congressmen returned to their
respective homes as their states seceded, Wigfall remained in
Washington after Texas left the Union on February 1, and stayed
even after the Texas legislature elected him to the provisional
Confederate Congress. He justified his actions by explaining
that the Texas legislature had not officially advised him to
leave the Senate and until it did he would speak, debate, and
vote "if it suits my convenience." In reality, Wigfall chose to
stay in the enemy capital as a self-appointed "rear-guard," to
antagonize his foes and to gather intelligence for Confederate 
8 4officials. He excelled at the former. When Zachariah
8 3Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd Session, 14; Texas 
Republican, January 5, 12, 1861.
8 4Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd Session, 1442; 
Charleston Mercury, April 5, 1861.
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Chandler, a Senator from Michigan, said that rather than listen 
to proponents of secession he would move west and live among the 
Indians, Wigfall responded, "God forbid! I hope not. They have 
already suffered much from their contact with whites." Wigfall 
concluded a debate with unionist Senator Andrew Johnson by 
saying, "Now let the Senator from Tennessee put that in his pipe 
and smoke it." After South Carolinians chased a federal supply 
ship out of Charleston Harbor by firing a warning shot across its 
bow, Wigfall blustered, "The Star of the West swaggered into 
Charleston harbor, received a blow planted full in the face, and 
staggered out. Your flag has been insulted; redress it, if you 
dare. You have submitted to it for two months, you will submit 
to it for ever....You tell us you will keep us in the Union. Try
p C
the experiment." When a friend of Wigfall's in South Carolina 
heard of the senator's antics he observed, "Wigfall chafes at the 
restraints of civil life. He likes to be where he can be as rude 
as he pleases, and he is indulging himself now to the fullest 
extent, apparently."®^
While Wigfall remained in Washington he did more than wage a 
war of words. Acting in concert with the Confederate War 
Department, Wigfall established a recruiting station in 
Baltimore, Maryland, to receive volunteers and weapons for the 
Confederate army and arrange for their transportation to South
8 5Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd Session, 1372-73, 
1440; Kittrell, Governors Who Have Been, 153.
®®C. Vann Woodward, Mary Chesnut's Civil War (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1981 ), T2~.
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8 7Carolina. He also informed Southern officials of northern
popular opinion, about what President Buchanan might do, and 
about what they might anticipate from the Lincoln administration. 
The New York Tribune protested Wigfall's use of the franking 
privilege and the United States mails "to hatch and promote 
treason" while he continued to draw his pay from the federal 
government. Such protests were in vain. Only the promise of
Û pcombat in Charleston could force Wigfall to leave Washington.
The people of Charleston gave Wigfall an enthusiastic 
welcome home when he arrived in early April. "I have returned to 
my native land," he told a crowd that gathered to greet him at 
his hotel. He claimed that secession had already produced 
wonders. By leaving the North the Confederate States had 
eliminated all sources of political corruption. They had turned 
their backs on democracy and returned to the republican form of 
government the Founding Fathers had intended. He said that the 
new Confederate Constitution proved "that we are wiser than our 
ancestors" because it ended the "miserable scramble" for the 
presidency by limiting tenure of office to a single, six-year 
term. The selection of Jefferson Davis as president, he stated.
8 7L.T. Wigfall to General Beauregard, March 16, 1861, 
Wigfall to L.P. Walker, March 21, 1861, L.P. Walker to Wigfall, 
March 21, 1861, in Official Records, I, 276, 278; Wigfall to 
[L.P. Walker], March l7, 1861, C.K. Sherman, R. Cleary, W.N. 
Barker to Wigfall, March 16, 1861, Ibid., Series I, volume 53, 
134-34; Wright, Southern Girl, 32-34.
88Louis Wigfall to [?], February 18, 1861, C.C. Jones 
Autograph Letters, Duke University; Wigfall to Governor F.w. 
Pickens, March 4, 1861, in Official Records, I, 261; New York 
Tribune in Texas Republican! February 23, 1861.
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demonstrated the wisdom of the Southern people. According to 
Wigfall, Davis had "great, striking, and remarkable qualities," 
and combined the statesmanship of John C. Calhoun with the 
courageous leadership of Andrew Jackson. For Wigfall, only one 
objective remained unfulfilled; he wanted war and an invasion of 
the North.
Wigfall had trouble choosing between a military and a 
political career in the Confederacy. Initially, he pursued both. 
Although the Texas legislature had already selected him for the 
provisional Congress in Montgomery, Wigfall decided to linger in 
Charleston where he hoped war would begin. General P.G.T. 
Beauregard appointed him brigadier general of volunteers on April 
10, and he joined former Governor John Manning —  his old friend 
—  as an aide to Beauregard. Acting on his own authority (and, 
according to one witness, alcohol), Wigfall stormed Fort Sumter 
during the bombardment and successfully negotiated its surrender. 
His daring made him a Southern hero. Southerners greeted him
Q Qwith cheers and adulation on his trip to Montgomery. In June, 
when the Confederate capital moved to Richmond and close to the 
enemy's army the temptation to act in a military capacity again 
overcame Wigfall. After the first Battle of Bull Run, Wigfall 
assumed command of the 1st Texas Battalion and served as a 
military aide to Davis while he continued to serve in the
89 Charleston Mercury, April 4, 5, 1861.
90 King, Wigfall, 119-21; C[harlotte] M. Wigfall to [Halsey 
Wigfall], April 20, 1861, Wigfall Family Papers, Library of 
Congress; Russell, Diary, 63.
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Congress. His preference for military affairs, however, did not 
escape notice. "Heavens! How that redoubtable Wigfall did rush 
those poor Texans about," observed South Carolina diarist, Mary 
Chesnut. Despite ninety degree heat, she noted, "He manuevered 
them until I was weary for their sakes." Because of his diverse 
and energetic services, Wigfall's fame spread quickly through his
infant country. Davis turned to him as a confidant. Wigfall had
91never enjoyed such success.
Ironically, Wigfall's passion for military affairs poisoned
his relationship with Davis and destroyed much of his popularity.
By 1862 Wigfall began to blame Davis for Confederate military
defeats and joined with "other malcontents, in giving him what
92trouble they could." After Confederate defeats at Gettysburg 
and Vicksburg, Wigfall's anger grew. "Has it ever occurred to 
you that Davis's mind is becoming unsettled?" he asked a 
colleague. "No sane man would do as he is doing." After 
Wigfall's family snubbed the Davises at a dinner party, Mary 
Chesnut thought, "It seems incredible —  but Edgefield and Texas 
combined makes one stouthearted enough for a n y t h i n g . I n  the
91King, Wigfall, 131; Woodward, ed., Mary Chesnut's Civil 
War, 123; C.M. Wigfall to [Halsey Wigfall], May 23, 30, 1861, 
wigfall Family Papers, Library of Congress.
92King, Wigfall, 139; Woodward, ed., Mary Chesnut's Civil 
War, 359; Walter F. McCaleb, ed.. Memoirs, with Special Reference 
to Secession and the Civil War, by John H. Reagan (New York and 
Washington: The Neale Publishing Company, 1906), 161.
93Wigfall to C.C. Clay, August 13, 1863, Clement C. Clay 
Collection, William R. Perkins Library, Duke university, Durham, 
North Carolina; Woodward, ed., Mary Chesnut's Civil War, 433.
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Senate, Wigfall supported both conscription and military 
confiscation, a law allowing the government to take any goods it 
needed from the private sector and pay only what the government 
deemed a fair price. Even if these measures were necessary to 
sustain the war effort, Hammond told Wigfall, "Your acts of last 
Session were posatively [sic] cut-throat, all taken 
together....You have broken all the Banks, the speculators & 
Manufactures.
During the next decade, Wigfall's behavior mocked the 
gallantry and daring that he had professed all his life. After 
Robert E. Lee surrendered in April, 1865, Wigfall tried to reach 
General Kirby Smith's army in Texas. Afraid of capture and 
punishment for treason, Wigfall disguised himself. He shaved his 
beard and procured a private's uniform and parole for Private 
J.A. White of Texas. He left his family near Montgomery before 
continuing his journey home. Upon his arrival he learned that 
Smith's army had also surrendered. Wigfall believed he could not 
remain in the South after his brother Arthur wrote from Edgefield 
that "the Parish is permanently destroyed," and "the state is 
ruined —  & no longer a fit place to live in."^^ Like many other 
former Confederates, Wigfall fled to London. By October 1866, 
his family joined him for a poverty-stricken, self-imposed exile. 
"They say it is as much as his wife can do to keep him out of the
94Hammond to Wigfall, April 15, 1864, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress; King, Wigfall, 150-51.
95Wright, Southern Girl, 242-46; Arthur Wigfall to Louis 
Wigfall, August l5, 1865, Wigfall Papers, BTHC.
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gutter, he is drunk all the time," wrote one acquaintance.
Wigfall sent periodic dispatches to friends in the South to 
determine the condition "of our down-trodden conquered country." 
In 1872, he returned to the United States. He and his wife lived 
in Baltimore until 1874 and then moved to Texas. He had planned 
to resume his law practice in Marshall, but on February 18, 1874, 
died in Galveston from an undisclosed cause.
The Confederacy offered as much reason for optimism for 
Laurence Keitt in 1861 as it did for Wigfall, and ended even more 
disastrously. Keitt told his old friend Jamison that the 
Provisional Congress acted harmoniously and wisely, created a 
good Constitution, and chose an able president, though he had 
preferred Howell Cobb of Georgia. Sooner than most, however, 
Keitt became disenchanted with the new government. Early in 1861 
he feared that Davis favored reunion with the North. By summer 
he worried that Confederate financial policies and the lack of 
domestic industry provided "the most unsubstantial foundation" 
for a new country. Personal concerns compounded his political 
anxieties. Even the "pageantry —  cheers, enthusiasm, and waving 
kerchiefs" at Montgomery proved unsatisfactory to Keitt, he told
[M.F. Maury to Richard Maury], December 15, 1866, Richard 
L. Maury Papers, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, 
Durham, North Carolina; Wigfall to Clay, October 17, 1866, Clay 
Collection, Ibid.; Wigfall to Simon Bolivar Buckner, October 23, 
1866, Simon Bolivar Buckner Papers, Huntington Library, San 
Marino, California; King, Wigfall, 231.
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his wife, because "your absence is a sad drawback to
Keitt hoped the army might provide him with more excitement 
and bring him closer to his family. As colonel of a volunteer 
regiment, Keitt was stationed on Sullivan's Island in Charleston, 
near his plantation in Orangeburg. At his barracks he could 
receive visits from Sue and supervise the management of his 115 
slaves. His initial military experiences confirmed Keitt's 
romantic preconceptions of warfare. "This camp life is a 
stirring one," Keitt joyously reported to Sue in January, 1862. 
"The men are getting into their new uniforms and they are looking 
famous.
Disillusionment with the administration, with Congress, and 
the conduct of the war, however, affected Keitt as it did 
countless other Southerners. "Davis has become odious," Keitt 
reported to Sue in May, 1862. "It seems things are coming to 
this pass: to be a patriot you must hate Davis." Keitt 
considered the president incompetent, an imbecile, and a coward. 
"You cannot find a more signal failure in history," he wrote 
Hammond. Keitt thought the only service Davis could render the
QQcountry was "to get a rope and hang himself." Keitt found
97Keitt to D.F. Jamison, February 9, 1861, David F. Jamison 
Papers, Washington and Lee University; Woodward, ed., Mary 
Chesnut's Civil War, 433; Keitt to Hammond, February 13, August 
20, l86l, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; Keitt to Sue, 
February 19, 1861, Keitt Papers, Duke University.
98Keitt to Sue, January21, 26, 1862, Keitt Papers, Duke 
University.
9 9 Keitt to Sue, May 4, 1862, January 13, 1864, Ibid.; Keitt 
to Hammond, June 14, 1862, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
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Congress no better than Davis. "Congress seems to be made up of 
idiots. In our government there are only dreamers and 
mountebanks," Keitt complained. He urged Barnwell Rhett to run 
for Congress in 1864 to set the Confederacy back upon a proper 
course. By 1864, Keitt found political divisions within the 
Confederacy disturbing. With a "worthless Government" and an 
invading army to fight, he believed liberty was under attack by 
both internal and external foes. He wondered whether political 
cohesion in the South required "the antagonism of alien interests 
and people," an antagonism that vanished with secession. Keitt 
believed that lack of virtue in the South was killing his 
cherished cause. "To see a great cause lost, and a great people 
butchered by gross and criminal incapacity," he complained to 
Sue, "strikes like a dagger to the heart. To see a sacred 
struggle moulder away day by day, and high hopes sink into the 
grave...inspires fear that our people have not risen to the 
height of this present crisis.
Desertions, threats of mutiny, and war-weariness combined to
101tarnish Keitt's ideal of warfare. "War in any aspect is
cruel, but this war is robbed of chivalry, and is scarcely more 
than butchery," he complained. "It is hate, without manliness —  
war without generousity —  cruelty without courage —  rapine
Keitt to Sue, January 15, 22, 24, 31, 1864, Keitt Papers, 
Duke University; Robert Barnwell Rhett, "Autobiography," in 
Robert Barnwell Rhett Papers, South Carolina Historical Society, 
Charleston, South Carolina.
1 Ol Keitt to Sue, January 13, 17, 1864, Ibid.; Keitt to 
Hammond, December 11, 1863, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
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without greatness." By 1864 war had touched most of the South,
affected soldiers, civilians, and politicians, yet "nowhere has
anyone risen up with a star upon his forehead." Keitt believed
that he had "as much to do probably as anyone else in bringing
about this Revolution" and decided that he must assume a more
active role in it.^^^
Keitt had tried to secure a promotion to brigadier general
—  at one time by enlisting the aid of Louis Wigfall —  but he
remained only a colonel charged with garrison duty in Charleston.
In the spring of 1864, however, the army transferred him to
Virginia. He eagerly anticipated the opportunity to distinguish
himself and to face his northern foe. "I don't think I fear
death more than a gentleman ought," he had told his wife two
103years before, "...but I do hate to leave you." As he readied
himself and his men for battle an observer noted that Keitt had 
more enthusiasm than ability. Each of his men "knew that he was 
being led by one of the most gifted and gallant men in the South, 
but every old soldier felt and saw at a glance his inexperience 
and want of self-control." Keitt showed no lack of boldness and 
aggressiveness, "but he was preparing for battle like in the days 
of Alva or Turene, and to cut his way through like a storm 
center." Keitt was determined to restore chivalry to the war.
102Keitt to Sue, January 24, February 11, March 1, 1864, 
Keitt Papers, Duke University.
1 0  3 Keitt to Wigfall, January 16, 1863, Wigfall Family 
Papers, Library of Congress; Merchant, "Keitt," 401; Keitt to 
Sue, May 1, 1862, Keitt Papers, Duke University.
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At Cold Harbor, on June 1, he mounted his grey horse "like a 
knight of old." Without even a line of skirmishers to proceed 
him, Keitt led his men across an open field toward the Union Army
of the Potomac. After advancing only a matter of yards, Keitt
was shot in the liver. Other officers ordered his men to 
retreat, and comrades took the fallen colonel to a field 
hospital. Four days later he died and became "intermingled with 
the very life" of his dying country. He was only thirty-nine.
James Hammond had once described Keitt as "a true man to
every body but himself & sagacious where he is not concerned."
Sam Houston once said of wigfall, "I should think more of the 
fellow than I do, if it were not that I regard him as a little 
demented either from hard drink, or from the troubles of a bad
c o n s c i e n c e . "105 Both Keitt and Wigfall believed that a life of
daring would bring success and fulfillment, but both trapped
themselves in a web of recklessness and emptiness. A description
of Keitt's speaking style from 1860 served equally well as a
summary of his and Wigfall's lives;
As an orator, he has created more decided sensation than any 
one now a M[ember of] C[ongress], having a pyrotechnic 
style, rich in versatility, startling paradox, and copious 
expression. His speeches are melo-dramatically effective, 
made up of the entrances and exits of ideas, that sparkle
104D. Augustus Dickert, History of Kershaw's Brigade 
(Newberry, South Carolina: Elbert H. Aull Co., 1899), 365, 368- 
70, 375; R.S. Ripley to Sue Keitt, June 2, 1864, S.D. Hammond to 
Sue Keitt, June 5, 1864, Keitt Papers, Duke University.
^^^Hammond to W.G. Simms, October 23, 1860, Hammond Papers,
Library of Congress; Houston to Andrew Jackson Hamilton, March
17, 1860, Williams and Barker, eds., The Writings of Sam Houston,
VII, 527. ----------------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
293
vividly while they are on the stage and go off in a tumult 
of applause, leaving an intoxicating sense of beauty and 
daring, yet.nothing distinct but a metaphor or bold antithesis.
^^^Harper's Weekly, IV (December, 1860), 802
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Chapter VI 
"PLOUGHSHARES COME BEFORE PHILOSOPHY"
No fire-eater loved the South more than James Dunwoody 
Brownson DeBow, and none criticized it more. He blamed a variety 
of its problems on the ignorance and idleness of planters and on 
the tendency of so many southerners to look back towards an 
idyllic, bygone era. When agricultural depression struck, he 
said, planters invariably accused banks and tariffs or unseen 
politicians for their woes, made their slaves produce more 
cotton, lowered their profits in the process, and continued to 
wonder what was happening to them. DeBow said that whenever 
sectional tensions rocked the Union, southern politicians went to 
the stump to expostulate about constitutional theory or the next 
presidential election, and harangued about northern merchants and 
manufacturers who had "conspired to put him down" or take away 
his slaves. The typical planter or politician would moan and 
complain, but would not "for the soul of him go to work."
Instead, he would cling blindly to his ideals and wait 
impatiently for "the 'good old times' to return again."
DeBow considered this nostalgic, agrarian romanticism an 
anathema. "Why... should the planter above all others be 
permitted to pass his days and nights in listless idleness," he 
asked in the first volume of his Commercial Review in 1846. 
Planters must work, DeBow said, just like merchants and 
manufacturers. He called on planters to abandon the use of 
overseers and to "remember the old saying, 'the master's
294
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footsteps are manure to his land.'" Southerners should grow less 
cotton, he suggested, and more corn and forage, and raise more 
livestock. Furthermore, the planter must teach his sons "that 
idleness is the 'road to ruin,'" and his daughters "that they are 
not dolls or milliner girls, but that they are the future makers 
or marrers of this beautiful republic." In a subsequent issue 
DeBow complained "That the South should be DEPENDENT upon the 
North for its imports, is inexplicable upon any sound principle 
of political economy, and evidences a state of things humiliating 
in the extreme. We do not want capital," he explained, "but most 
sadly want enterprise. Whether they remained in the Union or 
chose to secede, DeBow insisted that all southerners learn to 
provide for themselves.
The circumstances surrounding DeBow's youth made him value 
self-sufficiency and diligent work. He was born on July 20, 1820 
in Charleston. His father. Garret DeBow, was a successful 
merchant in New York City before he moved to South Carolina in 
the early 1800's. When Garret died in 1826, however, he was 
broke and left his widow with no money for their four children. 
Although "weak in body," the young DeBow had to help support 
himself and his family. As a teenager he found a job as a clerk 
in a wholesale grocery store. In his off hours DeBow read 
extensively, and without the benefit of a formal education was 
able to secure a job in 1836 as a instructor in a log cabin
DeBow's Review, I (May, 1846), 434-35; II (December, 1846), 
407. DeBow's journal used a variety of different names, but will 
be referred to here as DeBow's Review and cited as Review.
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school near Charleston. Because of his determination to improve 
his own education and find a better paying job, the young teacher 
enrolled at Cokesbury Institute, a vocational school in Abbeville 
District. He studied agriculture there for a year before 
deciding to go to college. He could not afford to enroll at South 
Carolina College, and had saved barely enough money to attend the 
less prestigious College of Charleston.^
DeBow always demanded more from himself than others. He 
kept a journal during his youth in order to instill a sense of 
discipline. Its brief, daily entries were not noteworthy, except 
for those in which he chastised himself for idleness. On January 
10, 1837, he wrote,
—————————— L3ziri6ss ——————————
is the only cause that I can attribute 
the suspension of 
this Journal 
for more than six months and a half 
I trust to be more regular
  hereafter ----
1837 
James D B DeBow
After failing again to maintain his daily regimen, DeBow
lamented, "Oh Idleness how great an Evil art thou," and vowed
"...hereafter we shall be at least deadly enemies." Although
DeBow made only sporadic efforts to continue his journal over the
2Review, After the War Series, III (June, 1867), 497-99; 
Paul F. Faskoff and Daniel J. Wilson, eds.. The Cause of the 
South; Selections from DeBow's Review, 1846-1867 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 1-2; Ottis Clark 
Skipper, J.D.B. DeBow: Magazinist of the Old South (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1958), 1-3.
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next few years, he fulfilled his pledge to combat indolence.^
In college DeBow's study habits earned him a reputation for 
diligence. "We called him 'Old DeBow' —  he was so earnest and 
untiring in his pursuit of knowledge," one classmate recalled. 
DeBow often studied all night and went to class dishevelled, but 
"ready for any discussion or intellectual tilt." It was at 
college that DeBow first showed an interest in writing and 
publishing. During his first term, the enthusiastic freshman 
gave a speech in the college chapel urging students to begin a 
monthly campus periodical. The frail DeBow might not have been 
able to lead as vigorous a life as Louis Wigfall and Laurence 
Keitt, but he believed that a campus publication would produce a 
"yearly quota of gladiators, well armed, equipped and disciplined 
for conquest in the glorious arenas of literature" and thereby 
bring honor to his "gallant state." Although DeBow's efforts to 
launch a campus periodical failed, his labors in the classroom 
did not. He graduated in 1843 at the head of his class.^
Like Keitt and Wigfall, DeBow turned to law immediately 
after college. He read for a year and passed his bar 
examination, but soon found legal matters uninteresting. His 
friend and first biographer, the Louisiana historian Charles 
Gayarré, said that DeBow was not destined to be an attorney. "He
3DeBow Journal, Box 5, J.D.B. DeBow Papers, William R. 
Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.
^Review, XXVII (November, 1859), 572-73; After the War 
Series, III (June, 1867), 499; DeBow Journal, October30, 1840, 
Box 57 DeBow Papers, Duke University.
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was a born statistician, with a dash of the man of letters," 
Gayarre remembered. DeBow tried his fortunes as the latter. He 
submitted an article to the Southern Quarterly Review, the 
leading journal in the South, with headquarters in Charleston. 
Daniel K. Whitaker, editor of the Review, published DeBow's first 
piece in July, 1844, and three more over the next year. DeBow's 
writing, consisting of reviews of recent works on history, 
politics, and philosophy, was well received by readers. More 
important, however, Whitaker learned of DeBow's interest in the 
business aspects of the Review and by 1845 made DeBow junior 
editor.^
Even though DeBow complained that "the whole duties of the 
Editorial department have developed upon me," his work consumed 
neither all his time nor his attention. Ever since his youthful 
experiences with merchants in Charleston, DeBow was fascinated 
with all aspects of commerce. The world of business excited him. 
To DeBow, financial transactions and ledgers proved as 
exhilarating as military glory did for John Quitman; progress and 
technological advances were as romantic to DeBow as the novels of 
Sir Walter Scott were to Laurence Keitt. DeBow found the noise 
of a steam engine "an eternal melody of iron," and the seemingly 
boundless resources of his young country a beckoning invitation
Review, After the War Series, III (June, 1867), 499; 
Southern Quarterly Review, VI (July, 1844), 95-129; VII (January 
and April, 1845), 75-103, 479-526; VIII (July, 1845), 191-243; 
DeBow to J.F.H. Claiborne, September 12, 1845, J.F.H. Claiborne 
Collection, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 
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for anyone with "ability, energy, and enterprise." He predicted 
enthusiastically that one day "Our children shall throw away the 
telegraph as a play-thing and a bauble."® At Charleston in 1839 
he had attended his first Southern Commercial Convention, an 
assembly of business promoters who met annually at various 
southern cities. From his editorial post on the Southern 
Quarterly Review DeBow solicited articles on commerce and 
developed a name for himself among Charleston businessmen. At a 
meeting in October, 1845, Charlestonians elected DeBow as a 
delegate to the next Southern Commercial Convention to be held at 
Memphis, Tennessee.^
In November, before he left for the convention, DeBow wrote 
a series of newspaper articles concerning topics that would come 
under discussion at Memphis, such as the tariff, slavery, federal 
aid to improve navigation on the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, 
and a railroad connection between Charleston and the Mississippi. 
As he gathered information for these articles, DeBow became 
convinced of the need for a southern commercial journal. In 
Charleston, he issued a circular calling for the creation of a 
Merchant's Review, which he modeled after Hunt's Merchant's 
Magazine, a commercial journal published in New York. Like
DeBow to Claiborne, September 12, 1845, Claiborne 
Collection, Mississippi Department of Archives and History; 
"Fragments of the Past," Review, After the War Series I (June, 
1866), 630; Review V (February, 1848 ) , 173.
^Review IV (November, 1847), 337-38; VI (September, 1847), 
204; John B. O'Niell to DeBow, October 1, 1845, DeBow Papers, 
Duke University; Skipper, DeBow, 15.
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Hunt's, this new magazine would include articles on trade, 
commerce, manufactures, and agriculture. At Memphis, DeBow 
promoted this project and received much encouragement, including 
the best wishes of fellow delegate John C. Calhoun.
On his way to and from Memphis, DeBow passed through New 
Orleans. The bustling port city fascinated him. He had already 
considered it a promising location for a southern journal while 
still at his desk at the Southern Quarterly Review. By 1845, 
subscriptions to that periodical had shrunk to 2,500, a condition 
DeBow attributed to the indifference of the people of Charleston 
toward literary ventures. When a reader in Mississippi suggested 
to DeBow that the journal might prosper in the expanding, 
thriving city of New Orleans, DeBow responded enthusiastically.
He had previously noted the success of the Southern Medical 
Journal published in the Crescent City. If printers and the 
public in New Orleans showed enough interest, DeBow thought the 
removal of the Southern Quarterly Review to New Orleans an
goutstanding idea.
DeBow left the Southern Quarterly Review late in 1845 after 
a personal dispute with Whitaker. He moved to New Orleans in 
November and began preparations for a monthly commercial journal. 
His efforts at Memphis and Charleston had yielded enough money to 
begin publishing in January, 1846. DeBow did not want to issue a
Q
DeBow to Claiborne, September 12,1845, Claiborne 
Collection, Mississippi Department of Archives and History; 
Review, After the War Series II (July, 1866), 109; Skipper, 
DeBow, 21.
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strictly literary publication like the one he had just left. 
"Ploughshares come before philosophy," he explained. Intending 
his journal to meet "the practical wants of every-day life," he 
thought of calling it the Practical Review, but realized that 
title offered "inelegance and no little ambiguity." DeBow 
decided to call the first volume The Commercial Review of the 
South and West. As he had planned, the Review included articles 
on trade, commerce, commercial policy, internal improvements, 
manufactures, and agriculture; only occasionally did he include
Qliterary works.
DeBow knew many Americans doubted that the South could ever 
become a great commercial region. "The climate is uncongenial, 
say they —  produce corrupts in your summers —  you have no 
energy in such hot regions —  slavery retards you." He claimed 
these were all misconceptions and dedicated his Review to 
combating these beliefs. DeBow said that the only factors which 
inhibited southern commercial development were the blind devotion 
of southerners to "the once rich but now decaying results of 
agriculture, and... ignorance of the true nature and dignity of 
COMMERCE and the elevating influences it is calculated to exert." 
To DeBow, the southern economy was a slumbering giant. "We 
invoke the South to awake," he trumpeted, and "construct its 
railroads, extend its commerce, build up its manufactures, 
protect its arts, endow its universities and colleges, [and] 
provide its schools." DeBow recognized that agriculture would
9Skipper, DeBow, 14-15, 17; Review I (January, 1846), 2-5.
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remain essential to the South, but insisted "Commerce is King."^® 
From 1846 to 1849, DeBow struggled to keep his Review 
solvent. He spent almost nothing on himself. His room above his 
office in Exchange alley had no furniture, and he slept on a 
Mattress on the floor. He wrote almost one-third of the articles 
for the first two volumes himself while he tried frantically to 
solicit contributions from such men as James H. Hammond and 
William Gilmore S i m m s . H i s  brother Frank and his brother-in- 
law Edwin Q. Bell served as the nucleus of his small staff of 
correspondents and collection and subscription agents. Many of 
these worked on commission; none earned much. DeBow suspended 
the August, 1846, issue to conserve his dwindling resources. A 
local philanthropist, however, soon came to the aid of the 
struggling editor. Maunsel White had arrived in the United 
States a poor Irish immigrant, but made a fortune as a merchant 
and sugar planter in south Louisiana. White lent DeBow enough 
money to keep the Review in print. New financial problems forced 
DeBow to suspend publication again from January to June, 1849, 
but by the end of the year he had paid off all his debts. With 
the help of two new subscription agents the list of subscribers 
grew steadily. By 1848 the Review had over 800 subscribers; in 
two years its list of almost 5,000 subscribers represented one of
^^Review, II (September, 1846), 115; IV (October, 1847), 
211; VIÏ (September, 1849), 230-31. DeBow used the motto 
"Commerce is King" for the Review.
11Review, After the War Series, III (June, 1867), 500-501; 
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University; Skipper, DeBow, 22.
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the largest of any southern periodical
Both DeBow and his Review quickly achieved national renown. 
After 1849 he seldom had trouble soliciting articles from others. 
Many southerners, like Laurence Keitt, turned to the Review as a 
forum to express their views on a variety of topics to a wide 
audience. DeBow did not, however, limit the Review to southern 
issues or readers. "We have the broadest notions of our 
country," he wrote, as was customary, in the plural. "We cherish 
Maine and Louisiana as sisters." Although northerners 
constituted only a small fraction of his subscribers, many held 
his work in high regard. John Quincy Adams was an early patron, 
and Senator Charles Sumner once turned to DeBow for statistical 
information. Even Herman Hunt, proprietor of Hunt's Magazine, 
praised DeBow's work and wished his southern counterpart well.^^
DeBow earned respect from many northerners for his 
professional ability, but he acquired distinction in the South 
for his unflinching sectionalism. Although he claimed to publish 
a journal with a national focus and adhere to an "active 
neutrality" regarding politics, DeBow was a vocal southern 
partisan. He always believed that the North had neither an 
understanding of southern institutions nor a right to interfere
12Review, XXXV (July and August, 1864), 97; After the War 
Series, III (June, 1867), 501; Clement Eaton, The Mind of the Old 
South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 54 ; 
Skipper, DeBow, 21-26, 50.
13Review, IV (October, 1847), 210; Skipper, DeBow, 26, 50; 
Sumner to DeBow, March 1, 1854, and Herman Hunt to DeBow, July 
23, 1850, DeBow Papers, Duke University.
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with them. Slavery, "and of course, the very existence of the 
South, are in constant danger," he w a r n e d . I n  May, 1845, the 
Southern Baptist Convention was organized in Augusta, Georgia, 
separating from northern church members over questions concerning 
slavery. As a delegate DeBow had voted in favor of separation, 
an act he later remembered as the proudest of his life. He had 
first tried using a journal to help promote sectional interests 
that same year while he was still working for the fledgling 
Southern Quarterly Review. "For the interest of Southern Letters 
& Southern Character & Southern Rights this work must not be 
suffered to perish," he said.^^
As editor of the Review, DeBow emerged as a leading defender 
of slavery. When DeBow launched his journal he stated that the 
debate over slavery "has long been settled, and so far as the 
south is concerned, should never be more mooted." In 1850 he 
printed an article that gave a Biblical defense of the 
institution, but complained that "the subject is growing hacknied 
[sic]." Provoked by persistent attacks on slavery by "crack- 
brained abolitionists," however, DeBow responded with an 
intricate r e b u t t a l . H e  repeated the popular assertion that
14Review, IV (October, 1847), 211; XII (May, 1852), 504-505.
^^Ibid., XXIX (August, 1860), 250; John McCardell, The Idea 
of a Southern Nation; Southern Nationalism and Southern 
Nationalists, 183Ü-1860 (New York; W.W. Norton & Comoanv. 1979), 
192-93; DeBow to Claiborne, September 12, 1845, Claiborne 
Collection, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
l^Review, III (May, 1847, 421; IX (September, 1850), 281; XV 
(November,T853), 537.
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emancipation would prove harmful to the slaves because free
blacks could not care for themselves without the constant
17surveillance and pressure "of a superior race." DeBow also
echoed the beliefs that American economic prosperity and
republican government rested on the foundation of African
slavery. "Civilization itself," he said, "may almost be said to
1Adepend upon the continual servitude of the blacks in America."
Because he believed the future of the South required territorial
expansion, DeBow advocated the geographic extension of slavery.
He believed that slavery would accompany southerners on their
march through Mexico and into central America. If the natural
growth of the slave population failed to keep pace with the
increased demands of a vast slave empire, DeBow hoped southerners
19would revive the African slave trade. Regarding slavery as a 
versatile and adaptive institution, DeBow argued that slavery 
must accompany southern economic diversification, that 
slaveowners must transfer some of their chattel from the fields 
into cotton mills and railroad construction. If "properly 
organized and directed," DeBow claimed, slaves would constitute a 
skilled industrial labor force that would last well into the
^^Ibid., VII (September, 1849), 205; XI (February, 1851), 
132, 14F7~XIII (September, 1857), 70-71, 228-29.
1 ftIbid., XI (February, 1851), 132.
^^Ibid., VII (July, 1849), 62; XXII (June, 1857), 663-64; 
XXV (August, 1858), 166.
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twentieth century.
Although DeBow shared the concern of other fire-eaters that
consolidation of political power threatened slavery, "the great
centralization of capital at the North" worried him more. DeBow
warned that the South must emulate the industrial advances of the
North either to match its "strength and weight" within the Union
? 1or to defend itself as an independent nation. "The great
progress of this nation cannot and will not be confined to
localities," he insisted. Because of slavery, he conceded, "The
hands of all mankind seem to be against us." If their defense of
slavery led southerners to secede, DeBow warned, a Southern
nation could not sustain itself with agriculture alone. "We want
physical strength, the sinews of defences [sic] and war,"
products that only an industrial society could create. Because
sectional conflict appeared to threaten the country periodically
with civil war, DeBow viewed southern dependence upon the North
for industrial goods as economic slavery. In 1852 he beseeched
fellow southerners.
Throw off this yoke of bondage, and begin to show your 
manhood at once. We are poor and miserable, whereas we 
should be great....Whatever divisions exist in southern 
politics there can be none upon this of Southern Industrial 
Independence. Fire-eater and compromiser must all meet 
here.... Here is separate state action upon which all must 
agree —  that of the loom, and the spindle, and the
Ibid., XII (May, 1852), 557-59. In "The Origin, Progress 
and Prospects of Slavery," Review, IX (July, 1850), 9-19, DeBow 
projected that the South would have a slave population of over 
10,500,000 by 1910, over three times the number in 1850.
^^Ibid., II (September, December, 1846), 75-76, 407; IV 
(October, 1847), 211.
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2 2locomotive.
DeBow insisted that such independence was possible if only his 
fellow southerners would "put their shoulder[s] to the wheel, 
intellectually and physically.
Of southerners' physical prowess DeBow had no concern; it 
was their intellect, he believed, that required stimulation. He 
thought that generally southerners suffered from insufficient and 
inadequate education. His editorial experiences had proven to 
him "the painful truth" that the South lacked a large reading 
population. Antiquated attitudes toward agriculture, he held, 
had blinded southerners to the need for industrial development.
He watched with dismay as hundreds of youths every year left the 
South to attend better colleges in the North. Like Beverley 
Tucker, DeBow went to the classroom and the press in an effort to 
reeducate southerners. Unlike the Virginian, DeBow considered 
practical, not philosophical knowledge the key to southern 
redemption.
DeBow's concern with the shortfalls of education in the 
South led him to advocate sweeping reforms. Sounding like Thomas 
Jefferson, DeBow said, "The more universally educated the people 
become, the more stable will become the republic." Accordingly, 
he called for a comprehensive system of free education. He urged
^^Ibid., XII (May, 1852), 504-505.
23Ibid., After the War Series, I (January, 1866), 4.
^^Review, I (January, 1846), 2-3; VII (September, 1849), 
228, 230-31.
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city and state governments to raise taxes for the support of both 
common schools and universities. The former must better prepare 
students for college because, he asserted, primary education 
would be in vain "if there be nothing beyond." He insisted that 
ability alone should determine who attended college and suggested 
that poor students receive fee exemptions. Better education in 
the South would also prevent northern schools from luring away 
southern youth and, DeBow promised, would thereby fulfill an 
important political function. He explained, "The South should 
take charge of her own sons, and not trust them to the tender 
keeping and instructions of those who are hostile to the 
interests which those sons are hereafter to maintain.
The University of Louisiana provided DeBow with an 
opportunity to put his theories of education into practice. 
Authorized by the state constitution of 1845 and located in New 
Orleans, the university existed in name only when the legislature 
incorporated it in 1847 but provided no funding. In February of 
that year Maunsel White suggested, "It is high time that some 
efficient steps were taken to organize and set in operation the 
Institution." DeBow agreed. Recognizing the legislature's 
reluctance to raise revenue for support of the school, DeBow set 
forth a plan to operate it as a joint-stock company under the 
control of the state, the city of New Orleans, and private 
investors. In the Review DeBow proposed that the university 
include a department of commerce and statistical information, the
^^Ibid., V (March, 1848), 232-35.
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only one of its kind in the world. He argued that New Orleans 
was uniquely suited for such a program. He cited the census of 
1840 to show that one in thirteen New Orleanians was engaged in 
commercial activities, a concentration greater than in any other 
American city. DeBow pictured the university as a dispensary 
of practical education, one that gave preference "to the useful 
over the ornamental." His goal was to "diffuse knowledge among 
men, and not among philosophers I" He wished to replace "antique" 
subjects like metaphysics, philology, and dialectics with 
pragmatic ones such as civil engineering, "the Philosophy of 
Manufactures, the Chemistry of Agriculture, the Principles and 
Laws of Commerce, and the mysterious and inexhaustible powers of 
the Steam Engine." DeBow's plan won the, wholehearted endorsement 
of White. In 1848, White offered to donate land and money to the 
university if it would create a chair of Commerce and Statistical 
Information —  and place James DeBow in it.^^
University administrators unanimously named DeBow to the 
chair of Commerce, Public Economy, and Statistics in 1848 and 
gave him until August, 1849, to organize his department. Having 
anticipated his nomination, however, DeBow had already carefully 
prepared for his new duties. He recommended that the university
2 6John P. Dyer, Tulane: The Biography of a University (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1966), 20-25; Maunsel White to DeBow,
February 10, 1847, in Review, III (March, 1847), 260-65); Review, 
VI (August, 1848), 111; Skipper, DeBow, 43.
27Review, V (March, 1848), 237; VII (September, 1849), 226, 
228-29; Maunsel White to the Board of Administrators of the 
University of Louisiana, January 28, 1848, in ibid., V (March, 
1848), 240; Skipper, DeBow, 43-44.
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secure an endowment of twenty to twenty-five thousand dollars for 
the commerce department, though he offered no suggestion as to 
where this money should come from. This endowment, he 
anticipated, would yield between two thousand and twenty-five 
hundred dollars annually in interest and this sum, he said, 
should constitute the professor's salary. He proposed also, "as 
a further stimulous to exertion," that the professor receive 
"certain moderate fees from individuals attending his classes or 
private Lectures." Students had to pay fifty dollars in tuition 
to the university and anyone else so interested could attend 
individual lectures for ten dollars each, "with the exception of 
those whose means are limited, and who shall receive the 
advantages free." The state, he said, should allocate money for 
a hall and appropriate five hundred dollars a year to increase 
the collections of commercial and economic literature in the 
library. DeBow provided a list of almost three hundred books 
that he considered basic. Turning from administrative matters, 
DeBow discussed the syllabus. His course would consist of two 
parts: the theory of commerce, economy, and statistics, and
practical applications. He planned to require twelve books, 
including Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and annual economic 
reports from American and foreign governments. He would deliver 
twelve lectures and students would take a public examination at 
the year's end.^®
DeBow began his academic career with optimism. Despite
28Review, ill (June, 1847), 512-16; Skipper, DeBow, 44-45.
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small enrollment in his class and the university he anticipated 
hiring many professors and inviting distinguished speakers to 
give guest lectures. He now planned on delivering twenty-five to 
thirty lectures and hoped the university would publish them; he 
would use the work as a textbook for in subsequent classes. He 
split his course in two, offering one class on economics and the 
other on commerce. After attending public examinations in 1851, 
Professor DeBow boasted that the University of Louisiana was the 
best school in the southwest and believed it had the potential to 
become "the best in the world.
The realities of higher education in Louisiana, however, 
crushed DeBow's dreams. Enrollment in the university and in 
DeBow's class did not increase appreciably by the time he left 
the faculty in 1855. Few people matched Maunsel White's 
financial support for the school, so the Board of Administrators 
could never provide an endowment for the Department of Commerce. 
Legislators proved more indifferent to the plight of the 
university than the citizens of New Orleans. During DeBow's 
tenure, the school received an average of less than $9,000 
annually from the state, and most of this amount went to the 
medical school. In 1855 DeBow complained that school buildings 
were generally "unfinished and untenantable." The university 
would not prosper until after the Civil War when, under private 
control, it was renamed Tulane University. As his friend Gayarré
29Review, III (June, 1847), 513-14; VII (August, 1849), 188; 
XI, (August, 1851), 220-21.
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said, DeBow's professorship proved a "barren honor.
DeBow continued to manage the Review while he worked at the 
university, yet these did not constitute his only activities. He 
"was always craving for some additional task," Gayarré recalled, 
and found many from 1847 to the early 1850's. In 1847 he helped 
establish the Louisiana Historical Society and remained active in 
the organization after it merged with the state Academy of 
Sciences. His sundry activities first brought him to the 
attention of Charles Gayarré, then secretary of state in 
Louisiana. At his recommendation, DeBow was appointed to direct 
the new state Bureau of Statistics. DeBow had always had an 
innate curiosity about statistics and considered their accurate 
and reliable compilation not only fascinating but also essential
for economic planning and commercial development. He gladly
31accepted his new post.
To DeBow, statistical information also became a major
element in the conflict between northerners and southerners.
The former have for a variety of reasons had the advantage 
of us in exhibiting their resources and strength. They have 
had all the statisticians to themselves and all the 
statistical reports. They have used them as powerful 
implements of aggression, and the South, having nothing to 
show in return, has been compelled to see her cause greatly 
prejudiced. Until almost the present day none of the 
southern states have regarded it at all important to secure
^^Dyer, Tulane, 22, 335; Skipper, DeBow, 46; Review, XIX 
(October, 1855), 436; After the War Series, III (June, T867), 
501. --------------------
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records and returns of population and wealth. Not one 
periodical devoted itself to those subjects, though the 
North had many. We were taunted with our comparative 
weakness, poverty, insecurity, decay, and told that they 
were the natural results of slavery! Having no facts to 
oppose, we were passive, and for the most part admitted the 
justice of-the charge. [But] We had not studied our own 
strength.
DeBow maintained, however, that the South was not an economic 
backwater, as northern foes claimed, and that a slave society 
could compete with any in an industrial age. He was sure that a 
careful statistical analysis would prove that "the South has 
nothing to blush for.
In its initial promise and eventual frustrations, DeBow's 
experiences at the Bureau of Statistics resembled his work at the 
state university. In the Review he congratulated Louisiana 
legislators for creating the first permanent statistical bureau 
in the country and urged other states to follow their example.
He published a sample survey in the Review in 1848 that provided 
guidelines and suggested topics of inquiry for the bureau.
DeBow's elaborate questionnaire, to be completed by parish 
(county) officials, asked for information on such subjects as 
local history, topography, demographics, ethnicity, education and 
religion, descriptions of local agriculture and manufacturing, 
local professional societies, and literary production. After 
two years, however, DeBow's circular had "produced little fruit."
^^Review, VIII (May, 1850), 441.
^^Ibid., XI (February, 1851), 152.
Review, VI (July, October, and November, 1848), 79-80, 
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He complained that legislative appropriations for the bureau were 
too small and handicapped his ability to collect information. By 
1851 only three parishes had responded. Despite a multitude of 
other commitments, DeBow redoubled his efforts to complete his 
survey of the state. With sectional tension adding urgency to 
his labors, he insisted that southerners must stop the 
"unlicensed misrepresentation or widely propagated error" of 
northerners. And if sectional conflict led to war, DeBow said, 
his survey would help show southerners "our resources of 
resistance.
Few southerners matched DeBow's energy or shared his vision. 
Only a bare majority of parishes in Louisiana ever responded to 
his survey. By 1852 he was so discouraged that he recommended 
the abolition of the state Bureau of Statistics. He believed the 
work should continue, but under private auspices. DeBow 
published preliminary findings in the Review and still tried to 
convince people in other states to emulate his work. His 
crusade, however, ended in failure and he was never able to 
publish a complete report.
DeBow's work at this time brought him into contact with 
officials in Washington. in 1850 he had written to the 
Commissioner of Patents in the recently-established Department of 




R̂eview, VIII (May, 1850), 442-43; IX, (September, 1850), 286—8 .
Skipper, DeBow, 47-48; Review, XIV (May, 1853), 431.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 15
statistical information in other states. The same year DeBow had 
also written a series of letters to Joseph Kennedy, director of 
the Census Board, to offer suggestions about administering the 
next census. Newly enlarged and more sophisticated than before, 
the seventh census resembled the survey DeBow had conducted in 
Louisiana. Kennedy was fired soon after President Franklin 
Pierce took office in 1853, the victim of a patronage battle. 
Because Democrats in Louisiana had been prominent supporters of 
Pierce, the president wanted to reward his backers there by 
selecting a Louisianian as the new superintendent of the census.
■3 7DeBow was the obvious choice.
DeBow was already in Washington petitioning for a different 
job when administration officials offered him the one at the 
census office. He had hoped to receive an appointment as 
Commissioner of Patents, as he had hoped he would four years 
earlier. At that time he had expected a fellow Louisianian, 
President Zachary Taylor, to make him the first commissioner ever 
from the South. Intent on giving applications for patents from 
southerners special attention, DeBow must have been disappointed 
when he was not chosen. In 1853, however, when Pierce's men 
offered him the post at the census bureau —  and a $3,600 annual 
salary —  DeBow gracefully accepted.^®
37DeBow to Edmund Burke (Commissioner of Patents), n.d., in 
Review, VIII (January, 1850), 32-39; Skipper, 69-72.
38Skipper, DeBow, 72; DeBow to Thomas Ewing, March G, 1849, 
James Dunwoody Brownson DeBow Letters, The Historic New Orleans 
Collection, New Orleans, Louisiana; Review, XIV (May, 1853), 524.
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When DeBow took office in March, 1853, he found the Census 
Bureau in disarray. Although Kennedy had already supervised the 
collection and initial tabulation of census returns, DeBow 
considered the bureau's traditional procedures obsolete and 
inefficient. He said that the Bureau had printed previous 
censuses "in such a manner as unfitted them for general use, 
understanding, or reference," and that much information had been 
inaccurate. The bureau had incomplete holdings of schedules from 
before 1830, and those it did possess were "unbound, and in great 
confusion." Shortly before he began work the census office had 
160 employees, many of whom were strictly political appointees. 
Although DeBow also owed his job to politics, he complained that 
many of his staff had no previous experience and that some could 
not even add. He fired most of these "laggards" and maintained a 
staff of only thirty-five "working men."
DeBow also offered a thoughtful program of reform in the 
hope that changes would continue at the bureau after his tenure 
ended. First he called for professionalization of the 
"enumerators," those charged with collecting data. DeBow 
believed that every county or parish in the country should select 
someone familiar with statistical information and thoroughly 
acquainted with the area, such as local tax assessors. Each
39The Seventh Census of the United States; 1850 (Washington: 
Robert Armstrong, Public Printer, 1853), vi; J.D.B. DeBow, 
Statistical View of the United States... Being a Compendium of the 
Seventh Census (Washington: A.O.P. Nicholson, Public Printer,
1854), 11, 17-18 ; Review, After the War Series, III (June, 1867), 
593.
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county should then pay for the services performed, he argued, and 
not the federal government. Similarly, DeBow asserted that 
employees in the census office required special training and 
education. The bureau could not function effectively if it were 
staffed by political appointees who gained and lost their jobs 
with every new administration, he said. Instead, DeBow wanted 
the federal government to follow the example of several states —  
including Louisiana —  by establishing a permanent bureau of 
statistics and hiring only properly trained personnel. It would 
take until 1880 for Congress to incorporate some of DeBow's 
recommendations.
In the meantime DeBow proudly announced that the seventh 
census marked a new era in statistical information. Its 640,000 
pages of manuscript schedules constituted twice the number 
produced by the previous census and over four times that of the 
1830 census. The census included more detail than ever on 
population, occupation, slaveholding, taxation, manufacturing, 
religion, schools, libraries, newspapers, crime, and pauperism. 
Although some northerners questioned whether DeBow's pro-South 
bias affected the compilation of his data, most Americans agreed 
that he was the leading statistician in the country.
After completing his duties at the census office DeBow
40DeBow, Compendium of the Seventh Census, 17-19; Skipper, 
DeBow, 80.
41DeBow, Compendium of the Seventh Census, 12; Skipper, 
DeBow, 79-80. Also see [F] M Kelley to DeBow, May 4, 1855, James 
Henry to DeBow, June 18, 1855, and Maunsel White to DeBow, August 
11, 1860, DeBow Papers, Duke University.
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proudly announced, "I am an American Citizen," and celebrated the 
bonds of Union in his Review. Only two years before he had 
declared, "in a question between the North and the South, I 
prefer the South," and used the Review to rally popular support 
for secession. This shift stemmed neither from hypocrisy nor 
opportunism, even though the fortunes of the Review had suffered 
from DeBow's inattention at this time.^^ Instead, it betrayed an 
ambivalence DeBow had toward the Union, an attitude that emerged 
periodically throughout his life.
From its outset the Review clearly revealed that its editor 
was torn between his dedication to the South and to the Union.
As a champion of commerce DeBow believed that the prosperity of 
the South was linked with that of the North. "Together they have 
flourished, and together they must falter and fall," he said in 
1850. In part, DeBow spoke here from personal interest. The 
Review had offices in New York and Boston as well as Washington, 
Richmond, Charleston, Mobile, and New Orleans, and he had 
invested in property not only in the South but also in Iowa, 
Kansas, and Minnesota.DeBow's political philosophy only 
exacerbated his dilemma. At times his political discourses 
sounded exactly like Beverley Tucker's. DeBow once described 
American politics as a battle that pitted "federation against 
consolidation —  chartered rights against cruel, inexorable
^^Review, XII (May, 1852), 500; XVII (August, 1854), 111-14; 
Skipper, DeBow, 79.
43Review, VIII (May, 1850), 442; Skipper, DeBow, 64, 87, 130.
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majorities —  liberty against power —  a constitution against the 
omnipotence of parliament [Congress]." But DeBow shared none of 
Tucker's logic or reasoning when he turned to the question of 
sovereignty. DeBow either could not make up his mind about 
sovereignty or did not understand its meaning. In September, 
1846, he stated that the federal government enjoyed "full 
possession of all the high and essential attributes of 
sovereignty," but only eight months later claimed it was 
southerners' "sovereign right" to own s l a v e s .
Only issues of honor could force DeBow to choose 
consistently between his section and the nation. A staunch 
advocate of industrialization and modernization, DeBow 
simultaneously had as acute a sense of honor as any southerner. 
Defense of personal honor could lead DeBow nearly to the extremes 
of Keitt and Wigfall. After the death of his wife Caroline Poe 
DeBow in 1858 DeBow's relationship with the Poe family had become 
strained over the upbringing of DeBow's daughter. He visited the 
Poes in Virginia hoping to reach some understanding with them, 
but found "their persecutions related chiefly to the child and my 
control of it" more than he could tolerate. Perhaps the Poes 
expressed understandable concern that the busy DeBow might not 
prove an attentive parent. Whatever words they exchanged, DeBow 
announced "my line of duty is clear." He decided that unless 
"reason is restored to them" he would not allow the Poes to see 
his child. He explained to Gayarré, "She cannot in honor receive
44Review, II, (September, 1846), 75-76; III (May, 1847), 421
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the caresses of those who by word & act have dishonored her
father."45
To DeBow southern honor required as vigilant a defense as 
did his young daughter, when northerners challenged the morality 
of slaveholders, DeBow snapped back "as Southerners, as 
Americans, as MEN, we deny the right of being called to account 
for our institutions, our policy, our laws, or our government." 
For southerners, he maintained, slavery represented "country, 
life, death —  everything." Attacks on the institution, 
therefore, were insulting, degrading, and intolerable. DeBow 
also perceived challenges to southern honor in the region's 
commercial dependence upon the North. "Why are we for ever 
nerveless, in debt, and without surplus for any purpose, and must 
run off to the North whenever we would procure a little capital 
to work a mill site or dam a river?" he asked. DeBow insisted 
that only economic self-sufficiency could remove this mark of 
degradation and dishonor from the S o u t h . whatever the source 
of the insult, DeBow offered the same counsel. Rather than 
meekly accept dishonor, DeBow said, southerners must "act as 
patriots ever should act, doing and daring, and leaving the 
consequences to God." He believed that southerners must fight 
the progress of free-soilism and abolitionism without hesitation.
45J.D.B. DeBow to Charles Gayarré, July 29, 1858, Charles 
Gayarré Papers, The Historic New Orleans Collection, New Orleans, 
Louisiana; Skipper, DeBow, 108. Caroline Poe was a cousin of 
writer Edgar Allen Poe.
46Review, III, (May, 1847), 421; IX (November, 1850), 567; 
XII (May, 1852), 498-99.
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When rights or honor came under attack, DeBow insisted that "the 
course of manhood against the invader ceases to be words.
To DeBow the territorial issue and congressional debates of 
1850 menaced southern rights, liberty, and honor. Although not 
yet prepared to advocate secession, DeBow insisted that the right 
of southerners to control their slaves "without compromise of any 
sort, must be preserved, or the Union will become a snare rather 
than a blessing." He warned his readers that northern political 
and economic power grew constantly "and soon will be 
irresistible." The conflict between sections, he said, "must 
soon be settled."^®
In July, 1850, DeBow published an editorial entitled "The 
Cause of the South." In it he warned southerners that they faced 
a precarious situation. The South had to defend itself from the 
"reckless fanaticism" of northerners who, he charged, plotted to 
destroy slavery. The abolition of slavery, DeBow asserted, could 
not occur without "a servile war, continued struggles of the 
races of whites and blacks, desolation of fields, hearths and 
homes, abandonment of half a score of great States entirely to 
Ethiopian manners, industry and civilization!" On the other 
hand, if southern resistance led to destruction of the Union —  
"the source of our greatness and strength" —  DeBow predicted 
that southerners would suffer economic "impotency and ruin." He
"̂̂ Ibid., IX  (November, 1850), 567; XV (November, 1853), 537.
4 8Ibid., V I I I  (May, 1850), 441; I X  (November, 1850), 567; X 
(January, 1851), 1.
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had hoped that the Nashville Convention might adopt some middle 
course, but was disappointed that state after state "gave [the 
Convention] the cold shoulder." When assemblies such as the 
Nashville Convention failed to lead to action, DeBow correctly 
observed that in the North, "Our protests are regarded [as] but 
gasconade; our earnestness, hypocrisy; our solemn declarations of 
rights, the silly declaration of men, without concert, whom the 
first federal thunders will coerce into submission —  unwilling 
and boisterous and fretful, to be sure, but still submissive."
He thought that genuine salvation for the South lay not in 
"bandying constitutional arguments" with northerners, in 
congressional debates, or in blind faith in the sanctity of the 
Union, "but in the busy hum of mechanism, and in the thrifty 
operations of the hammer and the anvil." As long as northerners 
conducted southern commerce, built and navigated the ships that 
carried southern cargoes, supplied materiel and engineers for 
southern railroads, wove and spun southern cotton, dominated the 
region's publishing industry and the nation's literature, 
educated southern youth, and received millions annually from 
southerners traveling to northern "watering places," the South 
would never have the leverage required to protect its rights and 
interests within the Union. With so much at risk, DeBow 
exclaimed, "Before heaven! we have work before us now."
DeBow was shocked when radical newspapers in Georgia and
49Ihid., IX (July, 1850), 120-24. Substantial excerpts from 
this article appear in Paskoff and Wilson, eds.. The Cause of the 
South, 183-88.
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South Carolina objected that his editorial was too moderate. As 
one of the few Louisianians to support the first Nashville 
Convention, DeBow considered himself "a very Hotspur in these 
wars of the South." In turn, he lashed out at those who joined 
the struggle for southern rights "at the very eleventh hour!" 
DeBow assured his readers that he would continue to fight for 
southern interests "until the citadel is safe from every internal 
and foreign foe."^^
After Congress passed the Compromise of 1850, DeBow began to 
sound like some of the radicals he had recently denounced. He 
said that northerners had failed to respect the compromises they 
had made with southerners in the past, and he did not anticipate 
that northerners would treat this new bargain any differently. 
Northern transgressions had pushed southerners beyond 
forbearance, he exclaimed. While profiting from their business 
connections with the slave states, northerners had always held 
their southern neighbors in contempt, he protested. Northern 
hostility to southerners had been a "concealed and creeping 
worm," but it had now "crept up from the slime and filth to the 
topmost column of the national temple." By January, 1851, DeBow 
believed that the South was no longer safe within the Union.
DeBow's familiar call for southern self-sufficiency now took 
on urgent and even desperate overtones. Southerners must cut all
^^Review, IX (September, October, 1850), 352, 463.
51Ibid., XI (January, March, 1851), 106-107, 329; XII (May, 
1851), J T n 499.
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ties with the North, he said. DeBow estimated that northern
businessmen earned $40,000,000 a year through processing raw
materials produced in the South. If southerners could mill every
bale of cotton they produced, they would cease paying "tribute to
Northern looms" and "hush the sound of every spindle in New—
52England." He estimated that 50,000 southerners traveled north
every year where they spent $15,000,000. He insisted that this
practice must stop. In the Review he described "southern
watering places and scenery" as being as attractive as any in the 
53North. He also demanded that southerners cease sending their 
children to northern schools. Even if southern schools were 
inferior, DeBow explained "better would it be for us that our 
sons remained in honest ignorance and at the plough-handle, than 
that their plastic minds be imbued with doctrines subversive of 
their country's [the South's] peace and honor, and at war with 
the very principles upon which the whole superstructure of the 
society they find at home is b a s e d . D e B o w ' s  statistical 
analysis showed that southerners' economic "vassalage to the 
North" cost them $100,000,000 annually in money funneled to 
northern manufacturers, resorts, and s c h o o l s . I f  southerners 
threw off "this humiliating dependence" and kept their money home 
DeBow maintained that they would have enough capital to create
52Ibid., XI (January, 1851), 107; XII (May, 1852), 499. 
^^Ibid., XI (January, March, 1851), 107-108, 160, 352-57. 
^^Ibid., XI (March, 1851), 362.
^^Ibid. , XII (May, 1852), 500.
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their own navy, build new factories and railroads, and improve 
their schools and cities. If southerners obeyed the dictates of 
self-defense, he promised, "a separate confederation will be 
formed, for which there are at the South all the resources of 
wealth, and power, and opulence!"^®
DeBow's extremism increased while southern resistance waned 
and unionism experienced a resurgence throughout the South.
Other fire-eaters no longer doubted his earnestness, but by the 
end of 1852 DeBow faced a more immediate and practical problem,
the possibility of alienating moderates. If his Review were to
survive, he too would have to stop discussing secession and 
accept the Compromise of 1850. Ever the pragmatist, DeBow did 
exactly that.
Only a year after vilifying northerners as treacherous 
enemies, DeBow resumed the comfortable business relationships he 
had shared with them prior to the recent crisis. Over the next
few years DeBow drew most of the revenue for the Review from
northern advertisers, even though he offered better rates to 
southern businessmen.^^ He worked with officials of the New York 
World's Fair in 1853 by screening potential exhibitors from the 
southwest. When that same year DeBow announced his decision to 
head the Census Bureau, he explained that his work in the 
nation's capital might make his Review more national in scope, 
though he promised that it would remain devoted to southern
^^Ibid., XI (February, 1851), 161; XII (May, 1852), 500. 
^^Ibid., XXII (May, 1857), 555-56.
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interests.
DeBow's unionism was contingent upon a rigid enforcement of
the Compromise of 1850 both in letter and spirit. He stipulated
that all Americans must keep "the rough and jagged points of
sectional rivalry" from disrupting the nation. In 1853 he warned
northerners that abolitionism threatened to destroy the calm that
59resulted from the new compromise. When he reprinted articles 
from the Review in his three volume Industrial Resources of the 
Southern and Western States, DeBow included a substantial number 
of works on blacks and slavery. He vainly hoped that his 
anthology would "entirely exhaust the subject" and finally put an 
end to the national debate over s l a v e r y . W h e n  anti-slavery 
agitation continued, however, DeBow urged southerners to remain 
vigilant in the defense of slavery and watchful of the "growing 
wanton and arrogant" power of the North.
By 1856, the growth of the Republican party, bloodshed in 
Kansas and congressional debate over the territory's statehood 
combined to alarm DeBow. He found "no principle so clear" as the 
right of southerners to make Kansas a slave state, and he
C O
Ibid., XIV (March, May, 1853), 300, 524.
eg=^Ibid., XV (November, 1853), 486, 537; XVII (August, 1854), 
111-14.
^^J.D.B. DeBow, The Industrial Resources, Etc., of the 
Southern and Western States... (3 volumes; New Orleans, New York, 
and Charleston; Published at the Office of DeBow's Review, 1853), 
I, preface; II, 196-345; III, 53-70.
61J.D.B. DeBow to H. W, Conner, April 5, 1854, in New York 
Times, April 14, 1854; DeBow to the governor-elect of Virginia 
[Henry A. Wise], October 2, 1855, DeBow Papers, Duke University.
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interpreted northern opposition as a sign of another impending 
constitutional crisis. Believing the Kansas controversy proved 
that northerners had abandoned the spirit of compromise, DeBow 
turned his back on unionism and again focused exclusively on the
fZ ̂cause of the South.
DeBow launched his campaign for secession at the Knoxville 
Commercial Convention in 1857. In his presidential address to 
the Tennessee meeting DeBow conceded "that in practical results" 
commercial conventions had proven a failure. They had "built no 
railroad, equipped no steamship, nor established a factory or 
college." They had, however, provided an annual forum in which 
southerners could express their grievances against the North. 
DeBow therefore recommended that henceforth southerners should 
use these conventions to promote political unity in the South and 
to teach its people that the South had sufficient resources to 
survive outside the Union "and to maintain the rank of a first 
class power whenever it should be deemed necessary, to establish 
a separate confederation."^^
According to DeBow the rise of the Republican party made 
secession imperative. Republicans not only planned to prevent 
the expansion of slavery into the territories, thereby excluding 
southerners "from every avenue of national growth," but also to
DeBow to [?], August 20, 1856, DeBow Letters, The Historic 
New Orleans Collection; DeBow to [A.L.S.], August 20, 1856, James 
D. Davidson Papers, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, 
Durham, North Carolina; Review, XXI (October, 1856), 438.
G^Review, XXIII (September, 1857), 230, 232-33, 301.
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"denounce us as cowards and robbers... unfitted to share with them 
in Christian communion." This attitude, he believed, rendered 
the possibility of future compromises impossible. Unless 
southerners were prepared to give up slavery, remaining in a 
Union that included Republicans would destroy their honor. And 
if southerners did yield to their northern "task masters," DeBow 
warned, they jeopardized their very existence when free blacks 
would spread death and destruction over the land. If southerners 
could prevent the "overwhelming and seemingly unscrupulous power" 
of Republicans from transforming the country into an "open and 
palpable tyranny," DeBow insisted that they must do so. But if 
the Union could not be saved with southern rights intact, DeBow 
said, "It is to be crushed.
Five years earlier DeBow had worried that the South lacked 
the industrial capacity to sustain itself as a separate nation, 
but by 1857 the erstwhile champion of commerce had joined the 
swelling number of southerners who believed that cotton provided 
them with unlimited economic power. The reasons for his shift 
remain unclear. DeBow certainly knew that world demand for 
cotton had grown throughout the decade and he might have 
believed, as many southerners did, that the agricultural base of 
the southern economy saved it from the financial convulsions 
northern businessmen suffered as the Panic of 1857 began.
Whatever the reason, DeBow now paid homage to the omnipotence of 
cotton. Serving on the resolutions committee of the Savannah
Ibid., 227-30, 231
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Commercial Convention in 1856, DeBow called for the increase of 
agricultural productivity and for the elimination of northern 
participation in the trade between the South and Europe. At 
Knoxville, DeBow attributed magical qualities to cotton. If a 
Southern Confederacy took the cotton trade out of northern hands, 
he predicted, "Great interior towns will spring up as by 
enchantment and great sea-cities and arteries of communication 
between them reticulate the whole face of the country." A 
nominal tariff would quickly give a Southern government the funds 
to build "palaces and fleets and navies." Cotton would protect a 
Southern nation from all adversaries and make its borders secure. 
DeBow explained that if the North failed to return fugitive 
slaves, a Southern Confederacy had but to withhold exports of 
cotton to cripple northern industry. "It is the cotton bale that 
makes the treaties of the world, and binds over the nations to 
keep the peace," he claimed.
Few southerners were willing to consider secession in 1857. 
Most placed their faith in President James Buchanan and hoped for 
yet another compromise to settle sectional strife. When the 
president split with members of his own party over Kansas, his 
support in the South grew. But DeBow doubted that the 
Pennsylvania Democrat had the ability either to take control of
^^Ibid., XXI (November, 1856), 550-53; XXII (September, 
1857), 13^36.
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his own party or to contain the growing Republican opposition. 
Facing popular opposition, when DeBow continued his campaign for 
secession in 1858 he did so more passionately and energetically 
than ever.
In the spring DeBow gave a speech to the alumni of the 
College of Charleston. Like his address at Knoxville, he used 
the occasion to advocate secession. DeBow professed love and 
devotion to the Union, but told his audience "that people are 
easiest enslaved who, clinging to the traditions, the memories, 
and the fame of their country, are mindless, as to its present 
practical workings." And the current political situation, he 
warned, offered only subjugation to the South. With no prospect 
of creating new slave states southerners would soon be 
overwhelmed by the North. Southerners would have no security or 
liberty in a Union that found them outnumbered and politically 
powerless. Because the Republican party proclaimed hatred and 
hostility toward slavery, a Union with them would denigrate 
southern honor. DeBow asked, "Has republicanism in seventy years
fitted us for concessions and degradations to which not a
thousand years of monarchy or despotism have fitted the Cossak or
the Briton?" Southerners had but two choices, he said; 
submission to the North or immediate secession. Only the latter 
was "above board and manly," and DeBow reminded his listeners 
that "if language has any meaning, we are committed by every
DeBow to W. P. Miles, September 4, 1857, William Porcher 
Miles Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill; Review, XXX (April, 1861), 429.
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regard to manliness and honor." Despite his own lingering
attachments to the Union, DeBow declared himself "an extremist
perhaps —  a fire-eater, in the language of our enemies —  a
disunionist, when the question is between the surrender of the
substance of rights and liberties and the maintenance of this
6 7sentiment of Union."
Immediately after his speech at Charleston, DeBow prepared 
for the Montgomery Commercial Convention of 1858. He wanted to 
make the Alabama meeting into even more of a political forum than 
Knoxville had been. To do so, he prodded delegates into a 
discussion of one of the most volatile issues of the day, the re­
opening of the African slave trade. In 1857 in the Review he had
called for discussion of the topic. Although he had declined to
take a position on the issue, his mere mention of it emboldened 
others. "Stick to the Slave Trade," begged George Fitzhugh, one 
of the leading defenders of slavery in the South. DeBow found 
William L. Yancey another important ally. Of all the topics he 
might address at the convention, Yancey told DeBow, he preferred 
to discuss the African slave trade.
DeBow played only a minor role once the convention assembled
in May, but must have been pleased with its results. Yancey's 
impassioned orations on southern rights and the African slave
^^DeBow to Lewis R. Gibbes, December 27, 1857, Lewis R. 
Gibbes Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress; 
Review, XXX (April, 1861), 429-35.
^^Review, XXII (June, 1857), 663-64; George Fitzhugh to 
DeBow, January 26, 1858, and William L. Yancey to DeBow, March 
25, [1858 or 1859], in DeBow Papers, Duke University.
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trade had their desired effect and, combined with the attendance 
of Barnwell Rhett and Edmund Ruffin, transformed the commercial 
convention into a political one. DeBow's agenda promised to 
prevail again the following year; he, Yancey, and John Quitman 
(elected in absentia), were among those chosen to prepare the 
address calling for the next meeting at Vicksburg, Mississippi.®^ 
Encouraged by the radicalisation of the Montgomery 
convention, DeBow began to agitate for secession more openly than 
ever. In the Review he argued that the only remedy for the
sectional crisis was to "make us independent of all nations, and
respected by all." With the right of nullification rebuked and 
that of secession questioned, DeBow explained, "The right of 
revolution seems only to have survived —  which is to say, that 
there is no remedy against oppression under a federated system." 
Those who looked for "an ark of safety from great and impending 
dangers," he promised, would "find it in separation."^®
Yancey's inability to attend the Vicksburg convention forced 
DeBow to do much of the talking. Again he chose to focus on the
African slave trade. If African slavery were "very right and
very proper," DeBow wondered, how was it "immoral, irreligious, 
wicked, and inexpedient" to bring more Africans to the South? 
Repeating information supplied by Edmund Ruffin, DeBow pointed to 
the rise in slave prices and increased demand for their labor as 
reasons to renew the trade. Natural population increase, he
®®Review, XXIV (June, 1858), 604.
^®Review, XXV (July, August, December, 1858), 124, 127, 703.
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said, could not keep up with demand, especially in the rapidly 
expanding Southwest. Besides, an influx of slaves would bring 
prices down and enable more whites to buy them and use them on 
less profitable land. Finally, DeBow agreed with Yancey that 
federal restriction on slavery in any form was an insulting 
"brand upon the institutions of the S o u t h . A l t h o u g h  only a 
small minority of southerners wished the African slave trade re­
opened, DeBow convinced the delegates at Vicksburg, by a vote of
44 to 19, to pass a resolution urging the repeal of all state and
7 ?federal prohibitions on the trade.
Finding that most southerners refused to support the 
Vicksburg resolutions, DeBow shifted his attention back to the 
Republicans and the election of 1860. He said that the 
presidential election would resolve "the greatest political 
excitements ever known in the history of this country." He 
warned that Republicans, "an active, powerful, unscrupulous 
organization," were prepared to destroy the South and the 
Constitution. DeBow had little hope for electoral victory over 
this foe, but grew optimistic about southern resistance after the 
Democratic party split at the Charleston convention in the spring 
of 1860. The actions of southern delegates, he believed, proved
^^Review, XXVII (July, 1859), 97; Edmund Ruffin, "The 
Effects of High Prices of Slaves," ibid., XXVI (June, 1859), 647- 
57; DeBow to Yancey, June 3, 1859, in Ibid., XXVI (August, 1859), 
232-34.
72Ibid., XXVI (June, 1859), 713. At Vicksburg, DeBow was 
also elected president of the newly formed African Labor Supply 
Association. This organization, however, apparently never met. 
See ibid., XXVII (July, 1859), 120-21.
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that a union of the South is not so impracticable as its enemies
have been taught to think." "Aroused from its lethargy and
despair," DeBow thought the South finally ready to confront its
7 3northern nemesis.
In the summer DeBow turned his attention to "Presidential 
Candidates and Aspirants." He reviewed the qualifications of 
over thirty men mentioned frequently for the presidency. DeBow 
found most of them wanting, their only assets coming from the 
"doctrine of availability." John C. Breckinridge, Joseph Lane, 
and Jefferson Davis received positive evaluations from DeBow and, 
predictably, Abraham Lincoln got the worst. The "low and vulgar 
P&ftisan of John Brown," claimed DeBow, owed his candidacy only 
to "intrigue and perfidity." Should Lincoln win, DeBow asked,
"is there not enough virtue in our people to break the ignoble 
shackles [of Union], and proclaim themselves free?"^^
As the election drew closer DeBow reverted to an old and 
familiar tactic. After pages of statistics in the Review 
comparing the economies, industry, and population of the North 
and South, he listed the wealth that the Union extracted annually 
from the South. Fishing bounties, customs, profits northern 
manufacturers made from southern resources, northern importers 
and shippers, money spent by southern travellers and students in 
the North, and money paid to northerners working in the South 
totalled $231,500,000, according to DeBow. Again he hoped that
^^Review, XXVIII (June, 1860), 742.
^^Ibid., XXIX (July, 1860), 92-103.
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his readers would realize that the South had ample resources to 
sustain itself if it seceded.
In the last issue of the Review to appear before the 
election, DeBow's rhetoric reached its most extreme and 
intemperate level. In every previous sectional crisis, he said, 
the only southerners who claimed the North posed no threat to 
slavery were "certain hungry applicants for federal office, the 
more ambitious national politicians, a few of the larger holders 
of slaves, whose fathers were born in New-England, or graduated, 
themselves, at Harvard, and whom great property has made timid, 
some very respectable old ladies, and a batch of Yankee editors, 
and school-masters, throughout the land." Because of them, DeBow 
insisted, the South had made concession after concession to the 
North. If they but remained true to themselves, DeBow assured 
southerners, they would make the South safe and free.^®
"All chance for the election of Breckinridge & Lane is gone, 
and that of Lincoln is almost certain," Frank DeBow wrote to 
James in late August. The DeBow brothers actually looked forward 
to Lincoln's election, believing that southern unity was never so 
great and secession never more certain. In October James assured 
an audience in Washington that South Carolina would secede soon 
after Lincoln's election and that Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, 
and Texas would quickly follow. "Florida and Arkansas are but 
offshoots from the Carolina tree," DeBow stated, "and the
^^Ibid., XXIX (August, 1860), 211. 
^^Ibid., XXIX (October, 1860), 534-35.
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governor of Louisiana agrees in the sentiment of 'Lincoln and
disunion.'" DeBow said that for fifteen years he had tried to
warn southerners about the growing fanaticism of the North, "and
7 7now the long-predicted revolution has come."
On his way back to Louisiana DeBow stopped in Charleston and 
spoke with Robert N. Gourdin, leader of the 1860 Association.
This group was organized in September to promote secession by 
distributing literature throughout the South. Gourdin asked 
DeBow to write a pamphlet that discussed the interests of 
nonslaveholders in slavery. DeBow's response, printed by the 
Association, in the Charleston Mercury, and in the Review, marked 
the final chapter of the antebellum pro-slavery argument.
DeBow's reputation as an economist and statistician made his 
discourse a signal piece of propaganda during the secession 
crisis.
DeBow insisted that all southerners had a vital interest in 
slavery. Though the census of 1850 listed 347,255 slaveowners, 
DeBow suggested that family members had to be added to obtain a 
more accurate idea of the number of southerners who relied upon 
slavery. A revised total came to around two million. Almost 
every non-slaveholder came into contact with slavery, and.
^^Frank DeBow to J.D.B. DeBow, August 21, 1860, DeBow 
Papers, Duke University; Charleston Mercury, November 6, 1860.
78Charles E. Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to War 1860-1865 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1950), 3 4-35, 
41; DeBow, "The Non-Slaveholders of the South: Their Interest in 
the Present Sectional Controversy Identical with that of 
Slaveholders," Review, XXX (January, 1861), 67-77; Charleston 
Mercury, December l5, 1860.
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according to DeBow, many owed their livelihood to the 
institution. Small farmers often grew corn and wheat and raised 
livestock for sale to planters, who often did not grow provisions 
for their slaves on their own plantations. DeBow asserted that 
slavery touched all aspects of southern agriculture, trade, and 
commerce. Like other fire-eaters, DeBow subscribed to the mud­
sill theory. Whereas poor whites occupied the bottom of the 
social order in the North, DeBow maintained that slavery placed 
blacks irrevocably at the bottom of southern society. "No white 
man at the South serves another as his body-servant," he 
explained, "to clean his boots, wait on his table, and perform 
the menial services of his household!" Because they saw daily 
examples of slavery, all white southerners guarded and 
appreciated their own liberty. Slavery also provided southerners 
with potential social mobility. Many southerners could afford to 
purchase at least one slave, and if they bought a female "her 
children become heirlooms, and make the nucleus of an estate." 
Sons of non-slaveholders had already made a significant impact on 
southern society. DeBow noted that Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, 
James H. Hammond, William L . Yancey, and Maunsel White, among 
others, had risen to prominence without having been raised by
slaveowning families. Having recently purchased a few slaves,
7 QDeBow proudly counted himself among this group.
Because of the interdependence and interaction of 
slaveholders and non-slaveholders, DeBow continued, no conflict
^^Ibid., 67, 69-71, 73-75, 77,
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existed within the South between free and slave labor. He 
claimed that slavery did not have an adverse affect on free 
labor. On the contrary, DeBow said that northern workers often 
left their jobs in crowded cities and sweatshops for more 
attractive employment opportunities in the South. He provided 
statistics to show that white laborers in New Orleans,
Charleston, and Nashville earned more than their counterparts in 
Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Toronto. He conceded that a few 
southerners opposed slavery, but claimed that transplanted 
northerners and "the crazy, socialistic Germans in Texas"
p Aaccounted for most of these.
Non-slaveholders had more reason than anyone to preserve 
slavery, DeBow suggested. He considered it a truism that blacks 
"sink by emancipation in idleness, superstition, and vice." 
Slaveholders would have the resources to escape if the plague of 
black freedom ever befell the South, he said, but warned that 
poorer whites "would be compelled to remain and endure the 
degradation." Considering all the benefits provided by slavery 
and the horrors sure to follow its extinction, DeBow was certain 
that the non-slaveholder would gladly "die in the trenches, in 
defence of the slave property of his more favored neighbor." In 
a Southern Confederacy "our rights and possessions would be 
secure," he concluded, and predicted that "opulence would be 
diffused throughout all classes."®^
^°Ibid., 69, 71-72. 
^^Ibid., 69, 76-77.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
339
In the two months after Lincoln's election, DeBow did 
everything he could to encourage secession. His speeches in New 
Orleans won him the praise of Henry J. Leovy, pro-secession 
editor of the New Orleans Delta. He spoke in Charleston with 
Barnwell Rhett, wrote editorials for the Charleston Mercury, and 
joined Edmund Ruffin on December 20 in Charleston to witness the 
vote for secession. While Ruffin proceeded to Tallahassee in 
January to encourage a Florida convention to chose secession, 
DeBow went to Jackson where he joyfully watched the Mississippi 
legislature vote to secede. His elation increased when his
Q 2adopted state, Louisiana, voted to secede on January 26, 1861.
After seven states left the Union DeBow turned his attention 
to the creation of a Southern nation. He hoped that the 
delegates at the provisional Congress in Montgomery would quickly 
form a new government and name Jefferson Davis, who DeBow had 
respected for years, the new president. After Fort Sumter, DeBow 
reassured southerners that northern invaders could never conquer 
the South. Slaves, he said, provided "a powerful back ground of 
defence." He claimed that northern enemies would not disrupt the 
relationship between master and slave any more successfully than 
the British had during the Revolution and the War of 1812. And 
because slaves could remain at home to raise provisions for a 
Southern army, DeBow explained, the South could put ten million
Q 2
Henry J. [Leovy] to DeBow, November 19, 1860, Frank DeBow 
to James DeBow, January 5, 1861, DeBow Papers, Duke University; 
New Orleans Delta, November 20, 1860; Skipper, DeBow, 120; 
Review, XXX (February, 1861), 251.
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men in the field. Finally, DeBow believed that the federal 
blockade of the South would lead to the realization of his life­
long dream of southern industrial independence. "Every branch of 
manufacture is springing up," he exclaimed with more optimism 
than objectivity. He thought that Southerners would soon create 
everything they needed and bring the war to a close by winter.®^ 
On June 8, 1861, DeBow reviewed recent events with 
satisfaction and pride. On that day, "into this world of toil & 
labor," came J.D.B. DeBow, Jr. A year after Caroline died, James 
married Martha E. Johns of Nashville. There, Martha gave birth 
to their first son the same day that the Tennessee legislature 
voted to secede. "Thus," said the senior DeBow, "the young DeBow 
in recompense perhaps of his fathers!'] long services in the 
cause is a born citizen of the Southern Republic, upon whose 
escutcheon God willing he will make his mark."®^
DeBow, too, was eager to leave his mark on the new 
Confederacy. In February he had written to William P. Miles, an 
old college friend and currently a Confederate congressman, to 
request a position in the government. "You know my capacity, 
training, & ambition," he said. When Union gunboats bombarded 
the South Carolina coast later in the year, DeBow was tempted to
8 3DeBow to Miles, February 5, 1861, Miles Papers, University 
of North Carolina; Review, XV (September, 1853), 322-23; XXX 
(May, June, 1861), 6Ü1, 682; XXXI (July, 1861), 102, 329-30.
8 4DeBow to Charles Gayarré, June 8, 1861, Charles E.A. 
Gayarré Papers, Grace King Collection, Louisiana and Lower 
Mississippi Valley Collections, LSU Libraries, Louisiana State 
University; Skipper, DeBow, 108-109.
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join the army and come to the aid of his native state.
Realizing, however, that his frail health prevented him from 
serving in the military, he consoled himself with the thought 
that "there is power in the pen which may equal the blade.
His willingness to serve the Confederacy came to the 
attention of Christopher G. Memminger, secretary of the treasury. 
Because of DeBow's intimate knowledge of the southern economy, 
Memminger appointed him to the Produce Loan Bureau in August, 
1861. DeBow's task was to secure revenue for the Confederate 
government through sales of commodities loaned to it by planters. 
"I am delighted with the post," he told Gayarré. By the end of 
the year, Gayarré observed that DeBow was "buried under the 
mountain Load of the Produce Loan." After a while, DeBow's 
relationship with Memminger soured, and charges of malfeasance 
against his subordinates tarnished DeBow's administration of the 
Bureau. When similar charges were levelled at DeBow he angrily 
wrote to President Davis to deny any impropriety. With Davis's 
support —  and a doubling of his salary to $6,000 a year —  DeBow 
continued to serve in the government until the end of the war.®^
DeBow's frustrations at the Produce Loan Bureau exacerbated
DeBow to Miles, February 5, 1861, Miles Papers, University 
of North Carolina; DeBow to Gayarré, December 16, 1861, Gayarré 
Papers, Louisiana State University.
®^DeBow to Gayarré, August 7, 1861, Gayarré Papers,
Louisiana State University; Gayarré to DeBow, December 8, 1861, 
DeBow Papers, Duke University; Paskoff and Wilson, eds.. The 
Cause of the South, 6; DeBow to Jefferson Davis, August 4,1864, 
Jefferson Davis Papers, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane 
University, New Orleans, Louisiana (see also Davis's marginalia).
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other problems brought on by the war. Certain at the start of
hostilities that world demand for cotton would break the northern
blockade, DeBow was disheartened when he met with Yancey in the
spring of 1862 and learned that the Confederacy could not expect
8 7foreign intervention. He had also been sure that New Orleans
was impervious to attack, and lashed out at the Confederate
commander. General Mansfield Lovell, and the administration when
8 8northerners captured his home city without a struggle. His
wife, son, daughter Carrie, and two slaves had moved from
Martha's home in Nashville to New Orleans, but escaped the Union
advance and found refuge in Winnsboro, South Carolina. By
August, 1862, wartime conditions forced DeBow to suspend
publication of the Review. He printed one more issue in
Columbia, South Carolina, two years later, but was then forced to
89stop again for the duration of the war. Losses on the 
battlefield and personal misfortune, however, did not diminish 
his faith in his cherished cause. Having long since forgiven 
Davis for the fall of New Orleans, in 1864 DeBow tried to rally 
his countrymen to the support of their beleaguered president.
"He has stood, brave as Ajax and wise as Ulysses," DeBow
8 7DeBow to Gayarré, July 4, 1861, January 8, 1862, Gayarré 
Papers, Louisiana State University; Review, XXXIII (May to 
August, 1862), 1, 86.
Û Q
DeBow to Miles, March 7, 1862, Miles Papers, University of 
North Carolina; DeBow to Gayarré, June 22, 1862, Gayarré Papers, 
Louisiana State University.
89Skipper, DeBow, 171; Review, XXXV (July and August, 1864),
97.
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declared, and would yet prove equal in ability and accomplishment 
to George Washington. Though DeBow mourned the loss of the 
"hero-martyrs of the war," each drop of their blood added to his 
defiance of "the hireling miscreants who invade our soil." As 
the war drew to a close he desperately hoped that General Lee 
would find some way to save the Confederacy. He even considered 
fleeing to Mexico to help organize a Confederate guerilla 
force.
After surveying the physical destruction war had brought, 
however, DeBow decided to remain in the South and help rebuild 
his beloved section. He obtained a pardon from President Andrew 
Johnson, and in 1865 began to revive the Review. With new 
headquarters in Nashville and regional offices in Boston, New 
York, Washington, Cincinnati, Charleston, and New Orleans, DeBow 
published the first postwar issue in January, 1866. He still 
promoted the development of commerce, manufacturing, and modern 
agricultural techniques, but did so now from a national 
perspective, not a sectional one. "Regarding the issues of the 
past as dead," DeBow planned to discuss only those political 
questions that affected the current and future relationship 
between the states, "the permanency of the Union, and the honor 
and prosperity of the Country." He stated that his only regional 
concern was the reestablishment of southern economic prosperity. 
He retitled his journal DeBow's Review, Devoted to the
90Review, XXXV (July and August, 1864), 102-103; DeBow to 
Gayarrel February 3, 1865, Gayarré Papers, Louisiana State 
University.
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Restoration of the Southern States, and Development of the Wealth 
and Resources of the Country. He subtitled it more succinctly 
the After the War Series.
DeBow's apparent conversion to nationalism after the war was 
similar to the change that occurred after the collapse of the 
secession movement in 1852. As before, he did not abandon his 
beliefs or act merely opportunistically. He simply faced facts. 
The Union had dealt the Confederacy, secession, and slavery fatal 
blows. He testified before the Congressional Committee on 
Reconstruction that "The [southern] people, having fairly and 
honestly tried the experiment of secession, are satisfied with 
the result." Satisfied, but not regretful for having tried to 
leave the Union. After four years of bloodshed southerners had 
lost everything, DeBow said, "but not, as they think, honor."
Like duellists who had vindicated themselves on the field of 
honor, DeBow believed the gallantry and honor that southerners 
exhibited during the war should command respect and trust from 
their adversaries once hostilities had ceased. Furthermore, he 
genuinely believed that President Johnson intended southerners to 
carry out reconstruction themselves. No military force was 
needed to police the South, he told congressmen, "except what the 
States themselves would furnish." Although he still believed 
emancipation would prove disastrous for blacks, he said that
91Review, After the War Series, III (June, 1867), 503; DeBow 
to [Frank DeBow], October 7, December 1, 3, 1865, January 18, 
1866, in J.D.B. DeBow Papers, Barker Texas History Center, 
University of Texas, Austin (hereinafter cited as BTHC); Review, 
After the War Series, I (January, 1866), 2.
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white southerners, insofar as possible, were capable of helping 
blacks adjust from slavery to freedom. "No outside interference
q 2is necessary," he claimed.
Although he could accept emancipation as a consequence of 
war, DeBow never changed his attitudes towards blacks. He had 
pledged that whites southerners would do everything possible "for 
the social, physical, and political advancement of the race," but 
always considered these possibilities extremely limited. As a 
businessman he believed that white employers must treat their 
black employees decently in order to make them "cheerful and 
reliable laborer[s]." He did not, however, consider blacks equal 
to whites. He thought them unfit for suffrage. He continued to 
profess that abolition would result in a stream of indolent 
blacks moving into crowded cities, "eking out a very uncertain 
subsistence." He blamed the Freedman's Bureau, a federal agency 
created to assist blacks make the transition to freedom, for 
creating hostility between the races "which did not exist at the 
time of the surrender." DeBow promoted debate in the Review over 
how best to deal with free blacks, but far from striving for 
objectivity he continued to solicit articles from such antebellum 
defenders of slavery as George Fitzhugh.
Just as he had done before and during the war, DeBow busied
92Review, After the War Series, I  (January, May, 1866), 3,
555-56.
93Review, After the war Series, (January, May, 1866), 2; 
DeBow to Gov. B.F. Perry, October 12, 1865, in ibid., 7-8; DeBow 
to Frank DeBow, December 19, 1866, DeBow Papers, BTHC.
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himself with several ventures simultaneously. Although he and 
Martha both worked eight hours a day on the Review, in 1866 DeBow 
accepted the presidency of the Tennessee Pacific Railroad, a 
company with plans for regional development and a southern
transcontinental route. In the Review he began to serialize a
journal he had kept during the war. In the winter of 1867 he 
started to do the same with his "Memories of the Late War" when 
he received news from Elizabeth, New Jersey, that Frank had 
fallen ill while on a business trip to the North. Despite 
inclement weather James made his way east to attend to his 
brother. Shortly after his arrival he too became sick. On 
February 26 a doctor diagnosed James's illness as an "aggravated 
case of peritonitis." DeBow died the next day.^^
DeBow's widow and his associates took over the Review. They
continued to print "Memories of the War," but never found the 
rest of DeBow's journal. Without DeBow's tireless leadership the 
journal that bore his name began to founder. His heirs sold the 
Review in March, 1868, but its new owners had no better luck.
They suspended publication in 1870, and the journal finally 
perished in October, 1879, after a firm in New York revived it as 
the Agricultural Review for four issues.
94DeBow to Frank DeBow, May 1, August 23, December 19, 1866, 
DeBow Papers, BTHC; Review, After the War Series, II (July to 
December, 1866), passim; III (January to May, 1867), 480-81 and 
passim.
9 5Review, After the War Series, III (June, 1867), 603-604; 
Iv, V (1867-1868), passim; Paskoff and Wilson, eds.. The Cause of 
the South, 8.
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In the year before his death DeBow had resumed his campaign 
for southern industrial independence. Rebuilding war-ravaged 
cities and replacing the railroads and factories that had been 
destroyed required southerners to "put their shoulder[s] to the 
wheel, intellectually and physically." He had warned his readers 
"The South will lose the most compensatory lesson of the war...if 
she does not unlearn and discard the theory which once governed 
her policy, that she controlled her own prosperity in her control 
of cotton." The true source of wealth for the South, he had 
argued as he did before the war, would come from diversified 
industry. The South could not and should not wait for 
northerners to carry out this phase of reconstruction, DeBow 
insisted; that would only recreate the antebellum economic 
situation of southern dependence upon the North. "Put up little 
mills, spin a little cotton yarn, weave a little cotton cloth, 
make coarse and cheap woolens to start with," he suggested; "the 
finer and more profitable work will follow in time." Southerners 
should start with the best and most modern machinery and exploit 
all their natural resources. He pointed to the South's ample 
water power and timber, its coal and mineral reserves in the 
southern Appalachian mountains. He called for the development of 
an iron industry in northern Alabama and hoped that would spur 
industrialization elsewhere. "Every new furnace or factory is 
the nucleus of a town," he explained, one that would attract 
workers from all over the country. One of the staunchest 
defenders of the Old South, James DeBow finally became one of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
first spokesmen for the New South.
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chapter VII 
"THE GREAT ONE IDEA OF MY LIFE"
In the spring of 1865 Edmund Ruffin wanted to die. He was 
seventy one years old, infirmities prevented him from working, 
and his growing deafness cut him off from the pleasures of 
conversation. Northern troops had sacked his plantations, and 
his slaves had fled. One of his sons had died while fighting for 
the cause that had given Ruffin's life meaning. "For years back 
I have had nothing left to make me desire to have my life 
extended another day," he had written in his diary early in May; 
only the hope of a miraculous Confederate triumph over the Union 
had kept him alive. But now that hope had gone. The last 
Confederate armies had surrendered. Ruffin feared that President 
Andrew Johnson would order the execution of many secessionists 
and southern wartime leaders. "I am not only a helpless & 
hopeless slave, under the irresistible oppression of the most 
unscrupulous, vile, & abhorred of rulers," he thought, but 
believed that his presence endangered his family. Even if left
unmolested by his northern conquerors, Ruffin could not face life
among black freedmen. He found it astonishing that his fellow 
southerners accepted defeat and emancipation "so quietly & cooly, 
as if we were already prepared for, & in great measure,
reconciled to their speedy approach & infliction." Their
attitude served as a rebuke to his life's work, he believed. He 
felt rejected and unappreciated by his countrymen, just as he had
349
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before secession. Unlike James DeBow, Ruffin would not seek a 
pardon, nor would he flee his beloved South, as did Louis 
Wigfall. He decided to defy his northern foes and leave 
southerners a legacy of resistance by taking his own life.^
Methodically and carefully, Ruffin prepared for his death. 
Fifst he had to overcome his fears of death and of transgressing 
against God by committing suicide. He prayed for weeks that God 
would divert him from his intentions if they were sinful. He 
also read the Bible, scouring scriptures for a specific 
injunction against suicide. He found none. God's commandment 
not to murder, Ruffin believed, did not apply to suicide. He 
reasoned that murder involved taking the life of another, and 
against his will. Furthermore, Ruffin noted that the Bible 
included exceptions to the seventh commandment by permitting the 
execution of criminals and of enemies in wartime. He found 
confirmation for his beliefs in the story of the Jews who killed 
themselves at Masada rather than face certain enslavement and 
death at the hands of the Romans. Turning from spiritual 
concerns, Ruffin considered how his death would affect his 
family. "My powers of both body & mind are so impaired that I am 
as incapable of rendering personal service to anybody," he 
thought. His departure, therefore, could not hurt his family 
and, he believed, it would only end the burden he had placed upon
Ruffin Diary, April 15, 17, 20, 21, 24, 30, May 1, 2, 9,
16, 18, 1865, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress; Betty 
L. Mitchell, Edmund Ruffin; A Biography (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1981), 210-11, 215-18, 243-44.
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them by becoming dependent on them in his old age. At peace with 
his decision, Ruffin had only to decide when to commit the act.
He wanted to wait for his eldest son to return home; Edmund 
Ruffin, Jr., would have to attend to the burial. But he could 
not wait too long because he did not want his death to postpone 
or interfere with the upcoming wedding of a nephew. On the 
morning of Saturday, June 18, he decided that the time had come.^ 
Early that day, Ruffin joined his unsuspecting son, 
daughter-in-law, and granddaughters for breakfast at their home, 
Redmoor, in Amelia County, Virginia. He then returned upstairs 
to his study. Earlier, when he had contemplated his death,
Ruffin had written a short note requesting that his remains be 
buried in South Carolina, among the people "to whom I am indebted 
for much kindness & favorable consideration." He had hoped that 
his fellow Virginians would keep his memory alive and appreciate 
the efforts he had made on behalf of southern rights. To give 
his death meaning, however, Ruffin now decided to alter the tone 
of his final utterance. At ten o'clock in the morning he wrote 
in his diary,
I here declare my unmitigated hatred to Yankee rule —  to 
all political, social & business connection with Yankees —
& to the Yankee race. Would that I could impress these 
sentiments, in their full force, on every living southerner, 
& bequeath them to every one yet to be born! May such 
sentiments be held universally in the outraged & down­
trodden South, though in silence & stillness, until the now 
far-distant day shall arrive for just retribution for Yankee 
usurpation, oppression, & atrocious outrages —  & for 
deliverance & vengeance for the now ruined, subjegated, & 
enslaved Southern States! May the maledictions of every
^Ruffin Diary, June 16-18, 1865.
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victim to their malignity, press with full weight on the 
perfidious Yankee people & their perjured rulers —  & 
especially on those of the invading forces who perpetrated,
& their leaders & higher authorities who encouraged, 
directed, or permitted, the unprecedented & generally 
extended outrages of robbery, rapine & destruction, & house- 
burning, all committed contrary to the laws of war on non- 
combatant residents, & still worse...on aged men & helpless 
women!
With the aid of a forked stick Ruffin was ready to pull the 
trigger of his rifle when visitors came unexpectedly to the front 
door. Not wishing to put his guests through an upsetting ordeal, 
he waited for them to leave. When they did he returned to his 
room to finish what he had begun. The intervening two hours had 
only increased his determination. He opened his diary for a 
final entry. "And now, with my latest writing & utterance, & 
with what will [be] near to my latest breath, I here repeat, & 
would willingly proclaim, my unmitigated hatred to Yankee rule —  
to all political, social, & business connection with Yankees, & 
to the perfidious, malignant, & vile Yankee race." He put the 
muzzle of the gun in his mouth and pulled the trigger, but the 
percussion cap exploded without discharging the shot.
Downstairs, Jane Ruffin heard the noise and raced outside to find 
Edmund, Jr. Before they could get back to stop him, the old man 
had calmly reloaded his weapon and fired again. His children 
found his lifeless body still sitting upright, defiant and
undated fragment, [1865], Edmund Ruffin Papers, Alderman 
Library,University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia; Ruffin 
Diary, June 18, 1865.
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unyielding even in death.^
The manner of Ruffin's death served as the quintessential
example of his life. Highly opinionated, obstinate, 
intransigent, once Edmund Ruffin decided to do something he
allowed nothing to stop him. Although he prided himself for his
inflexibility, it was this very trait that posed a personal 
dilemma. While he often contemptuously scorned all who opposed 
him, Ruffin simultaneously craved the love and appreciation of 
his countrymen. Extreme and unyielding even among fire-eaters, 
Ruffin had the misfortune of living in one of the least radical 
southern states. He knew that his political views often 
alienated him from more conservative Virginians, but he could 
find no way to restrain himself from expressing them except for 
complete withdrawal from society. This, however, was 
unsatisfactory because Ruffin so desperately sought to 
participate in public affairs. His entire life was an internal 
battle between his heart and his mind, a search for acceptance 
without compromising his ideals. It was a struggle unresolved 
even by his death.
Ruffin's upbringing and family heritage inculcated him with 
the idea that he would assume a position of importance in public 
affairs. Born on January 4, 1794, at Evergreen mansion in Prince 
George County, Edmund was of the seventh generation of Ruffins in
Ruffin Diary, June 18, 1865; Mitchell, Ruffin, 255-56; 
Edmund Ruffin, Jr., to his children, June 20, 1865, in Tyler ' s 
Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine, V (January, 
1024), 193-95.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
354
Virginia. The first arrived in 1666 and immediately began to 
acquire land and slaves. Edmund's grandfather, also named 
Edmund, served four terms in the House of Delegates. When the 
younger Edmund was born his father, George, owned over 140 slaves 
spread out over several plantations, and ranked as one of the 
largest slaveholders in the commonwealth. Small and sickly, 
Ruffin was raised and tutored at home. He quickly demonstrated a 
fondness for reading. He loved history and fiction, and had read 
all of Shakespeare's plays by the time he turned eleven. His 
father wanted Edmund to receive a gentleman's education so in 
1810 he sent his sixteen year old son to the College of William 
and Mary. in Williamsburg the young Ruffin found alcohol, the 
charms of Susan Travis, and literature more attractive than his 
school books. And, doubtless, the knowledge that his father's 
estate promised him a comfortable living made it easier for him 
to neglect his studies. He inherited Coggin's Point plantation 
and some slaves when his father died and met his subsequent 
suspension from college without apparent concern. Susan Travis's 
father. Champion, a prominent politician from Jamestown, had no 
objections either. He allowed Ruffin to marry his daughter, and 
the young couple moved to Coggin's Point.^
The outbreak of war with Great Britain in 1812 suddenly 
ended the Ruffins' honeymoon. He considered military service not
Mitchell, Ruffin, 3-6; Henry G. Ellis, "Edmund Ruffin: His 
Life and Times," John P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolph- 
Macon College, ill (June, 1910), 101; William Kauffman 
Scarborough, ed.. The Diary of Edmund Ruffin (2 volumes; Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972- ), II, 136, 604.
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only a patriotic duty but also a social responsibility. As he 
explained years later, "young people of 'gentle birth,' or used 
to early comforts, but also of well-ordered minds, could undergo 
necessary hardships with more contentment & cheerfulness than 
other persons of lower origin, & less accustomed to the 
indulgences & the training that wealth & high position afforded." 
The aristocratic eighteen year old enlisted as a private in the 
first regiment of volunteers called out from Virginia. Although 
he saw no action during his six month service near Norfolk, he 
believed that he had borne himself with dignity. Over four 
decades later he would remember the military discipline and 
training that he received during the War of 1812.®
He returned to Coggin's Point in 1813 and to the ruined 
farmlands of Tidewater Virginia, British armies had not ravished 
the soil, but generations of careless agricultural practices had. 
Failure to rotate tobacco with other crops had virtually depleted 
the land, and no contemporary fertilizing techniques could 
restore it. Ruffin's plantation produced only eighteen bushels 
of corn per acre in 1813 and only eight the next year, while 
farms in the West yielded thirty-five or more. When the 
inexperienced young farmer looked to his neighbors for help, he 
discovered that they adhered blindly to traditional, ineffective 
methods. Unlike many other planters who left or planned to leave
^Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 42; Mitchell, Ruffin, 6-7,
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the area, Ruffin was determined to make his land profitable,^ 
Finding other farmers of little help, Ruffin turned to 
books. First he read John Taylor's Arator, a series of essays 
written in 1803 and reprinted in a book ten years later. Ruffin 
scrupulously followed Taylor's advice; he enclosed a large field, 
covered it with vegetable and animal manures, and plowed deeply. 
After four years, however, he found that Taylor’s methods had 
helped only his initial harvest and deep plowing only increased 
erosion. He had also drained some of his most promising swamp 
lands, but after three years of cultivation was forced to abandon 
this acreage. Ruffin felt defeated. In 1817, while he waited 
for a buyer to relieve him of Coggin's Point, Ruffin read Sir 
Humphrey Davy's recent Elements of Agricultural Chemistry. 
Although as ignorant of chemistry as he had been about farming, 
Ruffin was intrigued by Davy's hypothesis that carbonite of lime 
might neutralize acidity in soil. Working from engravings in 
Davy's book, Ruffin reproduced the author's apparatus for testing 
the chemical composition of the soil and began testing his and 
neighbors' farmlands. His tests showed that the fossil shells, 
or marl, so abundant in the region had sufficient alkalinity to 
correct the chemical imbalance in the fields. In February, 1818, 
Ruffin had some slaves dig marl from pits on his estate and haul 
it to a newly-cleared plot. Tidewater farmers had experimented
Avery 0. Craven, Edmund Ruffin, Southerner: A Study in 
Secession (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, T982), 
51-53; David F. Allmendinger, Jr., "The Early Career of Edmund 
Ruffin, 1810-1840," The Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography, 93 (Aprill 1985), 128, 130, 131-32, 134.
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with marl before, but Ruffin was the first to combine the marling 
process with Taylor's method of cultivation. His first harvest 
yielded forty per cent more corn than his control sample. The 
self-trained scientist had proven skeptical neighbors wrong and 
discovered the key to rejuvenating the soil of the Tidewater 
South. ®
After five years of struggling to save his land, Ruffin 
faced a greater and more protracted challenge; convincing other 
farmers to adopt his methods. Despite their own failures and 
Ruffin's proven success, most of his fellow planters were too 
conservative and unwilling to change to follow the progressive 
example of Edmund Ruffin, agricultural reformer. His friend and 
benefactor, Thomas Cocke, helped Ruffin found and organize the 
Agricultural Society of Prince George County in 1818 where the 
young planter first presented his findings that October. Three 
years later he published a revised and enlarged version of his 
address in the American Farmer, an influential journal published 
in Baltimore. Although he received the praise of its editor, his 
fellow Virginians remained unconvinced. The intensive demand 
marling placed upon labor, Ruffin knew, made many question the 
efficiency of the practice. The procedure required as many as 
nineteen of the fifty-two slaves on Ruffin's plantation in the 
early 1820's. Even his friend Cocke called the operation
Allmendinger, "Ruffin," 136, 138, 142; Craven, Ruffin, 54- 
55; Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern 
United States to 1860 (2 volumes; Washington; Published by the 
Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1933), II, 780-81.
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"Ruffin's Folly," and in 1826 discouraged Ruffin from publishing 
his new manuscript. An Essay on Calcerous Manures. In 1829 
Ruffin left Coggin's Point for Shellbanks, a new plantation a few 
miles away. Once again he turned a worthless farm into a 
profitable operation. His success gave him the confidence to 
publish his Essay in 1832. The American Journal of Sciences and 
Arts gave Ruffin's book a lengthy and positive review, and even 
the skeptical Thomas Cocke now praised Ruffin's achievements.
But most farmers in Virginia stubbornly refused to change their 
ways, and no amount of self-assuredness or critical acclaim could 
compensate Ruffin for lack of public acceptance.^
In order to popularize his scientific agricultural practices 
Ruffin launched a monthly periodical, the Farmers' Register, in 
June, 1833. Published in Petersburg, Virginia, and briefly at 
Shellbanks, Ruffin's journal rose rapidly to prominence in the 
Old Dominion and beyond. Within a few months the success of the 
Register forced the rival Virginia Farmer out of business. The 
editor of the American Farmer called the Farmers' Register the 
best publication of its kind in America or Europe. Ruffin sold 
Shellbanks and moved nearly seventy slaves to his son's 
plantation, Beechwood, in order to give himself more time to 
devote to the Register. Both editor and chief contributor,
Ruffin wrote approximately half of all articles that appeared in 
the Register during its nine year existence. He reprinted the
^Allmendinger, "Ruffin," 127, 130-31, 142, 146, 148-50; 
Craven, Ruffin, 54-56.
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Arator, his Essays on Calcerous Manures, and, after his 
appointment as corresponding secretary for the new State Board of 
Agriculture in 1841, included its reports. By the early 1840's 
most Tidewater farmers had adopted Ruffin's techniques. Only his 
decision to devote more space in his journal to controversial 
political questions thwarted the success of the Farmers'
Register.
Through his publishing efforts Ruffin had finally earned the 
respect of most Virginians, but that was not enough for the man 
who had spent a quarter century trying to gain the approval of 
the public; he wanted their adulation. Even though he knew that 
his political views, especially a recent campaign against paper 
money, drew more popular opposition than his agricultural ideas, 
Ruffin perceived any rebuff or setback as a personal attack, a 
complete rejection of him and all his accomplishments. The 
"niggardly support" and "contemptuous treatment" of the Board of 
Agriculture by the state legislature made Ruffin imagine "that 
the public of Virginia was wearied of me and my writings —  & 
therefore that I would withdraw entirely from all connexions with 
the public in my native country." He duly resigned his post on 
the board in 1842, the same year that he stopped publishing the 
Farmers' Register. Three years of retirement only exacerbated 
Ruffin's feelings of rejection. "My former & I will presume to
Mitchell, Ruffin, 35-36; Allmendinger, "Ruffin," 142, 148- 
49; Edmund Ruffin') "Incidents of My Life," II, 55, Edmund Ruffin 
Papers, (microfilm) Southern Historical Collection, University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Gray, History of Agriculture in the 
Southern United States, II, 855.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
360
say great services rendered to my native state, (however praised 
& complimented, by some of the public,) have been returned mostly 
by slighting neglect, ingratitude, & subjecting me to malignant 
persecution, because I tried to add to my other services to the 
agricultural interest that of defending it from the paper banking 
robbers," he complained to a friend. "Under such circumstances I 
confess being soured towards my countrymen. Any compliments & 
honors offered by them to me now, come too late."^^
Ruffin rashly uttered these remarks after a generation of 
frustrating public service. Although initially he had wanted 
nothing to interfere with his fanatical devotion to agricultural 
reform, his involvement with agricultural societies led him to 
his first political venture. Opposition to the protectionist 
Tariff of 1816 had motivated several local agricultural groups to 
form the United Agricultural Societies of Virginia in 1818. With 
Ruffin as its secretary the organization sent a petition to 
Congress requesting the abolition of discriminatory tariffs.
Thereafter, Ruffin gradually supplanted his agricultural crusade
12with various political ones.
Like his distant cousin Beverley Tucker, Edmund Ruffin 
believed that the federal government had already accumulated too 
much power by the early 1820's and feared that his own "state
11Ruffin, "Incidents," III, 223, Ruffin Papers, University 
of North Carolina; Mitchell, Ruffin, 57; Ruffin to James H. 
Hammond, July 6, 1845, James H. Hammond Papers, Division of 
Manuscripts, Library of Congress.
l^Mitchell, Ruffin, 23.
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rights republican creed and principles will hereafter, as
heretofore, be professed only by parties out of power and seeking
its attainment." He had "very little respect for the general
course and measures of any party," and therefore belonged to
none. In 1823 the dogmatic Ruffin rejected all five likely
candidates for the next presidential election. Andrew Jackson,
Henry Clay, John Quincy Adams, John C. Calhoun, and William H.
Crawford all, he believed, had disregarded constitutional checks
on federal power through their advocacy of tariffs, internal
improvements, and federal banks. Ruffin asserted his political
independence by recommending that Virginians support Nathaniel
Macon, a Revolutionary War hero and elder statesman of North
Carolina, for the presidency. As a last resort, Ruffin would
even prefer John Marshall, a Federalist with consistent political
views, over a candidate who advocated Federalist principles while
1 ̂calling himself a Republican.
Ruffin's clear enunciation of state rights principles and 
limited government and his growing local celebrity as an 
agronomist moved many of his more influential neighbors to 
promote him for the state senate in 1823. He was elected to a 
four year term "almost without seeking either public favor or any 
of its rewards —  & certainly without my using any electioneering 
arts, which I always despised, & had not the tact to exercise.
13Drew Gilpin Faust, A Sacred Circle; The Dilemma of the 
Intellectual in the Old South (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977), 5; The Bank Reformer, I (November, 
1841), 39; Mitchell, Ruffin, 23-24.
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even if willing to be so aided." After three years in Richmond, 
however, the idealistic and inflexible junior senator had had 
enough of public office. Though he strove to base each vote on 
"the best interests of my country, & of my constituents, 
according to right & justice, & to decide on the claims of 
individuals according to their merits," he believed that every 
one of his colleagues did the opposite. He accused each of them 
of acting only "to promote the personal & private interests of 
his friend, his constituent, or his political supporter, even at 
more or less [the] sacrifice of the public interest." Ruffin 
considered himself the solitary source of integrity in the 
legislature, just as he had perceived himself as the only source 
of truth in agriculture. He believed himself "too honest" and 
conscientious to curry popular support by compromising his 
convictions, and the constant demands by his constituents to 
promote "some private & selfish interest" made him "tired & 
disgusted with being 'a servant of the people.'" Ruffin resigned 
with a year left in his term. He never changed his attitude 
about the political process and never held elected public office 
again.
For the next several years Ruffin remained at Shellbanks to 
continue his agricultural experiments and writings, but spoke out 
on public issues whenever he deemed it important. One issue came 
in the aftermath of Nat Turner's uprising, a slave insurrection
^^Mitchell, Ruffin, 25-28; Scarborough, ed., Diary, II, 544-
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that resulted in the deaths of at least sixty white people in 
Southampton County, Virginia, in August, 1831. Hysteria spread 
among white inhabitants of the surrounding counties. "The true 
facts were enough to inspire terror," Ruffin recalled, but he 
also remembered that a "state of insanity" gripped the entire 
community. Lack of information led many to spread wild rumors 
and exaggerate the magnitude of the crime. Even after Turner and 
his conspirators were captured, the panic did not abate. Within 
a hundred mile radius slaves who had never heard of the 
insurrection until after the fact were charged with complicity; 
many were executed.
Ruffin observed these developments with horror. Much of the 
evidence used against these innocent slaves "at any sober time 
would not have been deemed sufficient to convict a dog suspected 
of killing sheep." Worse still, Ruffin thought, the courts 
accepted testimony "from infamous witnesses," from men "of the 
lowest class & character," whose testimony Ruffin considered 
untrustworthy. He noted that if some "moderate or sane person" 
tried to defend a falsely accused slave or demanded a fair trial 
"he incurred odium, if not personal danger, as a favorer, if not 
approver, of murderous insurgents, & midnight slayers of sleeping 
men, women & children." When a panel of four judges, and not "an 
ignorant & impassioned jury," sentenced one slave to be hanged 
Ruffin could take no more. He composed a petition to Governor 
John Floyd demanding a pardon for this unfortunate slave. 
Believing the rule of law more important than his own popularity.
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Ruffin boldly canvassed the region for signatures. He received 
eleven. Unwilling to admit defeat and armed with self- 
righteousness, he personally presented his petition to Governor 
Floyd. Ruffin found, however, that the governor "did not dare, 
or deem it politic, to grant the petition, or to pardon in any 
such case." Upon Ruffin's return home threats of personal 
violence only increased his contempt for "fellows of the baser 
sort," and confirmed his elitist outlook.
Ruffin repeated his habit of retreating to his plantation 
after suffering a popular rebuke. Still smarting from the 
ignominy he suffered during the Turner affair, even the 
nullification controversy could not stir him to action. Although 
he supported the nullifiers, it was almost thirty years before he 
gave the movement his retroactive endorsement.^^ Of more 
immediate concern to Ruffin was the publication of his Essay on 
Calcerous Manures and the establishment of The Farmers' Register.
In the first issue of his journal Ruffin announced his 
intention to discuss "such subjects of political economy as are 
connected with the preservation & support of the interests of 
agriculture," but he quickly began to offer unsolicited opinions 
on a variety of topics, in his writings and in public. "Why 
should such a difference in the rewards of labor exist, and be
15Scarborough, ed.. Diary, II, 207-209; Mitchell, Ruffin, 
31-33. ---- ------
^^[Edmund Ruffin], "A Reminiscence of the Time of 
Nullification," Southern Literary Messenger, XXXII (April, 1861), 
249-57; Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 579.
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increasing in degree, between the sexes?" he asked in the 
Register, women, he insisted, should receive "at least as high 
rewards" as men for equal work. At about the same time, Ruffin 
also fought for higher salaries for college professors during a 
six-year tenure as a Visitor of William and Mary College.
Although proud of his work on behalf of teachers and "especially 
in putting down gross abuses" at the College, Ruffin found yet 
again that through his services "I incurred odium & gained no 
thanks.
Ruffin's crusading zeal often drew him to causes which 
appeared the most difficult. One of his most ambitious projects 
came late in 1840 when he explained to a friend, "I am every day 
the more convinced that this is the time to raise the state- 
rights banner —  & that if it is done properly, it will be 
supported by a party stronger than any in the country before 18 
months from this time." The presidential ticket of William Henry 
Harrison, a Whig, and John Tyler, a Democrat and a friend of 
Ruffin's, caused Ruffin to hope that "the better parts of the 
fragments of both [parties] will become in action what they now 
profess in words to be, state-rights republicans." To 
fascilitate the growth of a new party that advocated "strict 
limitation on federal powers, Ruffin and his second son, Julian, 
established The Southern Magazine and Monthly Review in January, 
1841. They hoped that their magazine would help organize and
17'Farmers' Register, I I I  (September, 1835), 257-58; Ruffin, 
"Incidents," 1 1 , 52-53 ; Scarborough, ed., Diary, I I ,  546; Faust, 
Sacred Circle, 105.
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discipline the "moral and intellectual forces" of state rights 
men and serve as a forum "for the improvement of our own southern 
country, for building up our own literature and science, and for 
sustaining our own doctrines, principles and institutions."^®
The first issue of Ruffin's Southern Review contained 
fiction, poetry, articles on classical history, and some 
previously unpublished letters of George Washington. it also had 
a piece that Ruffin had worked on for months, "Revolution in 
Disguise," in which he presented a theme commonly used by fire- 
eaters, "the great changes which have already been made in the 
spirit & working of the Constitution, without touching its 
letter." Over the fifty years since the adoption of the 
Constitution, Ruffin explained, Americans had strayed from the 
careful proscriptions of power laid out by the founding fathers. 
The establishment of protective tariffs, for example, was a 
"truly revolutionary movement" because they discriminated against 
the more agricultural southern states. Nowhere, Ruffin asserted, 
did the Constitution permit discriminatory taxation. Ruffin 
stated that the founders never intended or expected the people to 
chose their president and vice president "directly and in mass." 
The growing electoral power of the masses alarmed the elitist 
Ruffin. He insisted that presidential electors must remain free 
from the impassioned and ignorant instruction of the people. The
18Ruffin to A.P. Upshur, October 24, 1840, Tucker-Coleman 
Collection, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg, Virginia; Ruffin to John Tyler, June 29, 1841, in 
Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 613-16: The Southern Magazine and 
Monthly Review, I (January, 1841), î ^HT. ---------
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presidency, too, had assumed too much power, according to Ruffin. 
He believed that the Constitution clearly granted the legislative 
branch of government more power than the executive, but argued 
that now Congress was "the foot-stool of the president."
Patronage and party spoils increased the president's influence 
both in the capital and in the states. Ruffin blamed recent 
presidential judicial appointments with "polluting the fountain 
of justice with the filth of party and political servility."
These and other usurpations of power had transformed "this once 
free and responsible republican government" into "a monarchy in 
disguise," Ruffin concluded. "The people have been blinded by 
party-spirit," he said, but added cryptically that once the 
people realized that they had been deceived and deluded "they 
will rise to the majesty of that moral power which virtue alone 
can give, to avenge and repair the violations and perversions of 
the good principles of the constitution."^^
Before he began the Southern Review Ruffin had speculated 
that "the public cannot yet bear to hear the truth told" about 
political corruption. The cold reception his periodical received 
convinced him that he was right. His greatest disappointment, 
however, came from the reaction of fellow state-rights men.
Ruffin complained to Beverley Tucker, who had encouraged his 
recent journalistic venture, that proponents of state rights 
either met his efforts with "utter indifference" or looked at the
19Ruffin to Upshur, September 26, 1840, Tucker-Coleman 
Collection, William and Mary; Southern Review, I (January, 1841), 
33—59.
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Southern. Review as a vehicle through which they could "denounce &
abuse each other, so as to render their quarrel permanent, &
ensure...the utter annihilation of the state-rights party, & the
degradation & contempt of their principles." Infighting and
public apathy forced Ruffin to abandon the Southern Review after
2 0publishing only two volumes.
Before Ruffin gave up on his state-rights campaign he
decided to focus his energy on just one issue, banking reform.
Against "this enormous system of fraud & pillage," he vowed, "I
determined to resist, if I stood alone." Believing paper money
and federal banks unsound and unconstitutional, Ruffin made both
the target of a multi-faceted attack in the early 1840's. He
began by writing articles in the Farmers' Register and the
Southern Review that called for restrictions on loans and
payments of hard money upon demand. In Petersburg he formed the
Association for Promoting Currency and Banking Reform, an
organization dedicated to deluging the state legislature with
petitions demanding the replacement of bank notes with specie.
Ruffin and son Julian also edited and published The Bank 
21Reformer. Less a periodical than a monthly polemical tract, 
Ruffin issued The Bank Reformer to promulgate "the correct 
principles and beneficial operations of honest and legitimate
2 0Ruffin to Upshur, September 26, 1840, Ruffin to Beverley 
Tucker, February 5, 1841, Tucker-Coleman Collection, William and 
Mary; Faust, Sacred Circle, 91.
21Ruffin, "Incidents," II, 52, Ruffin Papers, University of 
North Carolina; Farmers' Register, IX (January, 1841), 530-34; 
Mitchell, Ruffin, 40-41.
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banking," and to expose the "wrong-doing and fraudulent
practices" currently used by banks. He distributed his
publication gratuitously "to known and zealous friends of the
cause." Ruffin pledged to keep his publication free from the
influence of political parties and to use it as a forum for the
promotion of "the state rights creed and principles." The Bank
Reformer included copious quotations on the evils of paper money
from men like George Washington, John Adams, Andrew Jackson, and
Henry Clay. Ruffin reprinted editorials and articles on the
subject from the New York Herald, the Philadelphia Ledger, and,
of course, the Farmers' Register. In both these and original
articles, Ruffin denounced advocates of contemporary banking
22practices as "servile and shameless...bank slaves."
Ruffin's activities and diatribes were in vain. Petitions 
that he had included in the back of each Bank Reformer went 
unsigned; again, the public did not share his concern or sense of 
urgency. In desperation Ruffin turned to an unorthodox and 
sensational new tactic. Instead of endorsing bank notes with his 
signature he started writing various admonishments on them and 
returning them to circulation. "The paper banking system is 
essentially and necessarily fraudulent. The very issue of paper 
as money is always a fraud; and must operate to rob the earnings 
of labor and industry, for the gain of stock-jobbing, wild 
speculation and knavery," Virginians could read on their money, 
courtesy of Edmund Ruffin. Even when he realized that his cause
22The Bank Reformer, I (November, 1841), 33, 37-39,
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was hopeless Ruffin continued to deface bank notes. He went as 
far as automating the process with the help of a small printing 
press. The habit provided him with a catharsis for the anger and 
frustration he had accumulated in his various causes over the 
past two decades. Other men might spend their time and money 
hunting and fishing, he told a friend, but Ruffin chose "to amuse
myself with hunting banks & bank directors, & in enjoying their
2 3anger & malignity."
"I cannot expect to amuse myself free of cost," Ruffin 
admitted of his "game" with the banking interests. In fact, the 
cost was dear. Like his Southern Review, Ruffin's Bank Reformer 
was short lived. He abandoned it in February, 1842, but public 
backlash against his political positions also hastened the 
suspension of the Farmers' Register three months later. His 
career as an editor cost Ruffin about $8,000 in unpaid 
subscriptions and seriously wounded his pride. After spending 
"ten of the best years" of his life on the Farmers' Register, 
Ruffin vowed to withdraw from public life in the ungrateful state 
of Virginia. It was a promise that he would keep for almost a 
decade.
A brief display of public appreciation immediately tested
2 3 The Bank Reformer, I (November, 1841), 48; Mitchell, 
Ruffin, 41-42; Ruffin to Hammond, September 7, 1845, Hammond 
Papers, Library of Congress; Hammond to Ruffin, October 10, 1845, 
Ruffin Papers, University of North Carolina.
^^Ruffin to Hammond, September 7, 1845, Hammond Papers; 
Mitchell, Ruffin, 42-43; Ruffin, "Incidents," II, 56, Ruffin 
Papers, University of North Carolina; Farmers' Register, X 
(January, 1842), 155.
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Ruffin's resolve. Acting upon resolutions of the agricultural
committee of the South Carolina legislature, late in 1842
Governor James H. Hammond asked Ruffin to conduct an agricultural
survey of the Palmetto State. Although Hammond warned Ruffin
that the people of South Carolina might not prove receptive to
Ruffin's work, the Virginian decided to accept the offer.
Politically, at least. South Carolina was more to Ruffin's
liking, and accepting the job gave him the excuse he wanted to
leave his position on the Board of Agriculture, which cut his
last official tie in Virginia. Early in 1843 Ruffin arrived in
Charleston and began a thorough, six-month investigation of the
entire state. He explored swamplands, looked for marl deposits,
and studied local farming practices. By the end of the year he
completed his Report of the Commencement and Progress of the
25Agricultural Survey of South Carolina for 1843. Hammond 
greeted the Report with enthusiasm. "I congratulate you on being 
one of the few benefactors of mankind whose services have been 
appreciated by the world, while living," the governor said. Most 
people in South Carolina, however, proved as slow to adopt 
Ruffin's recommendations as those in Virginia. Although 
Hammond's flattery could not relieve the pain Ruffin felt after 
being spurned yet again, it did help forge an important new 
friendship that prevented Ruffin from withdrawing entirely from
Hammond to Ruffin, December 18, 1842, and Ruffin, 
"Incidents," II, 55, Ruffin Papers, University of North Carolina; 
Craven, Ruffin, 80-82; Mitchell, Ruffin, 48.
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society.
Ruffin wished to retreat again to the seclusion of farm 
life, but in 1843 he owned only a house in Petersburg, "a place 
which I heartily disliked & despised." With the money he 
received from his South Carolina survey Ruffin purchased a new 
plantation. In January, 1844, he found 977 acres in Hanover 
County, northeast of Richmond, and moved his family there from 
Petersburg along with thirty of his slaves from Edmund, Jr.'s 
plantation. The previous owner had built an impressive mansion 
on the site but had also worn out the soil. The challenge of 
turning another dilapidated farm into a showplace and, perhaps,
the opportunity to prove his genius to Carolinians led Ruffin to
27name his new home "Marlbourne."
Ruffin immediately set to work. He used his slaves to 
construct an elaborate drainage system and put all but six of 
them to work digging and hauling marl; the others spread marl 
over the land. Ruffin was so consumed by the marling operation 
that he forgot to fill his icehouse before the spring thaw.
During a late freeze some considerate neighbors sent carts and 
slaves to Marlbourne to help Ruffin, but his monomania drove him 
to use the extra labor for moving more marl. After this display 
of friendship Ruffin decided to listen to his neighbors' ideas 
about farming. "But while this benefitted in some things," he
2 c
Hammond to Ruffin, February 14, 1844, Ruffin Papers, 
University of North Carolina; Faust, Sacred Circle, 1-3.
2 7Ruffin, "Incidents," II 161-62, Ruffin Papers, University 
of North Carolina; Mitchell, Ruffin, 50-51.
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quickly concluded, "in others I was more misled by erroneous 
opinions, than if I had followed entirely my own imperfect views, 
& reasoning in advance of all experience." He resumed his 
carefully devised system of crop rotation, and contrary to local 
wisdom chose to plant wheat, corn, and oats. He used the latest 
agricultural equipment, such as the McCormick plow and reaper and 
the Haw thresher. By 1848 he had doubled his initial production 
and that year earned almost $6,000 in profits on his wheat alone. 
Every year thereafter his crop yields and profits continued to
climb.28
As a slaveowner Ruffin was emphatically paternalistic. At 
times he considered himself a bad master because of his failure 
to discipline his slaves harshly, but he usually believed that 
kind treatment was the best incentive for efficient and faithful 
labor. He housed, clothed, and fed his slaves relatively well, 
attended to their medical and spiritual needs, and avoided 
separating families whenever possible. When he did split his 
slave force, he sent part to his son's plantation and, whenever 
possible, allowed the men to visit their wives at Beechwood, 
miles away. Finding hired overseers ignorant and ineffectual, 
Ruffin used Jem Sykes, one of his own slaves, as overseer for 
Marlbourne. He trusted Jem implicitly. Ruffin let Sykes live in 
the overseer's house and gave him the keys to every building on 
the plantation. Whenever Ruffin left Marlbourne Sykes was in
2 8Ruffin, "Incidents," II, 162-69, Ruffin Papers, University 
of North Carolina; Craven, Ruffin, 84-85; Mitchell, Ruffin, 52, 
55-57.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
374
29charge of over forty other slaves.
Ruffin's seclusion at Marlbourne did not ease "the 
bitterness of my feelings for the slighting & ungrateful conduct 
of my countrymen in general, & the apparent forgetfulness of the 
agricultural public of Virginia of my services." Considering 
this attitude, Ruffin admitted that "I was therefore not a little 
astonished" when he read in the newspapers that the State 
Agricultural Society of Virginia had elected him president in 
February, 1845. Determined to stay angry, however, he turned 
down the honor. Later he realized that his response "was 
ungracious," but when this and succeeding societies dissolved he 
gloated that he had not associated himself with "these 
abortions." Five years later the Agricultural Societies of the 
Eastern Shore of Maryland invited him to deliver their annual 
address. Marylanders had supported the Farmers' Register, Ruffin 
recalled, so this time he accepted. But the tone of his address 
belied his festering anger. "My speech had been written to 
condemn what I deemed the usual wrong procedure of agricultural 
societies, & to indicate a better course." In 1851 Ruffin 
received a letter from J.D.B. DeBow asking for a biography and 
portrait for the "Gallery of Enterprise" in DeBow's Review. Even 
though he admired the Review, initially Ruffin did not want his 
name and accomplishments included among "galleries 
of...nobodies." Ruffin could not resist the free publicity long,
Ruffin to Hammond, December 3, 1853, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress; Craven, Ruffin, 18-19; Allmendinger, 
"Ruffin," 149; Mitchell, Ruffin, 53-55.
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however, and finally consented.
As his sixtieth birthday approached Ruffin began to realize 
that he was an irascible old man. His hypersensitivity to 
rejection, he now understood, stemmed from "my vanity & love of 
notoriety." If any of his public acts failed to win instant and 
widespread popular support, Ruffin shamefully realized, he grew 
vindictive. "And when my slow anger has been raised to the point 
of hostility & vindictiveness," he admitted, "my resentment is 
implacable." Even the passage of time or the death of an 
"offender" seldom abated this hatred. He was not proud of this 
trait, but found himself unable to change. Recalling the cold 
reception that John Tyler experienced when he returned home after 
his presidency, Ruffin knew "If I had been in his place, I should 
never have forgiven these changed friends, & by returning neglect 
with interest, would have provoked general & undying hostility." 
Ruffin admitted, however, that Tyler "acted more wisely, & 
better." But no matter how diligently Ruffin worked to emulate 
his more gracious and magnanimous friend, he could not. He could 
never overcome his "habit of uttering my opinions of men & things 
freely & strongly, & uncautiously, as if every one I spoke before 
was a man of honour & my friend, instead of being, as often was 
the case, an enemy, a tattler & mischief-maker." Although he 
blamed others for repeating his confidential remarks out of 
context and "with false additions," he knew that his bluntness
^^Ruffin, "Incidents," III, 221, 223-24, 228, Ruffin Papers, 
University of North Carolina; DeBow's Review, XI (October, 1851), 
fronticepiece and 431-36.
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and inability to resist expressing his opinions was the root of 
much of his troubles. "I have not been able to correct myself," 
he lamented. "The only attempt to prevent the certain 
delinquency, was in my general course of seclusion from the 
public" and avoiding conversation with everyone but his family, 
closest neighbors, and most intimate friends.
One of these few friends was James Hammond. Ruffin found 
that he could share thoughts on all sorts of subjects with the 
Carolinian and receive understanding and even admiration.
Mostly, the two exchanged long letters about farming. Hammond 
followed Ruffin's experiments at Marlbourne with great interest 
and responded by telling Ruffin of his own at Redcliffe. They 
had like minds on politics as well. Hammond particularly admired 
Ruffin's scathing endorsements on bank notes. "What will it cost 
me to get a little press & do the same thing here," he asked? He 
suggested that they could work together; Hammond would print 
remarks on notes from Virginia, and Ruffin could do the same on 
notes from South Carolina. Hammond read sympathetically whenever 
Ruffin complained of alienation or rejection. He also gathered a 
sense of Ruffin's egotism and vanity, and therefore learned how 
not to upset his old friend. When asked to review the latest 
edition of Essay on Calcerous Manures, Hammond wisely declined 
because he knew that it would make Ruffin "mad as the devil if
31Ruffin, "Incidents," III, 222; Scarborough, ed.. Diary,
II, 541-42; Ruffin to Jane M. Ruffin, March 21, 1854, typescript, 
Elizabeth Gilmer Tyler Miles Collection, Alderman Library, 
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.
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3 2the whole article were not devoted to eulogizing him."
Hammond's activities in the early 1850's eventually roused 
Ruffin from his political hibernation. Both preferred secession 
over acquiescence to the Compromise of 1850. Ruffin considered 
the Compromise a "grievous wrong & humiliation of the South," but 
remained a passive spectator when Hammond attended the Nashville 
Convention in June, 1850. "I should like exceedingly to see you 
there," Hammond told Ruffin. Beverley Tucker would attend as a 
delegate; Hammond hoped the three of them could meet in 
Tennessee. Ruffin was not yet ready to leave Marlbourne, but he 
shared vicariously Hammond's disappointment when the Convention 
failed to instigate secession. After Cooperationists triumphed 
over Secessionists in South Carolina the next fall, however, 
Ruffin cautiously took a public stand. Under the pseudonym "A 
Virginian," he wrote a series of articles in the Richmond 
Examiner and the Charleston Mercury calling for southern 
resistance. He implored Carolinians to lead "in this holy war of 
defence of all that is worth preserving to the South." Ruffin 
endorsed Hammond and Tucker's "Plan for State Action" that 
recommended southerners withdraw their representatives from 
Congress, boycott presidential elections, and avoid all dealings 
with the federal government. Although resistance collapsed
3 2 Hammond to Ruffin, October 10, 1845, Ruffin Papers, 
University of North Carolina; Ruffin to Hammond, July 6, 
September 7, 1845, November 26, 1845, and Hammond to W.G. Simms, 
July 8, 1853, all in Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; Faust, 
Sacred Circle, 1-3.
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quickly throughout the South, for Ruffin there was no going 
back.
After years of introspection at Marlbourne, greater public 
appreciation of his farming practices, and the intellectual 
stimulation caused by the recent sectional conflict, Ruffin was 
ready to return to public life. In November, 1851, after 
stopping in Charleston to deliver his article for the Mercury 
that called on South Carolina to cut her ties with the federal 
government, Ruffin continued to Georgia and delivered an address 
to the Macon Agricultural Fair on the benefits of calcerous 
manures. A few months later, when Virginians attempted again to 
organize an agricultural society, Ruffin vowed to help. When he 
attended the first meeting, he was pleasantly surprised to find 
himself the center of attention. Delegates compounded his 
delight by organizing the society exactly along the lines that 
Ruffin had suggested, and for good measure elected him 
president.
As Ruffin prepared his address for the new Agricultural 
Society, he realized that topics he had previously considered 
most important were now moot. The majority of farmers in eastern 
Virginia now used marl, the society operated exactly as he had
3 3Ruffin, "Incidents," III, 248, 254; Hammond to Ruffin, 
January 12, February 8, March 27, May 7, 1850, February 7, 
September 30, 1851, Ruffin Papers, University of North Carolina; 
Charleston Mercury, November 7, 1851; Craven, Ruffin, 116-17.
^^Charleston Mercury, November 11, 1851; Ruffin, 
"Incidents," III, 227, Ruffin Papers, University of North 
Carolina; Mitchell, Ruffin, 81.
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wished, and political debate over the Compromise of 1850 had 
ceased. James Hammond, however, had exposed him to a new issue. 
In 1845 Ruffin had read Hammond's recent proslavery tracts, known 
collectively as the Clarkson letters. In 1833, while Ruffin 
edited the Farmers' Register, he had believed slavery "a great 
and increasing evil," as had many Virginians of the time. 
Professor Thomas R. Dew, however, had also convinced the young 
editor of "the utter inefficiency, or ruinous cost, of all the 
schemes that have been proposed for the emancipation and removal 
of the African race." But Ruffin's personal commitment to 
slavery and the growth of abolitionist agitation soon ended his 
ambivalence. "We shall have to defend our rights, by the strong 
hand, against the northern abolitionists," Ruffin decided after 
reading the Clarkson l e t t e r s . H e  chose to make his first 
contribution to the proslavery argument at the Virginia 
Agricultural Society.
In his address Ruffin stated that African slavery made 
southern society superior to the North. When "opposers of 
slavery" argued that the profit motive stimulated free laborers 
to work more productively than slaves and that slaveholders 
became "indolent and wasteful" because of their "prosperity and 
the ease of obtaining a living," Ruffin claimed they 
inadvertently proved "that the labors of the Southern slaves, in 
general, are lighter, and yet the profits of their owners
^^Ruffin to Hammond, September 7, 1845, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress; Farmers' Register, I (June, 1833), 36.
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greater" than those of northern workers and capitalists.
According to Ruffin, "There exists slavery, or the subjection of 
man to man, in every country under the sun." Hunger and cold 
enslaved northern workers to any employer who offered a job, he 
explained. In the North, Ruffin said, ignorant wage slaves and a 
growing number of immigrants "unacquainted with the principles of 
free government and unused to freedom in any form" could easily 
"be directed, governed, and enslaved by a few master-minds," and 
exploited "solely for the promotion of base self-interest and 
personal aggrandizement." He warned that enslavement of the 
working class in the North to a demagogue might result in 
"agrarianism, communism and anti-rentism —  all tending to 
anarchy and the destruction of property." But African slavery, 
Ruffin asserted, protected the South from these dire 
possibilities. By confining "the drudgery and brutalizing 
effects of continued toil to the inferior races," he professed, 
African slavery spared white southerners from wage slavery and 
provided "the superior race leisure and other means to improve 
mind, taste, and manners." Even if slavery were less profitable 
than free labor —  and Ruffin's experiences at Marlbourne had 
proven to him otherwise —  he believed the institution essential 
for maintaining the unique "mental and moral qualities" of white 
southerners.
Edmund Ruffin, Address to the Virginia State Agricultural 
Society, on the Effects of Domestic Slavery on the Manners, 
Habits and Welfare of the Southern States; and the Slavery of 
class to Class in the Northern States (Richmond; P.P. Bernard, 
Printer, 1853), 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14, 16.
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The enthusiastic response Virginians gave Ruffin's speech 
encouraged him to continue infusing his agricultural addresses
with political messages. Later in 1852 he returned to South
Carolina to deliver a paper at an agricultural fair in 
Charleston. He explained that over the past decade improved 
farming techniques had helped raise land values and tax revenue 
in Virginia. Ruffin claimed that rejuvenating the exhausted soil 
of the Tidewater South guaranteed not only the continuation of 
slavery in the region but also its future expansion. After the
passage of the Compromise of 1850, Ruffin explained, the renewed
growth of slavery was urgent if southerners were to preserve 
"their yet remaining rights and always vital interests." He 
called on southerners to stop their children from emigrating to 
other, more fertile states by improving production on their 
lands. This would give southerners enough population for 
sufficient representation in Congress to check "the plunderings 
and oppressions of tariffs, to protect Northern interests —  
compromises, so called, to swell Northern power...and all such 
acts to the injury of the South." Ruffin warned his audience 
that the growing power of the North forced them to choose between 
"wealth and general prosperity" and "ruin, destitution, and the 
lowest degradation to which the country of a free and noble- 
minded people can possibly be subjected."
Privately Ruffin worried that expressing these "extreme 
opinions as to southern wrongs & rights" might have been improper 
"even in Charleston." in fact, compared to diatribes by Barnwell
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Rhett, Ruffin's speech was mild. A few months later Ruffin 
learned that James DeBow, who had attended his address in 
Charleston, had persuaded the commissioner of patents to reprint 
Ruffin's paper in the federal agricultural report for 1852.
DeBow's actions flattered Ruffin; having the federal government 
pay for the printing and distribution of his attack on 
northerners greatly amused him.^^
Ruffin had finally achieved popularity in the South. Late 
in 1853 he was the center of attention at a state fair in 
Richmond that included former President Tyler and General 
Winfield Scott, a hero of the Mexican War. "It was a glorious 
scene," he boasted to Hammond. He smugly described the gathering 
as "truly an assembly of gentlemen." Ruffin's recent renown 
caused many changes in his life, "and in nothing a greater change 
than in my own happiness & feelings." With renewed confidence 
Ruffin completed his return to public life in 1854 when he 
accepted an appointment as agricultural commissioner of Virginia. 
Although a poor orator and uncomfortable speaking before an 
audience, Ruffin overcame his nervousness and spoke throughout 
the state on both agriculture and politics. He also continued 
writing, and in 1855 published Essays and Notes on Agriculture.
37Edmund Ruffin, "Southern Agricultural Exhaustion and its 
Remedy," Report of the Commissioner of Patents for the Year 1852. 
Part II; Agriculture (Washington; Robert Armstrong. Printer,
1853),373, 375, 378, 380—82, 386-87, 389; Ruffin, "Incidents," 
III, 247, Ruffin Papers, University of North Carolina. By 1850 
over 180,000 natives of Virginia lived in other southern states, 
and 155,978 had moved north of the Ohio River. See Clement 
Eaton, A History of the Old South (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1968), 195.
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3 8fourteen essays describing his work at Marlbourne.
While Ruffin enjoyed a resurgence in his public career,
privately he experienced a series of profound crises. As he
prepared his address for the Charleston agricultural fair in 1852
he made the unsettling discovery that he could not remember what
he had written just a few days before. The next winter he wrote,
"The decay of my memory had continued to increase, (as it still
has since,) so as to alarm me lest I should have greatly impaired
other mental powers, without my knowing it." Over the years his
mental faculties continued to deteriorate. Eventually he could
remember vividly only events long past. "My mind," he
complained, "has lost most of its former ability to retain recent
impressions, or to receive new ones." At the same time, physical
infirmities "much greater than even suited my age" forced the
sixty year old Ruffin to limit his activities at Marlbourne. He
3 9worried that he was dying.
Death often visited the Ruffin family during these years, 
but spared its patriarch. Two of Ruffin's children had died in 
infancy, three grandchildren followed by 1853, and his wife died 
in 1846. Ruffin's greatest jolt, however, came in 1855 when 
three of his adult daughters died unexpectedly within a few 
months. Their father poured out his grief and love for his
3 8Ruffin to Hammond, December 3, 1853, February 26, 1854, 
Hammond Papers, Library of Congress; Craven, Ruffin, 92; 
Mitchell, Ruffin, 86-87.
^^Ruffin, "Incidents," III, 245-46, Ruffin Papers, 
University of North Carolina; Scarborough, ed., Diary, II, 541; 
Ruffin, "Southern Agricultural Exhaustion," 389.
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eldest daughter, Jane, in a private, thirty-one page eulogy. He 
composed a similar piece a month later when Ella Ruffin died. By 
the time Rebecca Ruffin Bland passed away, Edmund could write no 
longer. Less than two years later Mary Ruffin, the wife of 
Edmund, Jr., also died. Edmund Ruffin had considered her "a 
daughter to me & a sister to my children, in love & by family." 
When Ruffin's own health improved, James Hammond tried to console 
his friend with the thought that he might live to be eighty. "I 
would not have it," Ruffin answered. "How many more of beloved 
children or grandchildren might I lose by death in the next 17 
years, if my life were so extendedl"^^
A strict but loving man, Ruffin had always found security 
and happiness among his family, even when he felt most ostracized 
by the public. He delighted in reading stories to his 
grandchildren in an Irish brogue and teaching them how to use 
sticks to roll wooden hoops. Every successive death shook Ruffin 
more deeply than the last, and sadly his fears of the future came 
true. Before he took his own life, Ruffin witnessed the deaths 
of eight of his eleven children and eight grandchildren. After 
learning that his son Julian had died in battle in 1864, Ruffin 
was numb. "My mind cannot take in the momentous fact, nor my 
perceptions approach to the measure of the reality." Previously 
he had worried that time had decayed his memory; now he wondered
40Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 109-10; II, xxiii-xxvi; Edmund 
Ruffin, "In Remembrance of Jane Dupuy, Formerly Ruffin," and "In 
Remembrance of Ella Ruffin," both in Ruffin Papers, University of 
North Carolina.
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if "age & decay have withered & dried up my affections & 
sensibilities, & hardened my heart, so that I can neither love as 
formerly, nor feel grief for the death of the most beloved.
By 1854 Ruffin's increasing public activities had replaced 
his interest in farming, and the deaths of his daughters the next 
year left him "still less inclined to bear the labors & 
perplexities of conducting any regular business." He decided to 
sell Marlbourne and his slaves to his sons Edmund, Julian, 
Charles, his daughter Mildred and her husband William Sayre. The 
Sayres lived at and managed Marlbourne. Ruffin liquidated his 
assets, kept $25,000 for himself, and distributed the remaining 
money —  approximately $115,000 —  among his children and 
grandchildren. In 1856 he moved to Beechwood to live with his 
son, but not in idle retirement. He continued to read 
extensively and wrote occasional articles on agriculture. He 
enjoyed nothing more than writing. "when so employed, I can with 
pleasure write rapidly for 12 or more hours in the day & night —  
& until it is necessary to rest my cramped right hand." Because 
he found it difficult to write well after stopping for any length 
of time, he decided to begin a diary, both to capture random 
thoughts and to prevent his writing skills from deteriorating.
He also decided to travel, "to visit distant friends & distant 
scenes, for which there had been no time in my previous busy
41Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 218, 293, 355, 409; II, xxiii- 
xxvi; Ruffin Diary, May 23, 1864, Library of Congress.
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life."42
One of his first trips was to White Sulphur Springs, a 
popular resort in western Virginia. There he spoke about 
politics with other vacationing southerners. Over the past two 
years northerners had reacted angrily to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
a bill which permitted slavery to expand north of the boundary 
set by the Missouri Compromise in 1820. The renewal of sectional 
tension was accompanied by the creation of a new political party, 
the Republicans. An exclusively northern organization, the 
Republicans united around the pledge to stop all further 
expansion of slavery into the federal territories. Ruffin and 
others contemplated the best southern response in the event that 
a Republican were ever elected president. Ruffin vigorously 
promoted secession and the creation of a Southern Confederacy as 
the only sound policy. "I was surprised to find how many 
concurred with me, in the general proposition," Ruffin noted, 
"though scarcely one of them would have dared to utter the 
opinions, at first, & as openly as I did."^^
Although he had never stopped wishing for disunion since 
1850, Ruffin found that only the rise of the Republican party had 
convinced other southerners that perpetuation of the Union posed 
a real threat to their liberties, interests, and very existence. 
Ruffin had already spent his entire life trying to save the South 
by rehabilitating its agriculture and defending its rights. But
^^Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 5-7, 15-16, 43-45.
4 3Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 16; Mitchell, Ruffin, 92,
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now Ruffin discovered his ultimate crusade; saving the South 
itself. The failures and rebuffs he had suffered earlier and his 
recent, painful private misfortunes had calloused Ruffin, but had 
also given the old reformer the resilience necessary to take on a 
difficult and dubious mission. No matter how encouraging he 
found the confidential conversations at White Sulphur Springs, 
Ruffin knew that "no one in Va had yet advocated such extreme 
measures." Aware that few others in his state had the boldness 
to begin the campaign for secession, Ruffin decided he was 
"willing to risk incurring the odium of opinions so unpopular 
still with many." The self-proclaimed leader of disunion in 
Virginia had but one reservation, that he would prove "a worthy & 
efficient advocate of the cause." His fanatical efforts over the 
next five years left no doubt of his unique abilities.
Among Ruffin's most enthusiastic supporters that summer was 
Roger A. Pryor, an editor at the Richmond Enquirer. Pryor 
promised to publish any editorials Ruffin wrote that promoted 
secession, no matter how extreme. Ruffin set to work 
immediately, and soon completed a series of articles entitled "On 
the Consequences of Abolition Agitation and the Separation of the 
Union" which Pryor published in D e c e m b e r . H e  began by warning 
southerners that even though Republicans had lost the 
presidential election a month before, they had done so by the 
narrowest of margins; had they managed their campaign better,
4 4Scarborough, ed., Diary, I, 16. 
^^Ibid., I, 17, 18, 19.
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Ruffin said, they would have won. Regardless, the rapid growth 
of the northern population insured the election of a Republican 
in 1860. Then, Ruffin explained. Republicans would destroy 
slavery, the South, and the Constitution without violating a 
letter of the law. The president would distribute patronage 
positions to abolitionists and send them to post offices and 
customs houses all over the South. Then he would replace 
military officers in southern forts and arsenals with more 
abolitionists, thus transforming all federal property into 
centers for abolitionist operations and havens for runaway 
slaves. A Republican Congress would end slavery in the District 
of Columbia and thereby make the nation's capital into the 
largest center for abolitionism in the South. By preventing the 
admission of new slave states —  as they had already done 
successfully so far with Kansas —  admitting only free ones, and 
even permitting existing free states to divide themselves, a 
Republican Congress would allow the North to create the three- 
fourths majority needed to pass constitutional amendments. Then, 
Ruffin stated, they would legally abolish slavery. If the South 
had resisted the first assault by abolitionists against slavery, 
the Missouri Compromise, Ruffin claimed that they might have 
crushed their foes in the bud. By yielding to anti-slavery 
forces in 1820 and compromising again in 1850, however, Ruffin 
argued that southerners had allowed abolitionism to grow too 
strong. Now it was too late to stop it within the Union. Ruffin 
asserted that the only safety for the South lay in secession. By
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acting promptly, he assured his readers, southerners could escape 
the tyrannical Union without fear of reprisal. Even if 
northerners were foolish enough to invade the South, he promised 
that Southern armies would crush them quickly and decisively.
During a visit to Washington in February, 1857, Ruffin 
continued his campaign for secession by meeting individually with 
various southern congressmen. He had hoped to find support from
R.M.T. Hunter, a senator from Virginia, but interpreted his
reluctance to speak out on any controversial issue as a sign that 
he had presidential aspirations and feared offending northern 
Democrats. In a meeting with Robert Toombs of Georgia, Ruffin 
expressed his approval of the senator's plan to tax northern 
commodities before their sale in the South, even though he
doubted the constitutionality of such a scheme. Ruffin met with
various other congressmen, but he also saw James DeBow. DeBow 
offered to publish of some of Ruffin's agricultural essays in his 
Review, and also suggested the reprinting of Ruffin's article on 
abolition and secession after only a cursory glance at the 
manuscript. "I was surprised that he should so consent," Ruffin 
thought, but he was pleased to find DeBow so willing an ally.^^
A few months later Ruffin found another influential 
supporter. On a trip to Charleston he visited Barnwell Rhett and 
his son and talked at length about disunion. Ruffin cautioned 
them that Virginia would never secede first, but if five or six
46Scarborough, Diary, I, 35-39; DeBow's Review, XXII (June,
1857), 583-93; XXIII (September to December, 1857), 266-72, 385- 
90, 546-52, 596-607.
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States in the deep South seceded then Virginia, Maryland, and all 
other slave states "would be forced to join their southern 
brethren." He wrote an article to that effect for the Mercury, 
and the Rhetts published it on May 13. That day Barnwell Rhett 
called on Ruffin so the two secessionists could continue their 
conversation. They commiserated that the South lacked "proper 
leaders —  men who have the will & the ability, & also the 
necessary influence with their people" to foment secession. Some 
of the best politicians, they thought, were "seekers of high 
federal offices, & aspirants for higher, & therefore are self­
bribed to a course of inactivity, or submission." To Ruffin, at 
least, Rhett had proven his commitment to secession for years. 
Because of Rhett's eagerness to publish Ruffin's editorials, the 
Virginian vowed to make the Mercury "my channel of 
communication.
Encouraged by the help of DeBow and Rhett, Ruffin tried to 
broaden his network of secessionists even further. He had long 
considered former governor Hammond "one of the ablest men in 
S[outh] C[arolina]," and the possessor of "unquestionably the 
most powerful mind in the southern states." Now, however, Ruffin 
saw his friend "rusting in solitude." In July Ruffin wrote to 
Hammond, "A leader is wanting for the south," and suggested that 
Hammond was that man. "Show that you are not dead for all useful 
action," Ruffin urged, and begged him to attend the Knoxville
47Scarborough, ed.,Diary, I. 65, 66, 225; Charleston 
Mercury, May 13, 1857.
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Commercial Convention in August. Previous conventions, Ruffin
explained, had been dominated by delegates who were "agents of
northern merchants, or otherwise intimately connected with
northern trade, & the keeping the south tributary to the north."
Ruffin believed that the proper leader could transform these
conventions into forums for the advancement of southern
interests, commercial and otherwise. Because Hammond declined
Ruffin's advice and did not attend the convention Ruffin ignored
the meeting at Knoxville. After James DeBow successfully
politicized the affair, however, Ruffin decided to pursue the
4 8same results at the next year's meeting.
In the meantime Ruffin continued to coax other southerners 
as he searched for a catalyst for secession. At the end of 1857 
he paid DeBow to reprint his disunion essay in pamphlet form and 
Ruffin mailed copies of it to various public figures in the 
South, including each governor, and on another trip to Washington 
early in 1858 he distributed over a hundred more. While in the 
capital Ruffin observed some of the tense congressional debates 
over the statehood of Kansas. He was not surprised, therefore, 
when he returned to Virginia and learned about the fight between 
Laurence Keitt and Galusha Grow. Although he considered such 
brawls disgraceful, he thought this incident "as probable a 
manner of the beginning of a separation of the states as any
4 8Ibid., I, 75; Ruffin to Hammond, July 4, 1857, Hammond 
Papers, Library of Congress; see above, pages 325-27.
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other.
Perhaps animated by this belief Ruffin composed another 
essay, "The Political Economy of Slavery." in this tract Ruffin 
repeated and elaborated upon standard proslavery assertions that 
slave labor was cheaper than free labor and that African slavery, 
because of the paternalism of white owners, precluded the 
development of pauperism in the South. With the encouragement 
and cooperation of William 0. Goode, another congressman from 
Virginia, Ruffin printed 5,000 copies of the essay on a visit to 
Washington in the spring of 1858. Ruffin paid for half the 
printing expenses, and Goode collected the rest from southern 
congressmen. With the help of sympathetic legislators Ruffin 
placed a copy of his pamphlet on the desks of every southerner in 
Congress —  and a few northerners as well. Over the next several 
days he mailed most of the rest free of charge, thanks to the 
franking privilege of Congressmen Goode and Thomas Ruffin of 
North Carolina (no relation), newly-elected Senator Hammond and 
Senator James M. Mason of Virginia.
As he mailed his essays early in May, Ruffin learned about 
his election to the upcoming southern commercial convention in 
Montgomery. Despite DeBow's powerful disunion speech at 
Knoxville, Ruffin did not believe such conventions of "direct
A QScarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 138, 148-49, 152, 155, 174.
^^Edmund Ruffin, "The Political Economy of Slavery," in Eric 
L. McKitrick, ed.. Slavery Defended; The Views of the Old South 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Incorporated,
1963), 69-85; Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 174, 180, 181, 182.
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use" for secession; on the other hand, he recognized the 
opportunity they presented for discussing political topics with 
men from all over the South, "& for the possible chance of 
forwarding the union & welfare of the southern states, & in my 
private capacity, instigating secession from the northern 
states.
On his train ride to Montgomery the evangelist of disunion
pressed copies of his slavery and disunion essays into the hands
of all sympathetic listeners, and upon his arrival began
immediately talking to Rhett, william L. Yancey, and others about
secession. "There seems in many a strong feeling of disunion,"
he noted optimistically. The proceedings of the convention did
not disappoint him. Yancey's impassioned orations in favor of
the African slave trade impressed the old Virginian, though
Ruffin believed Yancey "so fluent that he does not know when to
stop." Ruffin himself was moved to make a brief speech. He
suggested that future conventions should no longer address
strictly commercial issues, but instead "report upon each of the
great questions of public policy, in which the most important
interests of the South are involved." He explained that these
assemblies provided a unique opportunity to avoid the influences
of "unprincipled demagogues and greedy and interested office
52seekers" that plagued party conventions.
^^Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 183.
52Ibid., I, 183-85, 187-88; DeBow's Review, XXV (October,
1858), 1 ^ 6 0 .
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The politicization of the Montgomery convention and the 
inspirational speeches by Yancey gave Ruffin the encouragement he 
needed for one of his "schemes for the operating on the public 
mind of the South." A few days after the convention Ruffin met 
with Yancey to discuss the organization of associations designed 
to promote secession through discussion, public speeches, and 
publications. Ruffin asked Yancey if he would begin the effort 
on the next Fourth of July by giving an oration "directed to 
southern independence —  & making use of the examples of the 
disunionists who declared independence from our mother country." 
Yancey agreed to do it, and also supported Ruffin's "Declaration 
& League," a statement of southern grievances and appropriate 
responses. Yancey enthusiastically commenced the formation of 
the League of United Southerners in Alabama; Ruffin departed for 
home where he would help form an identical group called the 
Association of Southerners.^^
Ruffin did not wait until he returned to Virginia before he 
began to promote his Association. In North Carolina he tried in 
vain to convince his friend and kinsman. Judge Thomas Ruffin, to 
support his endeavor. "He is too cautious —  perhaps too wise —  
to go with me," Ruffin contemplated. Once back at Beechwood, 
however, his doubts evaporated when a friend of his agreed that 
"separation from the northern & oppressing states" was the only 
way to save the South. Ruffin immediately sent this friend a 
copy of the "Declaration & League," and wrote a letter of
^^Scarborough, ed., Diary, I, 195-96, 197, 220.
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encouragement to Yancey. Roger Pryor, now editor of the Richmond 
South, published two articles by Ruffin about the Association in 
early June. At the end of the month Ruffin read of Yancey's 
successful initiation of their "scheme" in Alabama. When Ruffin 
learned that a committee in Clinton, Louisiana, had recently 
created a similar organization he quickly mailed them his 
"Declaration" and "Plan of Association." The initial success of 
these organizations only made Ruffin impatient for future growth. 
"I am not content to wait for the slow actions of other persons," 
he told Hammond as he asked for the senator's help in franking 
more pamphlets that, again, Ruffin had paid for.^^
In August, however, Ruffin's project began to unravel. 
Although Hammond cooperated with Ruffin the senator's heart was 
not in the matter; contrary to his old friend, he believed 
southerners already well informed "& up to the matter" of 
secession. For Ruffin, worse than Hammond's lukewarm support was 
the publication of Yancey's "Slaughter Letter" and the ensuing 
distress caused by the Alabama fire-eater's promise to 
"precipitate the cotton States into a Revolution.Ironically, 
Yancey's most vocal critic was Roger Pryor. In the South he 
denounced Yancey and his League as menaces to the national 
Democratic party. Ruffin claimed that the hope of retaining 
northern political support for R.M.T. Hunter's presidential
^^Ibid., I, 53 and note, 197, 200, 205, 209; Ruffin to 
Hammond, July 23, 1858, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
55Ruffin to Hammond, August 9, 1858, Hammond Papers, Library 
of Congress.
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campaign, and not a lack of faith in "the cause of the South," 
motivated his attack. Still, Ruffin could not forget, "Pryor 
knew that the scheme, of association, & the general policy 
recommended were mine," and promptly terminated his friendship 
with the editor. Although Yancey continued to fight for the 
League in editorial columns, Ruffin decided to abandon the 
project.
At present, he believed, "not one in 100 of those who think 
with us, will dare to avow their opinions, & to commit themselves 
by such open action." Throughout Virginia, Ruffin observed, "any 
public man would destroy his political prospects by advocating 
the separation of the Union." Only men like himself, who neither 
sought public office nor had one to lose, could utter such 
sentiments with impunity. Ruffin believed that with a 
presidential election only two years away "every man who hopes to 
gain anything from the continuance of the Union, will be loud & 
active in shouting for its integrity & permanence" and, like 
Pryor, call for the unity of the Democratic party. For the time, 
Ruffin thought no one could "rouse the South." Personally he 
hoped for a sectional division of the Democratic party and the 
election of a Republican president "so that the dishonest & timid 
southern men may then be as strongly bribed by their selfish 
views to stand up for the South, as now to stoop & truckle to the
^^Ruffin to Hammond, August 9, 1858, Hammond Papers, Library 
of Congress; Scarborough, ed., Diary, I, 220-21, 222-23, 228,
263, 343. ----
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
397
North." In the meantime, Ruffin vowed to wait.^^
Patience, however, was a quality Ruffin lacked. He knew 
that he could not tolerate inactivity, and he thrived on his 
energetic, fanatic labors for secession. In fact, his efforts 
over the past few years improved his health. His loss of memory 
continued, but since he had begun his great crusade he noticed,
"I have been as contented & happy as my other circumstances 
permitted." He occupied his time by writing a flurry of new 
essays. Between 1858 and 1859 he wrote four articles for DeBow's 
Review and one for the Mercury, all of them arguing that
C Oemancipation would devastate blacks as well as whites.
While Ruffin did all he could to convince southerners of the 
danger that would accompany a Republican administration, he found 
the actions of others wanting. He complained that a speech 
delivered by Laurence Keitt in August, 1858, was too moderate, 
and even a letter from Hammond could not convince Ruffin that his 
old friend could resist the temptation to tie his fortunes with 
the national Democracy, when DeBow failed to print Ruffin's 
latest contributions as quickly as their author desired, Ruffin
^^Scarborough, ed., Diary, I, 205, 223, 226, 227, 444.
^®Edmund Ruffin, "Equality of the Races —  Haytien and 
British Experiments," DeBow's Review, XXV (July, 1858), 27-36; 
"The Effects of High Prices of slaves," ibid., XXVI (June, 1859), 
647-57; "The Colonization Society and Liberia," ibid., XXVII 
(July, September, October, November, 1859), 55-73, 336-344, 392- 
402, 583-94; "African Colonization Unveiled," ibid., XXIX 
(November, 1860), 638-649; Ruffin to DeBow, February 9, 1859, 
James D.B. DeBow Papers, William R, Perkins Library, Duke 
University, Durham, North Carolina; "Slavery and Free Labor 
Defined and Compared," Charleston Mercury, June 21, 22, 24, 28, 
30, July 1, 4, 1859.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
398
grumbled, "These delays & long intermissions are vexatious." The 
Vicksburg Commercial Convention of 1859 resolved to repeal 
federal prohibitions on the African slave trade, but Ruffin had 
hoped that it would do much more. All the while the Republican 
party grew, as did Ruffin's sense of imminent danger for the
South.59
In October, 1859, Ruffin read about John Brown's attempt to 
lead a slave insurrection at Harper's Ferry, Virginia. When he 
learned that many northerners considered Brown's efforts heroic, 
Ruffin exclaimed "It is astonishing even to me, & also very 
gratifying to me, that there should be so general an excitement & 
avowed sympathy among the people of the North for the late 
atrocious conspiracy." Surely, he thought, "This must open the 
eyes of the people of the south." Now even those who had feared 
disunion must recognize that course as "the only safeguard from 
the insane hostility of the north to southern institutions & 
interests.
When he learned that Brown had been condemned to death in 
late November, Ruffin hurried to the "seat of war." Brown's 
execution promised to be the dramatic sectional confrontation 
that Ruffin hoped would trigger secession. "For my part, I wish 
that the abolitionists of the north may attempt a rescue. If it 
is done, & defeated, every one engaged will be put to death like 
wolves." Even if such an attempt succeeded, Ruffin believed, "it
59Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 223-24, 304-305. 
5°Ibid., I, 348-51, 354, 356-57.
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will be a certain cause of separation." Ruffin's excitement was 
heightened upon his arrival in Harper's Ferry when he walked 
through the town with local dignitaries and "many young men... 
saluted me as we passed, though I did not know them. It is a 
stirring time." So stirring for Ruffin that he felt the 
reawakening of his "youthful military fervor" that had been 
dormant since his service in the War of 1812. He persuaded the 
commander of cadets from the Virginia Military Institute to let 
him join their ranks in the guard detail at Brown's hanging in 
nearby Charlestown. The old, gray-haired Ruffin realized, "I 
shall occupy the somewhat ludicrous position of being the 
youngest member (or recruit,) of this company of boyish 
soldiers," but he could not resist the opportunity to witness 
either a daring rescue attempt or the execution of the villainous 
Brown.
As the aged soldier joined the cadets on the morning of 
December 2, he saw that his young comrades had to use "all the 
constraint of their good manners to hide their merriment." After 
chatting with them briefly to break their tense amusement, Ruffin 
and the others marched to the gallows and waited for Brown's 
arrival. Brown approached on a wagon, sitting on his own coffin. 
He said nothing as he climbed the scaffold, and Ruffin thought 
his movements "gave no evidence of his being either terrified or 
concerned." A rope was placed around his neck, a hood put over 
his head. Confusion among his military escorts caused a delay of
G^ibid., I, 361-63, 366-68.
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at least five minutes, during which time Brown stood motionless. 
This "awful state of suspense," Ruffin believed, seemed "cruel & 
most trying...notwithstanding his atrocious crimes, & worse 
intentions." Finally Brown was hanged; his hands convulsed 
slightly after a minute, then a warm southern breeze rocked his 
body gently "like a pendulum.
After all the anticipation. Brown's death was strangely 
melancholy for Ruffin. "it is impossible for me not to respect 
his thorough devotion to his bad cause, & the undaunted courage 
with which he has sustained it, through all losses & hazards," 
Ruffin noted sympathetically. The southern fanatic gave due 
credit to his northern counterpart; "The villain whose life has 
thus been forfeited, possessed but one virtue (if it should be so 
called,) or one quality that is more highly esteemed by the world 
than the most rare & perfect virtues. This is physical or animal 
courage, or the most complete fearlessness of & insensibility to 
danger & death.
Ruffin did not mourn Brown's death. Instead, he quickly 
developed a dramatic new scheme to keep alive both the memory of 
Brown's raid and the fear it caused throughout the South. The 
day before the execution Ruffin had procured one of the many 
pikes that Brown & his accomplices had brought to Virginia with 
the intention of arming slaves. He pasted a label on its handle
6 2Ibid., I, 359-71; James M. Oliver, et al, to Edmund 
Ruffin, January 18, 1860, Ruffin Papers, University of North 
Carolina.
^^Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 350, 371.
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that read "Samples of the favors designed for us by our Northern 
Brethren." He carried the pike with him to Washington, naturally 
causing quite a stir along the way. Once in the capital he 
displayed his prize to various southern congressmen and the 
startled and curious guests at his hotel. The reaction caused by 
his pike made him decide to expand on his project by sending a 
labelled pike to the governor of each slave state. Ruffin asked 
the superintendent of the armory at Harper's Ferry to send the 
pikes to him in Washington. Like a child Ruffin waited 
impatiently for his special delivery. in the meantime he had 
written labels and made arrangements with Senator Clement C. Clay 
of Alabama to distribute the pikes on his behalf after he 
returned to Virginia. Ruffin continued to display his own pike 
upon his arrival in Richmond and carried it on many subsequent 
travels, transforming himself into the symbol of secession 
incarnate
Early in 1860 Ruffin stumbled upon yet another new tactic to 
promote disunion. He read a recently published novel that 
forecasted the results of secession. Ruffin thought it "a very 
foolish book," but believed "the subject promised something, & 
the idea might be carried out to good purpose." He began writing 
his own version on the last day of February. Ruffin's novel took
G^Ibid., I, 368, 375-76, 378, 379-82, 383, 392, 402, 431, 
438-39, 442-43; C.C. Clay to Ruffin, June 21, 1860, Ruffin 
Papers, University of North Carolina; Charleston Mercury,
November 28, 1860. Later, Ruffin must have acquired more pikes. 
Diarist Mary Chesnut noted in July, 1861, "Old Ruffin has 
promised me a John Brown pike." C. Vann Woodward, ed., Mary 
Chesnut's Civil War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 114,
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the form of a series of dispatches from an English correspondent 
in America to the London Times from 1864 to 1870, when civil war 
raged during the second administration of Republican President 
William Seward. Ruffin's Anticipations of the Future vaguely 
resembled Beverley Tucker's Partisan Leader, but as Ruffin 
explained, "I suppose every incident of danger, damage, or 
disaster to the South, which is predicted by northerners, or 
southern submissionists —  as war, blockade, invasion, servile 
insurrection —  (which I do not believe in my self,) & supposing 
these, as premises, I thence follow through what I suppose to be 
the legitimate consequences," that is, a Southern victory.
Ruffin worked intensely, but his fictional destruction of 
the Union and slaughter of Yankee troops "were alike amusing to 
my mind, &...conducive to immediate pleasure." By the end of 
April he had written over 270 pages and arranged for serializing 
his work in the Mercury under the title "Glimpses of the Future." 
After agreeing to cover two-thirds of the cost, Ruffin sent the 
complete manuscript —  over 400 pages —  to a publisher in June. 
Not even the unexpected Republican nomination of Abraham Lincoln 
could faze the author; just before sending his book to the 
printer he simply changed the premise so that Seward succeeded 
Lincoln in 1864.^^
^^Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 407-408; Ruffin to Hammond,
May 4, 1860, Hammond Papers, Library of Congress.
^^Scarborough, ed., Diary, I, 413, 415-16, 428-29, 437-38; 
Charleston Mercury, April 18, 21, May 9, 11, 16, 19, 31, June, 
passim, 1860; Edmund Ruffin, Anticipations of the Future to Serve 
as Lessons for the Present Time. In the Form of Extracts from an
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Ruffin continued a variety of other activities while he 
wrote Anticipations of the Future. He obtained a cloth suit made 
entirely in Virginia and wore it as he paraded with his pike to 
promote both southern manufacturing and a boycott of northern 
goods. Robert Barnwell Rhett, Jr., asked Ruffin's aid in finding 
copies of Beverley Tucker's speech at the Nashville Convention 
and Ruffin's "Consequences of Abolition Agitation" for 
republication in the Mercury. Ruffin gladly complied, and also 
sent a new article in which he attacked Governor Henry A. Wise of 
Virginia as "a political liar of the first magnitude." He 
intended all these actions to capitalize on the outrage John 
Brown had created in the South. By April, 1860, however, Ruffin 
noticed, "The violent agitation & impulse caused by the Harper's 
Ferry affair seem to have completely subsided.
Before Ruffin grew too despondent he received a heartening 
letter from Hammond. The senator believed "the end" was fast 
approaching in Washington and suggested that Ruffin "come & see 
the fun." Ruffin chose to stay in Virginia to work on his novel, 
but read gleefully in local papers that an end had come to the 
national Democratic party at its convention in Charleston.
Ruffin rejoiced on two counts; first, "that the south will be
English Resident in the United States, to the London Times, from 
1864 to 1870. With an Appendix, on the Causes and Consequences
of the Independence of the South (Richmond; J.W. Randolph, 1860 ) ,
viii, 7-8
®"^Scarborough, ed., Diary, I, 384-85 , 402, 404 , 405-406, 
410, 415; R.B. Rhett, Jr., to Ruffin, March 1, 1860, Ruffin 
Papers, University of North Carolina.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
404
henceforth separated from & relieved of the insatiable vampyre, 
the northern democracy," and second, that a split in the 
Democratic majority would "forward the election of Seward, or any 
other abolitionist," and thereby hasten secession. After the 
events at Charleston, Hammond's "promised inducement of 'fun'" in 
the capital proved irresistible. Ruffin would wait a few weeks 
before going to Washington, when he believed "'the end' shall be 
more nearly approached."^®
Before leaving for Washington, Ruffin went to South Carolina 
to attend the special convention for the election of delegates to 
the Southern Democratic convention in Richmond and "to see what 
is the disposition as to secession of the cotton states (or any 
of them) from the Union." When he arrived in Columbia, he 
conferred with the Rhetts and others. He warned them not to 
expect Virginia or any border state to secede first or even 
simultaneously with those of the deep South, but assured the 
Carolinians that other states would follow eventually, "after 
having served...as an impregnable barrier of defence against any 
attack from the north."®®
Armed with his "usual travelling supply of pamphlets,"
Ruffin proceeded to Washington. He had a brief conversation with 
Senator Mason and Laurence Keitt, with whom Ruffin now saw eye to
Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 415, 416-18; Hammond to 
Ruffin, April 16, 1860, Ruffin Papers, University of North 
Carolina; Ruffin to Hammond, May 4, 21, 1860, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress.
^^Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 423-25.
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eye. On a short visit to Baltimore Ruffin met Louis Wigfall.
Ruffin found the senator's "oddity of speech & opinions, & their
extravagance of [express]ion" amusing, but had no quarrel with
the Texan's views on disunion. Ruffin proudly saw his pikes in a
Senate committee room, all "beautifully labelled" under the
direction of Senator Clay. Meetings with others —  sometimes in
Ruffin's hotel room with his own pike in sight —  confirmed
Hammond's report that Washington was buzzing with anticipation 
70over secession.
The rapid changes in events and public attitudes made Ruffin 
grow more impatient than aver. Despite the cooperation he 
received from the Rhetts, Ruffin pressured them to publish his 
contributions faster than they were capable of doing. When DeBow 
could not keep up with Ruffin's writings, the Virginian denounced 
the quality of the Review and berated its editor as "a crafty & 
mean Yankee in conduct & principle." Having already spread the 
gospel of disunion along the eastern seaboard and into the Gulf 
South, Ruffin turned westward to Kentucky late in the summer of 
1860. He knew unionism was strong in the Bluegrass state and 
that "I must be deemed a sort of speculative Benedict Arnold" by 
many of its people. When he discussed politics, therefore, he 
did so "in jocular manner, & sometimes with exaggerated 
expressions," which left his "most odious doctrines to be 
inferred & understood." When he grew certain that some states in 
the deep South would secede if a Republican were elected
^°Ibid., I, 429-34, 447.
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president, Ruffin decided that he would not wait for Virginia to
join them. He vowed to leave his beloved state and "move
southward, where resistance, & safety for slave property, may be
71hoped for —  & which are hopeless in Va."
In the last two months before the election, Ruffin sent 
another series of articles to the Mercury. His latest articles 
promised Carolinians that no amount of federal power, not even an 
invasion by their entire military force of less than 19,000, 
could subjugate a single southern state. At the first drop of 
blood, he said, all other slave states would join any that had 
already seceded in a Southern Confederacy. Ruffin claimed that 
the southern coastline was too large to blockade effectively, and 
that the British would stop any such attempt soon after it 
began.
Ruffin also followed the news from the North with great 
interest. He was elated when state elections in Pennsylvania 
resulted in a strong Republican triumph and believed that 
Republicans would also carry Pennsylvania in November, insuring 
the victory of Lincoln and forcing southerners "to chose between 
secession & submission to abolition domination." He also read 
about Yancey's daring speaking tour through the North and urged 
his young colleague to devote "your time, your labor, & your
71R.B. Rhett, Jr., to Ruffin, April 5, 1860, Ruffin Papers, 
University of North Carolina; Ruffin to James DeBow, July 19, 
1860, Frank DeBow to James DeBow, August 21, 1860, DeBow Papers, 
Duke University; Scarborough, ed., Diary, I, 426, 443, 459-61.
^^Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 459, 466, 470, 477-78, 480; 
Charleston Mercury, November 6, 7, 1860.
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great power as a popular orator, to speaking to assemblages of 
the people in every southern state," to become "another Patrick 
Henry.
On November 6, election day, Ruffin voted. The day, he 
believed, would "serve to show whether these southern states are 
to remain free, or to be politically enslaved —  whether the 
institution of negro slavery, on which the social & political 
existence of the south rests, is to be secured by our resistance, 
or to be abolished in a short time, as the certain result of our 
present submission to northern domination." He decided to vote 
for the southern Democrat, John C. Breckinridge, then head 
immediately for South Carolina, "where I hope that even my feeble 
aid may be worth something to forward the secession of the state 
& consequently of the whole South.
Ruffin reached the South Carolina border the next day and 
discovered that a "universal secession feeling appeared."
"Minute men," wearing the distinctive blue cockade, joined him at 
every stop on the train to Columbia. The capital was bustling 
with state and local officials and cadets from the South Carolina 
Military Academy. Soon after reaching his hotel, Ruffin heard 
the sound of music and voices calling him out to make a speech.
He responded, "Fellow-citizens; I have thought and studied upon 
this question for years. It has been literally the great one
73Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 473, 476, 479-80; Ruffin to 
Yancey, October 29, 1860, in ibid., 633-35.
^^Ibid., I, 481, 482-83.
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idea of my life, the independence of the South, which I verily 
believe can only be accomplished through the action of South 
Carolina." Ruffin urged Carolinians to act quickly, to "give 
encouragement to the timid" and to "frighten your enemies.
The crowd greeted each of his brief utterances with loud 
cheers and applause that warmed the old man's heart. To his sons 
Ruffin wrote.
The time since I have been here has been the happiest of my 
life....The public events are as gratifying to me as they 
are glorious & momentous. And there has been much to 
gratify any individual & selfish feelings. I have always 
heretofore been treated most kindly & respectfully by the 
people of S.C. But all previous did not compare with the 
present time.
Ruffin thought the laudatory words of many "mere compliment, & in 
cases flattery. But even in the latter case it is gratifying to 
me." Only one thought dampened his enthusiasm; "Oh! if I may see 
such a time in Va.;"
A few nights later, in Charleston, another crowd called for 
Ruffin. "My friends, brother disunionists," he said, if Virginia 
remained in the Union "under the domination of this infamous, 
low, vulgar tyranny of Black Republicanism" and any other state 
seceded, "I will seek my domicil[e] in that State and abandon 
Virginia forever." The next morning he participated in the
75Ibid., I, 483-85; Charleston Mercury, November 8, 1860.
7 6Charleston Mercury, November 8, 1860; Ruffin to Edmund 
Ruffin, Jr., and Julian C. Ruffin, November 11, 1860, Ruffin 
Papers, University of North Carolina. Also see Elizabeth 
[Ruffin] Sayre to Ruffin, November 16, 1860, Julian C. Ruffin to 
Ruffin, November 17, 1860, and Mildred [Ruffin] Sayre to Ruffin, 
December 4, 1860, Ruffin Papers, University of North Carolina.
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raising of the Palmetto Flag on a newly erected, ninety-foot
"secession pole." He then joined Barnwell Rhett on a trip to
Georgia to determine that state's willingness to secede. When
they learned that Georgians would not discuss disunion until they
met in a special convention on January 16, the two fire-eaters
77returned to their respective homes.
Ruffin reached to Beechwood early in December, but not even
the death of another daughter, Elizabeth Ruffin Sayre, could
shake his attention from secession. A few days after her funeral
he set out again for Charleston, where he had been invited to sit
with delegates at a state convention and watch disunion become
reality. After obtaining one of the pens used to sign the
ordinance of secession, which he kept "as a valued memento of the
occasion," Ruffin made arrangements to attend the secession
convention in Florida on January 5. In Tallahassee, on his
sixty-seventh birthday, Floridians invited Ruffin to join their
proceedings and two days later asked him to speak. He did so,
but very briefly and simply to urge them to act quickly. On
January 10 news arrived that Mississippi had seceded the day
before, and Floridians joined them by a vote of sixty-two to 
7 8seven.
Ruffin returned to Beechwood later that month where he
77Charleston Mercury, November 17, 1860; Scarborough, ed.. 
Diary, I, 499-501.
^^"Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 503-505, 508, 510-11, 513, 
515-23, 525-29; Charles Campbell to Ruffin, November 22, 1860, 
Ruffin Papers, University of North Carolina.
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anxiously followed the news of last-ditch efforts in Congress to 
save the Union and the increasing tension between state and 
federal forces in Charleston Harbor. "The interest I feel for 
public affairs, & the Southern Confederacy, absorbs every other," 
so news from the provisional Confederate Congress at Montgomery 
could not come quickly enough for Ruffin. When he learned about 
the selection of Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. Stephens as 
president and vice president, Ruffin hailed the new 
administration for having greater "intellectual ability & moral 
worth" than any since James Madison's. With the establishment of 
the Confederate States of America, Ruffin decided to leave 
Virginia before Lincoln's inauguration, to "avoid being, as a 
Virginian, under his government even for an hour." He left his 
state on March 2, determined never to return except to visit his 
family or after it had joined him in the Southern Confederacy.^^ 
"I fear that some of the Hot heads of the South will come 
into unnecessary conflict with the Fed. troops," Elizabeth had 
written to her father shortly before her death. No one, however, 
was more eager for war than Ruffin. Believing that bloodshed 
would force the remaining southern states to join the 
Confederacy, Ruffin even hoped personally to draw fire from the 
Union forces at Fort Sumter while he sailed with local officials 
to inspect Confederate fortifications in Charleston Harbor. As
^'^Scarborough, ed. , Diary, I, 524 , 529-31, 545, 548-51, 557 , 
559; Ruffin to J. Perkins, March 2, 1861, John Perkins Papers, 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill.
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tensions increased he added the insignia of the Palmetto Guards 
to his homespun suit and joined the iron Brigade on Morris 
Island. The commander of the Confederate forces had designated 
the Palmetto Guards to fire the first shot at Sumter before dawn 
on April 12, and that company, in turn, gave the honor to Ruffin. 
After a generation of wishing for someone else to strike the 
first blow against the federal government. South Carolinians had 
found their man. Ruffin was "highly gratified by the compliment, 
& delighted to perform the service —  which I did." His shell
Q Astruck the fort, and the Civil War began.
"Accept my best wishes and grateful acknowledgement of your
heroic devotion to the cause of the South," President Davis wrote
to Private Ruffin. Julian Ruffin gave his father an even greater
reward; a week after the victory in Charleston he named his
newborn son Edmund Sumter Ruffin. The same week Ruffin learned
81that Virginia had seceded. Proudly, Ruffin headed for home.
When he returned to Virginia, however, Ruffin was alarmed at 
his state's lack of preparedness for war. He sent advice to 
Colonel Robert E. Lee about fortifications and the defense of the 
state. He implored President Davis to revoke the recent military 
appointments of those who recently were among "the most thorough 
& abject submissionists to Northern oppression & to Lincoln &
8 0Elizabeth Sayre to Ruffin, November 16, 1860, Ruffin 
Papers, University of North Carolina; Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 
566, 573-74, 581-82, 583-85, 586, 588-93.
81Jefferson Davis to Ruffin, April 22, 1861, Ruffin Papers, 
University of North Carolina; Scarborough, ed.. Diary, I, 606, 
610; II, X X V ,  18.
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abolition." He recommended that all those even suspected of 
being spies "be either driven out of the C[onfederate] S[tates] 
or treated as enemies & prisoners." For that matter, Ruffin 
wanted all native northerners currently in the South to be 
treated as enemies unless they gave "full evidence of being
Û 2southern in principle & in acts."
Ruffin turned his attention from imagined enemies to real 
ones in July when the Union army invaded his state. After the 
Palmetto Guards arrived from South Carolina, Ruffin rejoined his 
old company as it headed for Manassas Junction. Forced to march 
for miles in hot, muggy weather, the old man tired quickly. A 
Virginia militia captain came to Ruffin's rescue by allowing the 
venerable fire-eater to ride to battle on a caisson. During the 
confusing opening skirmishes of July 21, Ruffin briefly became 
separated from his unit; this time a sympathetic sergeant gave 
Ruffin a seat on a cannon as his artillerymen rushed past the 
Palmettos and toward Union troops who jammed Stone Bridge in 
their panicked retreat from Bull Run. Allowed to fire the first 
shot at the bridge, Ruffin's shell struck with deadly accuracy.
The next day Ruffin returned to Stone Bridge "to learn the 
number...killed by our cannonade." He saw but three corpses, and 
because two lay in a wagon he surmised that they had been wounded 
or killed already and were simply being evacuated when his shot 
struck them. "This was a great disappointment to me," he
8 2Ruffin to Robert E. Lee, May 14, 1861, Ruffin to Jefferson 
Davis, June 26, 1861, Ruffin Papers, University of North Carolina,
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grumbled to himself. "I should have liked not only to have 
killed the greatest possible number —  but also to know, if 
possible, which I had killed, & to see & count the bodies."
Months later, however, his morbid curiosity and his ego were 
mollified when he learned that at least six Yankees had died at 
his hands.
Like most southerners, Ruffin had expected to crush the 
federal invasion swiftly and decisively; the inability of 
Confederate forces to achieve a quick victory, therefore, left 
Ruffin frustrated. He was sure that bunglers in the army and the 
government had hindered the Confederate war effort and he joined 
men like Barnwell Rhett as critics of the administration. Ruffin 
was upset that after secession "many of the earliest & staunchest 
movers of secession, & defenders of southern rights & interests" 
had been bypassed for "the honors & rewards of office" in favor 
of "eleventh hour laborers," some of whom Ruffin believed "were 
submissionists to the last moment of free choice." Ruffin 
claimed that frustrated ambition underlay Rhett's particularly 
sharp denunciations of Davis, but Congressman Rhett had not 
actively sought high public office in the Confederacy. Ruffin 
had. In 1861 he petitioned a friend in the Confederate Congress 
to help him obtain "any respectable & honorable position, civil 
or military," and even suggested the improbable one of special 
commissioner to Washington, D.C., to engage in negotiations for
o 3Scarborough, ed.. Diary, II, 78-95; Mitchell, Ruffin, 191-
96.
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recognition of the Confederacy. After achieving success in his 
long struggle for secession, Ruffin's frustrated personal
O Aambition heralded the collapse of his dreams.
Physical destruction compounded Ruffin's woes during the 
heavy fighting in eastern Virginia in 1862. Union troops drove 
him and his family from their plantations; after the enemy 
withdrew, the Ruffin's returned to scenes of wanton destruction. 
At Beechwood, Yankees had taken food and stolen or destroyed most 
of the household contents and scattered wreckage across the front 
yard. Federal soldiers let Ruffin know they knew whose house 
they had sacked. In charcoal and in tobacco juice they had 
written on interior walls, "This house belonged to a Ruffinly son 
of a bitch," and "You did fire the first gun on Sumter, you 
traitor son of a bitch." A Pennsylvanian wrote in one of 
Ruffin's books, "Owned by Old Ruffin, the basest old traitor 
rebel in the United States. You old cuss, it is a pity you go 
unhanged." Marlbourne fared little better.®^
Most of the slaves on these plantations had fled in advance 
of the Union army or had joined them on their retreat. After 
spending so many years arguing that slavery was benevolent and 
slaves loyal to their paternalistic masters, Ruffin was shocked 
by the flight of his slaves. At first he decided that slaves 
left Marlbourne because of the negligent treatment they received
84Scarborough, ed.. Diary, II, 229; Ruffin to Perkins, March 
2, 1861, Perkins Papers, University of North Carolina.
^^Scarborough, ed.. Diary, II, 323, 337-38, 345-46, 368, 
416-22, 425-26, 471-72.
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from his son-in-law, William Sayre. Runaways were just as common 
at Beechwood, however, where Ruffin believed slave management was 
excellent. Even after a dwarf and two handicapped slaves escaped 
—  people from whom Ruffin never expected labor —  the old man 
was unable to understand how desperately these people wanted to 
be free.®®
Ruffin's reaction to the destruction of his property was 
twofold. Initially he sought vengeance. He called for an 
massive invasion of the North and, "justified by Yankee 
examples," demanded that southern armies leave "every village & 
town...in ashes" as they stormed through Pennsylvania, Ohio, and 
beyond. When he looked beyond his own misfortunes, however, his 
sympathy for other victims of the war overrode his anger. He 
contributed generously to the relief established late in 1862 for 
the victims of the Union attack on Fredericksburg. Eventually, 
the survival of Ruffin's beloved Confederacy took precedence over 
his concern with personal property. By 1864 he contributed 
hundreds of dollars to the Confederate treasury, hoping others 
would follow his example. He even urged the secretary of the 
treasury to make taxes "as heavy as our people will bear" for the
0 7duration of the war.
During the last two years of the war Ruffin still hoped for 
victory, but the realization that the demise of the Confederacy
®®Mitchell, Ruffin, 211-13, 227-28.
87Ruffin to Perkins, August 16, 24, 1862, Perkins Papers, 
University of North Carolina; R.R. Howison to Ruffin, January 3, 
24, 1863, Ruffin Papers, University of Virginia.
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was imminent made him long for his own death. The embittered old 
man wrote in his diary that death and even decomposition "cannot 
occur too soon." After the defeat of the Confederacy in 1865, 
Ruffin could "foresee nothing but failure." When he learned that 
Yankees had stolen the coat he had made of Virginia cloth, his 
heart sunk. He had worn it to Fort Sumter and to Bull Run, and 
"valued [it] as a relic & memorial." With few material 
possessions left and believing that he nothing to live for, his
Q pdecision to kill himself became easy.
When he reflected upon his life Ruffin found some 
consolation that other southerners recognized and appreciated his 
various accomplishes. But in Virginia, he complained, "my long 
continued literary labor[s] in behalf of the southern cause have 
been received with mortifying neglect," and "the great benefits 
conferred by me on the agricultural improvement & wealth of my 
country" had never received the attention he believed was due.
He grumbled that his only fame in Virginia resulted from "the 
accident of my having fired the first gun against Fort Sumter."
He did not want to die with his years of labor for the South 
eclipsed by "the accident at Fort Sumter." Because he felt 
"almost forgotten in my own country, & by the generation which I 
have so zealously & effectively labored to serve," he decided to 
entrust future generations with the remembrance and appreciation
®®Ruffin Diary, May 17, 1864, April 17, May 2, 9, 17, June 
18, 1865, Library of Congress.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
417
pQof his devotion to the South. With the last act of his life, 
the fanatical Ruffin hoped to make his cherished cause transcend 
his own death.
Four months after his suicide, Emma Holmes, a woman in South 
Carolina, noticed that almost everybody was trying to forget the 
agony of four long years of war. She, however, chose to 
remember. As she looked over photographs of Jefferson Davis, 
Robert E. Lee, and Edmund Ruffin, a friend of hers came by. Miss 
Holmes called her friend's attention to the picture of Ruffin.
The friend derided the Virginian as a fool for shooting himself 
just because the Confederacy was vanquished. "It hurt me deeply 
as well as greatly shocked me to hear such a dreadful event 
announced in such flippant language," she responded. "I had 
always loved & honored the heroic old man, an aged grandfather 
fired with zeal for freedom & love for his native South." Miss 
Holmes perceived his death the same way that Ruffin's son had. 
When Edmund Ruffin, Jr., told his children about the suicide, he 
concluded, "The Yankees have... killed your Grandfather."^®
89Scarborough, ed.. Diary, II, 548-49.
90John F. Marszalek, ed., The Diary of Miss Emma Holmes, 
1861-1866 (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 
478 ; Edmund Ruffin, Jr., to his children, June 20, 1865, in 
Tyler's Quarterly, V (January, 1924), 194.
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Chapter VIII 
"ABSTRACTIONS"
A friend of William Porcher Miles once told him that 
"revolutions are [not] effected on abstractions. There must be a 
pinch of some sort, & with cotton at 10c & negroes at $1000 the 
South will know no pinch." Miles disagreed. He believed, "The 
world is governed by 'abstractions' —  the American Revolution 
was fought upon an 'abstraction' —  honor was an 'abstraction' —  
all science was built upon 'abstractions.'"^ Other southerners, 
living in a society where slavery provided a constant reminder of 
degradation, might have viewed honor as a more concrete 
commodity, but Miles won the respect of southern radicals and 
moderates alike through a rigid adherence to his own abstract 
notions of honor and integrity. As an academician and as mayor 
of Charleston, he received plaudits for putting into practice 
abstract ideas of education and civic government. As a United 
States congressman during the late 1850's, as a Confederate 
congressman throughout the Civil War, and as a businessman after 
the war, however. Miles found the problem of reconciling abstract 
principles with political realities a vexing one.
In his youth Miles learned to value the abstract idea of
James H. Hammond to W.P. Miles, William Porcher Miles 
Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina; Charleston Mercury, May 21, 1860; William Porcher 
Miles, Oration Delivered before the Fourth of July Association 
(Charleston: James S. Burges, Printer, 1849), 21.
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liberty above all others. The second son of Sarah Bond Warley 
and James Saunders Miles, William was born on the anniversary of 
American independence, July 4, 1822, in Walterboro, South 
Carolina. His ancestors, French Huguenots, had come to South 
Carolina because that colony offered them the freedom to chose 
and practice their own religion. The young Miles learned that 
his grandfather, Major Felix Warley, had fought to create a free, 
republican government during the Revolution. During William's 
youth, his native Colleton District was the storm center during 
the nullification crisis; like Laurence Keitt, Louis Wigfall, and 
James DeBow, Miles grew up in an time of tension between state 
and federal authorities, in a place where Barnwell Rhett warned 
that the liberty of Carolinians was under attack by northerners. 
After receiving his primary education at Southworth School, Miles 
attended Willington Academy, the institution that a generation
before had produced the leading defender of southern liberty,
2John C. Calhoun.
Despite a background similar to other young fire-eaters. 
Miles exhibited no political propensities during or immediately 
after his college years. In 1838 he enrolled at the College of 
Charleston. His early experiences there were those of a young 
man unconcerned with lofty principles, abstractions, or even 
education. Instead of studying. Miles honed his skills at
Ruth McCaskill Daniel, "William Porcher Miles: Champion of 
Southern Interests," M.A. Thesis, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, 1943, 1-2; W.P. Miles to Charles Lanman, October 26, 
1859, William Porcher Miles Papers, South Caroliniana Library, 
University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina.
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practical jokes, and took particular delight when one of his 
victims responded to a prank with "tragic gravity." And while 
some of his friends spent their summers continuing their studies, 
Miles passed his time in the leisurely indulgence of peaches and 
watermelons and in pursuing a mysterious "Miss A." A friend 
warned him, "Oh Miles, thou hast fallen indeed, and coupling your 
accounts of fruit and ladies, I might suppose that your fall has 
been some what like father Adam's." Nothing came of Miles's 
first romance, but he found male companionship in a circle of 
friends that included James DeBow and the future historian and 
diplomat, William Henry Trescot. As a new school year began in 
the fall of 1840, another member of this circle, Joseph Toomer, 
committed suicide. His death jolted his young friends, and none 
more so than Miles. Perhaps shaken by this loss, after Toomer's 
death Miles abandoned much of his earlier frivolity (except for 
an occasional practical joke), and concentrated on his studies.
In 1842 he graduated at the head of his class.^
Academia continued to absorb Miles's interest after 
graduation. He began to study law in 1843 under the instruction 
of an attorney in Charleston, but abandoned it to take a job as a 
math tutor and, by the end of the year, accepted a job as 
professor of Mathematics at his alma mater. As a member of the 
small faculty at the College of Charleston, Miles enjoyed
^William H. Trescot to W.P. Miles, August 4, 21, September 
11, 1840, July 26, 1842; Samuel I. Legare to Miles, August 14, 
October 1, 1840; J. Maxwell Pringle to Miles, August 27, 1840, 
all in Miles Papers, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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prestige as an intellectual in his adopted city. The academic 
community recognized his knowledge not only of mathematics, but 
of literature, history, and classical languages as well. After a 
few years, however, the young assistant professor grumbled about 
the inadequacy of his salary. Miles hoped that the city council, 
which controlled the budget of the college, would increase 
tuition and use the revenue for raises. He capitulated, however, 
when he learned that the council opposed salary increases.^
During his first few years on the faculty. Miles showed no 
interest in politics. No record remains to suggest that he had 
the slightest concern with the Bluffton Movement of 1844, and his 
brief bout with the city council had no immediate impact on his 
activity in city government. In 1846, however, national politics 
commanded his attention. The Wilmot Proviso, which proposed to 
prohibit the expansion of slavery into any territories acquired 
from the war with Mexico, challenged Miles's notions of southern 
rights, the equality of the states under the Constitution, and 
the honor of a slaveholding people. With the renewal of 
sectional tensions and the approach of Independence Day in the 
summer of 1849, Miles turned his thoughts to the lessons he had 
learned about the Revolution, the Constitution, and America's
Daniels, "Miles," 3; C. Vann Woodward, ed., Mary Chesnut's 
Civil War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981)1 Ô36 ; Dumas 
Malone, id.. Dictionary of American Biography (21 volumes; New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), XII, 6Î7; Mitchell King to 
Miles, March 24, 1848, Miles Papers, University of North 
Carolina. Because of a scarcity of biographical information on 
Miles, Francis Butler Simkins's sketch in the Dictionary of 
American Biography provides the most accessible outline of 
Miles's life.
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struggle for freedom. He believed that the North now threatened 
southern liberty, just as the British once had. When the Fourth 
of July Association of Charleston invited Miles to give their 
annual oration in 1849, he decided "that as a Southern man I was 
bound, on such an occasion, in honor and conscience, to express 
myself in the strongest and fullest manner."^
Miles began his speech with the customary discussion of the 
meaning of Independence Day and a brief discourse about the 
Revolution, with special emphasis on the contributions of 
Carolinians.® The occasion, Miles said, should not only serve as 
a celebration of American liberty, but also as a time to review 
the nation's past, examine the present, and contemplate the 
future.^
Did Americans still adhere to the principles of liberty, or 
had they strayed from the course set for them by the Founding 
Fathers? According to Miles, preserving the letter and the 
spirit of the Constitution was the key to protecting America's 
inheritance of liberty. Like the fire-eaters, Miles argued that 
the spirit of the Constitution —  specifically, the equality of 
the states —  could be destroyed without violating the letter of
®Wm. Porcher Miles to George S. Bryan, Henry C. King, and 
R.W. Bacot, July 14, 1849, in Miles, Oration, 3.
®A.V.Huff, "The Eagle and the Vulture: Changing Attitudes 
Toward Nationalism in Fourth of July Orations Delivered in 
Charleston, 1778-1860," South Atlantic Quarterly XII (1972), 10- 
22; Joseph R. James, Jr.l “The Transformation of the Fourth of 
July in South Carolina, 1850-1919" M.A. Thesis, Louisiana State 
University, 1987.
^Miles, Oration, 5-7, 9-14.
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the law. Americans must vigilantly defend the Constitution, he 
warned, "lest it be insidiously undermined while we stand 
supinely by, refusing to see, or seeing refusing to counteract
Othe subtle designs of those who seek to overthrow it!"
Miles then argued that the Wilmot Proviso, and all attempts 
to prohibit the expansion of slavery, threatened the equality of 
the states, the Constitution, and liberty. That some northerners 
considered slavery sinful did not bother Miles. Although he 
believed slavery both the foundation of southern society and "of 
Divine institution," Miles could tolerate differences of opinion 
on the subject as long as all Americans acknowledged that the 
Constitution "recognized and countenanced" African slavery and 
left it under the exclusive jurisdiction of the states. Miles 
protested, however, that through legislation like the Proviso 
northerners made an unconstitutional attempt to wrest slavery 
from the control of southerners. By refusing to let southerners 
take their slave property into the federal territories. Miles 
said, northerners tried to deny southerners an equal opportunity 
to move into lands that they held in common with the North, lands 
that they had helped acquire for the United States during the 
Mexican War. To deny the free and legal movement of
Qslaveholders. Miles argued, was to revoke southern liberty.
"So far we have considered the Wilmot Proviso as a mere 
abstract question of Constitutional right," Miles continued. In
^Ibid., 7, 8, 14, 27-28. 
^Ibid., 16-17, 19, 22-23, 24.
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the North, friends of the South promised that restricting the
expansion of slavery posed no tangible threat to the South.
These people argued that the forces of nature —  aridity and cold
—  excluded slavery from these territories more effectively than
any legislation. If that were so. Miles countered, then why did
so many northerners continue to advocate a legislative solution
to the problem, and threaten the stability of the country in the
process? Answering his own question. Miles said.
They are not contending for an abstract principle —  they 
are not influenced by a mere spirit of fanatical opposition 
to slavery... they are deliberately, intentionally and 
advisedly aiming a deadly blow at the South. It is intended 
as a blow. It is intended to repress her energies —  to 
check her development —  to diminish and eventually destroy 
her political weight and influence in this confederacy.
Miles then lectured his audience that they, not northerners,
were the ones "contending for an abstract principle." Miles
considered African slavery inextricably intertwined with every
facet of southern society, culture, and the southern economy. It
was, he explained, "a part of ourselves." He claimed that to
exclude slavery from the territories was to exclude white
southerners. "We must be fumigated and purified from every
Southern taint —  must pass through a sort of moral quarantine,
before we can be allowed to enter the precincts of the free-soil
paradise!" he exclaimed. It was one thing for northerners to
harbor their own feelings about slavery, he said, but when they
excluded southerners from the territories because they declared
slavery immoral they effectively denied that southerners were
l^Ibid., 22-23.
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"equal members of this confederacy." If northerners could deny
southerners equality in the territories because of slavery, Miles
warned, they would set "the seal of inferiority" on southerners
and mark them "as those who from perverse moral obliquity are not
entitled to the enjoyment of full participation in the common
goods and property of the Republic." Miles found this situation
an attack on southern liberty and an insult to southern honor.
"Fellow-citizens," he cried, "are you willing to submit to such
monstrous injustice —  to so glaring a violation of the spirit of
the Constitution?"^^
Miles rejected the possibility that a compromise could bring
a satisfactory solution to this conflict. He stated that in the
past, "Every concession has but emboldened our adversaries to
more unscrupulous aggression." Miles insisted that southerners
emulate the Founding Fathers and resist. He reminded his
audience that their ancestors would have found it easier to
submit to unjust taxation than to launch a revolution, and that
the Founders' critics derided them as hotspurs and
abstractionists. Nevertheless, Miles went on, the Founders had
united behind abstract principles and triumphed over a powerful
foe. Would southerners do less, he asked, now that northerners
vilified them and sought to tamper with their slave property?
Carolinians! will you consent to this? Will you quietly and 
without a determined struggle allow this seal of infamy to 
be set upon you? Will you allow this stab to be made at the 
great principle of constitutional liberty, for which our 
fathers struggled so hard...and not throw your whole moral
l^Ibid., 17, 19-20, 29-30.
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weight and force as a guard before it? Or is that principle 
no longer as dear to us as it was to the men of the 
revolution? Or in this utilitarian age is all principle to 
be sneered at as a "metaphysical abstraction" —  and the 
profoundest questions in politics and constitutional law to 
be settled solely on the basis of dollars and cents? If so, 
let us pause and reflect; for all our institutions, our 
liberties, nay, our very existence are endangered. If so 
let us pause and reflect.for we are already degenerating 
from the spirit of '76!
Like many Carolinians, Miles had decided to side with John
C. Calhoun during the conflict that emerged over the impending
Compromise of 1850. After Calhoun died in March of that year,
however. Miles could only guess at what action the late senator
would have counselled. In 1849 Miles had believed southerners
must "act and feel as one man," avoid internal divisions, and use
their "political weight and power in the confederacy" to resolve
the sectional conflict. He had thought that Calhoun's calls for
southern unity made sense, and believed that Calhoun would have
supported disunion over submission to the Compromise. Miles also
worried that rashness might place Carolinians in "untenable
ground from which we may be forced to retreat." He therefore
supported the cooperationists, those who favored secession only
in concert with other states, because he believed their position
more nearly approximated Calhoun's ideal than did that of the
13immediate secessionists, led by Barnwell Rhett.
l^ibid., 21-22, 26, 29-30, 
13.l^ibid., 25-27; William H. Trescot to Miles, May 30, 1858, 
Miles Papers, University of North Carolina; W.P. Miles to C. G. 
Memminger, February 3, 1860, Christopher G. Memminger Papers, 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill.
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While secessionists and cooperationists formed parties and 
debated throughout the state in 1850 and 1851, Miles remained 
aloof. As a college teacher he had no role to play in the drama 
other than that of an interested and concerned citizen. 
Considering the convictions he expressed in 1849 and his later 
political career, Miles was conspicuous for his lack of 
involvement in the myriad Southern Rights Associations and 
rallies that pervaded South Carolina. Perhaps he grew disgusted 
at the bitter infighting and factionalism that rocked his state, 
the very sorts of divisions he had hoped to avoid. Perhaps the 
twenty-nine year old professor found the realities of southern 
unity more perplexing than they had seemed in theory. At any 
rate, when cooperationists defeated secessionists late in 1851, 
they did so without the help of Porcher Miles. And when 
cooperationism failed to alter the Compromise of 1850 or lead to 
secession, a disillusioned and despondent Professor Miles again 
began again to contemplate the intricate and frustrating problems 
of self-government.
An invitation to deliver an address to the Alumni Society of 
the College of Charleston in 1852 gave Miles an opportunity to 
discuss two "Political and Social Errors which seem to be gaining 
ground in the World," contemporary notions about the nature of 
republican government, and the belief that liberty was a 
birthright of all humanity. According to Miles, a republican 
government could only exist among people who possessed "the 
highest Moral and Intellectual Development," self-control.
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virtue, and patriotism. "Naked and Absolute Freedom" could not 
be permitted, Miles explained, because one person's freedom must 
not interfere with the freedom of others. "All cannot have every 
thing," he said; in a republic, people had to learn to live with 
restraints on their freedom. Miles explained that in the United 
States the Founding Fathers had institutionalized restraint 
within the Constitution, and had regarded it as "the essential 
frame-work of our Government" that even a numerical majority 
could never posses absolute power over others. The function of 
government in a republic. Miles argued, was to prevent anyone or 
any group from achieving absolute freedom, to enforce "Rational 
Freedom —  Freedom within the bounds of L a w . A m e r i c a n s  in the 
1850's, Miles asserted, had lost sight of these principles. The 
idea of restraint had decayed so thoroughly. Miles believed, that 
"Freedom of Thought, Freedom of Action, and Freedom of the Press 
run riot," and produced doctrines and theories that threatened to 
undermine "all that is venerable and time-honored in Politics —  
all that is conservative in Society —  all that is pure in 
Morals.
Miles stated that chief among these false doctrines was the 
idea that liberty was a birthright of all. Miles maintained that 
liberty was an "Acquired Privilege," not an inalienable right.
William Porcher Miles, An Address Delivered before the 
Alumni Society of the College of Charleston, on Commencement Day, 
March 30th, 1852 (Charleston; Steam Power Press of Walker &
James, 1852), TT-15, 23, 25.
l^ibid., 9-10, 22.
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Asserting that individuals and societies must prove themselves 
worthy of liberty, he maintained that not every person or society 
could do so. Those who believed otherwise, Miles said, 
subscribed to the "monstrous and dangerous fallacy of Thomas 
Jefferson," which proclaimed that all men were created equal.
"Men are born neither Free nor Equal," Miles insisted. Some were 
born with the capacity to earn liberty, others were not. He 
stipulated that governments must allow people the freedom to 
develop their natural abilities, but could not "make a Statesman 
of him who God intended should be a Ploughman," or "bind down 
forever to the plough him to whom God has given a mind capable of 
shaping the destinies of a People.
Except for a passing reference to free-soilers and 
abolitionists. Miles omitted all references to northerners, and 
nowhere in his speech did he mention African slavery or the 
Compromise of 1850. And yet the issues and events of the past 
few years had brought a profound change in his personal 
temperament and political philosophy and lurked behind the ideas 
he presented to his audience. Obviously, for Miles to defend 
African slavery he had to reject the idea of fundamental human 
equality and argue that blacks lacked the capacity for self- 
government. But more important, the Compromise of 1850 had 
proven to Miles that some northerners were unfit for republican
Ibid., 21-22, 23-25. Years later, as a congressman. Miles 
denied that freedom of speech countenanced northern attacks on 
slavery. See Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 1 ^  Session, 
Appendix, 205.
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government. To Miles, their attempt to meddle with slavery was a 
violation of "Rational Freedom" and "constitutional liberty," a 
failure to restrain the legislative power of a majority at the 
cost of the rights and liberty of a minority. In 1849 Miles had 
at least granted his foes the freedom to think, but since 
northerners had put some of their thoughts into practice Miles 
believed that he could not tolerate even that. With this speech. 
Miles excommunicated abolitionists and free-soilers from 
participation in national politics. Henceforth, he would meet 
all threats of interference with slavery with a call for 
immediate secession. This speech, then, marked Miles's 
transformation into a fire-eater.
James DeBow gave Miles's speeches unqualified praise in his
Review and publicly urged his friend to take a more active role
in public affairs. But Miles was content to remain quietly on
the faculty of the College of Charleston, where he wrote only
17infrequent expositions on local issues. His complacency ended 
suddenly, however, during an otherwise dull summer vacation in 
1855. While Miles idled away his time in the mountains of 
Virginia, on the coast a horrible yellow fever epidemic ravaged 
the city of Norfolk. Six thousand people fled, and most of the 
remaining ten thousand contracted the disease. Of these, about 
two thousand eventually died. Nearly half the local doctors died 
in their futile effort to stop an affliction about which they had
DeBow's Review V I I  (November, 1 8 4 9 ) ,  466;  XI  (June, 1 8 5 1 ) ,  
697; E.J. Pringle to Miles, January 23 ,  1 853 ,  Miles Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
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no scientific knowledge. The call for help went out,
particularly to the lower South where long contact with the
disease had given some a certain immunity. Miles decided that
after all the idealistic talk of southern unity earlier in the
decade, "if our great Southern talk about 'Southern men standing
by each other in time of trial' meant anything, it meant that we
18ought to go to the side of Old Virginia when in such distress."
For several weeks Miles worked as a nurse in beleaguered 
Norfolk, offering comfort to the sick and dying until the 
epidemic ended. The people of Charleston greeted the news of 
their local hero with a groundswell of support, coincidentally at 
the very time that local Democrats began to search for a
candidate for mayor. Miles's friends informed him that the
Southern Rights party wanted him to run, and that his fame made 
him the most available candidate. Trescot told him, "If ever 
there was a case in which the office sought the man and not the 
man the office, here it is." Furthermore, Trescot suggested that 
Miles continue his labors in Norfolk while his friends carried on 
his campaign. Miles had some reservations about serving as 
mayor, but Trescot helped convince him to run. He returned to
Charleston to make just one public speech, but won by a vote of
18Virginius Dabney, Virginia; The New Dominion (Garden City, 
New York; Doubleday & Company, inc., 1972), 260; Cyclopedia of 
Eminent and Representative Men of the Carolinas of the Nineteenth 
Century (Spartanburg, South Carolina; The Reprint Company, 1972), 
659; Miles to L.L. Brickhouse, October 7, 1855, Miles Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
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1260 to 837.19
By the time Miles entered office in November, 1855, he had 
already established a concern for reform. In the local elections 
two years before. Miles had witnessed widespread corruption among 
officeholders and passive acquiescence among the citizenry. This 
lack of virtue in city politics challenged Miles's ideals of 
self-government and honor. In a letter to the editor of the 
Charleston Mercury, he accused local officials of recording the 
votes of the deceased and of driving a "wretched drove...from 
poll to poll like oxen." When these men defended themselves by 
claiming that they engaged in nefarious activities solely in 
order to do good once in power. Miles became irate. Instead of 
rationalizing. Miles proposed that it would "be more straight­
forward and manly —  far less degrading" to simply dispense with 
elections and sell public offices to the highest bidders. The 
current situation, he lamented, disgraced the entire city and 
required the efforts of everyone to change the image of the 
community.
When a friend learned of Miles's election he suggested 
sarcastically to the honorable, idealistic new mayor, "Spend all
19Trescot to Miles, September 6, 16, 1855, I.W. Hayne to 
Miles, September 7, 1855, Miles Papers, University of North 
Carolina; Clarence McKitrick Smith, Jr., "William Porcher Miles, 
Progressive Mayor of Charleston, 1855-1857," The proceedings of 
the South Carolina Historical Association (1942), 30; Daniel, 
"Miles," 18.
^^Charleston Mercury, October 18, 19, 20, 21, 1854. Also 
see E.J. Pringle to Miles January 23, 1853, Miles to the Editors 
of the Mercury, October 21, 1854, Miles Papers, University of 
North Carolina.
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the money you can lay your hands on.... Charter steamboats and
send ship loads of the populace away to liberalise their minds."
Author William Gilmore Simms, a frequent visitor to Charleston,
offered similar, though less jocular advice. "Go on fearlessly;
only do not be too virtuous," he said. "A people for so long a
time corrupt and in corrupt hands, can't stand extreme virtue."
Despite this friendly warning, the inexperienced Miles
immediately began a sweeping program of reform based upon his own
21abstract principles of good government.
The first item on Miles's agenda was police reform. When he
entered office only an inefficient "night watch" existed in
Charleston. Miles corresponded with other mayors to learn about 
their police systems and sent his chief of police on a fact­
finding mission to Savannah and New Orleans, two cities that 
Miles considered similar to Charleston. After careful analysis, 
Miles presented his plan of reorganization to the city council. 
His bill, which passed with a reduction in funding, made the 
police chief responsible for appointing sergeants and privates, 
rather than the highly partisan city council. The mayor would 
now appoint the chief, his captains and lieutenants, subject to 
approval from the council. Miles doubled the number of mounted 
police, laid out a more rational plan for patrols, and expanded
21F.A. Porcher to Miles, November 9, 1855, E.J. Pringle to 
Miles, November 3, 1855, Miles Papers, University of North 
Carolina; W.G. Simms to Miles, January 5, 1856, in Mary C. Simms 
Oliphant, Alfred Taylor Odell, and T.C. Duncan Eaves, eds.. The 
Letters of William Gilmore Simms (5 volumes; Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1955 ), III, 417.
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police activities to around the clock. His plan brought swift
results. Increased police surveillance helped in the early
detection and eradication of fires, and thereby allowed Miles to
cut the budget of the fire department. His police force cracked
down on "habitual violators" who had had "pretty much their own
way" under previous administrations, especially tavern-keepers
who illegally sold liquor to slaves. Those who had once
prospered under the corrupt system gave testimony to Miles's
effectiveness by dubbing the vigilant new policemen "Paddy
Miles's Bull Dogs."^^
Miles had as much concern for social programs as he did for
law enforcement. Under his guidance the city council created a
house of corrections for juveniles in 1856, an institution that
stressed reformative training rather than punishment. His
administration allocated $40,000 for an alms house, an orphanage,
an asylum, and the juvenile facility, a large appropriation at
the time for a city of Charleston's size. Miles obtained $7,000
annually from the state to help care for the transient poor, and
2 3worked to increase municipal support for free black paupers.
After his recent experiences in Norfolk, Miles paid close 
attention to public health. Working from the conventional wisdom 
that "a wet soil is provocative of disease, and a dry one
22William Porcher Miles, Mayor's Report on City Affairs 
(Charleston: Steam Power Press of Walker, Evans and Co., 1857), 
15-17, 20, 22; Miles to L.R. Gibbes, May 15, 1856, Lewis R. 
Gibbes Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress; 
Smith, "Miles," 33.
^^Daniel, "Miles," 30-31, 43.
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conducive to health," he inaugurated a badly needed system of
drainage and sewerage and tried to replace "the present scavenger
system" of street cleaning with either a municipal sanitation
service or a private, contracted one.^^
When Miles entered office he inherited an enormous municipal
debt, which his expansion of services only aggravated. And yet.
Miles believed, "'Pay as you go' is the true rule, whether for
cities, or for men." Although he encouraged a variety of means
to increase revenue, he decided that the only way to set the city
on a sound financial footing was to increase property taxes.
Miles persuaded the city council both to raise taxes and to adopt
a plan that would extinguish the city's debt in thirty-five 
25years.
Although Miles did not eradicate every problem in his two-
year term, his accomplishments were impressive. Not only did he
greatly expand worthwhile services, but also, as the city council
acknowledged, "both by precept and example" Miles brought an end
2 6to the corrupt practices of previous administrations. His 
success as mayor and the constant prodding of his friends, most 
notably Trescot, encouraged Miles to become more involved in
^^Miles, Mayor's Report, 27, 29; Miles to Gibbes, January 
20, 29, 1856, Gibbes Papers, Library of Congress.
2 5Miles, Mayor's Report, 10-15.
2 ASmith, "Miles," 39. See W.P. Miles to J. Johnson 
Pettigrew, September 26, 1856, Pettigrew Family Papers, North 
Carolina Department of Archives and History, Raleigh, North 
Carolina, and Miles to Alfred Huger, November 10, 1857, Robert N. 
Gourdin Papers, Robert W. Woodruff Library, Emory University, 
Atlanta, Georgia.
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politics and to look beyond the city limits of Charleston. When
congressman William Aiken chose not to seek reelection in 1856,
2 7Miles decided to run for his seat in Congress.
Because of the recent emergence of the Republican party and
the heated debates over expansion of slavery into Kansas,
sectional issues dominated the campaign. Although other fire-
eaters resorted to their standard harangues and long, bellicose
orations. Miles did not. He refused to rehash southern
allegations of northern wrongs or the southern view of the state
of the Union; everyone knew these positions already. Miles
believed, and he for one was tired of hearing them. He declared
that the time to deliberate had passed, and the time to act had
arrived. If John C. Fremont, the Republican candidate, won the
presidency or if Congress prevented Kansas from adopting slavery.
Miles insisted that southerners react. They might refuse to send
their representatives to Congress, or, as he preferred, they
might call for a convention of all southern states to determine
some other form of protest. Whatever the immediate response.
Miles argued that southerners would only find lasting safety and
28liberty in a Southern Confederacy.
Miles won election that October with a majority in a three-
2 7James DeBow to Gibbes, December 27, 1857, Gibbes Papers, 
Library of Congress; Trescot to Miles, March 30, 1856, Robert N. 
Gourdin to Miles, September 8, 1856, S.G. Bailey to Miles,
October 13, 1856, Miles Papers, University of North Carolina.
2 ACharleston Mercury, October 11, 13, 1856; S.G. Bailey to 
Miles, October 13, 1856, Hiram Powers to Miles, October 23, 1856, 
Miles Papers, University of North Carolina.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
437
way race, receiving 1852 votes to the 1521 and 323 votes of his
29respective opponents. When he took his seat in Washington in 
1857, however, he was baffled by the situation that faced him. 
Although Fremont had lost the presidential election, his party 
continued to grow and send more members to Congress. The debate 
over Kansas dragged on, causing fissures within the Democratic 
party. The conflicting and contradictory advice of friends and 
associates only rendered Miles's situation more confusing. His 
young colleague Laurence Keitt and his friend DeBow both warned 
Miles not to trust President James Buchanan, his aides, or any 
northern Democrats. Miles discovered, however, that the Buchanan 
administration knew it could count upon the cooperation of 
southerners because of their mutual desire to check the power of 
the Republican p a r t y . W i l l i a m  Gilmore Simms, with whom Miles 
had developed a close friendship while mayor of Charleston, gave 
Miles impossible, amateurish advice. Simms warned him that 
Mississippi Congressman John A. Quitman was "an old granny, with 
an enormous deal of vanity," yet suggested that he would prove 
"efficient in conducting a charge, carrying an outpost, or making 
a feint or sortie." Simms insisted that Miles cultivate the 
friendship of James H. Hammond. "He will need the help of honest 
& fearless Lieutenants," Simms wrote. Above all, he demanded.
29Charleston Mercury, October 16, 1856.
^^Laurence M. Keitt to Miles, June 15, 1857, J.D.B. DeBow to 
Miles, September 4, 1857, Miles Papers, University of North 
Carolina; Miles to Gibbes, April 9, 1860, Gibbes Papers, Library 
of Congress. Also see Alfred Huger to [Miles], January 9, 1858, 
Miles Papers, University of North Carolina.
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"Let all your game lie in the constant recognition & assertion of 
a Southern Nationality!"^^ But Senator Hammond had decided to 
pursue a Southern Confederacy only as a last resort, and
preferred to work within the Union and the Democratic party to
32preserve southern rights.
The junior congressman groped for direction during his first 
year in the capital and played only a passive role within the 
vocal South Carolina delegation. Unable to cull helpful advice 
from his friends, when Miles made his first major speech in 1858 
he adopted the same rhetoric that he had used before entering 
politics. He quickly discovered, however, that it was one thing 
to propound his abstract theories of republican government and 
southern rights and honor in Charleston, and quite another to do 
so in Washington.
Addressing the Kansas controversy. Miles conceded that the 
geography of the territory effectively prohibited slavery. "But, 
sir, the issue has been made," he said, "the battle joined; and 
though it be on an abstract principle which does not at present 
promise to result in any practical advantage to us, I am willing 
to stand by the guns and fight it out." When northerners 
prevented the expansion of slavery into Kansas, Miles warned, 
they risked provoking a revolution. "The South may not dissolve
Simms to Miles, December 28, [1858], January 28, [1858], 
February 8, [1858], in Oliphant, éd.. Letters of Simms, III, 517- 
18; VI, 20, 34. For the friendship of the two, see ibid., I, 
cxxvi-cxxvii.
32Hammond to Miles, November 23, 1858, Miles Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
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the Union on the rejection of Kansas," he explained, "but such 
rejection would, assuredly, sever still another of the cords —  
rapidly becoming fewer —  which the course of events has been 
snapping one by one." Protective tariffs, he claimed, had 
already enriched the North at the expense of the South. Attempts 
to curtail the growth of slavery had stigmatized the South's 
social institutions "which constitute the essential foundations 
of her prosperity, the very life-blood of her existence." Should 
a revolution come, however. Miles added that it would not result 
from "abstract questions" of southern honor and equality alone. 
Free states, "already in a preponderance, are rapidly expanding 
and acquiring supreme and uncontrollable power," he stated; this 
growing power of abolitionists and free-soilers, he feared, 
threatened to transform the federal government into an engine of 
destruction. Revolutions were terrible. Miles cried, but 
"Tyranny and injustice are worse." He feared that northerners 
would soon have enough political power to deprive southerners of 
their liberty, to make them "hewers of wood and drawers of 
water." According to Miles, "The slow, undermining process by 
which the high spirit of a free people is sapped, their strength 
destroyed, their faith in themselves crushed out, their 
enterprise checked, their prosperity paralyzed, is more appalling 
to the true statesman and the patriot than the temporary, though 
critical, fever of revolution."
Faced with this menace. Miles considered it natural for the 
South "to look about her; to count up her resources; to estimate
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her strength; to measure her capacity for care of herself." And 
Miles agreed with his friend DeBow and other fire-eaters that the 
South possessed "every element of greatness, prosperity, and 
strength," that slavery imbued it with a uniquely harmonious 
social and economic structure, and helped produce commodities 
that allowed the South to dominate the commerce of the world. 
Therefore, even if Congress rejected a slave Kansas, Miles 
announced that the South would emerge triumphant. It would force 
southerners to face "the startling fact that they have no hope in 
the future of maintaining their equality in the Union. It will 
compel them to ponder the question whether they will choose 
subjugation or resistance, colonial vassalage or separate 
independence.
Before Miles spoke out on Kansas, Simms had warned him to 
consider carefully what he could do and say that others had not 
said or done already. Trescot thought Miles's speech an 
excellent one, "clear in argument, sound in doctrine and 
eminently proper in tone," but he agreed with Simms. "The 
subject was hopeless," he told Miles. If Miles really wanted to 
effect a change, Trescot pleaded, "tell us what to do." Like 
Miles, Trescot believed that "in the plentitude and insolence of 
their power" the Republicans might stir southern resistance, but 
Trescot suggested that no member of Congress could ever hasten 
secession. "Your position is a false one and whatever may be
285-89,
O 3 Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Appendix,
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your wishes, the means by which you work, prevent your 
accomplishing any thing," he explained. "You can't revolutionize 
a nation by the rules of the House;" that would constitute 
"National suicide," Trescot said, "and Congress cant [sic] get 
its own consent to that."^^
Although the Kansas controversy reinforced Miles's 
conviction that the South must secede, he realized that Trescot's 
evaluation of the issue, if not his own role in it, was correct. 
Months after Miles announced his readiness to "fight it out" in 
Congress, he saw that battling for the abstract right of 
expanding slavery to a region that admittedly was not conducive 
to slave labor "was a bad way...of preparing the Southern mind 
for a war to the knife." He continued to believe that the 
preservation of southern honor required a settlement favorable to 
the South, but he could not discover a feasible resolution. By 
the end of 1858, the idealistic young congressman was left 
muttering "eternal and infernal Kansas-Kansas-Kansas!
Miles's speech on Kansas at least reinforced his popularity 
among his constituents. When they reelected him in 1858, Miles 
still believed he could balance his duties as a member of 
Congress with those of promoting secession. In January, 1859, he 
added his voice to those of James DeBow and William L. Yancey in
Simms to Miles, [February ?, 1858], Oliphant, éd.. Letters 
of Simms, IV, 33; Trescot to Miles, May 2, 1858, Miles Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
35Miles to Hammond, November 10, 15, James H. Hammond 
Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress.
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calling for a repeal of federal laws that prohibited the African
slave trade. Like these other fire-eaters. Miles claimed that
such laws should fall under state jurisdiction and insisted that
stigmatizing any aspect of slavery branded the entire institution
as evil and all slaveowners as dishonorable.^^
The Charleston Mercury praised Miles's stance, and his
comments marked the beginning of a close alliance with the 
3 7Rhetts. Trescot, however, was dismayed. Miles's perceptive 
friend complained that reviving the African slave trade was 
impossible within the Union, and if southerners were really using 
agitation over this issue to foster secession, he moaned, "Why 
not in God[']s name let us say so and be done with it." 
Furthermore, he reminded Miles that it was the administration of 
President James Monroe, a southerner, with the cooperation of 
John C. Calhoun and the entire South Carolina congressional 
delegation who had worked with the British forty years before to 
stop the international trafficking of slaves. "Who cast the 
stigma?" Trescot asked.
Again Trescot scolded Miles and other southern congressmen 
for trying to "serve two masters." Trescot argued that Miles and 
the others "must assume the Union as the great underlying fact of 
his whole political life" and serve it in good faith, or scorn
Evan Edwards to Miles, April 16, 1858, Trescot to Miles, 
February 8, 1859, Miles Papers, University of North Carolina; 
Charleston Mercury, February 1, 1859.
Charleston Mercury, February 1, 1859 and Congressional 
Globe, 36th Congress, l^t Session, 365.
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the Union and "make a revolution at home." Trescot did not fault 
Miles for his intentions; in fact, he found them "honest, manly, 
direct." He offered his criticisms only to show his highly 
principled friend that "Our world is so completely out of joint, 
that the truer you are, the harder you will find it to run 
smoothly —  an illustration which I borrow from my cotton gin and 
Shakespeare.
During the next year Miles's world became even more chaotic. 
John Brown's raid occurred in October. In December, three days 
after his execution, the Thirty-Sixth Congress convened in 
Washington. Thoughts of Brown haunted southern congressmen and 
made them more sensitive than ever to the anti-slavery sentiments 
of their northern colleagues. Nominations for Speaker inflamed 
tempers and brought action in the House of Representatives to a 
standstill when Republicans backed a man particularly odious to 
southerners. This chaos made it easier for Miles to understand 
Trescot's warnings about splitting responsibilities as a United 
States congressman and a secessionist, and finally made the 
choice between the two simple.
The man behind the speakership controversy was John Sherman, 
a Republican from Ohio, and the issue that compounded 
southerners' aggravation was Sherman's endorsement of a book by 
Hinton R. Helper entitled The Impending Crisis of the South. 
Helper, a nonslaveowning North Carolinian who had moved to the
3 8Trescot to Miles, February 8, 1859, Miles Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
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North, condemned slavery as an inefficient and wasteful 
institution and appealed to lower class whites in the South to 
oppose slave labor. Southerners denounced Helper as a traitor 
and a renegade. The Republican party prepared to distribute
100,000 copies of his book in the North and added captions such 
as "Revolution —  Peacefully if we can, Violently if we must." 
John Sherman and a few score congressmen publicly supported this 
plan.3*
Coupled with John Brown's recent invasion of Virginia, 
Sherman's candidacy for speaker mortified southerners. Balloting 
for the speakership dragged on endlessly. Most southerners 
refused to vote for any candidate who had endorsed Helper's book, 
and the equally tenacious Republican minority refused to yield. 
Deadlock led to tension and threatened to erupt in hostility on 
the floor of Congress even more violent than the Brooks-Sumner 
incident or the Keitt-Grow melee. During one particularly bitter 
debate a gun fell from the pocket of a congressman from New York. 
Senator Hammond claimed that throughout the winter the only 
congressmen not armed with a revolver and a knife were those who 
had two revolvers. Another senator reported that friends of 
congressmen likewise brought concealed weapons into the public 
galleries.
David M. Potter, completed and edited by Don E. 
Fehrenbacher, The Impending Crisis 1848-1861 (New York: Harper & 
Row, Publishers! 1976), 386-87.
^^Potter, Impending Crisis, 389; A. Huger to Miles, December 
12, 1859, Miles Papers, University of North Carolina.
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Miles, too, armed himself. And yet, even in the midst of 
the tense environment of Washington, Miles remained more calm 
than some Carolinians at home. Governor William Gist assured 
Miles that the people of the state would support the withdrawal 
of the entire South Carolina congressional delegation in the 
event Sherman were elected. Gist preferred that plan to 
"ejecting the speaker elect by force," but if southern 
congressmen chose the latter, he told Miles, "write or telegraph 
me, & I will have a Regiment near Washington in the shortest 
possible time."^^
After dozens of ballots and protracted debates. Miles rose 
to speak. No one, he declared, was fit to serve as speaker after 
endorsing "a book containing doctrines so vile and atrocious that 
no honest man can find language strong enough in which to 
denounce them." He cautioned his northern colleagues that 
because "a profound state of excitement" caused by John Brown 
still rocked the South, southerners were likely to do almost 
anything if Sherman won the speakership. Believing states 
sovereign and "the sole judges of what is best for their own 
interests, and for their own peace and security," Miles warned 
that whenever southerners chose to they would "take their 
destinies into their own hands." Miles had no quarrel with those 
who denied that secession was a constitutional right. "Call it 
then revolution," he trumpeted. "Practically it will be that."
D.H. Hamilton to Miles, December 9, 1859, William Gist to 
Miles, December 20, 1859, Miles Papers, University of North 
Carolina.
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America's founders had exercised their inalienable right to alter 
or abolish government in 1776, and, Miles said, southerners could 
do the same now.^^
Although Miles, unlike most fire-eaters, believed that a 
civil war would be "so bloody, so terrible, that the parallel of 
it has never yet blotted the page of history," he explained that 
southerners faced greater dangers by remaining in the Union. He 
maintained that anti-slavery forces in the North not only sought 
to deny southerners the right "to drink from the same 
constitutional stream of equal rights and equal political 
privileges," but also used insidious propaganda to create social 
unrest in the South, "to set brother against brother, class 
against class." Northerners who condemned slavery as evil had 
already invaded the South in an attempt "to apply the 'knife' and 
'actual cautery' fire and sword, to what they consider 'a sore' 
on our body politic!" Miles exclaimed. "Can the southern people 
endure this without degradation and ruin?" he asked. He answered 
himself, "Impossible." Unless anti-slavery agitation stopped 
immediately. Miles thundered, the South would "assume her 
independent position among the powers of the earth.
Miles's speech helped fortify southern opposition to 
Sherman, but did nothing to break the deadlock in Congress. In 
South Carolina, however, Governor Gist tried to force a
William Porcher Miles, Speech of Hon W. Porcher Miles, of 
South Carolina, on the Organization of the House ([Washington,
D .C. ] : Lemuel Towers, [ 1860 ] ) , T~, 2~, 5-6 .
43lbid., 7-8.
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breakthrough. In December he appointed Christopher G. Memminger, 
a state representative, as a special commissioner to Virginia in 
an attempt to convince that state to secede and lead the South 
toward a Southern Confederacy.^^ A few days after Miles 
delivered his speech in Congress and with Memminger in route to 
Richmond, Miles decided to take Trescot's advice and promote "a 
revolution at home."
Miles deluged Memminger with suggestions and encouragement 
and told him to bank on the fear lingering in Virginia after 
Brown's raid.
If Virginia could only now be induced to withdraw from the 
Union unless every demand of the South were satisfied and 
some absolute security be given for the future, the South 
would have a glorious start given her on the path of 
independence, which we all so ardently desire and which must 
come sooner or later....If you can only urge our Carolina 
views in such a manner as to imbue Virginia with it —  (and 
at present she is in the best condition to be impregnated) 
—  we may soon hope to see the fruit of your addresses in 
the sturdy and healthy offspring of whose birth we would be 
so justly proud —  a Southern Confederacy. This would 
indeed be a worthy heir of the joint glories of the two 
commonwealths to spring from the loins of the Palmetto 
State !
No matter what action Virginia took. Miles believed "this Union 
cannot hold together very long."^^ Defeating the Republican 
presidential candidate in November might "stave off the issue for 
a little while —  but come it must." Miles told Memminger that 
he could not err in pressing Virginians too vigorously and in
^^Channing, Crisis of Fear, 112-27.
^^Miles to C.G. Memminger, January 10, 1860, Christopher G . 
Memminger Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of 
North Carolina.
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promoting "a Southern Confederacy as the only true and thorough
means" of defending and protecting the South.
On the last day of January, Memminger wrote Miles, "I am
very sorry to be brought to the conclusion that Virginia is not
prepared to do any thing." Before Miles received this news,
Sherman withdrew his name and William Pennington, a former Whig
from New Jersey, was finally elected S p e a k e r . N o  revolution
had occurred, and the spirit of resistance in Virginia had
seemingly evaporated. Yet this sudden apathy only made Miles
more resolute. If Virginia would not secede. Miles decided, "We
4 8further South, must act and 'drag her along.'" When Robert 
Barnwell Rhett, Jr. suggested to Miles that splintering the 
Democratic party at the next national convention would help the 
states of the deep South control the fate of "inferior
49contemporaries," he won Miles's wholehearted agreement.
As the year progressed. Miles emerged as one of the leading 
secessionists in South Carolina. His total commitment to 
disunion and his sudden prominence surprised his friends.
^^Miles to Memminger, January 15, 1860, ibid.
^^Memrainger to Miles, January 30, 1860, Miles Papers, 
University of North Carolina; Potter, Impending Crisis, 388-89.
48Miles to Memminger, January 18, 23, February 3, 1860, 
Memminger Papers, University of North Carolina; Trescot to Miles, 
February 22, 1860, Miles Papers, University of North Carolina.
49R.B. Rhett, Jr., to Miles, January 29, 1860, Miles Papers, 
University of North Carolina.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
449
especially Trescot.^® While state and national party conventions
met, split, and reconvened during the spring of 1860, Miles acted
as a conduit of information between Washington and Charleston.
In particular, he helped apprise the Rhetts of the popular mood
in the North and of the potential for meaningful resistance from
51other southern states. He also returned home in May and
delivered a brief speech to rally the spirit of resistance in
Charleston. Both tangible and abstract rights, he explained,
were in jeopardy. Again he asked Carolinians why northerners
would not yield if the right to expand slavery were merely an
abstraction, and lectured them once more that an "abstract right"
was a right nonetheless. Miles proclaimed that the next
presidential election pitted "power against principle —  the
majority against the minority, regardless of all constitutional
barriers." As a South Carolinian, Miles trumpeted, he owed his
allegiance to no other "nation," and called upon his countrymen
to join him in resisting the election of a Republican president
52rather than submit to "ruin and vassalage" in the Union.
As the heat of summer increased so did the vehemence of 
Miles's labors and language. He joined Barnwell Rhett in 
Charleston at a public meeting to support the nomination of John
^^Trescot to Miles, February 22, 1860, A. Huger to Miles,
May 7, 1860, Miles Papers, University of North Carolina.
^^R.B. Rhett, Jr., to Miles, March 28, April 17, May 10 
(telegram and letter), 12, 1860; D.H. Hamilton to Miles, April 4, 
1860, Miles Papers, University of North Carolina. See all 
correspondence for April, 1860, ibid.
52Charleston Mercury, May 21, 1860.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
450
C. Breckinridge by southern Democrats. After Rhett castigated
northerners for attacking southern rights, Miles discussed
strategies for the future. Southerners, he said, had erred in
the past by consenting to sectional compromises, and repeating
hollow proclamations of defiance made them seem like the boy who
cried wolf. Believing that the South had "all the elements of
wealth, prosperity and strength, to make her a first-class power
among the nations of the world," Miles wondered how southerners
could chose to remain in a Union that, in his view, threatened
their liberty. Why the South would balk at secession, "where she
would lose so little and gain so much," he said with some
exaggeration, "has always been to me a matter of simple
amazement." Miles insisted that the time to act had come. "Let
us 'resolve' less and do more," he cried. "I am sick at heart of
the endless talk and bluster of the South. If we are in earnest,
let us act." Instead of trying to preserve peace and union with
the North, Miles advised, southerners "ought rather to be
53preparing to grasp the sword."
Suddenly, a serious illness struck Miles during the final, 
critical months before the election. Typhoid fever forced him to 
end all activities and, ironically, to leave the sweltering South 
for the summer coolness of New England. Miles moved to Newport, 
Rhode Island, in August, where he stayed for several weeks. His 
condition remained so serious that for a while both Simms and 
Trescot feared for his life. Miles dragged himself back home in
S^Ibid., July 10, 14, 1860.
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time for the election in November, but the Rhetts noted that he 
was "still feeble" upon his arrival in Charleston.Although 
Miles's illness lingered through December, the virtually 
unanimous secession sentiment that swept South Carolina after 
Lincoln's election rallied his spirits and, perhaps, hastened 
his recuperation.^^
Miles recovered sufficiently to take his seat at the state 
convention at Columbia on December 17. His incapacity over the 
past three months had made him restless. Because of an outbreak 
of smallpox in Columbia, a majority at the convention —  
including the normally impatient Keitt —  decided to postpone 
voting for secession until they could reconvene a few days later 
in Charleston. Miles could not tolerate any more delays. Weary 
of endless resolutions and threats, he continued to demand, as he 
had the summer before, "Let us act if we mean to act without 
talking. Let it be 'a word and a blow' —  but the blow first." 
His sense of urgency failed to accelerate secession, but his 
resolve earned him the renewed support of his constituents, who 
selected them as their representative both for the provisional
Charleston Mercury, August 27, 28, September 13, November
3, 1860; Trescot to Miles, October 2, 1860, Miles Papers, 
University of North Carolina; Simms to Miles, August 31, November
4, 12, December 5, 31, 1860, in Oliphant, éd., Letters of Simms, 
IV, 238, 256, 262, 281, 315.
55See W.P. Miles to W. Garnett, November 13, 1860, William 
Garnett Chisolm Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, 
Virginia.
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and regular Confederate congresses.
After South Carolina seceded, the military situation in
Charleston harbor was of primary importance to Miles. Earlier in
December, through negotiations with President Buchanan, he and
other officials had tried to win the transfer of federal forts in
the harbor to state authorities. In return they promised to
restrain the people from attacking the forts unless Buchanan
tried to reinforce them.^^ In the excitement that swept
Charleston after secession, however, restraining the public
demand for the forts became more and more difficult. Miles
argued against a seizure "with all my might," fearing that a
hasty attack "would cost much time and many lives." Even after
the federal supply ship Star of the West tried to reinforce Fort
Sumter in January, Miles hoped for a peaceful separation. If,
however, "special spite and malice" induced the federal
government to attempt another foray into Charleston harbor. Miles
5 8was ready "to give Uncle Sam a warm reception."
^^Miles to Hammond, August 5, 1860, Hammond Papers, Library 
of Congress; Cyclopedia, 660; Miles to R.N. Gourdin, December 10, 
1860, Gourdin Papers, Emory University; Daniel, "Miles," 89.
^^John McQueen, William Porcher Miles, M.L. Bonham, W.W. 
Boyce, and Lawrence [sic] M. Keitt to James Buchanan, December 9, 
1860; James Buchanan to Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, James 
L. Orr, December 30, 1860, in Correspondence Between 
Commissioners of the State of South Carolina to the Government at 
Washington and the President of the United Stat^ (Charleston : 
Evans & Cogswell, 1861 ), 5-11.
^®Miles to M.L. Bonham, December 23, 1860, James L. Orr 
Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina; W.P. Miles to Howell Cobb, January 14, 1861, in U.B. 
Phillips, ed.. The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. 
Stephens, and Howell Cobb (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
453
Like Louis Wigfall, Miles maintained an active role in both
military and civil affairs in the spring of 1861. Soon after his
selection as chair of the Military Affairs committee in the
Confederate House of Representatives, Miles joined Wigfall as an
aide-de-camp to General P.G.T. Beauregard at Charleston and at
the first battle of Bull Run. Unlike Wigfall, however. Miles
recognized his limitations. He knew that a lack of military
training made him of little use on the battlefield. Although
tempted to fight late in 1861 when federal gunboats attacked the
Carolina coast. Miles made himself focus on his duties in 
59Congress.
Like other fire-eaters, however. Miles found only 
frustration in the Confederate Congress. Before secession he had 
wanted to eliminate all trade duties in a Southern Confederacy. 
Now, though, DeBow warned him that a sudden shift to free trade 
would alienate and antagonize the powerful sugar planters of the 
Gulf South, men who had prospered under the tariff policies of 
the U n i o n . M i l e s  complained that his colleagues on
Office, 1913), 528-29.
Miles to W.W. Corcoran, August 7, 1874, G.T. Beauregard to 
the Board of Trustees of the Hopkins University, August 23, 1874, 
in Letters and Testimonials Recommending Mr. Wm. Porcher Miles, 
of Virginia, for the Presidency of the Hopkins University? 
Baltimore, MD. (Charleston: The News and Courier Job Presses, 
1874), 5-8, 26-27; W.P. Miles to W. Ballard Preston, November 11, 
1861, Preston Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society, 
Richmond, Virginia; Cyclopedia, 660-61.
^^Miles to Hammond, November 15, 1858, Hammond Papers, 
Library of Congress; DeBow to Miles, February 15, 1861, Miles 
Papers, University of North Carolina.
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congressional committees made work impossible because their
habitual absences prevented a quorum, and he held no higher
opinion of President Davis than other fire-eaters.®^ Late in the
war, when some military officials began to discuss the efficacy
of using black troops in the Confederate army. Miles was
perplexed. He understood the urgent demands of the army, but
eventually decided, "It is not merely a military, but a great
social and political question, and the more I consider it the
less is my judgment satisfied that it could really help our cause
6 2to put arms into the hands of our slaves."
Despite all obstacles. Miles counted upon the southern 
people to fight to the last. He never lost his faith or devotion 
to "our great struggle for liberty, independence and even 
existence as a people."®^ In January, 1865, he offered a 
resolution in Congress stating, "That we, the representatives of 
the people of the Confederate States, are firmly determined to 
continue the struggle in which we are involved until the United
Miles to W. Ballard Preston, November 11, 1861, Preston 
Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society; Miles to Gourdin, 
December 16, 1863, February 28, 1864, Gourdin Papers, Emory 
University; Miles to G.T. Beauregard, October 9, 1882, William 
Porcher Miles Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of 
South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina.
®^W.P. Miles to W.N. Pendleton, December 23, 1864, William 
Nelson Pendleton Papers, Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina.
®^Miles to G.T. Beauregard, December 6, 1861, May 16, July 
27, 1864, in Autograph Collection of Simon Gratz, Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
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States shall acknowledge our independence."®^
Neither resolutions nor the Confederate army could stop the 
steady advance of Union forces. And yet, even the realities of 
defeat did not change Miles's abstract ideas. Watching how other 
southerners dealt with defeat greatly upset the highly principled 
Miles. "When we see the most ardent Secessionists and 'Fire 
eaters' now eagerly denying that they ever did more than 'yield 
their convictions to the voice of their State,'" and call 
secession a heresy and slavery a curse. Miles concluded "it is 
plain that Politics must be more a trade and less a pursuit for 
an honourable man than it ever was before." For any secessionist 
to return to public office in a reconstructed Union, Miles 
believed, entailed a forfeiture of self-respect, consistency, and 
honor. For himself and other secessionists, he said, politics 
"for a time cannot be a path which any high-toned and sensitive 
—  not to say honest and conscientious man —  can possibly 
tread.
Like his old friend DeBow, Miles decided that the best way 
for him to continue serving the South was to engage in some 
productive labor, unlike DeBow, the forty-three year old Miles 
had no idea what to do next. Having ruled out politics, his only 
option seemed to be returning to academia. But in 1863 he had 
married Bettie Beirne, the daughter of Oliver H. Beirne, a
®^Charleston Mercury, January 23, 1865.
®®W.P. Miles to R.N. Gourdin, September 25, 1865, Robert N. 
Gourdin Papers, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, 
Durham, North Carolina.
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wealthy planter in Virginia, and the salary of a teacher was 
insufficient for his growing family. In 1865 he vowed, "I will 
for the first time in my life begin 'to try and make money.'"
For a couple of years he worked for his father-in-law as a factor 
in New Orleans and in 1867 he took over the management of one of 
Beirne's plantations. Oak Ridge, in Nelson County, Virginia.
Miles's career as a tobacco and wheat planter was 
troublesome. Bad weather compounded his own inexperience, and 
mounting financial problems forced him to reconsider life in 
a c a d e m i a . I n  1874 a board of trustees began searching for a 
president for the new Hopkins University of Baltimore (later, the 
Johns Hopkins University). Miles eagerly applied. Along with 
his resume he included over forty letters of recommendation; the 
list of correspondents included some of the most prominent men of 
the old regime in the South. Among them were generals 
Beauregard, Wade Hampton, and Joseph E. Johnston, former senators 
James Chesnut, Robert W. Barnwell and R.M.T. Hunter, former 
congressmen William Aiken and Milledge L. Bonham, as well as 
several educators, jurists, and clergymen. All spoke highly of 
Miles, but the preponderance of southern accents proved 
detrimental to his application.
Rejected by Hopkins, Miles continued to live in isolation on
G^ibid.; Daniel, "Miles," 111.
^^W.P. Miles to Woodhouse & Porham, March 30, 1877, Robert 
Alonzo Brock Correspondence, Huntington Library, San Marino, 
California.
^^Letters and Testimonials, passim; Daniel, "Miles," 113.
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his farm, passing his time helping friends like Beauregard and 
Barnwell Rhett gather material for their respective histories of 
the Confederacy and reminiscing about people and times already 
buried in the past.®^ While Miles pined away in Virginia, 
however, important changes occurred in South Carolina. In 1877 
President Rutherford B. Hayes withdrew the federal forces which 
had occupied the state for twelve years and supported the tenuous 
Republican administration. Democrats subsequently reasserted 
their control. In higher education, the process of redemption 
included removing black students from South Carolina College and 
sending them to a new segregated institution in Orangeburg. 
Charles H. Simonton, a trustee of South Carolina College, told 
Miles that he intended to reestablish the school as a "Southern 
Institution," one that would preserve "our Southern notions of 
personal honor and truth." He explained that the war and 
Reconstruction had left an entire generation of Carolinians 
uneducated. "The honor and name of the State are to them but a 
dream of their fathers," he wrote. "A new class are coming into 
control of the State, and a sort of Red Republican agrarian 
spirit is abroad. The College must check and destroy this, must 
restore the tone of public opinion," he insisted. Tentatively, 
Simonton offered the position of president to Miles.
See Beauregard to Miles, July 26, 1869, R.B. Rhett to 
Miles, March 22, 1871, William Boyce to Miles, March 23,
September 22, 1875, Miles Papers, University of North Carolina.
^^Daniel Walker Hollis, The University of South Carolina (2 
volumes; Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1956), 
II, 80-81.
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Various problems kept the college closed for three years,
and when it reopened in 1880 Porcher Miles presided over a
student body of only a few dozen. Most students enrolled for
only two or three years and had more interest in the college of
Agriculture and Mechanics than in the political and moral
philosophy Simonton and Miles hoped to teach them.^^ Frustrated
in his efforts to instill these students with his notions of
"personal honor and truth," Miles decided to propagate his views
on education and post-war politics in a series of public
addresses. He took issue with the idea of "absolute freedom and
equality" as he had thirty years before, but now, he explained,
the specter of free black voters made this fallacy more menacing
than before. Miles said that the former slaves had not earned
freedom, citizenship, or the right to vote, but had had these
privileges conferred upon them. "Without the slightest previous
training or the possession of any qualification for it,"
according to Miles, an undisciplined black electorate threatened
to subject "the property and intelligence of the [white]
community to...pauperism and ignorance." To prevent such a
development. Miles argued, "the whole population should be truly
educated, trained to the just discharge not only of the right of
72suffrage, but of all duties of citizenship." He supported free
^^Hollis, University of South Carolina, II, 94-97.
7 2Wm. Porcher Miles, True Education. How to Make Education 
"The Cheap Defense of a Nation", (Columbia, South Carolina: 
Printed at the Presbyterian Publishing House, 1882), 7-9; Miles, 
Universal Education. How to Purify the Ballot-Box, (Charleston: 
The News and Courier Book Presses, 1882), 41 8-9.
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primary education for black and white alike, institutions that 
provided "the right kind of e d u c a t i o n . T h e s e  schools, he 
insisted, should expose students to "subjective ideas," the 
abstract concepts that Miles believed made self-government 
p o s s i b l e . I f  people did not learn these principles and learn 
to vote intelligently, however. Miles argued that they must be 
disfranchised, whether black or white.
When Oliver Beirne suffered a stroke in the summer of 1882 
and could no longer run his vast sugar interests in Louisiana, 
Miles felt obligated to leave South Carolina College and take 
over his father-in-law's business. In August he reluctantly 
resigned from the college and by autumn had moved into the 
grandest of Beirne's plantations, Houmas House, in Ascension 
Parish. From there Miles supervised the activities on twelve 
other plantations scattered over three parishes along the 
Mississippi River. None of the bad luck Miles experienced on his 
farm in Virginia followed him; by 1890, his lands produced around
100,000 tons of cane annually, which yielded over ten million 
pounds of sugar and earned him a gross income of $660,000. Two 
years later he and his son, William P. Miles, Jr., organized the 
Miles Planting and Manufacturing Company of Louisiana. Their
71Wm. Porcher Miles, Entire Education. How to Educate Body, 
Mind and Soul, (Charleston: The News and Courier Book Presses, 
1882), 8-9.
^^Miles, Entire Education, 7-8.
7 5Miles, Universal Education, 9.
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enterprise was the largest of its kind in the state.
A progressive planter, Miles used the latest methods of
cultivation, fertilization, and chemical analysis, helped found a
sugar experiment station in New Orleans and a weekly periodical,
7 7Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer. When he turned his 
attention to politics, however. Miles proved quite the 
reactionary. In 1893, when asked to accompany a group of sugar 
planters to Washington to lobby for retention of a tariff on 
sugar. Miles demonstrated that fire-eating was not dead. Calling 
himself "an old fashioned, strait out, 'strict construction' 
Democrat, bred in the South Carolina School of John C. Calhoun 
and State Rights," Miles pledged to oppose protective tariffs 
even though that opposition was contrary to his own financial 
interests. "I...don't believe the United States to be a 
'Nation,'" he intoned, "but a 'Confe[de]racy of States' & is 
constitutionally restrained from doing things that a consolidated 
nation can do." Although a planting magnate himself, Miles 
continued to believe that honor must govern the actions of 
individuals, businesses, and nations. But in the so-called 
Gilded Age, Miles protested that "Monopolists" and "Demagogues"
Daniel, "Miles," 117-21; Miles to Beauregard, October 9, 
1882, Miles Papers, South Caroliniana Library; W.P. Miles, Some 
views on Sugar. By an Old-Fashioned Democrat, (n.p.; [1894)), 
11, 15. Miles's pamphlet is in Middleton Library, Louisiana 
State University.
^^Daniel, "Miles," 120, 122.
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7 8had made a mockery of "just principles of government."
Although time had not altered Miles's politics, it began to
take a toll on his health. Afflicted with cataracts, he turned
over the management of his company to his son in 1896. He died
on May 13, 1899, at the age of seventy-six. His remains were
moved closer to the rest of the Beirne family; ironically, the
final resting place for this unrepentant rebel was Union cemetery
79in Union, Monroe County, West Virginia.
In 1841, Beverley Tucker had observed that many Americans
saw those who shared his political views as "'abstractionists' —
politicians of the absurd school of poor Old Virginia, who, it
seems, is one of these days, to die of an abstraction." Shortly
before Miles's death over a half century later, the stubborn old
professor from South Carolina echoed the words of his counterpart
from Virginia. "Oh Bah! with your constitutional arguments!" he
exclaimed in a soliloquy.
That's just like South Carolina! She always was a 
cantankerous little thing —  prating about 'the 
constitution' & 'Principles of the Government'! Well —  
thats so. Her enemies never tired of sneering at her 
therefor[e]. It is true they used to say, sarcastically, 
that she contended for 'Abstract principles.' As if all
Andrew Price to Miles, August 31, 1983, Miles to John 
Dymond, September 16, 1893, Miles Papers, University of North 
Carolina; Miles, Views on Sugar, 13; W.P. Miles to J.L. Brent, 
February 15, 18881 Joseph Lancaster Brent Papers, Huntington 
Library, San Marino, California.
^^Daniel, "Miles," 128-29; Biographical Directory of the 
American Congress 1774-1971 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1971), 1407.
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8 0Richmond Enquirer, August 17, 1841; Miles to Dymond, 
September 16, 1893, Miles Papers, University of North Carolina
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CONCLUSION
On July 4, 1854, an angry group of abolitionists held a 
meeting at Farmington, Massachusetts, to protest the fugitive 
slave law. Their leader, William Lloyd Garrison, stood before 
the crowd, held up a copy of the objectionable statute, and set 
it on fire. But Garrison knew that a formal destruction of this 
law would not end slavery in the United States; slavery was both 
recognized and sanctioned in the organic law of the country, the 
Constitution. To dramatize his unwillingness to live in a nation 
that permitted slavery, Garrison produced a copy of the 
Constitution, declared it "a covenant with death and an agreement 
with hell," and as he reduced it too into ashes he cried, "So 
perish all compromises with tyranny!"^
The fire-eaters had no more toleration for compromise than 
did Garrison. As William L. Yancey said, however, the fire- 
eaters thought that "the disease, which preys on the vitals of 
the Federal Union, does not emanate from any defect in the 
Federal Constitution —  but from a deeper source —  the hearts, 
heads and consciences of the Northern people." Yancey and other 
fire-eaters believed that northerners were taught to perceive 
slavery as "a religious as well as a political wrong, and 
consequently to hate the slaveholder." According to Yancey, no
Allan Nevins Ordeal of the Union, volume II, A House 
Dividing (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947 ) , 150-52, and 
Louis Filler, The Crusade Against Slavery 1830-1860 (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960), 213-17.
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law, no constitutional amendment, could reeducate the northern 
people on the slavery issue or prevent them from exerting their 
political power to attack slavery. Other fire-eaters agreed. 
Convinced that the hostile, irresponsible, and insurmountable 
political power of the North imperiled southern rights, honor, 
and liberty, the fire-eaters counselled secession.
Although some fire-eaters had attempted to create their own 
"State-Rights" party, no "Fire-Eater" party ever existed. None 
had to. The fire-eaters were an issue-oriented group; they 
believed that preserving southern liberty depended upon forming a 
Southern republic. Beyond that, however, seldom did any two 
agree on other issues. Each had particular concerns that did not 
receive the same support from others, yet in this very diversity 
and complexity lay their appeal. Southerners who came to support 
secession also viewed other goals as critically important. For 
those who wished to promote industrialization, James DeBow's 
secession was most appealing. Louis Wigfall spoke to those who 
rejected modernity and hoped instead to keep the South almost 
wholly agricultural. Proponents of lower tariffs, reviving the 
African slave trade, territorial expansion, could all find their 
positions represented by some fire-eaters; those who wanted to 
maintain some tariff protection or prohibit the African slave 
trade could find support from other fire-eaters. And just as 
fire-eaters converged upon secession from various paths, after
^William R. Smith, ed., History and Debates of the 
Convention of the People of Alabama... (Spartanburg, South 
Carolina: The Reprint Company, 1975), 142.
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their goal was attained each diverged again; their mission 
accomplished, whatever unity they had achieved was gone.
Though forms varied, the essence of their message remained 
the same. They believed that southerners faced an overwhelming 
and unconquerable political threat from the North, and argued 
their case before the southern people with consummate skill. 
Liberty, independence, and honor all had special meanings to 
those who lived in a world of slavery, dependence, and 
degradation. By describing the political struggle of the South 
as a choice between submission to an alien people or 
independence, they struck a very sensitive nerve among 
southerners. It was no accident that the first seven states to 
secede were those with the highest proportion of slaves to 
whites, the states where voters could most easily see the 
consequences of losing liberty. In other states, areas with the 
greatest number of slaves were most in favor of secession.^
In many ways, the fire-eaters were like all Americans of 
their time. They invoked the Revolutionary heritage and ideals 
of the Founding Fathers. They strove to perpetuate self- 
government as they perceived it and to correct abuses in the
See William J. Cooper, Jr., "The Politics of Slavery 
Affirmed: The South and the Secession Crisis," in Walter J. 
Fraser, Jr., and Winfred Moore, eds.. The Southern Enigma: Essays 
on Race, Class, and Folk Culture (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1983) , 199-215; Kenneth S. Greenberg, Masters 
and Statesmen: The Political Culture of American Slavery 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Bertram 
Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) ; Daniel W. Crofts, ''The 
Union Party of 1861 and the Secession Crisis," Perspectives in 
American History, XI (1977-78), 327-76.
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political process. Their concern with expansionism, 
industrialism, and romantic, millennial reform placed fire-eaters 
squarely within the mainstream of contemporary American society.^ 
All fire-eaters argued that they were defending their rights and 
values as Americans, and, whether gleefully or with regret, came 
to believe that these aspirations could only be protected in a 
Southern Confederacy.
After South Carolina seceded, the Rhetts congratulated the 
people of their state for toppling an "arrogant and tyrannous" 
nation. Just as important, they claimed, "Conservative liberty 
has been vindicated." By leaving a union with those who had no 
understanding of their society, the Rhetts said, "The problem of 
self-government under the check-balance of slavery, has secured 
itself from destruction."^ Faced with the challenge of Garrison 
and others opposed to slavery, the fire-eaters refused to remain 
in a nation where theirs was not the only interpretation of the 
Constitution and the only vision of America.
John L. Thomas, "Romantic Reform in America, 1815-1865," 
American Quarterly, XVII (Winter, 1965), 656-81; Ronald G. 
Walters, American Reformers 1815-1860 (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1978), introduction and chapter one. Walters excludes proslavery 
advocates from the body of antebellum reformers because "they did 
not have a distinctive organizational structure to spread their 
ideas and to channel the energies of the faithful." (p. 12) In 
its place, however, fire-eaters did use various political 
organizations (such as Southern Rights Committees), newspapers 
and periodicals to promote the most ambitious of reforms, the 
creation of a new nation.
. ^Charleston Mercury, December 21, 1860.




Most of the leading fire-eaters are well represented at the 
Southern Historical Collection at the University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill. The William Porcher Miles Papers not only 
provide the best source of information on Miles, but also 
constitute one of the most important sources for the study of 
southern politics in the years immediately preceding secession. 
Most prominent fire-eaters from 1858 through secession are 
mentioned in various letters, and several corresponded with 
Miles. Miles's own letters in this collection are few, but 
enlightening. The Robert Barnwell Rhett Papers, though few, 
provide important letters written by and addressed to the "father
of secession," as well as his first attempt at a history of the
Confederate States of America. The papers of Benjamin C. Yancey 
contain correspondence with his brother, William Lowndes Yancey, 
on both personal and political matters. The Southern Historical 
Collection has a microfilm copy of the Edmund Ruffin Papers, 
which are now held at the Virginia Historical Society. This 
invaluable collection includes Ruffin's various attempts at 
autobiography and some of his extensive correspondence with James
H. Hammond during the 1850s. The Quitman Family Papers are one
of the largest and best sources for studying John A. Quitman.
Two other collections at Chapel Hill proved to be
467
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particularly helpful. The Christopher G. Memminger Papers 
include several important letters from Miles concerning the 
prospects of secession in Virginia after John Brown's raid, and 
the John Perkins Papers contain some fascinating letters from 
Ruffin about affairs in the Confederacy.
Several collections include scattered material by or about 
fires-eaters. The junior Rhett speculates on secession in one 
letter in the William H. Branch Papers; the Thomas B. King Papers 
contain a glowing evaluation of Louis Wigfall; a letter from 
Miles concerning the prospect of black troops in the Confederacy 
appears in the William Nelson Pendleton Papers; the Tucker Family 
Papers include some correspondence from Beverley Tucker as well 
as an address to Hampton-Sidney College in 1841, and the James L. 
Orr Papers include a letter from Miles about the situation at 
Fort Sumter late in 1860.
The William R. Perkins Library at Duke University contains 
the papers of two major fire-eaters and valuable information 
about most of them in other scattered collections. The James 
Dunwoody Brownson DeBow Papers constitute the largest body of 
DeBow's correspondence; unfortunately, the vast majority of the 
collection concerns collection of fees for DeBow's Review. Even 
so, many useful letters appear in this collection, which includes 
some of DeBow's college notes and journals. Letters from Yancey 
and Ruffin also appear in this collection. More rewarding are 
the Laurence Massilon Keitt Papers. Filled with emotional and 
boastful letters from Keitt to his wife, the immodest Keitt left
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
469
an invaluable record not only of his own deeds, but also of his 
ideas and aspirations. Pertinent correspondence cover the decade 
from 1855 through Keitt's death in 1864.
Also at Duke, the vast Campbell Family Papers contain an 
interesting description of John Quitman during the Mexican War.
A few Benjamin Yancey Papers are held here, concerning both 
health and family matters; the M.J. Solomons Scrapbook has 
information on William Yancey during the Confederate years; the 
Armistead Burt Papers include correspondence from both Barnwell 
Rhett and Louis Wigfall, mostly about politics in South Carolina. 
The most important of the few letters in the Robert Barnwell 
Rhett Papers is one written to the younger Rhett in 1858 
supporting the actions of his father. The Abraham Watkins 
Venable Scrapbook contains in full Barnwell Rhett's remarkable 
oration in Macon, Georgia, in 1850. The Bernard Scrapbook 
includes a death notice of Rhett and provides an interesting 
account of the secession convention in South Carolina. A letter 
from Rhett, Jr., about wartime affairs appears in the P.G.T. 
Beauregard Papers. The Maury Papers include notice of Wigfall's 
alcoholism after the Civil War. The Charles C. Jones Autograph 
Letters include a description of the Washington scene in 1861 by 
Senator Wigfall and a note by Keitt concerning his brawl in 
Congress in 1858. A letter from DeBow about Kansas appears in 
the James D. Davidson Papers. The Clement Claiborne Clay Letters 
have correspondence from Wigfall and Yancey about political and 
military affairs in the Confederacy. The Robert N. Gourdin
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Papers contain a fascinating letter from Miles in which he 
evaluates his options after the defeat of the Confederacy in 
1865.
The Library of Congress holds several important 
collections. The extensive James H. Hammond Papers include 
dozens of letters from Beverley Tucker, several from Porcher 
Miles, Laurence Keitt, and Edmund Ruffin, and a few from wigfall, 
R.B. Rhett, Jr., and DeBow. Like the Miles Papers at North 
Carolina, these papers also include remarks on various political 
activities in the South, by Hammond and various others, 
especially on such topics as the Rhetts struggle for power in 
South Carolina and the young Louis Wigfall's various exploits.
The single best glimpse into the mind of a fire-eater is 
provided by the Edmund Ruffin Diary at the Library of Congress. 
From 1856 until his suicide in 1865, Ruffin recorded virtually 
every thought that crossed his mind, encompassing almost every 
topic imaginable, and, of course, provided editorial opinions on 
almost every person and event of significance during that period.
The Wigfall Family Papers at the Library of Congress contain 
mostly letters written by him during the Civil War and by family 
members before the war. Important letters from Rhett and Yancey 
also appear in this collection. The Lewis R. Gibbes Papers 
include a few letters from Porcher Miles about civic affairs in 
Charleston and by DeBow about his friends from the College of 
Charleston. The small Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers contain some 
of the most important letters anywhere from Quitman and Rhett
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that illustrate the maneuvering of radicals during secession 
crisis of 1850-1852. The Martin Van Buren Papers include an 
important letter from Barnwell Rhett about the Democratic 
presidential campaign of 1844.
The papers of William Lowndes Yancey at the Alabama 
Department of Archives and History include Yancey's 
correspondence, but is equally important for its collection of 
his speeches, both in pamphlets and newspaper clippings. The 
John Witherspoon DuBose Correspondence contains a great deal of 
information on Yancey, including interesting contemporary 
accounts that DuBose collected for his biography in 1892. The 
Benjamin Franklin Perry Letters provide a picture of Yancey's 
family life and show his continued devotion to his old unionist 
friend and mentor. Other collections that pertain to Yancey 
include the Henry Churchill Semple Papers, the William Phineas 
Brown Papers, and the Colin J. McRae Papers.
The largest volume of John Quitman material is at the 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History. Besides the 
voluminous John A. Quitman Papers, there are a few letters in the 
Quitman Family Papers. J.F.H. Claiborne collected hundreds of 
important letters from and about Quitman for his biography, and 
the Claiborne Collection remains a vital source for studying 
Quitman. This collection also includes a letter from James DeBow 
discussing his life in Charleston and plans to move to New 
Orleans in 1845, and a valuable letter by Rhett concerning the 
secession crisis of 1851. Other Quitman letters in this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
472
depository may be found in the Robert J. Walker Papers and the 
Nathan G. Howard Papers.
The Tucker-Coleman at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at the 
College of William and Mary constitute the best source of letters 
by and about Beverley Tucker. Particularly revealing are his 
letters to his father and half-brother, John Randolph of Roanoke. 
A letter by Ruffin is here, as well as occasional references to 
him. In Tucker's letters to and from Hammond there are several 
references to Barnwell Rhett around the time of the Nashville 
Convention.
The South Carolina Historical Society in Charleston has a 
fascinating collection of Robert Barnwell Rhett Papers. These 
include many revealing letters written from the 1850s to his 
death in 1876, and Rhett's various post-war literary attempts, 
such as his Autobiography and his Life and Services. In the 
latter, Rhett mentions Yancey's diplomatic assignment and Keitt's 
efforts to persuade Rhett to run for the Confederate Senate late 
in 1864. The Armistead Burt Letters include a letter describing 
the relationship between Rhett and John C. Calhoun in 1848.
At the Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collections at 
Louisiana State University there are a few small collections with 
material pertaining to John A. Quitman. The John A. Quitman 
Papers and the Southern Filibusters Collection contain a few 
important pamphlets relating to General Quitman, but the latter 
is sure to disappoint those whose focus is on expansion into 
Latin America. The Samuel A. Cartwright Papers also include an
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important letter from Quitman in which he describes his efforts 
to lead resistance to the federal government in 1850.
The Charles Gayarré Papers within the Grace King Collection 
include fascinating letters written by James DeBow during the 
Confederate period. The Edward Clifton Wharton and family Papers 
contain an insightful letter from Robert Barnwell Rhett, Jr., 
concerning the politics of South Carolina at the opening of the 
Civil War.
At the Barker Texas History Center at the University of 
Texas are the Wigfall Family Papers. Many of these are 
typescript copies of letters from Louis Wigfall; the originals 
are located in the Williams-Chesnut-Manning Papers of the South 
Caroliniana Library at the University of South Carolina. The 
John E. Campbell Papers contain a letter describing Wigfall as a 
"fire-eater." The James D.B. DeBow Papers contain several 
valuable letters written by DeBow after the Civil War.
The University of Virginia, Alderman Library contains a few 
letters by Beverley Tucker in the Bryan Family Papers; the most 
important concerns Tucker's views of Andrew Jackson. The 
Nathaniel Beverley Tucker Letter is a long one to Littleton W. 
Tazewell in 1826 about various and sundry political matters 
constitutes. The Edmund Ruffin Papers here mostly concern his 
activity during the Civil War. A letter by Ruffin also appears 
in the Elizabeth Gilmer Tyler Miles Collection that illustrates 
Ruffin's contempt of the masses and of presidential power.
A letter from Miles celebrating the spirit of resistance in
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South Carolina after Lincoln's election appears in the William 
Garnett Chisolm Papers at the Virginia Historical Society in 
Richmond. Miles's complaints about his committee duties in the 
Confederate Congress are recorded in a letter in the Preston 
Family Papers. The Daniel London Papers contain a letter from 
Barnwell Rhett revealing him as the author of an anonymous 
article in the Southern Quarterly Review. The Crump Family 
Papers include a letter from Beverley Tucker about the 
Nullification Crisis.
The Historical Society of Pennsylvania has a dozens of 
letters from John Quitman to his son in the Quitman Papers; these 
constitute the best source for the latter part of Quitman's life. 
The James Buchanan Papers include scattered correspondence from 
Yancey and Rhett regarding the Democratic party. The Ferdinand 
J. Dreer Autograph Collection includes a letter from Yancey 
celebrating Lincoln's election in 1860. The Autograph Collection 
of Simon Gratz contains an interesting self-evaluation by 
Barnwell Rhett in 1856, and several letters by Miles about the 
Civil War the Confederate "cause."
The Civil War Collection at the Huntington Library in San 
Marino, California, includes a letter by Rhett about the Battle 
of Bull Ruin. The Joseph Lancaster Brent Papers contain an 
example of Miles's post-war politics. The Robert Alonzo Brock 
Collection also has a post-war letter by Miles, several by 
R.B.Rhett, Jr., and one about Yancey by his first biographer,
John W. DuBose, that reveals the author's reverence for his
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subject. The Francis Lieber Papers include some bombastic 
letters from the youthful Laurence Keitt, and the Simon Bolivar 
Buckner Papers contain an inquiry by Wigfall from London about 
the condition of the South in 1866.
The Historic New Orleans Collection has a few letters by 
James DeBow in the James Dunwoody Brownson DeBow Letters, and one 
by DeBow about his sense of personal honor and trouble with his 
in-laws in the Charles Gayarré Papers.
At the Howard-Tilton Library at Tulane University in New 
Orleans, the extensive Jefferson Davis Papers contain a few 
letters to and from Yancey and DeBow written during the Civil 
War, as well as one by Davis to Yancey's widow in 1863.
The Robert W. Woodruff Library at Emory University has 
letters from Miles about civic affairs in Charleston, secession, 
and the Confederate government in the Robert N. Gourdin Papers.
The South Caroliniana Library at the University of South 
Carolina holds William Porcher Miles Papers that include a brief 
autobiography, his views on city politics in Charleston, and 
reflections on the Confederacy, written in 1882.
Letters from Miles and Keitt appear in the Pettigrew Family 
Papers at the North Carolina Department of Archives and History.
Washington and Lee College has a letter from Laurence Keitt 
in the David F. Jamison Papers describing the atmosphere in 
Montgomery during the meeting of the provisional Congress of the 
Confederate States of America.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
476
Newspapers and Periodicals
Included in parentheses are the dates that I have used for 
each newspaper.
The Charleston Mercury (1828-1865), was the organ of the 
Rhetts and the mouthpiece of southern radicalism for two 
generations; it provides not only the best source for studying 
the Rhetts' political careers and attitudes, but also for the 
activities and speeches of other fire-eaters, particularly 
Laurence Keitt and William Porcher Miles.
The Montgomery Advertiser (1860-61, 1863) was the greatest 
supporter of Yancey in his native state; the Montgomery Post 
(1861), one of his greatest opponents. Both provided extensive 
coverage of Yancey's activities during the secession winter of 
1860-1861. The Wetumpka Southern Crisis (1840), edited by Yancey 
and his brother during a presidential campaign, was a vitriolic, 
anti-Whig propaganda publication. The Richmond Enquirer and the 
New York Herald both printed important speeches by William L. 
Yancey during the presidential campaign of 1860.
Edmund Ruffin's Farmers' Register (1835-42) and his 
Southern Magazine and Monthly Review (1841) contained his views 
on a variety of non-political topics, but were as just as clear 
and vocal on political matters as Ruffin's The Bank Reformer 
(1841).
Local newspapers provided good coverage of other fire- 
eaters. Beverley Tucker wrote editorials for the Richmond 
Enquirer (1833 and 1841) in his attempt to preach both to the
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southern people and to President John Tyler. Missouri Gazette & 
Public Advertiser (1819) was Judge Tucker's mouthpiece during the 
debates on Missouri statehood. The Jackson State Rights Banner 
(1834) and Woodville Republican (1834) hadd important information 
on the career of John Quitman in Mississippi politics at a time 
that saw him irrevocably turn his back on nationalism. The 
Edgefield Advertiser (1840-46), the Marshall Texas Republican 
(1849-50, 1860-61), and the Dallas Herald (1858-59) provided the 
best newspaper sources for Louis Wigfall.
Some activities of James DeBow were reported in the New 
Orleans Daily Delta (1860) and the New York Times (1854). The 
Delta also provided coverage of Yancey's mass meeting in New 
Orleans in 1860, and the Times (1856, 1858) frequently reported 
the speeches and exploits of Keitt.
Articles and editorials by James DeBow in his DeBow's Review 
(1846-1867, including the After the War Series), provide the best 
information on the editor's life and thought, as well as 
occasional correspondence. Charles Gayarre's biographical sketch 
of DeBow in 1866 remains one of the best. Several articles by 
Edmund Ruffin and one by Laurence Keitt also appear in the 
Review. DeBow published a compilation of articles from early 
issues of the Review in Industrial Resources, Etc., of the 
Southern and Western States (3 volumes; New Orleans, New York, 
and Charleston; Published at the Office of DeBow's Review, 1853). 
Paul F. Paskoff and Daniel J. Wilson, eds., in The Cause of The 
South: Selections from DeBow's Review, 1846-1867 (Baton Rouge:
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Louisiana State University Press, 1982), include some of DeBow's 
most important essays and much valuable information on the editor 
and his magazine.
Some of the more literary magazines printed articles by and 
about fire-eaters. Edmund Ruffin published a reminiscence of the 
Nullification Crisis in the Southern Literary Messenger (1861); 
Beverley Tucker had several publications in that periodical 
(1834-36, 1841). The Southern Quarterly Review contains 
articles by James DeBow (1844-45), Tucker (1851), and an 
anonymous one by Rhett (1854). The London magazine Punch printed 
its irreverent "The Fight over the Body of Keitt," about the 
melee involving Keitt and Galusha Grow, on March 6, 1858.
Harper's Weekly (September, 1860), gave favorable coverage of 
Yancey's activities at the national Democratic Convention of 
1860, and sketches of Keitt and Miles at the end of the year 
(December, 1860). Robert Barnwell Rhett's desperate "Fears for 
Democracy," appeared in the Southern Magazine (September, 1875), 
306-332.
Government Documents
The Congressional Globe, from the 28th to the 36th Congress, 
offers the best information on the congressional activities of 
Rhett, Yancey, Keitt, Wigfall, Miles, and Quitman in Washington, 
D.C. Publications of the United States Bureau of the Census 
provide records of DeBow's work for the federal government. The 
Seventh Census of the United States: 1850 (Washington: Robert
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Armstrong, Printer, 1853), and DeBow's Statistical View of the 
United States... Being a Compendium of the Seventh Census 
(Washington; A.O.P. Nicholson, Public Printer, 1854), both 
include prefatory remarks by DeBow on the condition of his bureau 
and his proposed reforms. Due to DeBow's influence, Edmund 
Ruffin published "Southern Agricultural Exhaustion and its 
Remedy" in the Report to the Commissioner of Patents for the Year 
1852. Part II: Agriculture (Washington: Robert Armstrong,
Printer, 1853 ).
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (130 volumes; 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), contains 
detailed information of the activity at Fort Sumter, including 
the parts played by Wigfall and Miles. The Journal of the 
Congress of the Confederate States of America (7 volumes; 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904) includes an account 
of the fight between Yancey and Benjamin Hill, as well 
information on Rhett, Keitt, Miles, and Wigfall.
Published Letters, Memoirs, and Diaries
Several printed sources include letters by various fire- 
eaters as well as reactions to them by contemporaries. Among the 
most useful are Ulrich B. Phillips, ed.. The Correspondence of 
Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), Chauncey S. 
Boucher and Robert Brooks, eds.. Correspondence Addressed to John
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C. Calhoun 1837-1849 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1930), Charles Henry Ambler, ed.. Correspondence of Robert M.T. 
Hunter 1826-1876 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918).
Mary C. Simms Oliphant, Alfred Taylor Odell, and T.C. Duncan 
Eaves, eds.. The Letters of William Gilmore Simms (5 volumes; 
Columbia; University of South Carolina Press, 1955), contains a 
great deal of information on Tucker, Miles, Rhett, and politics 
in South Carolina in general. William P. Trent's William Gilmore 
Simms (reprint; New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1969), has 
some important letters from Tucker to Simms. J.F.H. Claiborne's 
Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman (2 volumes; New York: 
Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1860), contains dozens of letters 
unavailable anywhere else.
Amelia W. Williams and Eugene C. Barker, eds.. The Writings 
of Sam Houston 1813-1863 (8 volumes; Austin; University of Texas 
Press, 1942), contains some caustic remarks about Wigfall. 
Similarly, Leroy P. Graf, and Ralph W. Haskins, eds.. The Papers 
of Andrew Johnson (7 volumes to date; Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1967- ), recorded some critical comments about 
Rhett and Yancey in 1860. Clyde N. Wilson, et al, eds.. The 
Papers of John C. Calhoun (16 volumes to date; Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1959- ), provide insight into 
Rhett's relationship with Calhoun. A letter from Edmund Ruffin, 
Jr., to his children describing the elder Ruffin's suicide is in 
Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine V 
(January, 1924), 193-95.
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Several contemporaries of Yancey recorded their impressions 
of him in reminiscences and memoirs. Richard Taylor, in 
Destruction and Reconstruction; Personal experiences of the Late 
War (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1879), suggests that 
Yancey had second thoughts after leading a split at the 
Democratic Convention in Charleston. William Hesseltine, ed.. 
Three Against Lincoln: Murat Halstead Reports on the Caucuses of 
1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), has 
several interesting references to Yancey, as does William R. 
Smith, Reminiscences of a Long Life: Historical, Political, 
Personal and Literary (reprint; Louisville: Lost Cause Press, 
1961) .
Louis Wigfall had a dramatic impact on his peers. Walter F. 
McCaleb, ed.. Memoirs, with Special Reference to Secession and 
the Civil War, by John H. Reagan (New York and Washington: The 
Neale Publishing Company, 1906); C.W. Raines, ed.. Six Decades in 
Texas, or Memoirs of Francis Richard Lubbock, Governor of Texas 
in War-Time, 1861-63 (Austin: Ben C. Jones & Co. Printers, 1900); 
and A.W. Terrell, "Recollections of General Sam Houston," The 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly XVI (October, 1912), mention 
Wigfall's activities in Texas and Confederate politics.
Wigfall's daughter, D. Girard Wright, recorded her memories of 
her father in A Southern Girl in '61: The War-Time Memories of a 
Confederate Senator's Daughter (New York: Doubleday, Page & 
Company, 1905). A Union officer at Fort Sumter, Abner Doubleday, 
recalled Wigfall's dramatics in Reminiscences of Forts Sumter and
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Moultrie in 1860-61 (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 
1876) .
William Kauffman Scarborough, ed.. The Diary of Edmund 
Ruffin (2 volumes; Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 
1972- ), provides the easiest access to the Ruffin Diary from the 
Library of Congress, for 1856 to June, 1863. John F. Marszalek, 
ed.. The Diary of Miss Emma Holmes, 1861-1866 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1979), includes one 
southerner's assessment of Ruffin's life and suicide. C. Vann 
Woodward, ed., Mary Chesnut's Civil War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981), contains interesting references to 
Yancey, Miles, Ruffin, and Tucker's book. The Partisan Leader. 
William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South (reprint; 
Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1969), presents an 
English observer's reaction to Louis Wigfall's bluster and 
daring. A hint as to the role of Rhett in Congress and the 
Democratic party appears in Milo M. Quaife, ed.. The Diary of 
James K. Polk During his Presidency, 1845-1849 (4 volumes; 
Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 1910).
Pamphlets and Speeches
A compilation of speeches and pamphlets by William Porcher 
Miles called True Education is held at the William R. Perkins 
Library at Duke University is. At Middleton Library at Louisiana 
State University is Miles's, Some views on Sugar. By an Old- 
Fashioned Democrat (n .p .:[1894]), which contains the political
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views of unrepentant rebel.
Edmund Ruffin, "The Political Economy of Slavery," appears 
in Eric McKitrick, ed., Slavery Defended; The Views of the Old 
South (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, 
1963), 69-85.
No study of William L. Yancey is complete without examining 
his many public addresses. The most important are: An Oration on 
the Life and Character of Andrew Jackson (Baltimore: Printed by 
James Lucas, 1846); An Address to the People of Alabama, by W.L. 
Yancey, Late a Delegate, at Large, for the State of Alabama, to 
the National Democratic Convention, Held at Baltimore, on the 22d 
May, A.D. 1848 (Montgomery: Flag and Advertiser Job Office,
1848); Address on the Life and Character of John Caldwell Calhoun 
(Montgomery: Job Office Advertiser and Gazette Print, 1850); 
Speech of the Hon. W.L. Yancey, Delivered in the Democratic State 
Convention, of the State of Alabama, Held at Montgomery, on the 
11th, 12th, 13th, & 14th January, 1860 (Montgomery: Advertiser 
Book and Job Steam Press Print, 1860); Speech of the Hon. William 
L. Yancey of Alabama Delivered in the National Democratic 
Convention, Charleston, April 28th, 1860 (Charleston: Walker, 
Evans & Co., 1860); Speech of the Hon. William L. Yancey of 
Alabama at Wieting Hall, Syracuse, N.Y. (Published by Direction 
of the National Democratic State Committee, 1860).
William R. Smith, History and Debates of the Convention of 
the People of Alabama (Spartanburg, South Carolina: The Reprint 
Company, 1975), records Yancey's central role in the Alabama
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Secession Convention.
In addition, the following pamphlets show Yancey's impact 
in Alabama politics: Journal of the Democratic Convention, Held 
in the City of Montgomery on the 14th and 15th of February, 1848 
(Montgomery: M'Cormick & Walshe, Printers, 1848); Journal of 
Southern Rights Convention Held in the City of Montgomery, 
February 10, 1851 (Montgomery: Book and Job Office of the Daily 
Atlas, 1851).
A fascinating speech by Barnwell Rhett about political 
philosophy highlights The Death and Funeral Ceremonies of John 
Caldwell Calhoun, Containing Speeches, Reports, and other 
Documents Connected Therewith, the Oration of the Hon. R.B.Rhett 
Before the Legislature, &c. &c. (Columbia, South Carolina: A.S. 
Johnston, 1850). The Address of the People of South Carolina, 
Assembled in Convention, to the People of the Slaveholding States 
of the United States (Charleston: Evans & Cogswell, 1860) was 
written largely by Rhett, inviting other slave states to secede 
and unite in a Southern Confederacy.
Nathaniel Beverley Tucker's angry, blustering, fanciful 
speech at the Nashville Convention was published as Prescience : 
Speech Delivered by Hon. Beverly Tucker of Virginia, in the 
Southern Convention, Held at Nashville, Tennessee, April 13, 1850 
(Richmond; West & Johnson, 1862). Tucker's Discourse on the 
Dangers that Threaten the Free Institutions of the United States, 
(Richmond: John B. Martin & Co., Printers, 1841) is valuable for 
understanding Tucker's views on republican society.
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Two other important speeches are Louis T. Wigfall, Speech of 
Louis T. Wigfall, on the Pending Political Issues; Delivered at 
Tyler, Smith County, Texas (Washington, D.C.: Lemuel Towers, 
1860), and Edmund Ruffin, Address to the Virginia Agricultural 
Society, on the Effects of Domestic Slavery on the Manners,
Habits and Welfare of the Southern States; and the Slavery of 
Class to Class in the Northern States (Richmond: P.O. Bernard, 
Printer, 1853).
Contemporary Publications 
The wartime edition of Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, The 
Partisan Leader (New York: Rudd & Carleton, 1861), includes 
editorial comments on Yancey and secessionists in general. 
Tucker's A Series of Lectures of Lectures on the Science of 
Government, Intended to Prepare the Student for the Study of the 
Constitution of the United States (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 
1845) is essential for understanding both Tucker's political 
philosophy and his relationship with his students. Edmund 
Ruffin's Anticipations of the Future, to Serve as Lessons for the 
Present Times (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1860) is similar to his 




There are dozens of excellent studies of the antebellum
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South and American politics that help place the lives of the 
fire-eaters in context. My most valuable sources for the South 
were Jesse Carpenter, The South as a Conscious Minority 1789-1861 
(New York: The New York University Press, 1930); William J. 
Cooper, Jr., The South and the Politics of Slavery 1828-1856, 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978); Cooper, 
Liberty and Slavery: Southern Politics to 1860 (New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 1983); Clement Eaton, The Mind of the Old South (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976), and Eaton,
History of the Old South (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968); 
John McCardell, The Idea of a Southern Nation: Southern 
Nationalism and Southern Nationalists, 1830-1860 (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1979); and Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: 
Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1982).
For national politics, the most useful works were David M. 
Potter, completed and edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher, The 
Impending Crisis 1848-1861 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1976) and Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union (8 volumes; New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947-1971).
Previous works that contain special references to fire- 
eaters include William L. Barney, The Road to Secession: A New 
Perspective on the Old South (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1972); Ulrich B. Phillips, The Course of the South to Secession 
(New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939); H. Hardy Perritt, 
"The Fire-Eaters," in Waldo W. Braden, ed.. Oratory in the Old
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
487
South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), 
chapter 8; Alvy L. King, "Fire-Eaters," in David C. Roller and 
Robert W. Twyman, eds.. Encyclopedia of Southern History (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 434-35; William 
J. Cooper, Jr., "The Politics of Slavery Affirmed: The South and 
the Secession Crisis," in Walter J. Fraser, Jr., and Winfred B. 
Moore, eds.. The Southern Enigma: Essays on Race, Class, and Folk 
Culture (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), 199-215; 
Kenneth S. Greenberg, Masters and Statesmen: The Political 
Culture of American Slavery (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1985), and David S. Heidler, "Fire-Eaters: The 
Radical Secessionists in Antebellum Politics," Ph.D.
Dissertation, Auburn University, 1985.
Far more has been written about other contemporary political 
groups. These include Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption of the 
American Democracy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948); Eric 
Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the 
Republican Party Before the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977); David M. Potter, Lincoln and his Party During the 
Secession Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942); Hans 
Trefousse, The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard for Racial 
Justice (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968); 
Ronald Walters, The Antislavery Appeal; American Abolitionism 
after 1830 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); 
Louis Filler, The Crusade Against Slavery 1830-1860 (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960); and Peter F . Walker, Moral
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Choices; Memory, Desire, and Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
American Abolitionism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1978).
State Studies
There are several useful studies of politics and secession 
in various states. Among the best is J. Mills Thornton, Politics 
and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama, 1800-1860 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1978). It is essential for 
placing the actions of William L. Yancey in the context of state 
politics, and replaces Clarence P. Denman, The Secession Movement 
in Alabama (Montgomery: Alabama State Department of Archives and 
History, 1933). Stephen A. Channing, Crisis of Fear: Secession 
in South Carolina (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1970) 
and Charles E. Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to War 1860-1865 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1950) are the 
two best accounts of the first state to secede; the latter has 
important information on Barnwell Rhett's feud with President 
Jefferson Davis as well as the 1860 Association and James DeBow. 
Other studies of South Carolina include William W. Freehling, 
Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Crisis in South Carolina, 
1816-1836 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966) and John 
Barnwell, Love of Order: South Carolina's First Secession Crisis 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
Other state studies include William L. Barney, The Secessionist 
Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860 (Princeton: Princeton
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University Press, 1974); Walter L. Buenger, Secession and the 
Union in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984); and 
Ollinger Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Presidential Election 
of 1860 (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1969).
Biographies
Previous biographical accounts of fire-eaters range from the 
hero-worship of their contemporaries to solid scholarly works. 
Among the better ones is Robert J. Brugger, Beverley Tucker:
Heart over Head in the Old South (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978), and Robert E. May's John Anthony 
Quitman: Old South Crusader (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
university Press, 1985) which replaces J.F.H. Claiborne's Life 
and Correspondence of John A. Quitman (1860).
John Witherspoon DuBose, The Life and Times of William 
Lowndes Yancey (2 volumes; reprint; New York: Peter Smith, 1942) 
was a friend of Yancey's and a soldier in the Confederate army. 
Ralph B. Draughon's scholarly, "William Lowndes Yancey: From 
Unionist to Secessionist, 1814-1852," Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1968, unfortunately 
stops before the most important portion of Yancey's career. 
Draughon's "The Young William L. Yancey," Alabama Review 19 
(1966), 28-37, offers a succinct summary of the early chapters of 
his dissertation. George F. Mellon, "Henry W. Hilliard and 
William L. Yancey," The Sewanee Review 17 (1909), 44-47, provides 
a detailed account of Yancey's confrontations with his long-time
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Whig opponent. Joseph Hergesheiroer devoted a chapter to Yancey 
in his romantic Swords and Roses (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 
1929), 35-64, as did Clement Eaton in The Mind of the Old South, 
267-87.
The only biography of Rhett is Laura White's solid, Robert 
Barnwell Rhett: Father of Secession (reprint; New York: Peter 
Smith, 1965). Several important Rhett manuscripts have surfaced 
since the first publication of this book in 1931.
Only one biographical treatment apiece exists for Keitt, 
Wigfall, and DeBow: John Holt Merchant, Jr.'s uncritical 
"Laurence M. Keitt: South Carolina Fire-Eater," Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1976; Alvy L. King, Louis 
T . Wigfall; Southern Fire-eater (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1970); and Otis Clark Skipper, J.D.B. DeBow: 
Magazinist of the Old South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1958) .
Several historians have written about Ruffin. The first was 
Avery Craven, Edmund Ruffin, Southerner: A Study in Secession 
(reprint; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982). 
Betty L. Mitchell achieved greater objectivity than Craven in 
Edmund Ruffin: A Biography (Bloomington; Indiana University 
Press, 1981), but was not as successful as Craven in capturing 
her subject's character and vitality. Other works about Ruffin 
include Henry G. Ellis, "Edmund Ruffin: His Life and Times," John 
P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College III (June, 
1910), 99-123; and David F. Allmendinger, Jr., "The Early Career
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of Edmund Ruffin, 1810-1840," The Virginia Magazine of History 
and Biography 93 (April, 1985), 127-54.
There are only two brief studies of Miles: Ruth McCaskill 
Daniel, "William Porcher Miles: Champion of Southern Interests," 
M.A. Thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and 
Clarence McKitrick Smith, Jr., "William Porcher Miles,
Progressive Mayor of Charleston, 1855-1857," The Proceedings of 
the South Carolina Historical Association (1942).
In addition to these, two books by Drew Gilpin Faust add to 
the understanding of Rhttt, Tucker, and Ruffin: James Henry 
Hammond and the Old South: A Design for Mastery (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1982) is helpful for 
understanding South Carolina politics, especially the rivalry 
between Hammond and Rhett; A Sacred Circle: The Dilemma of the 
Intellectual in the Old South (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977), explores the friendship and ideas of 
Ruffin, Tucker, Hammond, George Frederick Holmes, and William 
Gilmore Simms.
Biographical Directories 
Because so little has been written about many of these fire- 
eaters, biographical directories supplied a great deal of 
information. Especially helpful were Dumas Malone, ed.. 
Dictionary of American Biography (21 volumes; New York, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1943), Cyclopedia of Eminent and Representative 
Men of the Carolines of the Nineteenth Century (Spartanburg,
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South Carolina; The Reprint Company, 1972), and Biographical 
Directory of the American Congress 1774-1971 (Washington, B.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1971). Norman G. Kittrell, Governors 
Who Have Been, and Other Public Men of Texas (Houston: Dealy- 
Adey-Elgin Co., Publishers, 1921) provided important information 
on Louis Wigfall's contemporaries.
Special Subjects 
Three works offer a good introduction to the romantic 
spirit, as embodied by some fire-eaters: Russel B. Nye, The 
Cultural Life of the New Nation 1776-1830 (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, Publishers, 1960); A.O. Lovejoy, "The Meaning of 
Romanticism for the Historian," Journal of the History of Ideas 
II (1941), 257-78; and Rollin G. Osterweis, Romanticism and 
Nationalism in the Old South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1971)
Because of the special academic affiliations of Tucker, 
Keitt, Wigfall, and DeBow, the following three works proved very 
useful: History of the College of William and Mary, from its 
Foundation, in 1660, to 1874 (Richmond: J.W. Randolph & English, 
1874); Daniel Walker Hollis, The University of South Carolina (2 
volumes; Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1951- 
1956); John P. Dyer, Tulane: Biography of a University (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1966).
Two studies of antebellum rhetoric were particularly useful 
for understanding the unique qualities of Porcher Miles's
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speeches: A.V. Huff, "The Eagle and the Vulture: Changing 
Attitudes Toward Nationalism in Fourth of July Orations Delivered 
in Charleston, 1778-1860," South Atlantic Quarterly XII (1972), 
10-22; and Joseph R. James, Jr., "The Transformation of the 
Fourth of July in South Carolina, 1850-1919," M.A. Thesis, 
Louisiana State University, 1987.
John Stanford Coussons, "Thirty Years with Calhoun, Rhett, 
and the Charleston Mercury: A Chapter in South Carolina 
Politics," Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1971, 
and Chauncey S. Boucher, "The Annexation of Texas and the 
Bluffton Movement in South Carolina," Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review VI (1919), 3-33, proved important sources of 
information on Barnwell Rhett.
Although neither author included fire-eaters in their 
studies, Ronald G. Walters, American Reformers 1815-1860 (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1978) and John L. Thomas, "Romantic Reform 
in America, 1815-1865," American Quarterly, XVII (Winter, 1965), 
656-81, suggest that the efforts of fire-eaters placed them 
within the context of antebellum reform.
Other useful works include Lewis Cecil Gray, History of 
Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860 (2 volumes; 
Washington: Published by the Carnegie Institute of Washington, 
1933), for references to Ruffin; Thelma Jennings, The Nashville 
Convention: Southern Movement for Unity, 1848-1851 (Memphis; 
Memphis State University Press, 1 9 8 0 ) ;  Eugene C. Harter, The 
Lost Colony of the Confederacy (Jackson: University Press of
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Mississippi, 1986), which mentions the role of Yancey's sons in 
establishing a Confederate Colony in Brazil after the war; D. 
Augustus Dickert, History of Kershaw's Brigade (Newberry, South 
Carolina: Elbert H. Aull Co., 1899), for a detailed account of 
Keitt at Cold Harbor; and Virginius Dabney, Virginia: The New 
Dominion (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1972), on relief attempts in disease-ridden Norfolk that helped 
Miles achieve fame in the South.
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